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11. An Analysis of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Light of its Form as a Framework Agreement

Author:
Monika Subritzky
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Goettingen Journal of International Law
Institution:
The Goettingen Journal of International Law
Abstract:
Nuclear weapons present a unique problem and risk to global safety and security. The destructive capability of nuclear weapons, which extends beyond intended targets, is what sets these weapons apart from all else; they are sui generis. These weapons are indiscriminate in both their scale of destruction, which cannot be said to involve proportionate force, and in their residual effects of radioactive fallout, which some scholars have equated to the effect of a poisoned weapon.1 The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was adopted at the United Nations Headquarters on 7 July 2017, with 122 States voting in favour of the final draft, one voting against, and one abstaining.2 As of July 2019, the Treaty has twenty-three parties and seventy signatories.3 It is currently not in force as it requires ratification by a minimum of fifty States in order to come into effect.4 The core prohibitions of the Treaty are set out in its first Article, in which State parties agree to never develop, acquire, use or threaten to use, transfer, or stockpile nuclear weapons. What the Treaty does not do, however, is directly eliminate any nuclear weapons; a challenging task in itself considering that none of the current possessors of nuclear weapons even partook in the negotiation of the Treaty. State parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have obligations under Article VI to undertake negotiations on effective measures leading to disarmament.5 Against a backdrop of little discernible progress on the implementation of Article VI over the last fifty years, Ireland, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, submitted a Working Paper outlining possible pathways to nuclear disarmament in an effort to fulfil the provisions of Article VI.6 These pathways were debated in 2016 during the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), which was set up for the purpose of providing a forum for discussion regarding advancing nuclear disarmament. The argument of this paper is that the TPNW has the potential to function radically as a disarmament mechanism. At first glance, the Treaty appears to fit within the second pathway outlined in the Irish Working Paper, effectively functioning as a simple Ban Treaty. However, a careful analysis reveals that it more neatly fits into the third pathway – a framework arrangement. It is this characteristic which makes the TPNW a novel and profound instrument as well as a potential foundational solution to the problem of nuclear weapons. The core section of the paper is divided into two parts. The first delves into the three main pathways discussed in the Irish Working Paper and analyzes how well each of the proposals can address the problem of achieving nuclear disarmament. As suggested by Brazil in the OEWG debates in 2016, three categories are key in establishing the degree to which each pathway can achieve progress in achieving nuclear disarmament – universality, effectiveness, and political viability.7 All nuclear disarmament treaties must intend to be universal in light of the humanitarian consequences of their usage. However, a disarmament treaty can be successful with universality as one of its objectives, rather than a precondition. Widespread support for a treaty also lends to its effectiveness, as do mechanisms for verification and enforcement.8 The political viability of a treaty is key as, without the willing participation of governments, proposals can easily be discarded. The analysis is centred on these categories. The second core part of the paper analyzes the structure of the TPNW with a focus on Articles 4 and 8. It demonstrates that the TPNW surreptitiously functions as a framework agreement and that this attribute has enormous value, both in practice and in shaping norms. The flexibility and adaptability of framework agreements is what makes them the most suitable mechanisms for nuclear disarmament.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

12. Risk Realism: The Arms Control Endgame for North Korea Policy

Author:
Van Jackson
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
While the reasons for seeking North Korean denuclearization are sensible, continuing to pursue that goal makes the United States and its allies less secure. In word and deed, North Korea has shown it has no interest in nuclear disarmament. Because denuclearization is antithetical to Kim Jong Un’s bottom line, U.S. attempts at diplomacy to that end are self-sabotaging. As long as disarmament of North Korea remains America’s professed goal, Kim Jong Un has every incentive either to avoid the negotiating process or favorably manipulate it at America’s expense—by stalling for time, making unfulfilled promises, and securing concessions without reciprocity. Worse, as the 2017 nuclear confrontation showed, making denuclearization an actionable goal of U.S. policy creates real risks of crisis instability—justifying extreme measures and extreme rhetoric in the name of what has become an extreme aim. But policymakers can avoid the pitfalls of the past by attempting something more realistic than denuclearization—an arms control approach to North Korea. The United States has significant unexploited margin to take diplomatic and political risks aimed at probing and potentially shifting North Korea’s approach to its nuclear arsenal. An arms control approach would seek to reorient U.S. North Korea policy to prioritize what matters most: reducing the risk of nuclear or conventional war without forsaking other U.S. interests at stake in Korea. Using diplomacy to enhance regional stability and foreclose the possibility of an avoidable nuclear war requires pursuing a negotiated outcome that both sides can accept, and that tests North Korea’s willingness to uphold commitments short of disarmament. U.S. policy often seeks to test North Korean intentions, but without offering the accommodations and concessions that would serve as a meaningful test. Remedying this problem through an arms control approach requires taking considerable unilateral actions consistent with U.S. interests before proceeding to a phased negotiating process.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Risk, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

