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151. Accelerating autonomy: Autonomous systems and the Tiger helicopter replacement

Author:
Marcus Hellyer
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
The benefits of autonomous systems on the modern battlefield have been widely recognised, yet Defence has only slowly adopted them. It continues to invest heavily in manned platforms that are increasingly expensive but still expose their crews to constantly proliferating threats. This means that Defence is acquiring small numbers of exquisite manned platforms that could be too valuable and too few to risk losing. Defence has started to explore using autonomous systems on the battlefield, but it’s now time to accelerate their development and adoption by the ADF. A new APSI Special Report, ‘Accelerating autonomy: autonomous systems and the Tiger helicopter replacement’ recommends how Defence can jump start the transition to greater use of autonomous systems. Report author Dr Marcus Hellyer said that ‘Defence has slowly been developing trust in unmanned systems. It’s laid a foundation, now it’s time to do a lot more.’ The report argues that Defence needs to identify areas of capability where autonomous systems can deliver disruptive innovation. Investing in those systems can deliver more capability at less cost than traditional manned systems.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

152. The Bushmaster: From concept to combat

Author:
Brendan Nicholson
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
This account of the Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle by Brendan Nicholson is the classic story of the ugly duckling—an ‘armoured Winnebago’—transformed swan-like into the vital lifesaver for Australian and Dutch troops on combat operations in Afghanistan. It was never designed to play that role. Based on South African and Rhodesian experiments with landmine-blast-deflecting V-shaped hulls, the Bushmaster was first conceived as a lightly armoured truck. In 1980s ‘Defence of Australia’ planning, the Bushmaster would move troops around the vastness of northern Australia pursuing ‘thugs in thongs’ bent on harassing locals. As with earlier ASPI case studies on defence projects, The Bushmaster: From concept to combat is designed to help those in Defence, industry and parliament and other interested observers to better understand the complexities of the business, all with the aim of improving how Australia equips its defence force.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, National Security, Armed Forces, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

153. Exploring the military and security links of China’s universities.

Author:
Alex Joske
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
What’s the problem? The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is building links between China’s civilian universities, military and security agencies. Those efforts, carried out under a policy of leveraging the civilian sector to maximise military power (known as ‘military–civil fusion’), have accelerated in the past decade. Research for the China Defence Universities Tracker has determined that greater numbers of Chinese universities are engaged in defence research, training defence scientists, collaborating with the military and cooperating with defence industry conglomerates and are involved in classified research.1 At least 15 civilian universities have been implicated in cyberattacks, illegal exports or espionage. China’s defence industry conglomerates are supervising agencies of nine universities and have sent thousands of their employees to train abroad. This raises questions for governments, universities and companies that collaborate with partners in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). There’s a growing risk that collaboration with PRC universities can be leveraged by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or security agencies for surveillance, human rights abuses or military purposes. Universities and governments remain unable to effectively manage risks that come with growing collaboration with PRC entities. There’s little accessible information on the military and security links of PRC universities. This knowledge gap limits the effectiveness of risk-management efforts. What’s the solution? Efforts to manage the risks of engaging with PRC universities should involve close collaboration between governments and universities. Both share a concern for protecting national interests, ensuring the integrity of research, preventing engagement from being exploited by rival militaries or for human rights abuses, and increasing the transparency of research collaboration. The Australian Government should establish a national research integrity office and refine and enforce foreign interference and export controls legislation. It should use the China Defence Universities Tracker to improve the screening of visa applicants and inform decisions to award research funding. Universities should be proactive in their efforts to concretely improve how research collaboration is managed. The China Defence Universities Tracker is a tool to help universities and researchers understand institutions in China and avoid harmful collaborations. Universities can use the recently published Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector to help review their management of collaboration.2 They should introduce clauses into agreements with PRC entities to terminate those agreements in the case of specific ethical concerns or indications of research going towards a military end use. Universities could demonstrate their commitment to these initiatives by establishing independent research integrity offices that promote transparency and evaluate compliance with ethics, values and security interests, serving as administratively distinct bodies that avoid influence from internal university politics.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Military Affairs, and Higher Education
Political Geography:
China and Asia

154. Nuclear strategy in a changing world

Author:
Rod Lyon
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
The immense destructive power of nuclear weapons continues to shape the international strategic balance, not least Australia’s place as a close ally of the United States in an increasingly risky Indo-Pacific region. What is the continuing utility to America’s allies of extended nuclear deterrence? Where is the risk of nuclear proliferation greatest? How should the world deal with the growing nuclear capabilities of North Korea? Is the nuclear order as sturdy and stable and it needs to be? These and other pressing issues are addressed in this volume by one of Australia’s leading thinkers on nuclear weapons and the global strategic balance, Rod Lyon. Rod’s career spans academic research and teaching at the University of Queensland, and strategic analysis for Australia’s peak intelligence agency, the Office of National Assessments (now the Office of National Intelligence). Since 2006 he has been a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and a frequent contributor on nuclear issues to The Strategist, Australia’s best online source of analysis on defence and strategic issues. The 36 pithy articles in this volume offer Rod Lyon’s distilled wisdom on critical nuclear issues, which are increasingly occupying the minds of Australia’s best policy and intelligence thinkers.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Australia, Australia/Pacific, North America, and United States of America

155. Defence projects and the economy

Author:
Rob Bourke
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
This report examines what the national economy stands to gain from nearly $100 billion of planned investment in new defence capital equipment including submarines, frigates and military vehicles. The report emphasises that although the general public has been informed about some of the economic benefits of those projects, it has limited access to reliable information on most of their economic costs. Nor has the public been fully informed of how much of what goes into the projects will be produced in Australia. The picture emerging from information available publicly contrasts with the image of vessel and vehicle projects as a major source of ‘jobs and growth’. At best, the projects appear to have a small positive impact on economic activity. That’s due to the substantial economic costs involved. Author Rob Bourke said that ‘for such large projects whose economic benefits have been portrayed as being far above their economic costs, it’s surprising how little supporting evidence has been made available to Australian taxpayers. With the economic upside of projects touted widely but the economic downside largely hidden from public view, it’s difficult to assess the merits of investments of national significance. Government messaging suggests that projects add much more to the economy than they take away. The evidence available publicly paints a different picture: Australia potentially paying a lot to protect a little. Vessel and vehicle acquisitions might now be difficult to alter. Nonetheless, the lessons in transparency that they provide are important to consider for future investments by Defence, especially with calls for its budget to move well above the current target of 2% of GDP.’
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Economy, and Investment
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

156. Strong and free? The future security of Australia's north

Author:
John Coyne
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
This report argues that ‘there is a need to reconceptualize Northern Australia, as a single scalable Defence and National Security ecosystem’. This ecosystem should be developed to ‘deliver integrated support to current and future ADF and National Security operations’. The strategic importance of Australia’s north to Australia’s defence has long been recognized by government and policy makers. Despite strategic policy commitments to Northern Australia, there is a growing body of evidence indicating that the gap is widening between strategic policy and Defence’s actual activities and presence in the north. This could well be symptomatic of a gap in Australia’s northern development policies. It is likely that with the significantly reduced warning times of future conflict the North of Australia will increasingly become either Australia’s Forward Operating (FOB) base, or its lily pad to another forward location within the pacific or the first or second island chain. The northern Australian industry base needs to be enhanced to be able to provide a permanent and scalable civilianized replenishment and depot repair capacity for Defence capabilities deployed across the various physical nodes of FOB North. If the Northern Australian industry base is not scalable then the ADF may not be able to optimally configure to undertake Defence of Australia tasks, nor short notification joint expeditionary operations within our regional neighbourhood. To succeed, the FOB North concept must be fully integrated with Australia’s broader national security strategy. ADF and National security activities ought to be integrally linked and mutually supporting. The FOB North concept will provide policy makers the foundation for thinking of the North as a facilitator of engagement with the region. FOB North will also make the North of Australia a vehicle for defence with the region, rather than defence from the region. The development of FOB North needs to be part of, and supported by, Australia sovereign nation building efforts. FOB North as both a sovereign defence and national security concept is an integral part of building national resilience in Northern Australia and as such should not be simply planned and delivered through a defence white paper (DWP). This kind of ambitious national approach will involve Defence working with a diverse array of stakeholders and partners. It will also allow Defence to make a significant and lasting contribution to its most basic strategic interest; a secure, resilient Australia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

157. The Australian Defence Force and contested space

Author:
Malcolm Davis
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
This new Strategy report looks at war on the high frontier of outer space, and what the implications such a development might have for the ADF. It highlights that space is not a sanctuary from geopolitical rivalries. The report notes that Australia is heavily dependent on the space environment, both for its national prosperity and societal well-being, and for its defence and national security, and the report examines Australia’s current approach to use of space for Defence. The report then examines emerging counterspace threats. China and Russia are moving towards deploying a suite of ‘counterspace capabilities’ to deny access to essential space systems used by the US and its allies, including Australia, prior to, or at the outset of a military conflict. These include direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons that physically destroy satellites in orbit after being launched from Earth’s surface; they are testing technologies that could be applied towards a co-orbital ASAT system designed to attack satellites from space; and have a range of ‘soft-kill’ ground-based technologies to disrupt, damage, and disable – but not destroy - satellites. Author Malcolm Davis notes that, 'China is developing the ability to rapidly attack US and allied (including Australian) critical space infrastructure prior to or at the outset of a future military conflict, in what amounts to the risk of a ‘space Pearl Harbor’ that would be designed to leave the US and its allies ‘deaf, dumb and blind.’ Such an outcome would severely erode the ADF’s ability to undertake information-led joint, integrated and coalition operations.' The report highlights the risks posed by ‘soft-kill’ systems described above. These don’t generate space debris, and thus have greater operational utility and anonymity, and they raise the threat of ‘grey zones in orbit. The report also examines efforts towards legal and arms control measures to constrain space weaponization and explores how these can contribute to reduce the prospect of warfare in space. The report finally makes a number of recommendations on how Defence should respond to this challenge to maintain freedom of action in space.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Space, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

158. You Can't Surge Trust: Lessons on Working with Allies and Partners

Author:
George Fust
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
Today’s increasingly complex global operating environment can change at the speed of a tweet or viral video. It is therefore imperative for US forces to have the relationships that offer flexibility and options for any contingency—relationships established in advance of unforeseeable events. The world’s interconnectedness and US defense requirements demand partners and allies with whom we work effectively to bridge cultural gaps. Those relationships increase interoperability by creating realistic expectations and combating what can at times emerge as negative stereotypes. Further, shared experiences can help overcome misunderstandings and foster friendships that will be critical in times of crisis. Simply put, you cannot surge trust. It must be cultivated and given constant attention.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Environment, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States and North America

159. Current Military Academy Service Obligation: Good for Civil-Military Relations

Author:
George Fust
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
Imagine receiving a free undergraduate education at one of the best colleges in the United States. The military academies provide this. Any economist, however, will tell you that there is no such thing as a free lunch. The American tax payer foots the bill for all those who are admitted to attend one of the military’s academies. In exchange, these citizens will commission as officers and serve an obligation of five years on active duty. The most recent National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) includes a section directing the Secretary of Defense to assess if this five-year service obligation should be extended. Congress is now questioning if the increase in the cost of educating and training should equate to an increase in time served for graduates. In short, is the nation getting “an adequate return on investment for a service academy graduate?”
Topic:
Defense Policy, Education, Training, and Military Service
Political Geography:
United States and North America

160. Breaking the Cycle: Iraq following the military defeat of Islamic State

Author:
Maria-Louise Clausen
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
Despite the Iraqi Security Forces’ success in the military defeat of Islamic State (IS) and reconquering of territory seized by IS in 2014, the Iraqi state faces substantial challenges. These challenges have been exacerbated by IS, but did not emerge with IS and will therefore also not disappear with the defeat of IS. This DIIS Report underlines the fragmentation and policization of the security sector as a concern. Although the continued threat from IS has a destabilizing impact on the Iraqi state, the report especially points to the role of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF: an umbrella term for more than 50 armed groups that mobilized against IS in 2014), the sustained focus on identity politics and the pressure on the Iraqi state as key issues for the rebuilding and stabilization of Iraq. The presence of PMFs in Iraq is a challenge to the Iraqi state’s monopoly of violence and the PMFs continue to commit violations with impunity. Moreover, the PMFs (Popular Mobilization Forces) are capitalizing on their role in the defeat of Islamic State to increase their political role. Finally, despite the recent movement towards issue-based politics, identity remains a vital element in Iraqi politics, as seen in the continued practice of power-sharing between Kurds, Shias, and Sunnis. This combined with the Iraqi population’s general lack of trust in the political system challenges reconstruction. Nonetheless, the report asserts that there is a window of opportunity for Iraq, that should be seized by the Iraqi elite and the international community to engage in the difficult process of reconstruction and reconciliation. The report provides a brief overview of some of the main challenges facing Iraq that must be dealt with if Iraq is to break the cycle of violence that has haunted the country for decades.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Democratization, Poverty, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Inequality, Fragile States, Economy, Conflict, Violence, Peace, and Justice
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East