The internationalization of Brazilian companies is a relatively recent phenomenon. From 2000 to 2003, outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) averaged USD 0.7 billion a year. Over the four-year period 2004−2008, this average jumped to nearly USD 14 billion. In 2008, when global FDI inflows were estimated to have fallen by 15%, OFDI from Brazil almost tripled, increasing from just over USD 7 billion in 2007 to nearly USD 21 billion in 2008 (annex figure 1 below). Central Bank data put the current stock of Brazilian OFDI at USD 104 billion, an increase of 89% over 2003. Caution is in order about these figures, however, as in Brazilian outflows it is difficult to separate authentic FDI from purely financial investment under the guise of FDI. According to the most recent data, 887 Brazilian companies have invested abroad.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Foreign Direct Investment
Several developed countries have introduced emergency measures to mitigate the effects of the Global Financial Crisis, including Australia, Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Although the measures taken are still undergoing changes by the executive branch and are thus a “moving target”, our survey reveals early evidence of differentiation between foreign and domestic actors in the emergency plans adopted by this sample grouping. It is this differentiation that may give rise to liability as breaching guarantees against discrimination of foreign investors under international investment law.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, International Affairs, Foreign Direct Investment, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, and Ireland
A comprehensive regulatory framework for the private sector is a prerequisite for a transparent, honest and just society: where regulation is weak, corruption risks grow strong. As the primary rule makers and enforcers, governments have a responsibility to ensure the effective regulation of markets, protection of citizens and enforcement of laws. Ultimately, an inadequate or unstable regulatory framework for the private sector — without the will, power or resources to enforce legislation — facilitates the marginalisation of stakeholder rights, distortion of markets and negligent or corrupt practices.
Corporate integrity is often perceived to be the product of ethical leadership, strong compliance and effective regulations that prevent and sanction wrong-doing. While these elements are essential, each on their own is not sufficient to comprehensively and sustainably tackle the broad range of interrelated corruption risks that face companies.
Topic:
Corruption, Crime, International Trade and Finance, and Markets
Cartels are illegal and costly. They inflate prices for consumers, exact an economic toll on countries and undermine the integrity of companies. Cartels can form in any sector, ranging from health care and transport, to construction and telecommunications. They leave no industry untouched or consumer unburdened. When companies engage in collusion by conspiring to fix prices, markets become inefficient and consumers bear unjustified price hikes that can reach up to 100 per cent.
Topic:
Corruption, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Law
The collapse of global financial markets in September 2008 has ignited a debate on what caused their quick undoing. As captured in the comments of the OECD Secretary-General, there is a growing sentiment that poor corporate governance is one of the forces to blame. It allowed the transparency, accountability and integrity of companies to be compromised and for abuses to go unchecked, particularly on matters of corruption.
Topic:
Corruption, Genocide, Markets, and Financial Crisis
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
The relationship between economic concentration and governance remains controversial. While some studies find that high economic concentration strengthens collective action and reform cooperation, others stress dangers of rent-seeking and state capture. In this paper I argue that effects are neither strictly positive nor negative: they are best described as an inverted-u-shaped relationship, where better governance performance emerges with moderate economic concentration. Decentralization reforms in Indonesia and the Philippines Q unprecedented in scope and scale Q provide a unique opportunity to test this hypothesis. Subnational case studies and cross-sections, from both countries, indicate that moderately concentrated polities are accompanied by better service and lower corruption. The presence of Scontested oligarchiesT Q small circles of multi-sectoral interest groupsQ creates a situation where economic elites are strong enough to influence policymakers and, at the same time, diverse enough to keep each other in check. The results of this paper suggest that contested oligarchies compensate for weakly-developed societal and juridical forces and can become a stepping stone to good governance.
The financial crisis has damaged citizens' trust in public institutions, especially the confidence that European citizens invest in the European institutions. The results of major public opinion surveys show a severe decrease in citizens' trust in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis with a slight recovery nine month later. In particular, citizens' net trust in the European Central Bank hit an historical low point in the aftermath of the financial crisis with a majority of people distrusting that institution. A variety of other surveys also show that confidence levels in the free market economy have decreased in most of the largest economies and demand for stronger state regulation has increased on both sides of the Atlantic. The key question now is whether this loss of confidence is a temporary or permanent phenomenon, which would have important consequences for the economy and for the proper working of the European institutions.
Kristina M. Lybecker, Daniel K.N. Johnson, Nicole Gurley, Alex Stiller-Shulman, and Stephen Fischer
Publication Date:
10-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Department of Economics and Business, Colorado College
Abstract:
Recent Wal-Mart openings have been accompanied by public demonstrations against the company's presence in the community, asserting (among other things) that their presence is deleterious to residential property values. Consider the following review of the film “Wal-Mart: The High Cost of Low Price”: At the start of intrepid muckraker Robert Greenwald's awareness-building documentary, Wal-Mart CEO Lee Scott addresses an ecstatic crowd of employees to announce yet another year of unparalleled growth for the world's largest store. And though this success also makes Wal-Mart a bigger target of envy and bad feelings, he exhorts the crowd to stay the course: Wal-Mart is vital to families struggling to get by on a budget; to the suppliers who depend on Wal-Mart to sell their goods; and to the “associates” who depend on Wal-Mart for a paycheck. But is it possible that rather than serve these dependents, Wal-Mart is actually destroying them? How can a store that drives down property values and kills off mom-and-pop businesses that can't afford to compete with Wal-Mart's high-volume, low-price strategy be good for a community?