2471. Information Sharing and Cross-Border Entry in European Banking
- Author:
- Caterina Giannetti, Nicola Jentzsch, and Giancarlo Spagnolo
- Publication Date:
- 02-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for European Policy Studies
- Abstract:
- Asymmetries can severely limit the cross-border border expansion of banks, if entering banks can only obtain incomplete information about potential new clients. Such asymmetries are reduced by credit registers, which distribute financial data on bank clients. Asymmetrically distributed information and adversely selected pools of borrowers constitute severe barriers for foreign banks when they enter new markets. In many instances, these problems force banks to either form 'alliances with incumbents' or simply enter through mergers and acquisitions (M). Yet such entry modes do not automatically lead to intensified competition as they may leave the number of competitors unchanged. Thus, institutions that reduce information asymmetries in credit markets (thereby encouraging entry through branches) may be very important if the objective is strengthening competition in addition to market integration. Recently, these institutions – credit registers – have received greater attention among academics and policy-makers in Europe, although there is still a remarkable lack of understanding of their empirical impact on banking.
- Topic:
- Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Monetary Policy
- Political Geography:
- Europe