Number of results to display per page
Search Results
1202. Proliferation in the "Axis of Evil": North Korea, Iran, and Iraq
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Despite the June 2000 summit meeting and meetings between high level U.S. and North Korean officials on the one hand, and economic turmoil and continued food shortages on the other, we believe North Korea remains committed to maintaining strong military forces. These forces continue to be deployed close to the border with South Korea in an offensively oriented posture, and North Korea's NBC and missile programs likely remain key components of its overall security strategy. The most likely large- scale regional war scenario over the near term, which would involve the United States, would be on the Korean peninsula. In recent years, North Korea has continued to pose a complex security challenge to the United States and its allies. Prior to the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea is believed to have produced and diverted sufficient plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons. In addition, although North Korea froze the production of plutonium in 1994, there are concerns that North Korea is continuing with some elements of a nuclear weapons program. North Korea also possesses stockpiles of chemical weapons, which could be used in the event of renewed hostilities on the peninsula. Research and development into biological agents and toxins suggest North Korea may have a biological weapons capability. North Korea has hundreds of ballistic missiles available for use against targets on the peninsula, some of which are capable of reaching tar-gets in Japan. Its missile capabilities are increasing at a steady pace, and it has progressed to producing medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). North Korea also has continued development of even longer-range missiles that would be able to threaten areas well beyond the region, including portions of the continental United States. As a result of U.S. diplomatic efforts, however, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has maintained a moratorium on launches of long-range missiles for over one year.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iraq, Iran, and Korea
1203. Western Military Balance and Defense Efforts A Comparative Summary of Military Expenditures; Manpower; Land, Air, Naval, and Nuclear Forces
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- The reporting of START accountable warheads has led to serious confusion between START accountable warheads and actual warhead.
- Topic:
- Security and Defense Policy
- Political Geography:
- United States
1204. The Military Balance in the Gulf: 2001-2002 Part III Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- As is the case with North Korea, experts differ over the seriousness of the Iranian threat. Most experts believe that Iran continues to pursue the development of long-range missiles, and of nuclear and biological warheads. Much will depend heavily on whether President Khatami and the more moderate elements in Iran's leadership can consolidate power and rein in Iran's hardline extremists, as well as on Iran's perception of the threat the US poses once it is ready to deploy and the cost of that deployment. This creates an extremely uncertain political climate.
- Topic:
- Security and Defense Policy
- Political Geography:
- United States, Middle East, and North Korea
1205. If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and The Conventional Military Balance
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Despite the Gulf War, and the loss of some 40% of its army and air force order of battle, Iraq remains the most effective military power in the Gulf. It still has an army of around 375,000 men, and an inventory of some 2,200 main battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, and 2,400 major artillery weapons. It also has over 300 combat aircraft with potential operational status. At the same time, Iraq has lacked the funds, spare parts, and production capabilities to sustain the quality of its consolidated forces. Iraq has not been able to restructure its overall force structure to compensate as effectively as possible for its prior dependence on an average of $3 billion a year in arms deliveries. It has not been able to recapitalize any aspect of its force structure, and about two-thirds of its remaining inventory of armor and aircraft is obsolescent by Western standards. Iraq has not been able to fund and/or import any major new conventional warfare technology to react to the lessons of the Gulf War, or to produce any major equipment -- with the possible exception of limited numbers of Magic “dogfight” air-to-air missiles. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has taken delivery on over $66 billion worth of new arms since 1991, Kuwait has received $7.6 billion, Iran $4.3 billion, Bahrain $700 million, Oman $1.4 billion, Qatar $1.7 billion, and the UAE $7.9 billion, Equally important, the US has made major upgrades in virtually every aspect of its fighter avionics, attack munitions, cruise missile capabilities, and intelligence, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities. Iraq's inability to recapitalize and modernize its forces means that much of its large order of battle is no obsolescent or obsolete, has uncertain combat readiness, and will be difficult to sustain in combat. It also raises serious questions about the ability of its forces to conduct long-range movements or maneuvers and then sustain coherent operations. Iraq has demonstrated that it can still carry out significant ground force exercises and fly relatively high sortie rates. It has not, however, demonstrated training patterns that show its army has consistent levels of training, can make effective use of combined arms above the level of some individual brigades, or has much capability for joint land-air operations. It has not demonstrated that it can use surface-to-air missiles in a well-organized way as a maneuvering force to cover its deployed land forces. Iran remains a major threat to Iraq. Iran lost 40-60% of its major land force equipment during the climactic battles of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. It has, however, largely recovered from its defeat by Iraq and now has comparatively large forces. Iran now has an army of around 450,000 men – including roughly 125,000 Revolutionary Guards, and an inventory of some 1,600 main battle tanks, 1,500 other armored vehicles, and 3,200 major artillery weapons. It also has over 280 combat aircraft with potential operational status. Iran has been able to make major improvements in its ability to threaten maritime traffic through the Gulf, and to conduct unconventional warfare. Iran has also begun to acquire modern Soviet combat aircraft and has significant numbers of the export version of the T-72 and BMP. Iran has not, however, been able to offset the obsolescence and wear of its overall inventory of armor, ships, and aircraft. Iran has not been able to modernize key aspects of its military capabilities such as airborne sensors and C4I/BM, electronic warfare, land-based air defense integration, beyond-visual-range air-to-air combat, night warfare capabilities, stand-off attack capability, armored sensors and fire control systems, artillery mobility and battle management, combat ship systems integration, etc. In contrast, no Southern Gulf state has built up significant ground forces since the Gulf War, and only Saudi Arabia has built up a significant air force. Only two Southern Gulf forces – those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – have a significant defense capability against Iraq. Saudi Arabia has made real progress in improving its 75,000 man National Guard. Its army, however, lacks effective leadership, training, and organization. It now has an army of around 75,000 men –, and an inventory of some 1,055 main battle tanks, 4,800 other armored vehicles, and 500 major artillery weapons. It also has around 