Search

Begin New Search Topic Deterrence Publication Year within 25 Years

231. Ensuring Deterrence against Russia: The View from NATO States

Author:
Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s military actions in 2014 and 2015, particularly in Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria, have upended expectations among NATO members about their security and the future course of NATO-Russian relations. In response, many of the NATO states bordering Russia have argued for reinvigorating NATO’s deterrent capabilities after two decades of drawing down conventional and nuclear forces in the immediate post-Cold War era. At its 2014 summit in Wales, NATO agreed to a number of short-term measures to bolster the alliance’s conventional deterrent, dubbed the Readiness Action Plan. But as the standoff with Russia has continued, some analysts—particularly in the United States—have argued for additional deterrence measures, including in the nuclear realm. In response, researchers from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey travelled to the NATO front-line states of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Turkey to assess the perceptions of governmental and nongovernmental experts regarding how NATO should respond to Russian actions, with an emphasis on how nuclear issues should be addressed. Our research also included meetings with experts in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as a thorough review of existing literature in the field on issues such as Russia’s new military approach and US nuclear weapon policies—past, present, and future. It was conducted with the aim of providing analysis and recommendations to NATO states in advance of the July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw. The following report highlights the key findings of this research, provides analysis on a country-by-country basis, and concludes with recommendations for consideration in Warsaw.
Topic:
NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, Europe, North Atlantic, Germany, North America, and United States of America

232. Rebuilding Deterrence: Post-2015 Defense Guidelines Challenges Facing the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Author:
Sugio Takahashi
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
On 27 April 2015, Japan and the U.S. concluded the new Guidelines for the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. This paper will explore the challenges facing the alliance after the revision of the Defense Guidelines. It will examine the evolution of Japanese thought on deterrence as outlined in the 2010 and 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines. It will also assess the strategic implications of China’s military modernization. This paper will conclude by offering possible policy solutions to the challenges facing the U.S.-Japan alliance in maintaining deterrence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

233. The Future of NATO in the New Security Environment. A Former Newcomer’s View

Author:
Marek Madej and Robert Czulda
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The article ‘The Future of NATO in the New Security Environment. A Former Newcomer’s View’, analyses the role of NATO alliance in the contemporary security environment within the context of its priorities defined by new Strategic Concept 2010, having special attention on potential role of former newcomers and potential new members.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and United States of America

234. Nuclear Deterrence: The Wohlstetter-Blackett Debate Re-visited

Author:
Rajesh Basrur
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The Cold War debate between Albert Wohlstetter and Patrick Blackett over the requirements of effective deterrence is of profound relevance half a century later. The two thinkers offered systematic arguments for their maximalist (Wohlstetter) and minimalist (Blackett) positions. How we conceive of these requirements shapes the kinds of nuclear weapons doctrines, forces and postures we adopt. Whereas the Wohlstetter-Blackett debate was based largely on deductive logic, the opposing arguments can today be assessed on the basis of evidence drawing from nearly seven decades of strategic behaviour between nuclear rivals. An analysis of major confrontations in five nuclear dyads – United States-Soviet Union, United States-China, Soviet Union-China, India-Pakistan, and United States-North Korea – clearly offers much stronger support for Blackett‟s minimalist case than for Wohlstetter‟s maximalist one. Effective deterrence does not require second-strike capability as defined by Wohlstetter and the nuclear balance has no effect on a state‟s capacity to deter. Consequently, the central tenets of orthodox nuclear deterrence theory and doctrine are shown to be without foundation. For policymakers, the optimal forces and postures required for effective deterrence are therefore less demanding and the hurdles in the path of arms control and at least partial disarmament less difficult to cross.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, China, India, and Asia

235. Rethinking U.S.-China Security Cooperation

Author:
Nancy Gallagher
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This paper argues that traditional arms control approaches no longer work well for even traditional security problems on the U.S.-Chinese security agenda for three reasons: Firstly, even when both states reason for arms control from the superpowers’ experience during the Cold War, they do so in different ways; secondly, a growing number of experts and policy elite in both countries do not think the benefits of formal arms control outweigh the costs and risks; and thirdly, those who think formal arms control has an important role to play lack a clear and compelling logic for why arms control is durable and achievable among highly interdependent states with unequal power, mixed interests, and dissimilar values. Past attempts find a new basis for U.S.-China security cooperation—e.g., by using voluntary measures or by relying on the economic interdependence of the two states—have proved insufficient. The second half of this paper suggests the basic elements of a cooperative security logic that could be a more appropriate and effective basis for cooperation. Instead of narrowly defining the objective of arms control as increasing deterrence stability at lower cost and risk, this logic aims more broadly to prevent threats from developing, provide reassurance, and promote consensual political order among states. Rather than trying primarily to set equal technical limitations on military capabilities, dialogue and negotiations should seek to ensure that whatever capabilities states have, including asymmetrical and dual-use ones, are used for mutually acceptable purposes and according to equitable behavioral rules. Issues related to transparency, verification, and compliance management would also be handled in ways that promote cooperation rather than competition. The paper concludes by examining how U.S.-Chinese cooperation in space, on nuclear weapons issues (including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), and on missile defense all stand to benefit from reliance on this new logic.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Bilateral Relations, Deterrence, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

236. Clarifying U.S. – Japan Mine Warfare Roles, Missions, and Capabilities in the Persian Gulf: An Examination of International Legal Issues

