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Begin New Search Topic Military Strategy Publication Year within 25 Years

1521. Jagannath P. Panda, China's Path to Power: Party, Military and the Politics of State Transition (New Delhi: Pentagon Press Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2010).

Author:
Dinoj Kumar Upadhyay
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Central European University Political Science Journal
Institution:
Central European University
Abstract:
The unprecedented rise of China as a global power in the international arena has prompted many global scholars and researchers to embark on critical studies of its dynamism and transition. Though much valuable literature is available on Chinese economic and social transformation for the interested readers, the vast majority does not depict a clear picture of “how, where and when China was transformed exactly?” There are several misperceptions associated with Chinese transformation, the nature of its polity, its decision-making processes, economic development and the civilian-military relationship. With his most recent work, China's Path to Power: Party, Military and the Politics of State Transition, Jagannath P. Panda seeks to explain, explore and conceptualize the Chinese transition design, “systemic incrementalism”, and provide a substantial contribution to the various facets of the never-ending debate on the rise of China. Panda argues that much of the analysis on the Chinese issues has been done through a prism of ideology and focused narrowly on its world view and economic growth. A scientific and comprehensive analysis of its gradual progressive reforms in the realm of politics and economics is missing.
Topic:
Military Strategy
Political Geography:
China

1522. Iran's Two Navies

Author:
Joshua Himes
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
The Arab Spring has fomented increasing uncertainty in the Middle East, a circumstance in which Iran's regional intentions are of increasing concern. U.S. attempts to isolate the regime are driven by concerns over Iran's nuclear program, the enduring energy chokepoint at the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran's export of radical Shi'a militancy through proxy groups across the region, particularly as it affects Iraq, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon.
Topic:
Islam and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria

1523. The Struggle for Syria in 2011

Author:
Joseph Holliday
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
This paper provides context for understanding the cycles of violence in Syria. The first section provides a brief historical overview of sectarianism in Syria in order to understand its role in the current conflict. The second section provides a framework for understanding the operations and strategy of the Assad regime. The paper then analyzes regime security operations in seven regions: Dera'a province; Damascus; Homs and Hama in central Syria; the coastal region; Idlib province; the Arab east; and the Kurdish northeast. The paper concludes with an examination of regional and international responses to the conflict.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Armed Struggle, and Sectarianism
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

1524. Simon Chesterman and Angelina Fisher (eds,). Private Security, Public Order. The Outsourcing of Public Services and its Limits

Author:
Ebrahim Afsah
Publication Date:
08-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Abstract:
This is the second release by a research project undertaken by the Institute for International Law and Justice at New York University, following the previously reviewed (21 EJIL (2010): 251) From Mercenaries to Market. The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies (Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnhardt (eds), Oxford University Press, 2007). In that commendable first volume, the editors sought to bring a variety of perspectives to bear on the increasingly topical issue of private security providers and their regulation by states. The contributions to that earlier collection were characterized by a distinctly pragmatic approach to the issue, seeking to re-assess the degree to which international law's categorical proscription of mercenarism remained tenable in a world where most states, rich and poor, view private service providers as an increasingly important part of their military posture.
Topic:
Security and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
New York

1525. Strategy and contingency

Author:
Hew Strachan
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
Strategy is oriented towards the future. It is a declaration of intent, and an indication of the possible means required to fulfil that intent. But once strategy moves beyond the near term, it struggles to define what exactly it intends to do. Part of the problem is generated by the conceptual shift from what current NATO jargon calls 'military strategy' to what the United States calls 'grand strategy' (and which other states, as the US once did, have come to call 'national strategy'). The operational plans of military strategy look to the near term, and work with specific situations. Grand strategy, on the other hand, can entertain ambitions and goals which are more visionary and aspirational than pragmatic and immediate. It is as much a way of thinking as a way of doing. By using the same word, strategy, in both sets of circumstances, we create an expectation, each of the other, which neither can properly fulfil. The shift from 'military strategy' to 'grand strategy' is particularly fraught: it suggests that the latter, like the former, is underpinned by an actionable plan. If strategy is a matter of combining means, ways and ends, what are the ends towards which a state, nation or group is aiming when it cannot be precise about the future context within which its means and ways are being applied? Answering that question is the central conundrum of grand strategy, and being able to do so sensibly is correspondingly more difficult the more extended the definition of the future which grand strategy uses.
Topic:
Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States

1526. Counterinsurgency after Afghanistan: A Concept in Crisis

Author:
David Ucko
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Six years have passed since the publication of Field Manual (FM) 3−24, Counterinsurgency. Embraced by sections of the military and civilian defense community seeking a fresh approach to the conflict in Iraq, the new field manual gained a political significance and profile unlike previous doctrinal publications. When General David Petraeus was able to incorporate some of the manual's core precepts into the new U.S. strategy for Iraq, and casualties and instability in Iraq declined over the following few years, both counterinsurgency doctrine and the people associated with it gained unprecedented influence.
Topic:
Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

1527. National Security Interrogations: Myth v. Reality

Author:
Steven Kleinman
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
Following the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden's compound, several Bush officials claimed that controversial interrogation techniques generated actionable intelligence used to kill the al Qaeda chief. While these claims were quickly refuted by current officials, some policymakers remain convinced that brutal interrogations are indeed effective mechanisms for eliciting information from detainees. Unfortunately, this debate is is informed by Hollywood depictions of interrogations and not in reality. We decided to ask an expert interrogator with years of experience handling high value detainees. In the this report, veteran military interrogator Steven Kleinman explains: What interrogation actually is (and why fictional portrayals muddy the waters); How coercive practices actually undermine interrogators' long-term goals; and Why experienced interrogators know that rapport-building is the most effective means to extract valuable information from detainees.
Topic:
Human Rights and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States

1528. U.S. European Command and NATO'S Strategic Concept: Post-Afghanistan and Beyond

Author:
Harlan Ullman
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Regardless of how the conflict in Afghanistan (along with NATO's role, presence, and draw down) is resolved, one consequence will be to increase the importance of U.S. European Command (EUCOM) both in Europe and for the entire transatlantic community. Whether Operation Enduring Freedom and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) produce a stunning victory in which Afghanistan emerges as a stable state under the rule of law with a viable government or a rocky withdrawal in the midst of continuing violence with no clear solution in sight, NATO nations will have long tired of that war. Fortunately, the Lisbon Summit with a 2014 end date has eased domestic political pressures over Afghanistan. However, that relief is by no means permanent.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Reform
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Europe

1529. Naval Future: International Preponderance Through Naval Partnership

Author:
Martin Murphy and Lee Willett
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In 2005 US Navy ship numbers fell lower than at any point since 1916 and little has changed since then. The Royal Navy now has fewer ships and sailors than Nelson had at Trafalgar. It is of course true that counting hulls is no longer a reliable way of assessing naval power yet numbers matter.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, International Security, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States

1530. Learning by Doing: The Pakistan Army's Experience with Counterinsurgency

Author:
Shuja Nawaz
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Despite having entered the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in force to support the coalition invasion of Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom, the Pakistan Army did not undertake real counterinsurgency operations till much after 2001. Most of its early operations centered on the conventional use of dominating force against irregular opponents in this rugged region. It was hampered as much by lack of training and equipment as it was by its outmoded approaches to fighting in the frontier region. Gradually, its officers began learning by doing, and the Swat operation in 2008 probably marked the turning point in the doctrinal shift to serious counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, regardless of the fact that the army called it Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counterinsurgency, and Governance
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia