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301. Avoiding the Pitfalls of Prevent

Author:
Joana Cook
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:
Prevent, one of four strands of the UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy, aims to ‘stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.’ Established in 2003, Prevent has included numerous initiatives that have specifically focused on women, for example in the context of mosque reformation and the inclusion of ‘moderate voices,’ or the creation of women’s stakeholder groups (NMWAG) to advise the government on prevention issues. Some of these have proved to be highly contentious, and have undergone numerous transformations, with some even calling for the termination of the Prevent program altogether. This paper will outline some specific Prevent, and related countering violent extremism (CVE), initiatives that have focused on women and highlight key criticisms of both the initiatives themselves, and the wider UK counter-terrorism and CVE agenda. By interrogating these, it aims to offer a case study of how lessons learned in the UK can inform policy in other contexts where women are being engaged to counter violent extremism.
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Women, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:
United Kingdom

302. The Prison Terrorism Nexus: Recommendations for Policymakers

Author:
James Howcroft
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
Among the many challenges in the fight against terrorism today is the issue of terrorists within prisons. Cross-pollination of terrorist and criminal networks and, in particular, the radicalization and recruitment of ordinary criminal offenders present significant and growing threats to security. What can countries do to manage and reduce these threats? To discuss these issues and exchange best practices, the Marshall Center hosted a Global Counter-Terrorism Alumni Community of Interest (COI) workshop from 29-31 August, 2017. Six alumni from the Americas, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, as well as French and U.S. subject matter experts, shared their countries’ national experiences. This served as a catalyst for discussion among sixty-five counter-terrorism (CT) professionals from forty-six countries. The following recommendations are the product of these discussions. 1. Include prisons in national CT strategies and develop an action plan to counter radicalization in prisons. COI participants identified insufficient political will and attention to the issue of prison radicalization as a key challenge. Inclusion of prisons within national CT strategies may help to focus attention on the issue while clarifying the roles and responsibilities of relevant agencies. It is also essential to develop research-based action plans for the management of terrorist offenders in prison in order to reduce the level of risk and prevent further radicalization.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Terrorism, Prisons/Penal Systems, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

303. Global Priorities in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Practitioner Perspectives

Author:
Sam Mullins and James Howcroft
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
This research note reports the results of a pilot questionnaire on priorities in terrorism and counterterrorism, which was completed by seventy-five security-sector professionals from more than fifty countries who attended the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies (PTSS) at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, from July to August, 2017. The results reveal that these practitioners consider terrorism to be one of the most serious threats to stability in their countries. Participants were especially concerned with jihadist terrorism and were more or less equally concerned with lone actors versus foreign fighters. The majority identified online versus offline methods as most important to terrorist recruitment, however this difference of opinion was not large. Looking to the future, they viewed hacking/cyber attacks by terrorists as particularly likely. In terms of counter-terrorism (CT), intelligence agencies were seen as playing the lead role, while cooperation between domestic CT agencies was seen as the biggest challenge. In contrast to this, terrorist use of encrypted communications was seen as least challenging. Participants were evenly split in their views on political negotiations with terrorists, but displayed a comparatively high degree of optimism about the prospects of deradicalization. Nevertheless, they also appeared to hold a government-centric view of CT, seeing relatively little role for civil society and non-governmental organizations. Border control was viewed as the capability most in need of further development.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

304. Guantanamo’s Last Year

Author:
Ken Gude
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
With one year left in his administration, President Barack Obama remains committed to closing the prison at Guantanamo Bay during his time in office. Congress has prohibited, at least for now, one aspect of the president’s preferred pathway to close the prison—transferring some detainees into the United States for trial or continued law of war detention. Much of this debate has focused on the question of whether President Obama will use executive action to override the congressional transfer ban. Doing so would be impractical and extremely unwise. The Obama administration should state publicly that it will not use executive action to bring large numbers of Guantanamo detainees into the United States in defiance of congressional statute. A better strategy would be to pursue alternative options for closing Guantanamo that, even given current statutory constraints, remain entirely in the control of the executive branch. Amid disappointment at the failure to close Guantanamo, it is easy to forget that President Obama originally believed it was feasible to identify, categorize, prosecute, and transfer all 242 detainees in just one year—the same amount of time he has left for the remaining 91 detainees. While congressional resistance is a new obstacle not present at the time of President Obama’s original pledge, moving the majority of detainees out of Guantanamo is now mostly about the implementation of policies and decisions already made, a much more manageable challenge than the one that Obama faced in 2009. If that goal is to be achieved, however, President Obama must command a greater level of urgency throughout his administration and especially at the Pentagon. The risk is not simply a failure that becomes a stain on the president’s legacy; rather, the much more serious risk is that the next administration could resume sending detainees to Guantanamo, which is on the wish list of many conservatives. The latter would do irreparable harm to American national security—and be a colossal waste of money. Holding a detainee at Guantanamo now costs $4 million per year per detainee, compared with less than $100,000 per inmate in the highest security prison in the United States. And while it is fair to say that the salience of Guantanamo as a recruiting tool for terrorist groups has faded during the Obama administration’s efforts to close it, it is not gone. Hostages held by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, are not dressed in Guantanamo-like orange jumpsuits by accident. And if new detainees were to be sent to Guantanamo by the next administration, the prison would roar back to prominence in terrorist propaganda and be an enormous self-inflicted wound on the country. We cannot afford to risk this possibility. Guantanamo must be closed during the Obama administration. This can be achieved by completing the following steps: Hold Periodic Review Board hearings for all eligible detainees by July 1, 2016. Accelerate transfers of those detainees designated for transfer or release. Order the Department of Justice to review detainee cases for prosecution and potential plea bargain in federal court. Pursue agreements with countries to prosecute under their laws any Guantanamo detainees accused of serious crimes. Engage the Afghan government to seek an agreement to transfer back to Afghan custody any remaining law of war detainees captured in connection with the war in Afghanistan. Some of these options may not represent the best or preferred method for the Obama administration to close Guantanamo, but this is a feasible and realistic path to close the prison in one year. Some of these choices will be difficult, but when measured against the possibility that Guantanamo could be back in the business of accepting new detainees in 2017, those difficulties should not be disqualifying. A reinvigorated effort from the Obama administration is urgently needed to make 2016 Guantanamo’s last year.
Topic:
Terrorism, Prisons/Penal Systems, Counter-terrorism, and Detention
Political Geography:
Caribbean, North America, United States of America, and Guantanamo

305. Writing the Future of Germany: Progressive Politics in Turbulent Times

Author:
Sigmar Gabriel
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Europe has reached a turning point in history. 2015 marks the end of a European era that began with an entire continent embarking on a new age of progress. Twenty-five peaceful years since the fall of the Berlin Wall had raised everyone’s hopes, and the future of Europe seemed to promise democracy, prosperity, security, and stability. Now, these hopes have been replaced by uncertainty. Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” with the anticipated triumph of liberal Western-style democracy, its normative consensus, and its market-oriented economy has not come about. Instead of a world of peace and progress, we are experiencing a world of uncertainty and insecurity: The Ukraine crisis has brought war back to Europe. The Greece debt crisis brought the eurozone to the brink of failure. The nihilist murderers of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, are exporting their terror to Europe—a continent that at the same time appears incapable of finding a common response to millions of refugees seeking protection and a new home in Europe. What’s more, although a unified Europe was blessed with many years of growing prosperity after the founding treaties of the European Union were signed, the Europe of today is economically and politically instable and increasingly perceived as a source of incalculable risks.
Topic:
Security, Counter-terrorism, Refugees, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, and Central Europe

306. Are U.S. Drone Strikes Legal?

Author:
Kate Martin
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
There has been much controversy and criticism about drone strikes conducted by the United States, especially those that have targeted Al Qaeda operatives outside Afghanistan in Yemen, Somalia, and the border regions of Pakistan. Many questions have surfaced about the effectiveness of using drone strikes. There is also a widespread perception that strikes have killed many civilians and that they are illegal. The Obama administration recently promised to release information about the number of civilians killed, as well as its policy guidance governing drone strikes outside Afghanistan. However, this new information is unlikely to directly address the question of what legal framework governs such drone strikes. In fact, the Obama administration has never been completely clear about its views on the legal basis for the drone program. But an understanding of the legal framework is necessary to evaluate the new information and the legality of the drone program.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Drones, and Legal Theory
Political Geography:
United States and North America

