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641. CO21092 | Vertical Farms: Are They Sustainable?

Author:
Paul Teng and Steve Kim
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Vertical farming seems like the perfect solution to tackle land-scarce Singapore’s unique food security challenges. Given Singapore’s energy mix, however, a more holistic analysis will help measure and manage the performance of vertical farms to support the local agri-food industry’s role in Singapore’s sustainable development agenda.
Topic:
Agriculture, Development, Energy Policy, Sustainability, Farming, and Farmers
Political Geography:
Asia and Singapore

642. Japan, Parasitology, and Framing Developmental Ambitions

Author:
Alex Bay, Aya Homei, John P. DiMoia, Simon Toner, and Paul Kreitman
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
This panel considers the central and formative role of parasitology in Modern Japan (1868-present); and, moreover, explores how Japanese parasitology affected the home islands and the region, not just during the imperial period (Meiji, Taisho, early Showa), but also during post-1945 Showa, suggesting some form of reconfiguration in the post-colonial era. The three papers span specific parasitic diseases and micro- / local Japanese history (Bay), to next considering larger questions of Japan’s public health and ODA (overseas development assistance) structure (Homei), as well as how these ambitions ultimately affected regional partners and neighbors such as South Korea and Vietnam (DiMoia). Simon Toner is the panel discussant, and Paul Kreitman will moderate. If the panel brings together a specific field and a nation-state at its beginning, the aim ultimately is to move forward, looking at how this field influences environments at the micro, regional, and global levels. In sum, the ambition of this panel is to examine parasitology not only as field of practice within Japan / Japanese empire, but also to look at (1) its colonial / imperial implications, and (2) its post-colonial / developmental ambitions. In this sense, the panel seeks to join and contribute to a newer, emerging literature for Japan looking at pre / post-1945 continuities, as well as looking at the effects of Japan’s ODA (overseas development aid) efforts within broader East Asia and Southeast Asia.
Topic:
Development, History, Public Health, and Parasitology
Political Geography:
Japan and East Asia

643. How Duterte Strong-Armed Chinese Dam-Builders But Weakened Philippine Institutions

Author:
Alvin Almendrala Camba
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Chinese construction contracts and development finance have increased massively in recent years. According to many experts, these projects are largely transplants designed to offshore and export Chinese technology, labor, and policy designs to host countries. However, these views have little regard for important nuances of place, time, and politics, ignoring the degree to which host countries—such as local elites, members of civil society, and norms—shape project design, implementation, and results on the ground. Under the regime of President Rodrigo Duterte, political elites in the Philippines have pressed Chinese firms to adapt to some of their demands for political expediency on key infrastructure projects. This pattern is evident from the Kaliwa Dam and the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project—both of which have made substantial progress during Duterte’s rule. In particular, Manila has bypassed local social and environmental regulations and has paved the way for Chinese dam builders to break ground on projects quickly so as to strengthen the Duterte government’s political standing. Around the world, Chinese firms have been highly attentive to the will of local political elites, limiting or sometimes completely avoiding relationships with opposition elites and ties to civil society members. Philippine politics is turbulent. Projects supported by the Duterte regime today might not have the same traction under his successor. So while these Chinese concessions have earned favor with Duterte and his allies, such tactics may prove unsustainable over the long term and could easily spur future resentment against China among local communities marginalized by this decisionmaking. In sum, it is Filipinos, not Chinese actors, who mostly have set the agenda on these major infrastructure projects, except on a few specific contractual terms.
Topic:
Development, Politics, Infrastructure, Rodrigo Duterte, and Construction
Political Geography:
China, Philippines, and Asia-Pacific

