101. Evaluating Counterfactual US Policy Action in Syria, 2011-16: A Review of Empirical Evidence from Related Cases
- Author:
- Daniel Solomon
- Publication Date:
- 08-2017
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
- Abstract:
- In public and policy debates about the US response to the conflict in Syria, comparisons to past responses to international cases of mass atrocity have become a fixture. In these debates, analysts use lessons from those past responses to forecast the likely consequences of US policy action in Syria or to speculate about the counterfactual consequences of actions not taken at various junctures. Comparisons to historical cases of international response provide important mental models for policy makers seeking to use specific tools and strategies to respond to the risk or occurrence of mass atrocities.2 For example, Barack Obama has said that his unwillingness to pursue military action against the government of Bashar al-Assad in response to its use of chemical weapons in August 2013 resulted in part from his dismay at the instability that followed the military operation that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led against Muammar Gaddafi’s forces in Libya in 2011.3 For Obama, the risk that even limited military action in Syria could become “another Libya” was enough to remove a range of possible military options from consideration. Which counterfactual US actions, if any, might have prevented or mitigated violence against civilians in Syria? This paper uses a systematic review of empirical studies of international responses to mass atrocities and related phenomena to evaluate these contemporary debates about US policy action in Syria.4 The purpose of this review is to evaluate plausible alternative avenues the US may have taken to prevent or mitigate mass atrocities against civilians in Syria. This analysis centers on “minimal rewrite” counterfactuals, in which a different policy action at a specific, time-bounded juncture in the US policy process on Syria might have led to a different outcome in violence against civilians. “Minimal rewrite” counterfactuals are opposed to socalled miracle world counterfactuals, which would require significant changes to the structural or contextual conditions that shape US policy.5 The paper centers on three policy actions that the US government debated—and in some cases implemented, to a limited degree—at various junctures since the conflict began in March 2011: (a) lethal support to the armed Syrian opposition, (b) limited strikes against Syrian government targets, and (c) no-fly zones. Although those US officials sometimes debated these options during overlapping junctures, the paper addresses opposition support and the direct military options as separate phenomena. The paper uses a review of historical, qualitative and quantitative studies of related cases and policy actions to assess the extent to which these actions may have affected the scope and severity of subsequent atrocities in Syria.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Syrian War, Atrocities, Counterfactuals, and Atrocity Prevention
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America