307. Towards a Continental Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism in Africa

Author:
Tarek A. Sharif and Joanne Richards
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Global Peace Operations Review
Abstract:
Violent Extremism is now recognized as a growing threat to peace and security in Africa, as exemplified by the recent terrorist attacks in Garissa, Abidjan, and Ouagadougou. While much of the policy discussion on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) focuses on the return of radicalized foreign fighters to the West, less attention is directed to those foreign fighters who may eventually return from Iraq, Syria, and Libya to other areas of North Africa, the Maghreb, and the Horn of Africa. Tunisia is one of the world’s largest contributors to the Islamic State in terms of foreign fighters, with smaller contributions from Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Sudan and Somalia. Issues concerning the return of foreign fighters to Africa are particularly salient not only because these individuals may return to their communities, but also because they may link up with other extremist armed groups present across the continent. These include groups affiliated to either al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, such as Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Attempts to counter violent extremism began in Europe in the 1980s with the advent of programs to dissuade and disengage right-wing extremists in Norway, Sweden and Germany. Although no common definition exists, since that time CVE has come to be associated with a range of measures designed to prevent and reverse the radicalization of individuals and groups, and to forestall the participation of these groups and “lone wolves” in acts of terrorism. Given that CVE is preventative and reactive, different CVE strategies are necessary for different stages of the radicalization continuum, including for individuals and communities with no exposure to extremist networks, those with some exposure, and those already radicalized. The latter is often associated with attempts to shift extremists towards acceptance of more moderate ideologies and is known as “deradicalization.” In some ways, CVE is difficult to distinguish from conventional counter-terrorism, which often includes traditional military measures and the sharing of intelligence between nation states. However, because conventional counter-terrorism does not address the root causes prompting radicalization, policy interventions under the rubric of CVE have more recently been designed to focus attention on the grassroots factors, which may render certain individuals more susceptible to radicalization than others. Social exclusion, poverty, and a lack of education are often named as typical contenders in this regard, although CVE practitioners generally acknowledge that no single causal pathway to radicalization can be identified. Reflecting these general trends, this essay charts the development of African Union policy, from its roots in conventional counter-terrorism, to efforts to devise a continental strategy for CVE in Africa. It also outlines a number of policy measures, which any such continental strategy should take into account.
Topic:
Security, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, and African Union
Political Geography:
Africa, Iraq, Sudan, Middle East, Libya, Syria, Morocco, and Somalia

308. Anti-terrorism Legal Regime of Pakistan and the Global Paradigm of Security: A Genealogical and Comparative Analysis

Author:
Syed Sami Raza
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Review of Human Rights
Institution:
Society of Social Science Academics (SSSA)
Abstract:
Pakistan is often criticized for its anti-terrorism legal regime—which institutionalizes preventive indefinite detention, special courts, and speedy trials. Pakistani officials, on their part, rebut this criticism by pointing to the Anglo-American anti-terrorism legal regimes, and generally to “the global paradigm of security.” Interestingly, should we trace the genealogy of the anti-terrorism legal regime of Pakistan, we find rich historical-juridical linkages between the Pakistani and Anglo-American regimes. These linkages converge on, or at least begin from, the British law of high treason. This law was adopted in certain colonial regulations in the early 19th century. In this article I demonstrate how the legal form and substance of the high treason law and of certain other colonial regulations traveled through colonial and post-colonial security laws, such that they have recently come to converge with the global paradigm of security.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Detention, and Due Process
Political Geography:
Pakistan and South Asia

309. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: International Relations Perspectives

Author:
Robert Nalbandov, M.J. Fox, Jacob Stoil, Jonathan Schroden, William Rosenau, Emily Warner, and Rebecca Yagerman
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
During the planning for this and upcoming issues, the staff of the MCU Journal, under the direction of the new editorial board, continues fine tuning our publication strategies to acquire content that speaks to the larger issues of policy important to the Marine Corps, generally and specifically. This has led us to seek authors who can provide more than just single threads of continuity, but rather to help us craft entire issues that focus on defined topics for deeper-level conversations. To that end, the closing issue of 2016 presents what, on the surface, may appear to be five articles speaking broadly to the concerns of one region, in this case the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Upon further reading, however, the reader will discover that this issue features two distinct sections that illustrate both political science and historical perspectives relevant to the U.S. military Services and the larger Department of Defense community.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Politics, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, North America, Tunisia, Somalia, and United States of America

310. Terrorism and Organized Crime

Author:
Sam Mullins and James K. Wither
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
This article begins with an assessment of the similarities and differences between terrorists and criminals, including profiles, methods, systems of organization and motives. Notably, the article identifies seven categories of crimes committed by terrorists: 1) Inherent/violent, 2) Preparation/facilitation, 3) Funding, 4) Specialized terrorism offenses, 5) Vigilantism/public relations, 6) Miscellaneous/Spontaneous/Unrelated Offences, and 7) Previous criminal records. Next, the crime-terror nexus is discussed and four types of relationships between terrorists and criminals are identified: 1) Interaction, 2) Appropriation, 3) Assimilation, and 4) Transformation. The article concludes with a discussion of the concept of convergence between terrorism and organized crime, and implications for counter-terrorism and law-enforcement.
Topic:
Terrorism, Law Enforcement, Counter-terrorism, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
Global Focus