Search

Begin New Search Topic Counter-terrorism Publication Year within 25 Years

191. Assessing Europe’s Efforts to Oppose Islamist Extremism

Author:
Robin Simcox
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Determining precisely what factors lead to radicalization is a pressing challenge. In fact, beyond the violent Islamist threat, the influence of political Islam and varying shades of Salafism are also growing across Muslim communities in Europe. This, too, has harmful social consequences. The scale of the problem facing Europe was exacerbated by the decision made by Germany in 2015 to open its borders to refugees fleeing conflicts in Muslim-majority countries. While security threats undoubtedly entered with the refugee flow (or individuals were radicalized and became threats once in Europe), the refugee issue has also introduced social and cultural questions relevant to overall cohesion and integration in Europe. This essay looks at these issues from the perspective of four European countries: the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden and France. Islamist terrorists have attacked each country in the last two years, and each has taken differing approaches to preventing extremism and facilitating integration. Dozens of conversations with government officials from across Europe have informed my conclusions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Government, National Security, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Ideology, and Islamism
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, Germany, and Sweden

192. Intelligence and Terrorism: The Impact of Terrorism on the Counter- Terrorism Roles and Architecture of Intelligence Agencies

Author:
D. Chen
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, St. Andrews University, Scotland
Abstract:
Counter-terrorism (CT) has since 9/11 become a leading component of intelligence work, alongside mainstays like political analysis and counterintelligence. The emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and new dimensions like extreme right wing (XRW) threats are placing heavy demands on intelligence. This paper addresses three questions. Firstly, whether and how intelligence agencies perform CT roles that go beyond disseminating information. Secondly, whether and how intelligence agencies are involved in CT policymaking. Thirdly, how countries have adapted their intelligence architectures for CT. The research comprised four interviews with senior practitioners and academics, alongside literature surveys. The research focused on the UK, US, Germany and France. Organisational theory was used to frame the analysis as existing intelligence theories were inadequate. The findings showed that intelligence agencies do play CT roles beyond providing information. They include investigating and neutralising terrorists, negotiating hostage releases, discreetly engaging foreign countries on CT, and collaborating with the private sector to build CT capability. However, intelligence agencies are reluctant to engage in CT policymaking out of concern that they might lose credibility if their reporting is politicised or a policy they back fails. The research on intelligence architecture showed that the US’s reforms, which were the most sweeping of the countries analysed, were in response to environmental pressures post-9/11 and increased the level of bureaucracy in the intelligence community (IC). The UK’s reforms were reactive but less extensive than the US’s, while Germany’s reforms were proactively initiated and aimed at bolstering CT coordination. The research highlighted that the key environmental influences on CT intelligence work going forward include technology, resource constraints and the legal environment. Day-to-day, intelligence agencies will continue to grapple with issues like how analytical practices can be bolstered to mitigate the risk of politicisation. More research is needed to develop new theoretical frameworks on CT intelligence, update perspectives on the intelligence-policy relationship, and explore applying organisational theory to intelligence work.
Topic:
Intelligence, Politics, Terrorism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

193. Will Iran Retaliate against the US for Designating the IRGC as a Terrorist Organization?

Author:
Yossi Mansharof
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Iran is not likely to target American troops, since Teheran’s strategy is to wait-out the Trump administration.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, Conflict, and State Sponsored Terrorism
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

194. Iran’s Struggle to Entrench Itself in Syria

Author:
Yossi Mansharof
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel, Russia and to some extent the US stand in the way of Iran’s permanent entrenchment in Syria. Israel needs to continue its strikes against Iranian and Hezbollah infrastructures across Syria.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, Conflict, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Syria

195. A Large-Scale Ground Offensive against Hamas is Inevitable

Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Neglecting IDF ground maneuver capabilities is a dangerous gamble.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, Hamas, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

196. Imperfect Proxies: The Pros and Perils of Partnering with Non-State Actors for CT

Author:
Brian Katz
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The Islamic State’s march across Syria and Iraq in 2014 and ensuing expansion via global affiliates posed a vexing challenge for the United States and key allies. The Islamic State sought not only to seize, govern, and defend territory as part of its so-called caliphate, but also to leverage these safe havens to build transnational terrorist networks. Countering the Islamic State would thus require large-scale ground operations to conquer the Islamic State proto-states and defeat its military forces, but the need to do so urgently and expeditiously to prevent external terrorist attacks. But who would conduct such a ground campaign? The Islamic State ’s expansion coincided with a shift in U.S. and allied military strategy: the adoption of the “by, with, and through” model for major counterterrorism (CT) operations. Rather than committing large numbers of ground forces, Western strategy would center on training, advising, and assisting host-nation militaries to serve as the main combat element. With small numbers of special operations forces (SOF) and key enablers such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and close air support, Western powers could bolster the battlefield effectiveness of local forces while limiting their own troop commitments. A national army like the Iraqi Security Forces was a natural host-nation partner. But what if there is no state with whom to partner? This paper will examine the recent history of partnering with non-state actors for CT operations where the United States and allies were unable or unwilling to work “by, with, and through” the host-nation.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, Non State Actors, Counter-terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Global Focus

197. Sharpening Our Efforts: The Role of International Development in Countering Violent Extremism

Author:
Erol Yayboke and Sundar R. Ramanujam
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Thanks to the generous support and cooperation from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the CSIS Project on Prosperity and Development releases this new essay anthology, Sharpening Our Efforts: The Role of International Development in Countering Violent Extremism. As policymakers confront the ongoing challenge of radicalization and violent extremism, it is important that stakeholders and counterterrorism strategists recognize the critical role for development and other non-kinetic approaches to counter violent extremism (CVE). To that end, this new anthology takes a multidimensional role mapping out the role of soft power institutions in enabling lasting peace, prosperity, and global security.
Topic:
Development, Foreign Aid, Violent Extremism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

198. United States Budgetary Costs and Obligations of Post-9/11 Wars through FY2020: $6.4 Trillion

Author:
Neta C. Crawford
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University
Abstract:
Since late 2001, the United States has appropriated and is obligated to spend an estimated $6.4 Trillion through Fiscal Year 2020 in budgetary costs related to and caused by the post-9/11 wars—an estimated $5.4 Trillion in appropriations in current dollars and an additional minimum of $1 Trillion for US obligations to care for the veterans of these wars through the next several decades. The mission of the post-9/11 wars, as originally defined, was to defend the United States against future terrorist threats from al Qaeda and affiliated organizations. Since 2001, the wars have expanded from the fighting in Afghanistan, to wars and smaller operations elsewhere, in more than 80 countries — becoming a truly “global war on terror.” Further, the Department of Homeland Security was created in part to coordinate the defense of the homeland against terrorist attacks. These wars, and the domestic counterterror mobilization, have entailed significant expenses, paid for by deficit spending. Thus, even if the United States withdraws completely from the major war zones by the end of FY2020 and halts its other Global War on Terror operations, in the Philippines and Africa for example, the total budgetary burden of the post-9/11 wars will continue to rise as the US pays the on-going costs of veterans’ care and for interest on borrowing to pay for the wars. Moreover, the increases in the Pentagon base budget associated with the wars are likely to remain, inflating the military budget over the long run.
Topic:
War, Budget, Counter-terrorism, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
South Asia, Middle East, and United States of America

199. Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the impact of terrorism

Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
The GTI report is produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and other sources. Data for the GTD is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland. The GTD contains over 170,000 terrorist incidents for the period 1970 to 2017. Deaths from terrorism fell for the fourth consecutive year, after peaking in 2014. The decline in deaths corresponds with the military successes against ISIL and Boko Haram, with the total number of deaths falling by 15.2 per cent between 2017 and 2018 to 15,952. The largest fall occurred in Iraq, which recorded 3,217 fewer deaths from terrorism in 2018, a 75 per cent decrease from the prior year. For the first time since 2003, Iraq is no longer the country most impacted by terrorism.
Topic:
Political Violence, Terrorism, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, ISIS, ISIL, Violence, War on Terror, and Peace
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North Africa, and Global Focus

200. What NATO’s counter-terrorism strategy?

Author:
Kris Quanten
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Until 2001, NATO considered the terrorist threat as a secondary phenomenon with a limited impact on the Alliance. The 9/11 attacks marked a radical turnaround: suddenly terrorism became a top secu- rity priority. This was also the first and only time in NATO’s history that Article 5 was invoked, further- more for a terrorist attack. Initially, the reaction to 9/11 was purely military. However, it soon became clear that there was lit- tle strategic vision underlying the initiatives to fight terrorism at the operational level. Hence, the hasty approval, at the NATO Prague Summit in 2002, of a Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism.1 This Concept foresaw a number of new initiatives, such as intelligence sharing, CBRN measures, the establishment of a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, and Civil Emergency planning, as a priority. Yet all these separate initiatives lacked coordination and an overarching vision.
Topic:
NATO, Regional Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and War on Terror
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America