13. Negotiating Toward a Denuclearization-Peace Roadmap on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Duyeon Kim
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security
Abstract:
This report examines pathways toward denuclearization and peace on the Korean peninsula by offering a conceptual framework and principles for a political roadmap informed by a technical understanding of nuclear issues, to guide Washington as it navigates a range of options in negotiations until 2020. Recognizing the inevitable linkages between denuclearization and the peace process and the effects the two issues have on each other, this report proposes and emphasizes the need for a comprehensive denuclearization-peace roadmap. The task and key challenge for the United States is to configure the right tradeoffs to create incentives for North Korea to take denuclearization steps without giving away too many vital rewards too soon, to maintain negotiating leverage. It is important to prevent Pyongyang from pocketing early gains and walking away from the process without making significant progress on denuclearization. Value-based metrics should be used in determining appropriate bargains.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Negotiation, Peace, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
South Korea and North Korea

14. Redefining Success for the Trump-Kim Summit

Author:
Richard N. Holwill
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassador's Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
A meeting between President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un (KJU), the Supreme Leader of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), can be a success even if it fails to achieve President Trump’s announced goal: an end to the DPRK nuclear weapons program. This meeting starts by giving KJU one of his long-sought goals. It will, in effect, be more than a meeting. It will be a “summit” and will confer on KJU the status of the leader of a legitimate government. President Trump would be wise to redefine success. He should not fall into the trap of saying that success will be defined by a “denuclearization agreement.” While that should be a long-term goal, it will not happen at this meeting. Still, the summit will be successful if it produces a process that can lead to a substantial reduction of tension on the Korean Peninsula. This is not to say that an agreement on denuclearization is off the table. Rather, it is to rec­ognize that these talks could present a framework for negotiation that would be very valuable, even if they will fall short of a nuclear disarmament accord. To understand the difficulty of reaching a nuclear arms agreement, we need only look at the way the two leaders speak about denuclearization. Each appears to define it differently. President Trump applies the term to nuclear weapons in the DPRK. KJU speaks of it as applying to the entire Korean Peninsula. He will argue that, if he must allow a mean­ingful verification regime, so must U.S. forces in South Korea.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

15. The Evolution of the North Korean Nuclear Program: from Survival Strategy to Ideological Legitimization

Author:
Marco Milani
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
In recent years the North Korean nuclear program has increasingly become a major concern for East Asian security. Pyongyang has repeatedly demonstrated its advancements in both missile and nuclear technology, with the final goal of acquiring a credible nuclear deterrent. To achieve this goal, the regime has committed a vast amount of state resources and has jeopardized relations with neighboring countries and major powers. This dangerous situation has created instability in the region and has hindered the possibilities of inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation. The traditional interpretation of the North Korean nuclear program focuses on the survival of the regime and emphasizes the military aspect of security. While these factors play a significant role, over the last twenty-five years new roles have emerged for the nuclear program. Survival remains the priority, but in addition to the military level of nuclear deterrence this paper introduces two different aspects directly connected to the security of the regime: economic security and domestic ideological legitimization. The development of nuclear weapons has been repeatedly used by Pyongyang as leverage in negotiations and to strengthen its political legitimacy. Understanding the complexity and the different factors behind this strategy is crucial to design and implement a viable and effective strategy aimed at limiting or eliminating the North Korean nuclear threat.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korea

16. A Way Out of the North Korean Labyrinth

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The sudden announcement of a North Korea-U.S. summit in March 2018 upended all previous diplomacy concerning North Korea’s nuclear program. In return for a bilateral presidential summit, Pyongyang has agreed to suspend testing of its nuclear and missile programs and accepted the continuation of scheduled U.S.-South Korea exercises as planned. While this unexpected development reduces tensions and opens up a political path to a solution on the Korean Peninsula, it also imparts increased urgency for a well-conceived U.S. diplomatic strategy so that the summit and any ensuing negotiations lead to positive outcomes for Washington and Seoul and the other interested parties, thus ensuring its sustainability. In this context, the author advances an assessment of the current situation and a proposal for a U.S. program that could reduce military tensions in and around Korea, lead to the stabilization of a new and legitimate equilibrium in Northeast Asia, and advance shared American, South Korean, and Japanese objectives.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Weapons, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

17. Managing a Nuclear-Armed North Korea: A Grand Strategy for a Denuclearized and Peacefully Unified Korea

Author:
Seongwhun Cheon
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
Managing a nuclear-armed North Korea is South Korea’s grand strategy to protect the nation’s vital security interest in the short term and achieve peaceful unification in the long term. Its foundation rests on two pillars of containing the North’s military expansion and nuclear coercion, and promoting constructive changes in North Korean society. This strategy of management is neither appeasement based on unfounded optimism of the North Korean leadership nor an intimidation tactic to overthrow the Kim Family Regime. Under the assumption that genuine peace or national integration is not possible unless North Korea is denuclearized and its society transformed, it is a strategy that exercises full vigilance toward the North and applies all available means and methods to reduce political and military threats from Pyongyang. It also patiently encourages gradual and fundamental changes in North Korea as the ultimate path to a denuclearized and unified Korean peninsula. The management strategy understands that no dialogue with North Korea could resolve the nuclear problem at a single stroke, and thus, it keeps expectations low and objectives achievable. It does not anticipate a sweeping deal to denuclearize North Korea.
Topic:
Nuclear Power, Grand Strategy, Peace, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

18. Pragmatic, Not Mad: The Rationality of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program

Author:
Mark Halchin
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The reasoning behind North Korea’s continued efforts to develop a nuclear deterrent remains puzzling to many, with the heavy costs and behavior of the regime leading to the belief that it is irrational. This paper argues that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is instead a rational strategy for the regime. The perceived threat from South Korean and American military forces, as well as its own ineffective conventional forces, make a North Korean nuclear program a viable and relatively cheap deterrent. Its limited foreign relations and near-total dependence on China largely insulate it from economic punishment. Finally, the nature of the regime allows it to disregard popular opinion while forcing it to accommodate military demands for a nuclear deterrent. The necessity of nuclear weapons for defence and the few downsides of possessing them means that Pyongyang is unlikely to give them up, thus dooming denuclearization efforts to failure.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and North America

19. Kazakhstan: Building a Nuclear-Safe World

Author:
Erzhan Kazykhanov
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassador's Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
As the 72nd session of the United Nations General Assembly convened on September 19, 2017, in New York to address issues with worldwide implications, significant attention was paid to nuclear nonproliferation and the threat that possession of nuclear weapons presents to the security of the entire interna­tional community. Addressing the Security Council, U.S. Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson con­veyed a comprehensive vision of reducing the threats emanating from weapons of mass destruction. First and foremost, Secretary Tillerson outlined the importance of highlighting the positive trajectories of nations that have voluntarily renounced their nuclear weapons. In this context, he said, “Kazakhstan is a particularly illustrative example of the wisdom of relinquishing nuclear weapons. In partnership with the United States, and aided by the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act spearheaded by U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, Kazakhstan opted to remove from its territory former Soviet weapons and related nuclear technologies, and [it] joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-weapons state.” This courageous decision by the leaders of Kazakhstan greatly reduced the prospect of nuclear weapons, components of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials and dual-use technologies from falling into the wrong hands. Nuclear weapons introduced complexity into relations with other countries, and they introduced the risk of miscalculation, accident or escalation. Kazakhstan’s actions represented a key step in that country’s becoming part of the community of nations. As a result of Kazakhstan’s letting go of nuclear weapons, the world does not look on Kazakhstan as a potential nuclear aggressor or a rogue state. It did not make enemies of its nuclear neighbors, Russia or China. Today Kazakhstan has overwhelmingly been at peace with its neighbors, and its trade relations are robust. This year, it hosted World Expo 2017, an event in Astana that showcased the sources of future energy and investment opportunities in Kazakhstan to attendees from around the world. This demonstrates that Kazakhstan is a modern nation making a substantial contribution to regional and international peace and prosperity. Kazakhstan has only benefitted from its early decision. In my previous career, I met President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the founding president of Kazakhstan, on many occasions and had the opportunity to ask him about this decision. He is more at peace with his choice than ever. He once remarked to me, “It was the best thing I ever did for our young country.” Indeed, the international community is well aware of the fact that one of the legacies of the former Soviet Union’s policy strategy in the aftermath of World War II and as a result of the Cold War arms race was building the new nuclear-weapons complex on Kazakhstan soil. The USSR leadership sought to use the country’s central geographical location to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles in a way that would reach even the most remote parts of the world and lead to the most devastating outcomes in affected areas.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Russia, Kazakhstan, and Eastern Europe

20. China and the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Promoting a Trilateral Dialogue

Author:
Heung-kyu Kim
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
As the Republic of Korea faces an increasing threat from North Korea, evolving U.S.-China relations are becoming important to Seoul’s strategy for dealing with Pyongyang. The United States and China are competitors, but they also seek cooperation on a range of global issues. And although South Korea seeks to have good relations with both great powers, it is increasingly being pushed to take sides in the ongoing U.S.-China competition. As the U.S.-China relationship becomes more complex, South Korea needs to carefully evaluate its policy toward China in order to find the best ways to ensure Chinese cooperation on the North Korean issue, particularly taking into account China’s evolving view of North Korea. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is profoundly changing its foreign policy, including its relations with the United States and the two Koreas. With more confidence in its own diplomatic, military, and economic capacity to protect its national interests, China under Xi’s leadership has begun to regard the entire Korean Peninsula as part of its sphere of influence.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea