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111. Kremlin Propaganda and Disinformation in Georgia: Tools, Channels, Narratives

Author:
Małgorzata Zawadzka
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to present the Kremlin’s propaganda and disinforma- tion mechanism based on a case study of Georgia. The importance of information security has been present in Russian strategic documents since the very beginning of the Russian Federa- tion, however the role of information as a weapon, not as a goal, was developed and publicly voiced much later. Although geopolitical goals in Georgia have remained the same, the switch to non-military means changed the targets, objectives and tools used to achieve them. This paper, following the research and media monitoring conducted between September 2016 and September 2017, analyses Kremlin channels, tools and narratives in the Georgian information sphere and evaluates its effectiveness.
Topic:
Media, Propaganda, Disinformation, and State Media
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Caucasus, and Georgia

112. Online Information Laundering: The Role of Social Media

Author:
Kirill Meleshevich and Bret Schafer
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Russia’s ability to successfully conduct hybrid warfare is predicated on the creation of a fog of ambiguity between the Kremlin’s actions and the Kremlin itself. By conducting operations through an ad hoc network of proxies, carve-outs, and cutouts — whose connection to the Kremlin is difficult to definitively establish — the Russian government is able to maintain plausible deniability and thus lower the diplomatic and military costs of its actions. It is a strategy with deep roots: maskirovka — a Soviet-era military doctrine that translates as “mask” or “masquerade” — established operational deceit as a core tenet of both conventional and irregular warfare. While modern maskirovka is most commonly associated with the use of “little green men” to occupy Crimea, it is a tactic that is also deeply ingrained in the Kremlin’s ongoing disinformation campaign against the United States and Europe. This presents an obvious challenge: How can the West respond to an adversary who denies even being present on the battlefield? One answer may lie in understanding the operational resemblance between the spread of disinformation and the laundering of illicit funds. Just as ill-gotten money needs to be moved from an illegitimate source into an established financial institution, disinformation is most powerful when a façade of legitimacy is created through “information laundering.” Anti-money laundering practitioners describe the need for financial criminals to place, layer, and integrate illicit funds, meaning that money obtained through criminal means needs to find an entry point into the financial system, then move between banks or financial products to hide the identity of the owner, and finally be woven into an asset from which seemingly legitimate funds can be drawn. Russian disinformation follows a similar pattern; only here, the currency is information and the reward is influence. This piece will examine these similarities and explore the policy measures that could be taken in light of these findings.
Topic:
Internet, Social Media, Disinformation, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and United States of America

113. Responsible Reporting in an Age of Irresponsible Information

Author:
Heidi Tworek
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In Brief: Disinformation and misinformation seem to be everywhere. They are often spread by foreign actors like the Russian government who aim to stoke tensions within the United States. Other state or non-state actors may already be starting to copy these tactics. The problem of disinformation is exacerbated by two deeper and longer-standing crises within the American media system: a crisis of business model and a crisis of norms. Though issues of disinformation are not new, their appearance in new forms of weaponized information and social media call for new best practices within media organizations. This brief suggests some simple solutions to help journalists and editors avoid playing an unintentional role in information warfare and to increase trust in journalism. The recommendations fall into three categories: how to detect disinformation; how to increase literacy about foreign interference; how to anticipate future problems today.
Topic:
Social Media, Norms, Disinformation, Misinformation, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