350 combat aircraft with potential operational status. The army has made little overall progress in training since the Gulf War, can probably only fight about half of its equipment holdings in the Iraqi border area (and it would take 4-6 weeks to deploy and prepare this strength), and has declined in combined arms capability since the Gulf War. It has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have experienced a growing readiness crisis since the mid-1990s. It has lacked cohesive leadership as a fighting force since that time and cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management.. Kuwait now has an army of only around 11,000 men, and an active inventory of some 293 main battle tanks, 466 other armored vehicles, and 17 major artillery weapons. Only its 218 M-1A2s are really operational and only a portion of these are in combat effective forces. It has only 82 combat aircraft and 20 armed helicopters with potential operational status, and only 40 are modern F-18s. It is making progress in training, but has not shown it can make effective use of combined arms above the battalion level, and has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have moderate readiness, but cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management. There has been little progress in standardization and interoperability; advances in some areas like ammunition have been offset by the failure to integrate increasingly advanced weapons systems. Showpiece exercises and purchases disguise an essentially static approach to force improvement which is heavily weapons oriented, and usually shows little real-world appreciation of the lessons of the Gulf War, the “revolution in military affairs,” and the need for sustainability. Current arms deliveries are making only token progress in correcting the qualitative defects in Southern Gulf forces, and no meaningful progress in being made towards integrating the Southern Gulf countries under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
- Topic:
- Security and Defense Policy
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia
1206. Defending America: Redefining the Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defense
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 02-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- From a public policy viewpoint, these uncertainties mean the US must prepare for a wide variety of low probability attacks on the US, rather than to emphasize any given form of attack or group of attackers. The US must plan its Homeland defense policies and programs for a future in which there is no way to predict the weapon that will be used or the method chosen to deliver a weapon which can range from a small suicide attack by an American citizen to the covert delivery of a nuclear weapon by a foreign state. There is no reason the US should assume that some convenient Gaussian curve or standard deviation, will make small or medium level attacks a higher priority over time than more lethal forms.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Political Geography:
- United States and America
1207. Thoughts Before Yet Another NATO Summit
- Author:
- Jeffrey Bialos
- Publication Date:
- 09-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Transatlantic Relations
- Abstract:
- A significant NATO Summit is approaching. The United States and its European allies are at a crossroads. NATO is expanding to embrace former members of the Warsaw Pact. The future role of NATO as a military alliance in the 21st century remains under discussion. Will NATO truly be given tangible new missions and really act out of area, and what force structure will support its strategic objectives? Will the United States and its European partners bridge the gap over how to fight the war now underway? Will the widening gap in military capabilities between the United States and its coalition partners be addressed, and will there ever again be coalition operations with U.S. participation under NATO command? Are Europe and the United States “de-coupling,” with the creation of “Fortress Europe” and “Fortress America” in defense? There is an opportunity to seize the moment, and act on these vital issues.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and International Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- United States, America, and Europe
1208. Reconceptualizing NATO
- Author:
- István Gyarmati and Christopher Walker
- Publication Date:
- 07-2002
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EastWest Institute
- Abstract:
- With the NATO summit in Prague less than six months away, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic must quickly construct a new vision for the Alliance. Making NATO relevant for the 21st century requires developing a realistic plan for restructuring forces and re-examining long-held assumptions. NATO leaders must strike a course that recognizes a dramatically changed international landscape. Terrorism, organized crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies, and militant fundamentalism have risen to the top of most threat assessments. NATO has not yet made the adjustments necessary to meet these new threats. Political and commercial rifts between the United States and Europe are growing wider, and the technology and capabilities gap between America and its allies draws into question the relevance of European militaries. At the same time, the Alliance is poised to invite a set of new members – possibly as many as seven – to join its ranks. Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic thus face the daunting challenge of meeting the commitment of enlarging the Alliance while simultaneously transforming it.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Terrorism
- Political Geography:
- Russia, America, Europe, and Asia
1209. China's Rise and the U.S. Army: Leaning Forward
- Author:
- Russell D. Howard and Albert Willner
- Publication Date:
- 08-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
- Abstract:
- The United States led war on terrorism has already had a major impact on developing state relationships in Asia. The coalition of convenience that emerged in the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon has engendered a change in strategic thinking, perceptions, and influence. A significant shift in any of these three areas could have dramatic implications. For the United States, what is required is not only a reassessment of the new realities but also a strategy to take advantage of new opportunities and cope with potential threats. Perhaps nowhere is this need more apparent, or possible responses more fraught with risk, than in determining the impact of such strategic shifts on the U.S.-China relationship, particularly in the security realm.
- Topic:
- Security and Defense Policy
- Political Geography:
- United States, China, and Asia
1210. Clausewitz and the Morality of War
- Author:
- Suzanne C. Nielsen
- Publication Date:
- 08-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
- Abstract:
- The ideas of Carl von Clausewitz have been the subject of endless controversy since the posthumous publication of On War in 1832. Did Clausewitz produce a time bound analysis of the wars of his age, or a timeless classic? Was he an objective analyst of war's complexities, or an advocate of wars of annihilation? This paper explores Clausewitz's perspective on the moral issues that war inevitably raises. This exploration will address two main questions. First, what views does Clausewitz express on the role for ethical considerations in war? Second, did Clausewitz think that the statesman's actions in international politics could or should take into account moral considerations? This paper argues that Clausewitz prioritizes the interests of the state over moral considerations. However, his approach leaves open the possibility that state interests can vary over time in ways that expand statesmen's opportunities for moral action.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Civil Society, and Government