Search

Begin New Search Topic Fossil Fuels Publication Year within 25 Years

31. The European Green Deal, Three Years On: Acceleration, Erosion or Fragmentation?

Author:
Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega and Diana-Paula Gherasim
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The European Green Deal (EGD) is the single most defining policy initiative of the von der Leyen Commission. Since its publication in December 2019, it has become the European Union’s (EU) new raison d’être: protecting the planet and Europeans from environmental degradation, through a holistic approach to the energy transition, while promoting sustainable growth and a just transition with no social group or territory left behind. The credibility of the EGD was secured by the European Climate Law, which makes the objectives of climate-neutrality by 2050 and a reduction of at least 55% in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 legally binding at the EU level. This has given a strong mandate to the European Commission (EC) to propose an overhaul of European energy and climate policies. The EC has lived up to the task remarkably, resolutely sticking to an accelerated policy and legislative timeline, featuring around 30 strategies and action plans, in addition to emblematic, coherent legislative packages like Fit for 55. The European Parliament has also positioned itself as a key stakeholder, finding consensus on overall targets and objectives. While all Member States (MSs) finally subscribed to the EGD ambition and agenda, they remain torn between a discourse that is largely supportive of the energy transition, but which in reality suffers from insufficient implementation efforts and mounting difficulties. Three years since the EGD set the direction of travel for the EU for the next 30 years, the EU finds itself in the midst of a storm not seen since World War II, coming just after it successfully weathered the Covid-19 pandemic. The war in Ukraine is a tectonic game changer with profound implications that are yet to be fully grasped. For energy and climate policies, these new realities require reviewing many assumptions about the energy transition, energy security, social acceptance, economic competitiveness, and hence, decarbonization strategies and policies going forward.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Gas, Fossil Fuels, Nuclear Energy, Green Deal, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe

32. Countering global oil theft: responses and solutions

Author:
Etienne Romsom
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
This second of two papers on global oil theft discusses ways to reduce oil theft, misappropriation, and fraud. At US$133 billion per year, oil is the largest stolen natural resource globally, while fuel is the most smuggled natural resource. Oil theft equates to 5–7 per cent of the global market for crude oil and petroleum fuels. It is so engrained in the energy supply chain that thefts are priced in by traders and tolerated by many shipping companies as petty theft. Oil theft and related insecurity have substantial negative economic effects on developing countries, whether they produce oil or not. In 2012, non-oil-producing Benin saw a 28 per cent drop in taxable income after a spate of oil tanker hijacking incidents in the Gulf of Guinea in 2011. In Nigeria, the oil capacity shut-in and amount of oil deferred is more than twice the amount estimated as stolen, with a US$20 billion annual loss in petroleum profit tax—63 per cent of total government tax revenue in 2019. Organized oil crime syndicates are often transnational and conduct theft and fraud professionally, exploiting gaps in jurisdiction and adapting their practices when law enforcement becomes more effective. They evolve from ship piracy to stealing tanker cargoes to kidnapping tanker crews; from physical ransom of assets to digital hijacking via ransomware. The proceeds of oil theft often finance other organized crime, and it triggers violence against the community and in crime-on-crime activities. Twelve commonalities in oil theft and fraud have been identified that can direct international solutions, in three target areas: stolen oil volumes, stolen oil transport, and stolen oil money. Prosecution for acts of bribery offers opportunities for action: transport of or payment for illegal oil could constitute a bribe under the US Foreign Corrupt Practice Act if government officials were involved in the transaction or shipment. Bribe charges could be raised for paid ‘services’ that facilitate oil theft (through action or non-action).
Topic:
Corruption, Oil, Piracy, Cybersecurity, Fossil Fuels, Tax Evasion, and Theft
Political Geography:
Global Focus

33. The Road to Low-Carbon Economies in the EU's Arab Neighbourhood

Author:
Sara Nowacka
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
At the end of last year, Mediterranean Arab states (i.e., Egypt and Algeria) announced investments or tenders related to the production of renewable energy sources (RES). This is related to the pressure to move away from fossil fuels and the favourable conditions in these countries to produce solar energy. Although in the short term the EU cooperation with its Arab neighbours on RES might slow due to the war in Ukraine, in the longer perspective, given their capacities in this regard, it remains crucial in order for the EU to become independent on Russian energy.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Fossil Fuels, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Europe, Algeria, and Mediterranean

