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1. Preparing for the worst: Was North Korea’s decision to develop nuclear weapons rational?

Author:
Sanghoon Kim
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
North Korea’s foreign policy decision-making procedure is highly centralized to a single leader or, at most, a few political/military elites. While democratic governments are restrained both horizontally and vertically, authoritarian regimes are relatively free of constraints from the public. This paper examines the motivations behind North Korea’s nuclear weapons development in light of the rational deterrence model, then discusses the strategic implications of a rational, or irrational, North Korea. It concludes that North Korea’s decision to develop nuclear weapons was rationally motivated by the deteriorating security environment surrounding the state, but that this will not guarantee deterrence.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Authoritarianism, Deterrence, Denuclearization, and Rationality
Political Geography:
South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula

2. Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much?

Author:
George Perkovich
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
For decades, policy debates in nuclear-armed states and alliances have centered on the question, “How much is enough?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are enough to credibly deter given adversaries? This paper argues that the more urgent question today is, “How much is too much?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are too likely to produce humanitarian and environmental catastrophe that would be strategically and legally indefensible? Two international initiatives could help answer this question. One would involve nuclear-armed states, perhaps with others, commissioning suitable scientific experts to conduct new studies on the probable climatic and environmental consequences of nuclear war. Such studies would benefit from recent advances in modeling, data, and computing power. They should explore what changes in numbers, yields, and targets of nuclear weapons would significantly reduce the probability of nuclear winter. If some nuclear arsenals and operational plans are especially likely to threaten the global environment and food supply, nuclear-armed states as well as non-nuclear-weapon states would benefit from actions to physically reduce such risks. The paper suggests possible modalities for international debate on these issues. The second initiative would query all nuclear-armed states whether they plan to adhere to international humanitarian law in deciding if and when to detonate nuclear weapons, and if so, how their arsenals and operational plans affirm their intentions (or not). The United Kingdom and the United States have committed, in the words of the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, to “adhere to the law of armed conflict” in any “initiation and conduct of nuclear operations.” But other nuclear-armed states have been more reticent, and the practical meaning of such declarations needs to be clarified through international discussion. The two proposed initiatives would help states and civil society experts to better reconcile the (perceived) need for nuclear deterrence with the strategic, legal, and physical imperatives of reducing the probability that a war escalates to catastrophic proportions. The concern is not only for the well-being of belligerent populations, but also for those in nations not involved in the posited conflict. Traditional security studies and the policies of some nuclear-armed states have ignored these imperatives. Accountable deterrents—in terms of international law and human survival—would be those that met the security and moral needs of all nations, not just one or two. These purposes may be too modest for states and activists that prefer the immediate prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons. Conversely, advocates of escalation dominance in the United States and Russia—and perhaps in Pakistan and India—will find the force reductions and doctrinal changes implied by them too demanding. Yet, the positions of both of these polarized groups are unrealistic and/or unacceptable to a plurality of attentive states and experts. To blunt efforts to stifle further analysis and debate of these issues, the appendix of this paper heuristically rebuts leading arguments against accountable deterrents. Middle powers and civil society have successfully put new issues on the global agenda and created political pressure on major powers to change policies. Yet, cooperation from at least one major nuclear power is necessary to achieve the changes in nuclear deterrent postures and policies explored here. In today’s circumstances, China may be the pivotal player. The conclusion suggests ways in which China could extend the traditional restraint in its nuclear force posture and doctrine into a new approach to nuclear arms control and disarmament with the United States and Russia that could win the support of middle powers and international civil society. If the looming breakdown in the global nuclear order is to be averted, and the dangers of nuclear war to be lessened, new ideas and political coalitions need to gain ascendance. The initiatives proposed here intended to stimulate the sort of analysis and debate from which such ideas and coalitions can emerge.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Environment, Nuclear Power, Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, India, Global Focus, and United States of America

3. Russia’s exotic nuclear weapons and implications for the United States and NATO

Author:
Matthew Kroenig, Mark Massa, and Christian Trotti
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced five new nuclear-capable, strategic weapons systems. These systems include a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile and a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed submarine drone. What does Russia have to gain from developing these novel and exotic nuclear weapons? And what should the United States and NATO do about it? This new Atlantic Council issue brief, Russia’s Exotic Nuclear Weapons and Implications for the United States and NATO, answers these questions. Informed by a workshop convened by the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and Los Alamos National Laboratory, authors Matthew Kroenig, Mark Massa, and Christian Trotti evaluate the potential utility, motivations, and consequences of these new systems. Among other conclusions, the most significant may be that great-power competition has returned, and with it, the importance of nuclear weapons in international politics.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Power, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

