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351. The Changing Balance of Power in the Age of Emerging Cyber Threats

Author:
Ivo Tsekov
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
This paper addresses one of the key issues of the international security agenda today: the role of cyber warfare in the changing security landscape of the 21st century. Cyber warfare involves the actions by a nation-state or international organization to attack and attempt to damage another nation's computers or information networks through IT means. While a great deal has already been written on the topic, there needs to be a stronger examination of how the combination of cyber weapons with traditional strategic approaches might impact strategic choices related to cyber war. In order to understand whether there is a security competition in cyberspace, it is necessary to assess the current balance of power. Therefore, the issue of cyber warfare has relevance to practitioners, policy-makers, and scholars in the national, regional and international levels
Topic:
Power Politics and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Global Focus

352. Cyber and Deterrence: The Military-Civil Nexus in High-End Conflict

Author:
Franklin Kramer, Robert J Butler, and Catherine Lotrionte
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This paper analyzes cyber’s role in deterrence and defense—and specifically the military-civil nexus and the relationship between the Department of Defense (DoD), the civil agencies, and the key private operational cyber entities, in particular the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and electric grid operators. The focus of the paper is on high-end conflict including actions by an advanced cyber adversary, whether state or nonstate, and not on the “day-to-day” intrusions and attacks as regularly occur and are generally dealt with by governmental agencies and the private sector without military involvement. High-end conflict can be expected to include attacks within the United States homeland as well as in forward theatres.
Topic:
Civil Society, International Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
America and Global Focus

353. Categorizing and Assessing the Severity of Disruptive Cyber Events

Author:
Nancy Gallagher and Charles Harry
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Faced with a rapidly growing volume and range of cyber attacks, policymakers and organizational leaders have had difficulty setting priorities, allocating resources, and responding effectively without a standard way to categorize cyber events and estimate their consequences. Presidential Policy Directive 41 laid out the Obama administration’s principles for executive branch responses to significant cyber incidents in the public or private sector. But it neither drew important distinctions between different types of cyber incidents, nor gave a standard way to determine where a particular incident falls on its 0-5 point severity scale. This policy brief demonstrates how an analytical framework developed at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland (CISSM) can help address these problems. It first differentiates between low-level incidents and more significant cyber events that result in either exploitation of information and/or disruption of operations. It categorizes five types of disruptive events and analyzes 2,030 cyber events in a dataset developed from media sources, showing that cyber exploitation remains more common than disruption, and that most disruptive activity fits into two categories: message manipulation and external denial of service attacks. Finally, the brief offers a standard method to assess the severity of different categories of disruptive attacks against different kinds of organizations based on the scope, magnitude, and duration of the event. This Cyber Disruption Index (CDI) is then applied to survey data on Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in the private sector to assess severity within a common category of disruptive events. Of 3,900 cases reported, only 5 events (less than 1% of the DDoS cases) had a combined scope, magnitude, and duration severe enough to be a priority for prevention and potentially warrant government involvement.
Topic:
Government, Cybersecurity, and Media
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, and D.C.

354. International Cybersecurity Information Sharing Agreements

Author:
Nilsu Gören and Theresa Hitchens
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Cybersecurity transcends national boundaries in many ways: The internet’s technical infrastructure is global in scope; threat actors based in one country can disguise their identities by taking control of computers in other countries; global businesses sell software, hardware, and security services that may introduce or combat vulnerabilities; and the consequences from a disruptive attack can spread far beyond the initial victim. Even the most cyber-savvy country cannot protect itself completely unless it wants to disconnect from the global internet and strictly limit who can use information technology and for what purposes inside its own borders. And this course of action is infeasible because it would result in dire consequences for the national economy, military, and all other systems that depend on advanced information technology. International cooperation to improve cybersecurity is a much more realistic and viable path. Information sharing is the most commonly promoted type of international cooperation, but very little is known about what type of cybersecurity information is currently being shared with whom, for what purposes, and under what conditions. As a first step towards answering this larger question, the International Cybersecurity Information Sharing Project undertook to survey, catalog, and analyze publicly available government-to-government cybersecurity-related sharing agreements to determine what types of information various governments have committed to share, and to identify gaps in information sharing. The ultimate aim of the larger project is to assess how multilateral cybersecurity sharing practices can be encouraged and improved in order to strengthen global cybersecurity. The project team started from the assumption that formal cyber sharing agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoU) are an important part of the foundation for the development of norms on cyber cooperation. Over the past several years, various international fora have reiterated that sharing information about cyber threats and vulnerabilities, national approaches to cyber protection, best practices, incidents of concern, and response mechanisms could increase mutual cybersecurity while reducing risks of misunderstandings and conflict. Different types of information sharing can be used to improve cybersecurity in various ways. By sharing threat perceptions and national policies, states can better understand each other’s concerns and priorities. By conducting multilateral exercises and sharing best practices for protection of networks, critical infrastructure, and software/hardware, states can help each other ensure safe data transfer across borders. Cooperation to build capacity in states with weaker infrastructure for managing the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) can help in identifying threats and responding to crises. This research found that cybersecurity information agreements are more numerous, but less specific than anticipated. The project documented and analyzed 196 agreements involving 116 different countries and 2,349 signatures. Extensive signature of agreements and associated commentary shows widespread accord on the principle that information sharing is necessary. However, it is unclear how much and what type of information sharing occurs in practice. Few agreement texts are public, and those that are often use vague language. And, despite the potential benefits of sharing more cyber-security information, many disincentives and logistical barriers remain. This project collected as much information as possible, not only about what states have agreed to do, but also what they actually do, and why they make those choices. After a brief summary of the approach taken and some limitations encountered, the study provides summary statistics about international cyber information sharing agreements. It then looks in more detail at sharing agreements and behaviors by some of the most active and/or important countries in regional organizations, and in multilateral fora that have focused on this topic. A summary of key findings, conclusions, and next steps is followed by annexes with more methodological information and texts for some of the most important agreements.
Topic:
Science and Technology and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Global Focus

355. The Global Exchange (Summer 2017)

Author:
David J. Bercuson, Hugh Stephens, Robert Hage, Robert Huebert, Stefanie Von Hlatky, Lindsay Rodman, Stephen M. Saideman, Hugh Segal, and Vanja Petricevic
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Global Exchange
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The Global Exchange is the Canadian Global Affairs Institute’s quarterly magazine featuring topical articles written by our fellows and other contributing experts. Each issue contains approximately a dozen articles exploring political and strategic challenges in international affairs and Canadian foreign and defence policy. This Summer 2017 issue covers trade deals, human rights, defense, cybersecurity and more.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Human Rights, Territorial Disputes, Cybersecurity, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Free Trade, Transparency, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Canada, North America, and Arctic

356. Against the Odds Driving Defense Innovation in a Change-Resistant Ecosystem

Author:
Jeffrey P. Bialos, Christine E. Fisher, and Stuart L. Koehl
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Transatlantic Relations
Abstract:
Generating the innovation to sustain the United States’ technology-based military superiority will, of necessity, be a core element of defense strategy for the Trump Administration. This paper identifies the challenges faced by the DoD’s large, multi-faceted research and development ecosystem in meeting that national security goal, and proposes a holistic and balanced strategy for addressing them. Fundamentally, the outgoing Obama Administration concluded that the U.S. military dominance against our near-peer adversaries is eroding in a globalized environment where commercial innovation is not only being rapidly generated through agile and fast-paced processes but is being rapidly disseminated globally and therefore available to potential adversaries. In contrast, the DoD faces the challenge of building a future force that is second to none while using internal processes that generally are overly cumbersome, somewhat antiquated and slower—processes which constrain its ability to access all available innovation, commercial and otherwise, and to rapidly transition that technology to the war fighter in order to produce robust effects on the battlefield. Notwithstanding years of studies that have highlighted well known institutional obstacles to change in both our defense R&D ecosystem and the Department more broadly, these challenges still largely remain. Numerous DoD initiatives to address these issues and incentivize change unfortunately have not moved the needle.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Cybersecurity, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
United States of America, North America, Washington, and D.C.

357. Getting it Righter, Faster The Role of Prediction in Agile Government Decisionmaking

Author:
Kathryn McNabb Cochran and Gregory Tozzi
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Humanity is fascinated by prediction failures. The failure to predict the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks has replaced the failure to predict the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as the United States’ canonical intelligence failure, but the failure to predict the Arab Spring is gaining ground. These failures have prompted some to argue that because prediction is a futile exercise, organizations are better served by investing in agile systems that can react rapidly to change rather than investing in predictive systems that help them anticipate change. The authors argue that this is a false dichotomy. Predictive systems can support agility, and recent advances in the science of forecasting offer multiple tools for organizations seeking to see around the corner faster and with more acuity.
Topic:
Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Global Focus

358. Artificial Intelligence and National Security

Author:
Gregory Allen and Taniel Chan
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Partially autonomous and intelligent systems have been used in military technology since at least the Second World War, but advances in machine learning and Artificial Intelligence (AI) represent a turning point in the use of automation in warfare. Though the United States military and intelligence communities are planning for expanded use of AI across their portfolios, many of the most transformative applications of AI have not yet been addressed. In this piece, we propose three goals for developing future policy on AI and national security: preserving U.S. technological leadership, supporting peaceful and commercial use, and mitigating catastrophic risk. By looking at four prior cases of transformative military technology—nuclear, aerospace, cyber, and biotech—we develop lessons learned and recommendations for national security policy toward AI.
Topic:
Science and Technology, International Security, Military Strategy, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Global Focus

359. Cybersecurity Campaign Playbook

Author:
Belfer Center
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
People join campaigns for different reasons: electing a leader they believe in, advancing an agenda, cleaning up government, or experiencing the rush and adrenaline of campaign life. These are some of the reasons we got involved in politics. We certainly didn’t sign up because we wanted to become cyber experts and we’re guessing you didn’t either
Topic:
International Affairs and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Global Focus

360. Taking Stock: Estimating Vulnerability Rediscovery

Author:
Trey Herr, Bruce Schneier, and Christopher Morris
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
How often do multiple, independent parties discover the same vulnerability? There are ample models of vulnerability discovery, but little academic work on this issue of rediscovery. The immature state of this research and subsequent debate is a problem for the policy community, where the government’s decision to disclose a given vulnerability hinges in part on that vulnerability’s likelihood of being rediscovered and used maliciously by another party. Research into the behavior of malicious software markets and the efficacy of bug bounty programs would similarly benefit from an accurate baseline estimate for how often vulnerabilities are discovered by multiple independent parties.
Topic:
Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Global Focus