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291. Next Steps in Libya

Author:
William Danvers
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The alarming security, economic, and political trends in Libya are currently a critical issue for the international community. Europeans are particularly concerned about Libya as a point of departure for refugees and migrants. Despite recent progress, the presence of the Islamic State, or IS, in Libya is also an urgent security issue for the country, as well as for the United States, Europe, and Libya’s neighbors. At the same time, Libya is struggling to unify its government. Libya’s downward economic spiral further complicates the possibility of a unified government and a more stable Libya. Libya’s problems are legion, but establishing a single government and creating a more secure environment are the first orders of business. The Government of National Accord, or GNA—a body that reflects an agreement made last December with the help of the United Nations—has begun to establish itself in Tripoli and is trying to incorporate two opposing Libyan governments, which have been fighting each other since 2014. These are the Islamist-led Libya Dawn coalition—also known as the General National Congress, or GNC, which controls Tripoli and the eastern government in Tobruk—and the House of Representatives, or HoR, backed by retired Libyan Gen. Khalifa Hiftar and Operation Dignity. The GNA is working to establish a new government and taking immediate steps to improve conditions. While Libya has made progress in fighting IS over the past few months, the threat remains as long as IS leadership views Libya as a way to extend its caliphate—an Islamic state led by a caliph, a successor to the Prophet Muhammad. This is particularly true in light of recent setbacks for IS in Syria and Iraq. If the international community wants to help Libya rebuild, it needs to have a plan that outlines how it will assist Libya with its economy and the development of institutions that can provide the foundation for a revitalized nation. It is clear that having a functioning, unified government and making Libya significantly more secure is necessary to implement efforts to help Libya rebuild its economy and government. Indeed, a blueprint for such efforts could be an important incentive for the Libyan people to coalesce around a government and a unified approach to security. As President Barack Obama famously said in a press interview earlier this year, his biggest “mistake” was not having a plan to help Libya after the fall of Prime Minister Moammar Gadhafi. But it is not too late to develop plans to put Libya on a path that offers promise rather than chaos.
Topic:
Security, Islamic State, Political stability, and State Building
Political Geography:
Africa, Libya, and North Africa

292. After Liberation

Author:
Hardin Lang and Muath Al Wari
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Two years on, the U.S.-led campaign against the Islamic State, or IS,* has achieved some important gains. This is particularly true in Iraq, where the liberation of Fallujah last month has focused attention on Mosul—the capital of the so-called caliphate. But military victory is only half the battle. As the Islamic State is pushed out of Iraqi cities and towns, the communities it ruled must be integrated back into Iraq. Nature abhors a vacuum; the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Counter ISIL should do more to support the Iraqi government in filling that vacuum. For its part, the Iraqi government itself must display a greater commitment to inclusive governance that reinforces its own legitimacy. Failure to do so would risk squandering hard-won gains by setting the stage for the Islamic State—or its successor—to return. It also could undercut U.S. strategic goals in the Middle East more broadly. The key will be to close the gaps in resources and priority afforded to the different elements of the global coalition’s campaign. That campaign is organized along five lines of effort: military efforts, counter-finance, stopping the flow of foreign fighters, stabilization, and strategic messaging. The military line, otherwise known as Operation Inherent Resolve, has cut the territory controlled by the Islamic State almost in half. Other key coalition lines have yielded less robust results. In particular, efforts to stabilize territory in the wake of combat operations have not kept pace with progress on the battlefield—even as that progress makes stabilization all the more urgent.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Islamic State, Political stability, and State Building
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

293. After Liberation

Author:
Hardin Lang and Muath Al Wari
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Two years on, the U.S.-led campaign against the Islamic State, or IS,* has achieved some important gains. This is particularly true in Iraq, where the liberation of Fallujah last month has focused attention on Mosul—the capital of the so-called caliphate. But military victory is only half the battle. As the Islamic State is pushed out of Iraqi cities and towns, the communities it ruled must be integrated back into Iraq. Nature abhors a vacuum; the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Counter ISIL should do more to support the Iraqi government in filling that vacuum. For its part, the Iraqi government itself must display a greater commitment to inclusive governance that reinforces its own legitimacy. Failure to do so would risk squandering hard-won gains by setting the stage for the Islamic State—or its successor—to return. It also could undercut U.S. strategic goals in the Middle East more broadly. The key will be to close the gaps in resources and priority afforded to the different elements of the global coalition’s campaign. That campaign is organized along five lines of effort: military efforts, counter-finance, stopping the flow of foreign fighters, stabilization, and strategic messaging. The military line, otherwise known as Operation Inherent Resolve, has cut the territory controlled by the Islamic State almost in half. Other key coalition lines have yielded less robust results. In particular, efforts to stabilize territory in the wake of combat operations have not kept pace with progress on the battlefield—even as that progress makes stabilization all the more urgent.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Islamic State, Political stability, and State Building
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