Author:
Sean Henseler
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
The “Armitage/Nye Report” suggests that one area for potential increased alliance defense cooperation is minesweeping in the Persian Gulf. There is no question that Japan has the capability to deploy minesweepers to the Gulf and that doing so might have a deterrent effect were Iran to announce once again that it was planning to close the SOH. The real question for policymakers revolves around Japanese willingness to do so.
Topic:
International Law, War, Bilateral Relations, Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, Persian Gulf, and United States of America

237. Optimal Deterrence: An Evaluation of the Leaks-Regulating Regime

Author:
Ananth Padmanabhan, Tina Thomas, and Jacob Victor
Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
Recent high-profile leaks have led to renewed calls, especially from some members of Congress, for a more rigorous leaks-prosecuting regime. In response, others, most visibly the press and certain watchdog groups, have strongly resisted the claim that a more forceful response to unauthorized disclosures benefits the American public. This report evaluates the existing leaks-regulating regime and considers which of the current reform proposals are most likely to provide optimal deterrence. First, this report outlines the myriad and sometimes contradictory interests at stake implicated by unauthorized disclosure of classified information: protecting national security, safeguarding First Amendment rights, ensuring government accountability and transparency, promoting consistency in prosecution, and furthering efficient government functioning. Second, this report examines why it has proven difficult for the government to successfully prosecute leaks. It identifies four leading reasons. First, it can be difficult to identify a leaker, given the vast proliferation of the classification system and the expansion of national security bureaucracy. Second, the government faces significant legal burdens at trial— prosecutors often have to rely on circumstantial evidence; in the case of intangible information disclosure, the government may also have to deal with a heightened scienter requirements. Third, a trial may attract unwanted attention to an issue the government prefers to keep secret and defendants sometimes try to capitalize on this by using “graymail” defenses. Finally, the recipients of unauthorized disclosures—usually members of the press—enjoy robust constitutional protections that can restrict evidence gathering.
Topic:
Governance, Legal Theory, Deterrence, Classification, and Leaks
Political Geography:
Global Focus

238. Can Iran be Contained? Thoughts on the Possibility of Extended Deterrence in the Middle East

Author:
Carlo Masala
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
“Extended deterrence,” or “active deterrence,” as it is sometimes called, threatens a nuclearstrategic response in case of a nuclear attack on the territory or troops of one’s allies. This paper aims to explore the possibilities of extended deterrence in the Middle East in light of an Iranian nuclear military capability. Two preliminary remarks are necessary in order to frame the line of reasoning on the issue. First, discussion of the possibilities and pitfalls of extended deterrence in the Middle East does not intend to insinuate that diplomatic efforts to stop the Iranian regime from constructing a nuclear device have failed or that a nuclear Iran is already a given. Exploring the possibilities of extended deterrence in the Middle East is, rather, an attempt to be intellectually honest and anticipate that all the efforts underway for almost a decade will fail because the Iranian regime is determined to produce nuclear warheads or reach the breakout point, in which it will become a “virtual nuclear power.” Either trajectory will have a decisive impact on the nuclear realm, but even more so, on the political balance of power in the region; each has the potential to reshuffle relations not only between Iran and Israel but also between Iran and the Arab states in the Middle East. If either development is perceived as detrimental to the already fragile security situation in the Middle East, academics and practitioners must start thinking about a “Plan B”. The second preliminary remark that must precede any analysis of extended deterrence and its applicability to the Middle East concerns the nature of the subject to be explored. Although for about six decades there has been a profusion of literature on the mechanisms of deterrence and extended deterrence (in conjunction with the same number of critical studies on why deterrence and extended deterrence might not work),1 we still don’t know much about these two concepts. This paradox can be explained by the simple fact that so far we have not experienced the failure of a deterrence relationship, i.e., resulting in a nuclear war between two powers. Proponents and opponents of deterrence believe – in the theological sense of the word – that deterrence either works or doesn’t, respectively, but neither camp knows for certain. The consequences of this highly unsatisfying state of the art is that neither the “more may be better” nor the “dead end of deterrence”2 approach provides any form of guidance for policymakers. If academics want to speak truth to power they need to be aware of, first, the limitations of their theories, and second, that the real world can’t be grasped with parsimonious concepts.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

239. Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region: Implications for Stability in the Taiwan Strait and Beyond

Author:
Mark Stokes and Ian Easton
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
Aerospace power is unquestionably defining the future strategic environment in a region whose vast distances place a premium on speed and agility that defy the laws of gravity. This monograph addresses trends in China’s force modernization, strategy, and doctrine; development of conventional air force, air and missile defense, and long range precision strike modernization in Taiwan, Japan, India, and the United States; and options for countering the coercive utility of evolving PRC aerospace power, including cooperative threat reduction initiatives.
Topic:
Deterrence, Modernization, Strategic Stability, Military, and Aerospace
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia-Pacific

240. Evolving Capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army: Consequences of Coercive Aerospace Power for U.S. Conventional Deterrence

Author:
Randall Schriver and Mark Stokes
Publication Date:
08-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
How the PRC could apply force as an instrument of national power may be more significant than specific technical capabilities it develops and fields. An increasingly sophisticated arsenal of advanced weapon systems serves as an enabler for the PRC to expand its range of options for exercising coercive uses of force to resolve differences with democracies in the region.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Deterrence, Military, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Aerospace
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America