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Begin New Search Topic Fiscal Deficit Publication Year within 25 Years

1. Lessons from China's fiscal policy during the COVID-19 pandemic

Author:
Tianlei Huang
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Expansionary fiscal policy helped China's economy grow in 2020, a year in which most economies contracted because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Amid a broader pivot to policy and regulatory tightening, fiscal support was withdrawn in 2021. In 2022, government budget turned expansionary to ensure economic stability ahead of the Communist Party Congress, but the execution fell short and fiscal policy ended up being weaker than planned. A recurrent problem during the pandemic, however, was that local governments did not fully spend their budgets. Aside from the sharp drop in local governments' land sale revenue in 2022, which dragged down their spending, it was also caused by local governments' failure to fully utilize their special bond quotas approved by the central government for capital investment. China's fiscal policy during the COVID-19 pandemic highlights four issues with implications for fiscal policy making. First, the government needs to avoid projecting unrealistically high land sale revenue in its budgets. Second, it needs to reconsider its problematic use of local-government special bond as a major fiscal stimulus instrument. Third, it needs to make sure its deficit, growth, and inflation targets are consistent. Last, Beijing needs to be more tolerant of higher fiscal deficits, at a minimum ensuring that overall fiscal spending grows at least as rapidly as nominal output.
Topic:
Budget, Economic Growth, Fiscal Policy, COVID-19, and Fiscal Deficit
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2. Do Interest-growth Differentials Affect Fiscal Policy? Evidence for Advanced Economies

Author:
Philipp Heimberger
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This paper analyses the link between discretionary fiscal policy and interest-growth differentials (r-g). Panel regressions based on a dataset for 20 advanced countries over the years 1990-2019 reveal no evidence of a systematic linear relationship between fiscal policy and r-g. However, more unfavourable r-g differentials are linked more strongly to a tighter fiscal stance when public-debt-to-GDP ratios are higher – but only in the euro area, not in advanced stand-alone countries issuing government debt in their own currency.
Topic:
European Union, Economies, Fiscal Policy, Public Debt, OECD, and Fiscal Deficit
Political Geography:
Europe

3. The Cyclical Behaviour of Government Spending for Social Protection: Is the OECD Methodology Robust?

Author:
Aleksandr Arsenev, Philipp Heimberger, and Torben Schütz
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
Spending elasticities measure the reaction of different government spending components to the business cycle. They are important inputs for fiscal forecasts, and they are particularly relevant in the context of European Union (EU) fiscal rules, as elasticity estimates enter the estimation of fiscal space. This paper analyses the sensitivity of the estimation method used by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Commission to obtain government spending elasticities by focusing on 11 EU countries in the 1995-2020 period. Our results suggest that spending elasticities are sensitive to small variations in data and model specification. For most EU countries, we reject the assumption that only unemployment spending responds to cyclical variations. While unemployment spending is indeed a major driver of counter-cyclical social spending, other categories of social spending also show signs of responding to the business cycle.
Topic:
Budget, European Union, Finance, Macroeconomics, Public Debt, Social Spending, Public Spending, and Fiscal Deficit
Political Geography:
Europe, Greece, France, Poland, Germany, Denmark, Romania, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Austria, and Czechia

4. Fiscal resiliency in a deeply uncertain world: The role of semiautonomous discretion

Author:
Peter R. Orszag, Robert E. Rubin, and Joseph E. Stiglitz
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Orszag, Rubin, and Stiglitz outline a new fiscal framework that they argue would better equip policymakers to face deep uncertainties about future interest rates (which, they say, may not remain low forever), hard-to-predict global shocks, and climate risks. They reject fiscal anchors—simple limits on deficits or debt as a share of GDP that governments adopt to check their spending and borrowing—that have historically guided fiscal policy and believe any attempts to modify such targets for the current period of low interest rates are likely to fail. Instead they propose making the budget respond more automatically to economic distress (through stronger automatic stabilizers) and to long-term fiscal pressures (e.g., embedding adjustment mechanisms in health care and pension programs), as well as creating an infrastructure program and extending debt maturities to insure against interest rate changes. Such a "streamlined dashboard" would then allow policymakers to use discretion as necessary to take any additional actions—either to provide more stimulus during short-term difficulties or to adjust the automatic features themselves—rather than adhering to fiscal targets that may no longer be appropriate when economic conditions change.
Topic:
Financial Crisis, Economy, Fiscal Policy, and Fiscal Deficit
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. COVID-19 and the U.S. Fiscal Imbalance

Author:
Jeffrey Miron
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Policymakers must do something to slow the growing debt burden or else face a major fiscal meltdown. Proposals such as Medicare for All and the Green New Deal would only make the looming fiscal crisis worse. Before COVID-19, the U.S. debt burden was large and on an unsustainable path under reasonable assumptions about economic fundamentals. Standard policy responses, such as higher taxes or lower discretionary spending, could not substantially slow the growth of the U.S. debt burden; only reduced growth in entitlement spending, especially on Medicare, had the potential to avoid eventual fiscal default. COVID-19, the ensuing recession, and the subsequent policy responses have all increased U.S. deficits substantially, potentially altering these conclusions. But these events are likely to be temporary and may be partially offset by other demographic and economic changes related to COVID-19. As a result, the pandemic did not substantially alter the projected path of the U.S. fiscal imbalance. That bit of good news does not alter the grim long‐​term U.S. fiscal outlook. The most effective way to slow the growth of the debt burden is to cut entitlement spending substantially.
Topic:
Debt, Tax Systems, Fiscal Policy, COVID-19, and Fiscal Deficit
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

6. The Ambiguous Consensus on Fiscal Rules: How Ideational Ambiguity Has Facilitated Social Democratic Parties’ Support of Structural Deficit Rules in the Eurozone

Author:
Andreas Eisl
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
In recent years, all eurozone member states have introduced national fiscal rules, which put limits on public deficits and debt. Fiscal rules reduce the fiscal policy discretion of politicians and affect their capacity to use public budgets for macroeconomic steering and redistribution. While such institutional discretion constraints run against the traditional policy preferences of social democratic parties, it is puzzling why they supported national fiscal rule reforms during the European debt crisis. This paper argues that the concept of structural deficit rules, central to reform efforts across the eurozone, allowed for the formation of an ambiguous consensus between center-right and center-left parties. While conservative and liberal parties are generally supportive of institutional discretion constraints, structural deficit rules – in contrast to nominal deficit rules – allowed social democratic and other left-wing parties to link such rules with their broader policy preferences of Keynesian countercyclical policymaking and the protection of tax revenues across the economic cycle to ensure the state’s capacity for redistribution. Drawing on three country case studies (Germany, Austria, France), this paper shows how the concept of structural deficit rules facilitated – at least discursively – the support for discretion-constraining institutions among social democratic and other left-wing parties. In theoretical terms, this study also advances research on the role of ambiguity in political decision-making, (re-)conceptualizing three forms of ambiguity underlying ambiguous consensus: textual ambiguity, institutional ambiguity, and ideational ambiguity
Topic:
Economics, Macroeconomics, Fiscal Policy, Eurozone, Political Parties, Public Debt, and Fiscal Deficit
Political Geography:
France, Germany, and Austria