34. Environmental Justice and Carbon Pricing

Author:
James K. Boyce, Michael Ash, and Brent Ranalli
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
Opposition to carbon pricing has come not only from the fossil fuel lobby, as might be expected, but also from environmental justice (EJ) advocates who seek to end the disproportionate environmental harms imposed upon people of color and low-income communities, and who fear that carbon pricing could reinforce rather than remedy pollution exposure disparities. This paper focuses on the objections to carbon pricing that EJ advocates have raised. They argue that carbon pricing (i) fails to reduce emissions significantly, (ii) fails to reduce the disproportionate impacts of hazardous co-pollutants on people of color and low-income communities; (iii) hits low-income households harder than richer households; and (iv) commodifies nature. This paper discusses how carbon pricing can be designed to address these very real concerns.
Topic:
Environment, Inequality, Justice, Fossil Fuels, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Global Focus

35. From Passive Owners to Planet Savers? Asset Managers, Carbon Majors and the Limits of Sustainable Finance

Author:
Joseph Baines and Sandy Brian Hager
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
City Political Economy Research Centre (CITYPERC), University of London
Abstract:
This article examines the role of the Big Three asset management firms — BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street — in corporate environmental governance. Specifically, it charts the Big Three’s relationships with the public–owned Carbon Majors: a small group of fossil fuels, cement and mining companies responsible for the bulk of industrial greenhouse gas emissions. It finds that the Big Three much more often than not oppose rather than support shareholder resolutions aimed at improving environmental governance. Notably, this is even the case with the Big Three’s environmental, social and governance funds. A more fine–gained analysis shows that the combined voting decisions of the Big Three are more likely to lead to the failure than to the success of environmental resolutions and that, whether they succeed or fail, these resolutions tend to be narrow in scope and piecemeal in nature. Based on these findings, the article raises serious doubts about the Big Three’s credentials as environmental stewards.
Topic:
Environment, Finance, Fossil Fuels, Sustainability, and Corporate Governance
Political Geography:
Global Focus

36. The Consequences of Unilateral Withdrawals from the Paris Agreement

Author:
Mario Larch and Joschka Wanner
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
International cooperation is at the core of multilateral climate policy. How is its effectiveness harmed by individual countries dropping out of the global mitigation effort? We develop a multisector structural trade model with emissions from production and a constant elasticity of fossil fuel supply function to simulate the consequences of unilateral withdrawals from the Paris Agreement. Taking into account both direct and leakage effects, we őnd that a US withdrawal would eliminate more than a third of the world emissions reduction (31.8% direct effect and 6.4% leakage effect), while a potential Chinese withdrawal lowers the world emission reduction by 24.1% (11.9% direct effect and 12.2% leakage effect). The substantial leakage is primarily driven by technique effects induced by falling international fossil fuel prices.
Topic:
Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Fossil Fuels, Carbon Emissions, and Paris Agreement
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

37. Taiz Siege Continues as Talks Face Roadblocks – The Yemen Review, June 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
A truce between the internationally recognized Yemeni government and the armed Houthi movement was extended on June 2 and has largely held, despite intermittent violence and unresolved issues from the original agreement. While the truce has succeeded in limiting violence and facilitated the reopening of Sana’a airport, negotiations over the besieged city of Taiz have devolved into recriminations, fueling concerns that the armed Houthi movement will renege on its commitment to reopen access to the city. UN-facilitated negotiations on lifting the blockade of major roads into the city continued into July. Yemen’s economic performance over the month of June was characterized by familiar patterns of fuel shortages and renewed depreciation of the rial in government-held territory. The slide was halted by news of a further US$400 million in pledged Saudi financial support, announced as Presidential Leadership Council head Rashad al-Alami visited Riyadh. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have announced billions of dollars in economic support since the PLC took over executive responsibilities in early April, though it is unclear how much has been delivered as Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are demanding institutional and governance reforms before allowing the Yemeni government to access most of these funds. Renewed fuel shortages in the south precipitated familiar scenes of long lines at petrol stations. Anger over price hikes and power outages during the height of summer, combined with a perceived failure of the government to implement timely economic reforms, sparked demonstrations in Aden and other areas of southern Yemen. The demonstrations overshadowed Al-Alami’s otherwise fruitful tour of regional capitals, where he secured promises of various forms of support from Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar.
Topic:
Economy, Fossil Fuels, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

38. Government Instability Overshadows Truce – The Yemen Review, July 2022

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Long-running tensions between the Islamist Islah party and the Southern Transitional Council boiled over in Shabwa in July, as political disputes over security posts devolved into clashes between their affiliated forces. Government efforts to assuage the parties were unsuccessful, setting the stage for a battle over the capital, Ataq city, in early August. The Shabwa tensions overshadowed agreement on a two-month extension of the UN-brokered truce between the government and the armed Houthi movement, though sporadic violations continued. A proposed six-month extension fell apart over disagreements on road reopenings, air travel and payment of public sector salaries. The Presidential Leadership Council announced a cabinet reshuffle at the end of the month, replacing the heads of four ministries. The new appointees were all southerners, approved by the STC, in a nod to the substantial power wielded by the movement. The government also appointed new governors of Hadramawt and Socotra; the latter is the STC’s top man on the island. Meanwhile, Houthi authorities continued to profit handsomely from the exorbitant cost of fuel in areas they control while also attempting to convince consumers that the Saudi-led coalition is to blame for sky-high prices at the pump.
Topic:
Leadership, Fossil Fuels, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Instability
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

39. Forecasts of Electric Vehicle Penetration and its Impact on Global Oil Demand

Author:
Marianne Kah, Hon Xing Wong, and Jasmine Chiu
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
The transportation sector is responsible for more than half of global oil demand, with passenger vehicles and trucks making up by far the largest fraction. Many countries with decarbonization goals therefore seek to expand electrification of road transport to meaningfully decrease reliance on this fossil fuel. The degree to which electric vehicle (EV) penetration can alter global oil demand has implications for whether more stringent government decarbonization policies will be needed to reach net zero targets. This report, part of an oil and gas research initiative at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, compiles medium- and long-term forecasts of EV penetration and addresses the question of whether the sharp increase in EV sales in recent years—a fourfold rise from 2019 to 2021—is projected to continue or even accelerate. It compares survey responses from 14 entities, including governments, think tanks, oil companies, consultants, and investment banks in the fourth quarter of 2021 with a similar survey conducted in 2019. The report examines forecasts for passenger EV sales and fleet share as well as those for electric commercial trucks out to 2050, and considers some of the key underlying drivers of passenger vehicle oil demand (e.g., population growth, GDP growth, battery cost trends). Some forecasters offered multiple scenarios, including business as usual (BAU), carbon constrained, and net zero carbon emissions (NZ) by 2050, with meaningfully different results. Overall, survey respondents anticipate an acceleration in the rate of EV penetration in passenger vehicles and light-duty trucks in the medium and long term, both in terms of sales and the ensuing share of the total fleet.
Topic:
Oil, Fossil Fuels, Transportation, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:
Global Focus

40. Fossil Fuel Subsidy Inventories vs. Net Carbon Prices: a Consistent Approach for Measuring Fossil Fuel Price Incentives

Author:
Jens Bohm and Sonja Peterson
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Different reports including the broadly cited OECD fossil fuel subsidy inventory arrive at high monetary values of fossil fuel subsidies and suggest that phasing out these subsidies has a high potential to increase the efficiency of climate policies. We show that the inventory approach gives misleading information about this potential since there is little correlation with net carbon prices that actually reflect the stringency of climate policies. We use data on net fossil fuel taxation from the OECD´s Taxing Energy Use report and augment it with data on subsidies and emission permits, to calculate national and sectoral net carbon prices for the top six emitters (China, US, India, Russia, Japan and Germany) and for Poland and Sweden, two European countries perceived as examples of opposing environmental policies. Our results show that in high-income countries, subsidies mainly relate to reduced fuel tax rates for certain uses, so that e.g. Sweden, for which the OECD inventory reports subsidies per ton of CO2 26 times higher than the US, has a 770% higher national net carbon price than the US. While Germany and Russia have similar subsidy levels in the OECD inventory, the national net carbon price in Germany is 50 €/tCO2, while producer subsidies lead to a negative net carbon price of -6€/tCO2 in Russia. Our results illustrate that raising taxes on fossil fuels will often lead to higher reported inventory subsidies. Inventory measures thus give little information about the efficiency of climate policy. Our analysis also shows the large differences in net carbon prices across countries and across sectors within countries. Net carbon prices should replace fossil fuel subsidies in the policy debates and become the basis for national energy tax reforms and international agreements on minimum carbon prices.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, Natural Resources, and Fossil Fuels
Political Geography:
Global Focus