114. It’s Not Just Facebook: Countering Russia’s Social Media Offensive

Author:
Bradley Hanlon
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Russian influence operations exploit the vulnerabilities of social media platforms to disseminate false narratives and amplify divisive content in order to undermine democracies, divide societies, and weaken Western alliances. In conducting these operations, the Kremlin employs a variety of tools across the social media space, including fake accounts/personas, political advertisements, bot networks, and traditional propaganda outlets. Additionally, Russian influence operations utilize a range of social media platforms, each with a different role, to distract public discussion, foment social unrest, and muddle the truth. In order to successfully counter the Kremlin’s online offensive, Western policymakers will need to understand and address Moscow’s use of the social media ecosystem as a whole. Further, politicians will need to partner with the private sector and civil society organizations to help construct effective, sustainable, and forward-looking responses to Russian influence efforts. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg testified on Capitol Hill this week following the recent exposure of his company’s failures to protect up to 87 million Facebook users’ data. Facebook has been at the center of a whirlwind of revelations regarding the Kremlin’s manipulation of social media since the site first announced that it had shut-down several hundred Kremlin-linked accounts in September 2017. Facebook announced last week that it deleted an additional 135 Facebook and Instagram accounts, as well as 138 pages, linked to Kremlin influence efforts. We have also learned that Russian trolls used the social media site to create events that reached over 300,000 Americans. The House Intelligence Committee last fall revealed a slew of Kremlin-linked political ads that were published on Facebook in an attempt to exacerbate divisions in American society. Investigations into the Russian cooptation of Facebook and Twitter have unveiled a network of social media influence efforts operating at the Kremlin’s behest. These efforts utilize a range of social media platforms to dispense Kremlin narratives and sow division and discord abroad. As important as Facebook is in the information space, it is just one of many platforms actively being exploited by Russian information operations. As Putin seeks to project influence and weaken institutions abroad, Moscow makes use of a wide range of tools including disinformation, cyber-attacks, illicit finance, support for fringe political groups, and the weaponization of energy. Putin’s foreign policy efforts are often characterized by decentralized ad-hocracy, encouraging Kremlin-affiliated actors to apply tools if and when they are applicable to pursue the state’s larger strategic goals. The flexibility and synthesis of these operations allows the Kremlin to seize on opportunities and adapt to local contexts in order to maximize the impact of its efforts. Russia uses similar tactics in its social media campaigns, deploying simultaneous operations across a range of platforms in order to multiply effects and undermine Western efforts to counter and defend against this activity. As Clint Watts describes, “Within the Kremlin’s playbook, each social media platform serves a function, a role in an interlocking social media ecosystem where Russia infiltrates, engages, influences and manipulates targeted American audiences.” As new platforms and technologies emerge, the Kremlin will seek to coopt and integrate them into this network of online influence.
Topic:
Social Media, Disinformation, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia and Global Focus

115. Countering Russian Information Operations in the Age of Social Media

Author:
Keir Giles
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
As investigations into attempts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election continue, more aspects of Russia’s approach to information warfare are coming to light. A steady stream of new disclosures is revealing a complex blend of hacking, public disclosures of private emails, and use of bots, trolls, and targeted advertising on social media designed to interfere in political processes and heighten societal tensions. Moscow’s hostile actions are driven by the belief that Russia is already in a state of conflict with the West, led by the United States, and that the internet is a domain for waging this conflict. From the earliest stages of the internet’s development, Russia has held a starkly different view from the West of its benefits and its potential. Russia’s national security establishment immediately saw connectivity as a threat and a potential weapon—and eventually as one that could help achieve regime change and deprive a country of its sovereignty—rather than as an enabler of economic development. The organization of Russia’s information-warfare capabilities, which include cyber operators, media outlets, and false flag entities, is shrouded in secrecy. In the West, generally only the intelligence community has a clear picture of how Russian capabilities are directed. Barring the sudden appearance of a Russian counterpart to Edward Snowden, the only view into Russia’s information toolbox is provided by cybersecurity companies and criminal prosecutions. The picture is further muddied because the Russian government keeps many of its cyberwarfare actors at arm’s length by employing contractors and former criminals through middlemen, giving Moscow a degree of deniability if caught. Nevertheless, both Western governments and private industry can take steps to mitigate Russian influence operations. Western governments should swiftly and decisively denounce Russian information activities as soon as they are identified, and their counterintelligence agencies should identify quantitative means to measure the effectiveness of Russia’s methods. Social media companies should more aggressively police their platforms for malicious state-sponsored content, and they should work with news organizations to promote verified and fact-checked content on their platforms.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Political stability, Disinformation, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

116. War by Other Means

Author:
Max Bergmann and Carolyn Kenney
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Liberal democracies across the globe are under attack. They are being attacked not by traditional weapons of war but by disinformation—intentionally false or misleading information designed to deceive targeted audiences. While these attacks may not pose a threat to the physical safety of democratic citizens, they do pose a threat to democracy. In modern democratic societies, credible information is critical to the economy, political system, and way of life that citizens have come to expect. When citizens of democracies do not trust information, the forums for discussing politics and debating policy are compromised. If the media in a democracy is viewed as biased or, worse, as aligned with special interests, the bedrock of the democratic system—its ability to resolve differences through debate, persuasion, and compromise—breaks down. A democratic society can withstand deep disagreements, but if its citizens cannot agree on some basic and fundamental facts, that democracy will struggle to function.
Topic:
War, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

117. The Authoritarian Resurgence: Forward to the Past in Russia

Author:
Lilia Shevtsova
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Democracy
Institution:
National Endowment for Democracy
Abstract:
The Russian system of personalized power has demonstrated the ability to reproduce itself by both imitating and containing the West. In its quest for survival, the system has used foreign policy to a) compensate for the Kremlin’s diminishing resources, and b) contain the West’s impact inside and outside of Russia. The Kremlin’s continued experiments with new “technology” to prolong the system’s life include not only repression but also information warfare, as is seen in the development of a pro-Kremlin lobbyist network in the West to support the left-right “International.”
Topic:
Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Conflict, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and North America