644. Chinese Mining and Indigenous Resistance in Ecuador

Author:
Cintia Quiliconi and Pablo Rodriguez Vasco
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Chinese mining companies were drawn to Ecuador by a strong interest in diversifying their sources of copper in Latin America. But Chinese mining operations in Ecuador, which could have contributed to Ecuadorian development, soon gained a negative reputation after these activities prompted a great deal of local pushback, especially from affected Indigenous communities. As a result, the major Chinese mining consortium that now controls Ecuador’s two main copper mines has taken adaptive steps to stabilize its mining investment and increase the security of its supply networks, steps that often have not produced the intended results. Working through two subsidiaries, the Chinese mining consortium has responded to this localized criticism with a blend of tactics that includes co-opting select local figures, colluding with national officials to sidestep environmental and sociocultural safeguards, and coercing inhabitants into relocating under the threat of force from accommodating Ecuadorian authorities. By turning Ecuadorian national elites against locals and using divide-and-conquer tactics among Indigenous communities, the Chinese-led mining projects have entrenched existing political cleavages, have undermined community cohesion, and ultimately have harmed Ecuador’s democratic fabric, especially the standing of civil society and Indigenous rights organizations. While Ecuador has welcomed Chinese capital and other sources of international investment, this infusion of financing has increased the risk of political abuses at the national and local levels. This paper explains the adaptive strategies employed by the Chinese consortium and its subsidiaries in charge of the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mining sites, contrasting the differing results these tactics have produced in each case. Both projects are located in Ecuador’s so-called Copper Belt provinces of Morona Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe, which are part of a mountain range known as the Cordillera del Cóndor. They are embedded in an ecologically and culturally sensitive zone that includes territory of the Indigenous Shuar community in the Ecuadorian Amazon. In the case of Mirador, the Chinese mining consortium’s adaptive response helped its subsidiary overcome local resistance but only by crushing it. In the case of San Carlos Panantza, local resistance so far has not been overcome, so the Chinese consortium has remained unable to proceed with its project. Neither case, even the Mirador site where mining has moved forward, is a sign of success for future relationships between Chinese mining conglomerates and Ecuadorian communities. To understand why the Chinese consortium’s adaptive tactics were somewhat more successful in Mirador, it is important to focus on the differing composition of the inhabitants of the land where the two mines are located. Mirador sits on territory shared by Shuar and non-Shuar settler communities who have different bonds with the land. The non-Shuar settlers emphasize the productive and commercial value of the land over the spiritual and symbolic value that is key for many in the Shuar community. The Canadian-held and later Chinese-controlled companies active in Ecuador’s mining industry understood this difference between Mirador’s inhabitants and adapted accordingly: they managed to displace resistant residents despite widespread opposition through questionable and sometimes arguably illegal purchases of land. In San Carlos Panantza, a second subsidiary of the Chinese consortium chose to respond to local criticism with the same alleged practices of violence, occupation, and displacement used in Mirador. However, although the two projects are geographically near each other, the situation played out differently at the second would-be mine: ongoing opposition has prevented mining operations from beginning at all yet. Again, paying attention to the inhabitants of the land is instructive. San Carlos Panantza is in the heart of Shuar territory in Arutam, a region with few non-Indigenous settlers. The mining incursion by the Chinese-run subsidiary and the Ecuadorian security forces tasked with supporting it were seen as a threat to the area’s Shuar people, who have been strongly protesting and opposing the mining venture since late 2016. This state of affairs is likely to have far-reaching effects for Ecuador too. The apparent collusion between Ecuador’s national government and the Chinese consortium (and its subsidiaries) has crushed those who oppose mining, has upended the country’s policies on resource extraction, and has yielded documented violations of local communities’ human rights. These events have transpired because both the Chinese firms and the Ecuadorian state have tended to see local communities as an obstacle to the development of the country’s extractive industries. As a result, local social and environmental safeguards have been weakened, tenuous consultation processes have eroded, environmental licenses have been granted under dubious circumstances, and local communities have been forcibly displaced. This paper explores the implications of the adaptive tactics chosen by the Chinese mining subsidiaries that run the Mirador and San Carlos Panantza mines. It also addresses how Chinese companies have, in some cases, negotiated with local communities to begin mining exploitation, while also analyzing the ways the Chinese mining consortium has interacted with the Ecuadorian government and other players, such as the Canadian mining company it acquired and other peer companies that set up successful coalitions for mining development in Ecuador. Finally, the paper explores the effects the agreements between the Ecuadorian government and the Chinese consortium have had on local actors.
Topic:
Development, Government, Mining, Indigenous, and Resistance
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South America, and Ecuador