294. Judgement Day for ISIL and What It Would Mean for Canada

Author:
Dave Murray
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for the Study of Security and Development, Dalhousie University
Abstract:
Despite the carnage wrought by ISIL around the world, the days appear numbered for its caliphate in Syria and Iraq. We are likely talking the shorter to medium term at most. ISIL faces intense military pressure on all fronts. It continues to lose territory and its leadership figures are being targeted and killed. Increasingly ISIL faces significant challenges in replenishing its losses due to efforts by Turkey and most nations internationally to block the flow of foreign fighters into the caliphate. As leadership figures are eliminated, internal factionalism will create serious stresses and vulnerabilities. The forces aligned against ISIL are powerful, despite conflicting agendas. Add to this reports of financial problems, including a strained ability to pay its militants, and the result is a picture of an entity on a downward trajectory. This in no way means that the caliphate or its extremist message will die easily or that we are nearing an end to the scourge of ISIL inspired terrorism – only that its ability to sustain itself territorially has limits. If one accepts the above assessment, now is the time to consider what this will mean. Now is the time for thinking and planning directed at dealing with the eventual collapse of a self-proclaimed state in which countless thousands have been radicalized, traumatized, received military and terrorists training, let alone the reality of child soldiers and intense psychological scarring caused by ISIL.
Topic:
Terrorism, Radicalization, Islamic State, Conflict, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Canada, Syria, and United States of America

295. The Mobilization and Recruitment of Foreign Fighters: The Case of Islamic State, 2012–2014

Author:
Almakan Orozobekova
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
This article examines how foreign fighters were recruited and mobilized for Islamic State in 2012-2014. Institutional and individual approaches to this phenomenon form the basis of understanding the mechanisms used for the mobilization and recruitment of foreign fighters. The former refers to a terrorist institution that plays a key role in the recruitment of individuals (top-down/institutional), and the latter refers to the self-radicalization process that foreign fighters undergo (bottom-up/ individual). In particular, the research focuses on an analysis of Islamic State and the recruitment/mobilization of sixteen foreign fighters from Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, France, and the United Kingdom. The analysis shows that both top-down and bottom-up concepts are important but that the extent to which each is used depends on the profiles of the country in question. The study concludes by demonstrating the comparative value of top-down and bottom-up approaches in terms of understanding contemporary terrorist recruitment and providing policy recommendations.
Topic:
Terrorism, Islamic State, and Recruitment
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Middle East, France, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia

296. The Rise and Consolidation of Islamic State: External Intervention and Sectarian Conflict

Author:
Abdul Basir Yosufi
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
This research paper examines the extent to which both the United States (US) intervention in 2003 and sectarian conflict in Iraq and the region contributed to the rise and consolidation of the Islamic State (IS). It is argued that the US intervention contributed to the rise of IS by creating a strategic cause for mobilization of insurgency while insufficient counterinsurgency resources and doctrine, and the lack of a post-war plan enabled the insurgency to consolidate. Although the US adapted its strategy and deployed additional resources as part of the “surge,” which succeeded in weakening of the insurgents significantly, the premature withdrawal of US troops allowed for a revival of the insurgency which eventually evolved into IS. The sectarian conflict in Iraq and the region further contributed to the rise and consolidation of IS by helping in prolif-eration of the group’s underlying ideology, increasing funding opportunities for the insurgents and driving the Sunni communities to support the Islamic State
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, ISIS, Islamic State, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Africa, United States, and Middle East

297. Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy: Spring 2016

Author:
Kristin A. Wagner, Satgin Hamrah, Benjamen Franklen Gussen, Robert Mason, Robert Maguire, Adi Saleem Bharat, Lauren Fisher, Joseph Sadek, Dalia Ghanem-Yazbek, and Serhat S. Çubukçuoğlu
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
Our Spring 2016 volume encapsulates the dangerous developments in MENA over the course of the past year. While the international community hoped for a resolution to the five-year Syrian Civil War, the conflict has further divided the region into a sectarian split, pitting Shia Iran and the Sunni gulf states on opposing sides. Additionally, Russia’s brief military intervention, finally winding down as of March 2016, has further destabilized the country and significantly increased the flow of refugees into the heartland of Europe. With the November 2015 Paris attacks, the threat of the so-called Islamic State (Daesh) to the west was finally realized, calling into question ongoing efforts to counter violent extremism, as well as to resolve the Syrian Civil War. Meanwhile, Turkey’s increasing two-front war against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Daesh has resulted in a series of deadly terrorist attacks throughout the country, putting further pressure on Turkish leadership to both find a solution to the Kurdish question and stem the refugee flow transiting northward from Syria. It is through this lens that the Spring 2016 edition has been crafted. With conflict and instability abound, we present first an exclusive interview with Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament Salim al-Jabouri. On a more positive note, JMEPP also interviewed Tunisia’s Minister of Economic Infrastructure and Sustainable Development, Hedi Larbi, on Tunisia’s relative stability and success in its post-Jasmine Revolution transition. This year’s featured articles include Robert Mason’s assessment of the Saudi leadership and the perilous position it now finds itself in, both geopolitically and domestically; and Serhat S. Çubukçuoğlu’s eyes on Turkey’s natural gas ambitions as being linked to settling the Cypriot peace talks, as well as re-establishing partnerships with its regional neighbors in the eastern Mediterranean. Benjamen Franklen Gussen creates a new picture of a geographically reoriented Middle East, while Dylan MaGuire analyzes the no-fly zone option in Syria, with a look back to previous operations in Iraq and Libya. Focusing on gender, Dr. Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck looks at integration and inclusion of women in Algeria’s military, yet presents a critique on its superficiality. With an eye on Turkey’s destabilized southern border region, Joseph Sadek provides commentary on the political and geostrategic jostling between Turkey and its Kurdish population, as well as the complex relationships between Turkey, the PKK, and Syrian People’s Protection Units (YPG) rebels. Turning to terrorism, Lauren Fisher presents an argument against the stovepipe methodology of countering violent extremism by exploring the complexities behind the topic. Finally, we conclude with a literature review by Adi Saleem Bharat on the Boycott, Divest, Sanction (BDS) movement as it pertains to academia.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, Security, Development, Gender Issues, Peace Studies, Infrastructure, Armed Forces, Violent Extremism, Women, Radicalization, Islamic State, Political stability, Arab Spring, Humanitarian Intervention, Syrian War, Negotiation, Kurds, and BDS
Political Geography:
Iraq, Israel, Libya, Palestine, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Cyprus

298. Syria's Armed Opposition: A Spotlight on the 'Moderates'

Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
More than four years after the start of the Syrian uprising, the country is the stage of a protracted civil war with a perplexing multitude of armed opposition factions competing over territory with the regime and among each other. Well over 1,000 such groups are currently active in Syria (Carter Center, 2014a, p. 11). They range from relatively small local protection units with a few hundred fighters to large movements with a national reach, such as Ahrar alKSham, which is estimated to number at least 10,000 fighters (Stanford University, 2014b).
Topic:
Political Violence, Civil War, Armed Struggle, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Syria

299. Salafism and the Islamic State

Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Islamic State (IS) is often identified as the world’s leading proponent of Salafism, or fundamentalist Sunni Islam. But, as Dr. Jacob Olidort points out, most of the world’s Salafis are not violent or politically active -- in fact, they explicitly condemn both. In this illuminating video presentation, Institute Soref Fellow Olidort provides an introduction to Salafi thought, describes the emergence of the Salafi movement, and deconstructs the Salafism of IS. This is essential viewing for anyone interested in the ideological roots of IS and how it diverges from other Islamist groups. Dr. Jacob Olidort, an adjunct professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, received his BA in Middle Eastern studies from Brandeis University, his AM in Near Eastern languages and civilizations from Harvard University, and his MA and PhD in Near Eastern studies from Princeton University. Dr. Olidort has spent nearly two years in the Middle East, including a Fulbright Scholarship in the UAE and field work on Salafism in Jordan. He has given presentations and has briefed on Salafism and on countering violent extremism to various academic and policy settings. His writing has appeared in Foreign Affairs, the Washington Post, the National Interest, and Lawfare, among other publications.
Topic:
Islam, Religion, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Salafism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

300. Protecting the West’s Interests in Turkey

Author:
Ross Wilson
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Ambassadors Review
Abstract:
Turkey has recently come to look like a beat-up boy. At home, it seems to have regained the authoritarianism of its past. Abroad, its behavior looks rough edged and militaristic. It gets blamed for not doing enough, or the right things, on Syria, the problem of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Europe’s migrant crisis. Some have concluded that this country, its regional policies in tatters and under the assault of an autocratic president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, can no longer be regarded as an ally.
Topic:
Migration, Military Affairs, Authoritarianism, Refugee Crisis, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, and Syria