In his classic 1973 book The Imperial Presidency, historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. warned that the American political system was threatened by “a conception of presidential power so spacious and peremptory as to imply a radical transformation of the traditional polity.” America's rise to global dominance and Cold War leadership, Schlesinger explained, had dangerously concentrated power in the presidency, transforming the Framers' energetic but constitutionally constrained chief executive into a sort of elected emperor with virtually unchecked authority in the international arena.
Sea-based missile defense is being advocated as an alternative to the Clinton administration\'s limited land-based national missile defense (NMD), which is in the early stages of testing. Proponents of sea-based NMD (which is only a concept, not a program) argue that such a system can be deployed more quickly and will be less expensive than the Clinton administration\'s land-based system. Some argue that the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) system—which is being designed to provide midcourse intercept capability against slower, shorter-range theater ballistic missiles—can be upgraded to attack longrange intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in their boost phase (when under powered flight at the beginning of their trajectories). Interestingly enough, advocates of sea-based NMD include not only traditional supporters of missile defense but also people who were previously opposed to missile defense.
Traditionally, strategic offensive arms control and ballistic missile defense have been viewed as mutually exclusive. During the Cold War, the general belief was that anti–ballistic missile (ABM) systems would call into question the ability of the superpowers to successfully survive a first nuclear strike and inflict sufficient damage with a second strike. That is, missile defense could allow one superpower to launch a first strike and then use its defenses to intercept a second strike with the other superpower's surviving warheads—thereby undermining deterrence and stability. Furthermore, the thinking was that this situation would result in a dangerous offensive arms race as each side sought to counter the effects of the other's defenses.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Not all proposals for deploying a national missile defense live up to their name. Many are for “international” missile defense systems that would also defend U.S. allies and “friends,” even though they are wealthy enough to build their own missile defenses. For example, some policymakers and analysts on both the left and the right advocate sea-based missile defense as a substitute for the Clinton administration's limited land-based system, which is designed to protect only the territory of the United States. Conservatives would like to build a more comprehensive, layered defense consisting of sea- and space-based weapons or land-, sea-, and space-based weapons. George W. Bush, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, is clear that he wants a comprehensive defense to defend U.S. allies and seems to favor the latter approach.
Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts
Publication Date:
04-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Historically, U.S. nuclear strategists and arms control experts have paid little attention to the People's Republic of China (PRC). China has not been a major factor in the U.S. nuclear calculus, which has remained centered on U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals as the principal framework for arms control and arms reductions. Yet today China is the only one of the five de jure nuclear weapons states qualitatively and quantitatively expanding its nuclear arsenal.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
At the beginning of the 21st century – a decade after the end of the Cold War – two major developments characterise the transformation of the European security landscape. The first development is the NATO enlargement and its evolving strategic concept that was applied in the Kosovo conflict. The second is the EU enlargement and the construction of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) for the European Union in close contact with NATO. Each and every country in Europe is forced to outline their interests and stance towards these developments.
Imagine trying to win an overseas air war where target intelligence can be gathered only part of the day, where aerial refueling is hampered by inability to fly in close formation under prevailing weather conditions, and where many newly developed radio systems for air, sea, and land forces don't work the way they did back in the U.S. Sound unlikely? It isn't - these constraints limited the U.S. forces' ability to operate to maximum efficiency during the Kosovo campaign. These restrictions on U.S. military equipment did not arise from sabotage, maintenance failures, or enemy countermeasures - they resulted from the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition system's failure to insist on qualifying spectrum allocations for new systems that depend on access to the radio frequency spectrum. Without such qualification, systems that function well in the U.S. may not be usable abroad. Unless new systems' use of radio frequencies is qualified, they may interfere with other military users or with critical civilian users of the radio spectrum, even at home.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Development, and Science and Technology
The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Defense Software was formed in September 1999 and tasked to: Review the findings and recommendations of previous Department of Defense (DoD) -wide studies on software development and acquisition Assess the current environment to identify changes since previous studies Assess the current state of software development programs – both DoD and Commercial Identify focused recommendations to improve performance on DoD software intensive programs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Development, and Science and Technology
Bribery of foreign public officials by businesses is a serious problem in the international marketplace. This corrupt practice penalizes firms that play by the rules and compete on the merits of their products and services. But the damage is not limited to billions of dollars of lost exports. Bribery of public officials in commercial dealings undermines good governance, retards economic development and is especially damaging to developing countries and those in transition to market economies.
In the years since WWII, the global private sector has come to dominate the development of technology and the manufacturing capabilities for a number of technologies of critical importance to the Defense Department of the Military Services. Examples include information systems, propulsion systems such as gas turbines and logistics systems.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Development, and Science and Technology