645. China’s Influence in South Asia: Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries

Author:
Deep Pal
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China’s economic and political footprint has expanded so quickly that many countries, even those with relatively strong state and civil society institutions, have struggled to grapple with the implications. There has been growing attention to this issue in the United States and the advanced industrial democracies of Japan and Western Europe. But “vulnerable” countries—those where the gap is greatest between the scope and intensity of Chinese activism, on the one hand, and, on the other, local capacity to manage and mitigate political and economic risks—face special challenges. In these countries, the tools and tactics of China’s activism and influence activities remain poorly understood among local experts and elites. Both within and beyond these countries, meanwhile, policy too often transposes Western solutions and is not well adapted to local realities. This is especially notable in two strategic regions: Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe; and South Asia. China’s economic and political profile has expanded unusually quickly in these two regions, but many countries lack a deep bench of local experts who can match analysis of the domestic implications of Chinese activism to policy recommendations that reflect domestic political and economic ground truth. To address this gap, the Carnegie Endowment initiated a global project to better understand Chinese activities in eight “pivot” countries in these two strategic regions. The project’s first objective was to enhance local awareness of the scope and nature of Chinese activism in states with (1) weak state institutions, (2) fragile civil societies, or (3) countries where “elite capture” is a feature of the political landscape. Second, the project aimed to strengthen capacity by facilitating a sharing of experiences and best practices across national boundaries. Third, the project sought to develop policy prescriptions for the governments of these countries, as well as the United States and its strategic partners, to mitigate and respond to activities inimical to political independence or well-balanced economic growth and development. To establish a comprehensive picture of China’s activities and their impact, this project dug deeply into Chinese activism in four case countries in each region—eight countries in total. We began by holding workshops, so that influencers across countries could share experiences and compare notes. Invited participants included policymakers, experts, journalists, and others—all with deep local knowledge, steeped in their countries’ politics, economies, and civil societies. In Europe, the four countries were Georgia, Greece, Hungary, and Romania, and in South Asia, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Cross-national discussions among these regional participants aimed to raise awareness, discuss the implications of China’s growing activism in their countries, and compare notes on the diverse ways in which these various countries had managed the rapid influx of Chinese capital, programs, people, technology, and other sources of influence.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Development, Economy, Engagement, Regionalism, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Bangladesh, China, South Asia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Maldives

646. COVID-19 and Land-based Investment: Changing Landscapes

Author:
Clarisse Marsac, Nathaniah Jacobs, and Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
The Covid-19 crisis has affected nearly all elements of the global economy, including the landscape of land-based investment (LBI). In addition to increased demand for land-based investment, especially among low- and middle-income countries which saw decreasing revenue and increasing spending in the first year of the pandemic, the crisis has also caused changes in the ways of doing business among host governments, home governments, and private sector actors involved in LBI. This report details and reflects on select Covid-19--related LBI developments in the short term, and potential longer-term shifts relevant to land-based investment practices in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. It also suggests possibilities for how a post-Covid economic recovery could improve practices for sustainable and responsible LBI.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Sustainability, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa, Asia, Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa

647. Comparison Between the IPCC Reporting Framework and Country Practice

Author:
Jiarui Chen and Martin Dietrich Brauch
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
The 2006 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Guidelines (IPCC 2008) for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (IPCC Guidelines) provide a recommend- ed (but not mandatory) methodology for preparing Na- tional Inventory Reports (NIR), which all Annex I Parties2 to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) must submit every year (Romijn et al. 2019). In practice, however, many countries apply modi- fied methodologies in their NIRs to reflect country-specif- ic situations better. While helpful in addressing country specificities, those modified methodologies may result in emission data that is less standardized and therefore harder to compare and consolidate. Also, the IPCC recom- mends that countries adopt higher tier methods and use more granular data. Since different emissions categorized by the IPCC3 can be calculated by multiple methods, and the granularity and quality of country emissions databas- es vary, different countries adopt different granularity lev- els and tier methods (IPCC 2008). The 160 Non-Annex I Parties to the UNFCCC (most of them developing countries) are not required to submit NIRs every year, but must submit Biennial Update Re- ports (BURs), including a national inventory report and information on mitigation actions, needs, and support re- ceived (Kainou 2016). Following the same IPCC Guidelines as NIRs, BURs are different from NIRs mainly in terms of reporting scope. The IPCC Guidelines require countries to report greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in NIRs from 1980 to the latest reporting period, while for BURs they merely encourage countries to submit summary informa- tion tables of inventories for previous submission years.4 Besides the required BURs, more Non-Annex I Parties have been submitting NIRs and Technical Annexes on REDD+ in recent years (Romijn et al. 2019). In 2020, 23 Non-Annex I Parties submitted NIRs (UNFCCC 2020). We recommend that the IPCC adopt, based on a man- date from the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, a consolidated framework to indicate best practice for each emissions category. A consolidated framework would help unify the granularity levels and standards across all coun- tries’ NIRs. It could also be extended to countries that have not adopted the IPCC Guidelines or published NIRs. Since an increasing number of Non-Annex I Parties are submit- ting NIRs to the UNFCCC, it is crucial to have a widely appli- cable framework that developing countries can also use. A consolidated framework would also make it easier for countries to communicate their emissions reductions goals in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. With the Paris Agreement, countries established an enhanced transparency framework (ETF): starting in 2024, countries will report transparently on actions taken and progress in climate change mitigation, adaptation measures, and support provided or received. It also provides for interna- tional procedures for the review of the submitted NIRs. A standardized reporting framework for NIRs would comply with the requirement of transparency framework under Paris Agreement (Winkler et al. 2017). To exemplify how a consolidated framework would work, after a background note on scopes and approaches in greenhouse gas reporting (section 1), we present the re- sults of our empirical research on the NIRs of Australia, Germany, Japan, and the United States, focusing on the differences in the choice of methodology (section 2) and emission factors (section 3). Then we conduct a case study on the German iron and steel industry, exploring the dif- ferences in emission reporting under different methods (section 4). Finally, we study the case of China, which has submitted BURs but not yet published annual NIRs, to understand how the IPCC Guidelines could be applied to more countries (section 5). We outline our findings and recommendations in section 6.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Environment, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

648. Fintech for Good: Governance Mechanisms for Sustainable Development

Author:
Olaf Weber and Sep Pashang
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Financial technology (fintech) for good can help to achieve sustainable development through environmental, social and governance investing, and through financial inclusion initiatives to address the needs of underbanked and unbanked individuals. Although the COVID-19 pandemic has necessitated greater dependence on digital banking technologies, the lack of cohesive governance and regulatory mechanisms around fintech in Canada and abroad is an obstacle toward achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The authors of this paper argue that better governance and regulatory frameworks are needed to minimize the risks associated with fintech for good while maximizing its benefits.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, United Nations, Governance, Sustainable Development Goals, Innovation, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

649. Korea's Aid Agencies and Result-Based Management System

Author:
Yul Kwon, Ju Young Lee, and Chami Park
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study was conducted to analyze the current situation of results-based management in Korea's ODA agencies and to find ways to reform the results-based management system. To this end, a fact-finding survey and literature review were conducted for the government agencies implementing ODA. This study also analyzed each institution’s aid implementation system, types of aid, and performance management environment. Based on this analysis, organizations that conduct self-evaluation were compared and classified into three results-based management models. The appropriate results-based management methods and evaluation indicators were derived according to the evaluation system and characteristics of each model.
Topic:
Development, Domestic Policy, and Management
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

650. Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia from a New Perspective

Author:
Sungbae An and Subin Kim
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Following the Asian financial crisis of 1998, there was a need to improve regional financial cooperation, including liquidity support. The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (hereinafter, CMIM) and the Asian Bond Market Initiative (hereafter, ABMI) are two of the outcomes, but it is difficult to find countries that are actively using these mechanisms. Against this backdrop, we will first examine the limitations of existing systems and propose ways to overcome those limitations, as well as new ways to strengthen East Asian financial cooperation. We suggest three ways to strengthen financial coopera-tion in East Asia from a new perspective: 1) monetary cooperation through Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) 2) establishment of development financial institution in Northeast Asia 3) financial cooperation with Central Asia and Mongolia. Of course, more precise planning is required to implement these alternatives, and it is also recognized that the topics covered in this study represent only a subset of regional financial and monetary cooperation. However, by overcoming the limitations thus far, it is hoped that it can be a contribution that provides at least a glimmer of thought, which can hopefully become more concrete in future studies.
Topic:
Development, Regional Cooperation, Monetary Policy, Financial Crisis, and Finance
Political Geography:
Central Asia and East Asia