4. Deterrence and Defense in Times of COVID-19 Europe’s Political Choices

Author:
Christian Mölling, Torben Schütz, and Sophia Becker
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Europe is headed for a recession that will dwarf the economic downturn after the 2008 financial crisis. The impact on national defense sectors could be devastating. But as crisis and responses are still in the early stage, governments can still take measures to mitigate the effect on defense. To safeguard political and defense priorities, EU and NATO States need to act jointly and decisively.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Deterrence, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

5. What next for NATO? Views from the North-East Flank on Alliance Adaptation

Author:
Michal Baranowski, Linas Kojala, Toms Rostoks, Kalev Stoicescu, and Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO leaders have invited Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to present proposals at their next Summit for measures to reinforce Alliance unity, increase political consultation and coordination between Allies, and strengthen NATO’s political role. To support his reflection process, the Secretary General has appointed a group of ten experts. Only one of these represents the 14 of 30 Allies who have joined NATO since 1999. In this policy paper we set out issues, concerns and expectations about NATO’s future adaptation from the perspective of the three Baltic states and Poland, based on a series of interviews with several senior officials and members of the expert community in each of the four states. While not identical, the views of our interviewees were close. They broadly agreed that while NATO faces a multitude of threats, Russia is by far the most serious. In response, NATO should prioritise—and enhance—its core task of collective defence. However, they recognised, it is essential for NATO to maintain a balance between the security interests of all Allies. They support the 360-degree approach and are ready to back and participate in efforts to deal with threats from other regions too. NATO should also retain its core tasks of crisis management and cooperative security. The Covid-19 pandemic suggests that NATO should re-calibrate the crisis management task to better reflect the need for collective support to the civilian authorities in large-scale efforts to deal with crises on Alliance territory. Our interviewees were generally cautious about otherwise expanding NATO’s roles and responsibilities, arguing that the Alliance should consider where it can add value, while avoiding overreach. They saw, for example, only a modest role for NATO in dealing with the challenge from China. They were, however, supportive of the Alliance developing further its global network of partnerships, both with states such as Australia, Japan and South Korea, and with other international organisations, notably the EU. NATO should also continue its cooperative security efforts with a focus on states in the immediate neighbourhood. And while further NATO enlargement is unlikely at present, the door should certainly remain open. Interviewees in all four states expressed concerns about the tensions within the Alliance and the lack of US leadership. While these tensions persist, it is probably unwise to consider drafting a new strategic concept. Nonetheless, the internal challenges might be eased if the Allies are prepared to use NATO to a greater extent as forum for consultation on a wide range of security issues.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Alliance, Deterrence, and Interview
Political Geography:
Poland and Baltic States

6. Capability and Resolve: Deterrence, Security and Stability in the Baltic Region

Author:
Heinrich Brauss, Kalev Stoicescu, and Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, NATO has revitalised its core business of deterrence and defence and adapted it to today’s political and geostrategic circumstances. In the Baltic region, the most visible expression of this effort has been the deployment of the enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups in Poland and the three Baltic states. These are, in turn, backed up by a readiness and reinforcement strategy, which NATO has also strengthened through the adoption of a number of measures agreed by the Allies. But deterrence is a complex matter that involves political, diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, information-related, and other aspects. In the Baltic region, the constraints of geography coupled with the proximity of the region to Russia pose particular challenges to NATO’s approach. The region remains a focus of tensions between Russia and the West and the three Baltic states are still NATO’s most vulnerable members. Moscow, meanwhile, pretends that it is particularly threatened in the Baltic region, where it regards the territory of the Baltic states as a potential bridgehead of American power projection and presents NATO’s deterrence measures as a deliberate, unprovoked and unjustified build-up of forces around its periphery. Two interdependent developments in the period since 2014 have pointed to a particular need to re-examine the credibility of NATO’s posture as it pertains to the Baltic region: first, Russia’s continued programme to achieve conventional military superiority in its western direction; and second, its recent deployment of new mobile, land-based, intermediate-range, nuclear-capable missiles. The former has given Russia has a substantial numerical advantage in ground forces in the Baltic region which give Moscow the option of executing a rapid land-grab attack before NATO could react. The latter could be used to try to decouple Europe from the extended nuclear deterrence provided by the US, paralysing NATO decision making and undermining the Allies’ resolve. Full and expeditious implementation of all decisions taken at Warsaw and Brussels to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture is therefore imperative. In this policy paper, we recommend some steps that NATO should take in order to strengthen the deterrent effect of NATO forces and to ensure that timely reinforcement of its peripheries is feasible. In the light of a US Congressional request for a detailed assessment from the Pentagon on whether to expand US military presence in the Baltic states, we pay particular attention to the role of US forces in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Political stability, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia and Baltic States

