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751. NATO Missile Defense: Is Europe Ready?

Author:
Edgar Buckley
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
No wonder everyone looks forward to a positive decision on making territorial missile defense a NATO task at the upcoming Lisbon Summit. Allies will breathe a collective sigh of relief for two reasons. First, proliferation of missile technology has exposed Europe to real future risks and threats, which can only be countered defensively through early preparation and deployments. Second, absent such a decision, the United States' Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) – to be deployed in Europe whatever the summit decides – is a fundamental challenge to NATO, detracting from its overall responsibility for collective defense and raising acutely uncomfortable issues, such as the prospect of U.S.-commanded defenses operating in parallel with Article 5 defense of NATO.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and International Security
Political Geography:
Europe

752. Modeling Defense Acquisition Strategy

Author:
Venelin Georgiev
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
Defense acquisition policy is one of the most important aspects of defense policy, and requires an efficient and effective strategy for implementation. As a universal method, modeling provides an opportunity for many different approaches to defense acquisition strategies to be developed and analyzed in order to select the best or most appropriate method, depending on a nation's current economic conditions. Variables that can be included in modeling the process of defense acquisition strategy include specific defense acquisition instrumental policies and their parameters; typical strategies currently in use in different defense acquisition domains; and strategic management tools, such as the strategic card (SC) and the balanced scorecard (BSC). In the end, the options for defense acquisition strategy that are developed through modeling are assessed based on the extent to which they appear likely to develop the set of desired military capabilities and implement the defense missions and tasks that have been set forth in the nation's defense policy, and remain in line with the level of ambition, budget resource restrictions, and level of associated risk.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Europe

753. North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex

Author:
Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
On November 12, during my most recent visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex with Stanford University colleagues John W. Lewis and Robert Carlin, we were shown a 25 to 30 megawatt-electric (MWe) experimental light-water reactor (LWR) in the early stages of construction. It is North Korea's first attempt at LWR technology and we were told it is proceeding with strictly indigenous resources and talent. The target date for operation was said to be 2012, which appears much too optimistic.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

754. Missile Defense: Challenges and Opportunities for NATO

Author:
Svenja Sinjen and Stephan Frühling
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In November 2010, NATO will adopt a new strategic concept at its summit in Lisbon. Finding agreement about the Alliance's purposes, strategies and required capabilities will not be an easy task. In the lead-up, the allies appointed a Group of Experts led by Medeleine Albright to make recommendations for the new concept, and which published its report in May 2010. One of the core recommendations of the Group is that "NATO should recognize territorial missile defense as an essential mission of the Alliance." NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen had also put Alliance missile defense on the agenda of the recent meeting of NATO foreign ministers in April. Hence, missile defense is shaping up as a core practical issue where NATO will have to agree on a new, coherent and meaningful policy at the Lisbon summit.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, and Arms Control and Proliferation

755. Cyber war and cyber power: Issues for NATO doctrine

Author:
Jeffrey Hunker
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
"Cyber War" is now the subject of considerable attention in the US, both in the popular media and in policy realms (together with its companions, cyber threats, cyber attacks, cyber terrorism, and cyber weapons). For those in NATO it is important to understand what cyber war and related terms mean, why they are subject of US focus, and what the implications for NATO are. That is the purpose of this paper.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
United States

756. On the Rocks: Korea and Japan Divided over the Dokdo Issue

Author:
D. Bong Youngshik
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
No serious observer of postwar relations between South Korea and Japan doubts that there is a bilateral issue between the two nations that is more persistent and volatile than their feud over the sovereign status of the two minuscule islets of Dokdo. This commentary examines the history of disputes over Dokdo, and attempts to argue that the starting point for a solution lies in the pragmatic and prudent approach, not in assertive diplomacy based on nationalistic sentiments. Since the end of World War II, Dokdo has been under the effective administrative control of the South Korean government. The Japanese government has protested at various official levels since then, arguing that the islets, which it calls Takeshima, belong to Japan in accordance with historical evidence and international law. The diplomatic feud over the territory did not flare up during the Cold War, because both countries involved in the controversy made security cooperation against the communist threat in Northeast Asia their top priority. It was only after concerns over the external regional security environment were lifted with the end of the Cold War that Japan began to fortify its claims to Dokdo in a far more assertive and diversified manner. South Korea responded to this change by making periodic departures from its traditional line of defense of “quiet diplomacy”—that is, taking the view that because its sovereignty over the islets is indisputable and its control over them remains complete, South Korea has no strategic interests in aggressively and emotionally reacting to Japan’s escalatory territorial policy. To do so would only reinforce Japan’s claim that there does exist an unresolved territorial issue between the two countries and the sovereign status of Dokdo is undetermined, when in fact South Korea’s position is the opposite.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

757. A Complex Strategy to Overcome the Yeonpyeong Incident

Author:
Young-Sun Ha
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since North Korea’s deadly artillery barrage on Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea has been stepping up efforts in its defense posture and international cooperation. In preparing against any further provocation from the North, Seoul has been reinforcing forces on the island, strengthening defense and deterrence capabilities, and drastically increasing its defense budget. Somewhat belatedly, it has also been taking up actions to reexamine the strategies of the ROK-U.S. military alliance, demanding cooperation from China and Russia while maintaining the traditional trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan. Of course, analyzing the causes of the weak response to the shelling and preparing to prevent further provocations are undoubtedly important. However, reading the bigger picture and formulating key strategies for the future is a far more critical task. The Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un leadership in November 2010 conducted two consecutive moves—revealing its uranium enrichment facilities and launching an artillery strike on Yeonpyeong Island. Understanding the situation of the whole East Asian region, while at the same time anticipating Pyongyang’s strategies and taking preemptive actions will be the main challenges ahead for Seoul. Firstly, it is important to understand the range of North Korea’s strategic options from aggressive diplomacy to peaceful diplomacy. The Korean Peninsula went through the Korean War in 1950 and following of the ceasefire, both Koreas were stuck between ‘hot war’ and ‘cold war.’ Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has passed the stage of ‘cold peace’ and moved towards a ‘hot peace.’ In spite of this global shift, North Korea has been frequently using combinations of ‘cold war,’ ‘hot war,’ ‘cold peace,’ and ‘hot peace’ on the international strategic chessboard. For example, during the Cold War period North Korea provoked the South in a number of cases: Rangoon bombing (1983), bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 (1987), attempted Blue House raid (1968), North Korean infiltration in the Uljin and Samcheok areas (1968). Even in the post-Cold War period, nuclear tests, naval battles in the Yellow Sea, the sinking of Cheonan naval ship and the shelling on Yeonpyeong Island ensued. At the same time, Pyongyang has been aggressively demanding for a peace agreement to this day. The possibility for limited warfare on the Korean Peninsula came dangerously close with the recent Yeonpyeong shelling, more so than the last North Korean provocation, the sinking of the Cheonan. As the pendulum of war and peace on the Korean Peninsula swung from the ‘cold war’ to ‘hot war,’ greater chaos arise. It is expected that the Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un regime will try to maximize the use of this pendulum of peace and war in order to strengthen Kim Jong-un’s weak power base. In spite of the dangers, merely worrying about the possibility of war is not going to help. Rather, we have to understand precisely why the North has raised the bar of aggression from acts of terrorism to that of a direct artillery attack on South Korean territory. It is likely that the North would pursue a ‘cold peace’ offensive to utilize the amplitude of the pendulum. A complex picture emerges when looking back on the recent comments made by top officials from North Korea, the United States, and China. Seoul and Washington have called for Pyongyang to engage in measures for active denuclearization and reengagement in inter-Korean relations as preconditions for resuming the Six-Party Talks. North Korea on the other hand has taken precisely the opposite measures. To read what the North Korean regime has in mind we have to think of the situation not as a motionless snapshot but as a moving footage. Furthermore, South Korea must do more than just respond to North Korea’s actions. Instead it should focus on making strategically preemptive moves. For this, it is necessary to examine why the North Korean regime expanded the pendulum’s amplitude and find measures to make the leadership pursue a survival strategy that does not include huddling around nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Alliance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

758. Controversies over missile defense in Europe

Author:
Raimo Väyrynen
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The plan to deploy an anti-missile system in Central Europe has been one of the most controversial security policy issues in the past few years. The Bush Administration pushed hard for the deployment of the radar site in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland, largely because it would provide an additional layer in the global anti-ballistic missile defense of the United States. In both of these countries, public opinion has been against the deployments and the governments have had to negotiate between external and internal pressures pushing them in different policy directions. Russia has been adamantly opposed to the missile defense plan, issuing both threats and suggesting alternative ways to diminish the threat that the United States feels from Iran. The result has been a political stalemate that has further complicated otherwise tense relations between Moscow and Washington, D.C. With the arrival of the Obama Administration, there is a pause in the missile dispute, but no permanent resolution of the conflict is in sight.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Washington, Poland, Moscow, and Czech Republic

759. Caught in the Conflict: Civilians and the international security strategy in Afghanistan

Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
The intensification and spread of the conflict in Afghanistan is increasingly affecting civilians. In 2008 there were over 2,100 civilian casualties, 55% of which were caused by militants. Despite steps to reduce civilian casualties, international military forces (IMF) caused 552 civilian deaths through airstrikes in 2008, which is up by 72% on 2007. IMF have also carried out or supported raids and search operations, a large number of which have involved an excessive use of force, including loss of life, physical assault, dam age to property and theft, as well as aggressive and improper treatment of women. Such conduct not only generates anger and mistrust towards foreign troops, but is steadily eroding popular support for the international presence in the country. Furthermore, many individuals detained by Afghan and US forces are held for long periods without charge or trial, and there are allegations of mistreatment and torture.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Human Rights, and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Central Asia

760. The Role of the Ministerial Advisor in Security Sector Reform: Navigating Institutional Terrains

Author:
Liz Panarelli
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
International actors in Security Sector Reform (SSR) are increasingly taking on roles as “advisors” to Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Justice. Rather than directly implement changes necessary for SSR, these advisors must persuasively articulate suggestions to their local counterparts. Advisors' success depends on their ability to convey recommendations in a manner that makes change acceptable to their advisees. Ministerial and governmental advising is not the exclusive purview of any one entity. Rather, advising is undertaken by a diverse range of individuals from U.S. and foreign governments, militaries, NGOs, private contractors, and U.N. agencies. These actors have correspondingly diverse objectives and approaches to SSR; without coordination or consensus on SSR programming, advisors may find themselves working at cross - purposes. Furthermore, the multiplicity of advisors and institutions makes sharing best practices and improving over time and across conflicts extremely difficult.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Government
Political Geography:
United States