7. Until Something Moves: Reinforcing the Baltic Region in Crisis and War

Author:
Ben Hodges, Tony Lawrence, and Ray Wojcik
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO’s ability to efficiently move large and heavy armed forces into and across Europe is a key aspect of its deterrence and defence posture. In establishing the enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and the three Baltic states, NATO leaders acknowledged that credible deterrence would also require these small multinational forces to be underpinned by a robust reinforcement strategy. In this report, we examine this key aspect of NATO’s defence and deterrence posture as it relates to the Baltic region. In a crisis, military movement in Europe is likely to be confronted by legal and procedural obstacles, by the limited capacity of infrastructure, and by issues related to coordination, command and control. The severity of these problems would vary according to the type of crisis. For an operation to restore Alliance territory following an armed attack, the sheer scale and breadth of NATO’s requirements for military movement would present a major challenge to Europe’s transport infrastructure, and to prioritisation and coordination efforts. NATO has had little practice in reinforcing Allies at scale since the end of the Cold War. A preventative deployment to respond to a potential crisis, meanwhile, would put a premium on speed of movement. In this case, legal and procedural obstacles may be more problematic as timescales for dealing with the bureaucracy would be similar to the timescales for the movement itself. NATO and the EU have cooperated widely to mitigate the legal and procedural challenges of moving armed forces across the European continent, but the processes in place remain numerous and complex. NATO and the EU have also collaborated on the harder task of ensuring that transport infrastructure is suited to military needs. Movement would be challenged by both physical constraints, such as weight limits on roads and bridges and traffic volume restrictions for rail transport, and procedural ones, such as the limitations of the contractual arrangements necessary to enable the use of civilian railway wagons and heavy equipment transporters for military purposes. Such constraints, while manageable in peacetime, may make it difficult to meet the armed forces’ requirements for large-scale movement during crisis. Furthermore, the Baltic region also lacks supporting logistics infrastructure, for example for receiving and staging (and sustaining for extended periods) forces that have arrived in the region. A third set of challenges arises from the need for coordination among the multiple agencies involved in the movement of armed forces. Even amongst movement specialists there is no clear picture of how these agencies would work together during crises or of how movements would be prioritised to serve the operational needs of the Joint Force Commander.
Topic:
NATO, War, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:
Poland and Baltic States

8. Dilemmas of Arms Control: Meeting the Interests of NATO’s North-Eastern Flank

Author:
Artur Kacprzyk and Lukasz Kulesa
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
While the countries of NATO’s north-eastern flank—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland—are correctly putting emphasis in their security policy on strengthening deterrence, they need to take a more proactive stance on arms control. Although current prospects are not promising in the light of Russian violations and circumventions of existing treaties, demand for greater engagement with Russia on arms control is growing among NATO nations. Without a constructive input from the flank countries, NATO’s arms-control agenda and the actions of individual European Allies could become detached from deterrence efforts and weaken NATO cohesion. The north-eastern countries should thus identify and promote balanced solutions that can be used to increase the region’s security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia

9. Reducing Russia-NATO Tensions: Codes for Unplanned Encounters at Sea

Author:
Liselotte Odgaard and Sune Lund
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This report first analyzes the use of CUES in the South China Sea, which is the region they initially were designed for as an instrument to prevent unwanted escalation. In what sense have CUES in the South China Sea set a precedent for reassurance measures in other regions? Second, we discuss whether CUES could be useful to lower tension levels between Russia and NATO in their ongoing conflicts over spheres of interest, strategic space, and appropriate deterrence measures in maritime Europe. The analysis draws on the first-hand experiences of personnel engaged in implementing the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). This allows us to go beyond rhetorical announcements of intention and understand how de-escalation instruments are used at the level of implementation and whether they have any effect. Third, we conclude by discussing the caveats to and advantages of adopting CUES in the Euro-Atlantic area and how they should be designed to take the specific strategic context of this area into account.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, International Relations, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and United States of America

10. A Russian View of the U.S. INF Withdrawal

Author:
Victor Esin
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The stabilizing role of the INF Treaty is still relevant. Its importance has even increased against the background of the sharp deterioration of relations between Russia and the West in recent years due to the well-known events in Ukraine, aggravated by mutual sanctions and NATO’s military build-up near Russian borders. Preserving the INF Treaty, which has now become the subject of controversy and mutual non-compliance accusations between Russia and the United States, is therefore doubly important.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe