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21. Estimating the Arms Sales of Chinese Companies

Author:
Nan Tian and Fei Su
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Quantitative research on the finances of the Chinese arms industry has been limited by the scarcity of available data. A scoping study to estimate the financial value of the arms sales of companies in the Chinese arms industry—using a new methodology—found information on four companies: the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), the China South Industries Group Corporation (CSGC) and the China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO). These four companies cover three main sectors of conventional arms production: aircraft, electronics and land systems. The estimates suggest that China is the second-largest arms producer in the world, behind the United States and ahead of Russia. All four of the profiled companies would be ranked among the 20 largest arms-producing and military services companies globally in 2017, with three—AVIC, NORINCO and CETC—in the top 10. The new methodology improves the understanding of the structure, size and evolution of the global arms industry.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Weapons, Arms Trade, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
China and Asia

22. Diplomatic Visits, New Arms Sales, and PLA Provocations Raise Tensions in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Events throughout 2020 have seen a measured but steady increase in tensions surrounding Taiwan. The government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to deny any legitimacy to the democratically-elected government of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. The PRC also continues to make menacing insistence upon unification on Beijing’s terms, in language that has grown more strident throughout the tenure of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping (China Brief, February 15, 2019; China Brief, November 1, 2019). Against this background, the PRC has reacted with both harsh rhetoric and saber rattling to enhanced U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic contacts in August and September, as well as a reported further round of impending U.S.-Taiwan arms sales (see discussion further below). One PRC English-language outlet opined in late September that “The U.S. has been releasing all kinds of supportive signals to Taiwan this year, with the level and frequency of their so-called interactions flagrantly enhanced… While [some in Taiwan] jump at such signals, they’d better think long and hard whether the signals are sweet poisons from the U.S. for Taiwan” (PLA Daily, September 25).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Arms Trade
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

23. Strategies for reforming Afghanistan’s illicit networks

Author:
Harris Samad and Fatima Salman
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This report explores illicit networks in Afghanistan in the context of peacebuilding, democratic consolidation, and enhancing state capacity. Existing literature on the topic is sparse. While the 1990s saw study of the subject matter as tangential to international arms and drug trafficking policies, this period laid the foundation for renewed interest on the issue partially catalyzed by the 2001 US-led invasion. The 2008 global financial crisis shifted this lens toward one of countering the financing of terrorism strategies, corruption, and money laundering. The current day reflects a broadening of how illicit networks are analyzed beyond sector-specific policies; that is, the subject matter today encompasses more of the sectors that make it profitable, rather than focusing only on the most relevant component at a given time. Indeed, it is an internationalized issue, encompassing the smuggling of different goods and involving individuals of varying motivations and capacities within and without Afghanistan. Illicit networks can be broadly understood at three main levels: hyper-local, national, and international. At a hyper-local level, illicit networks represent a series of interpersonal relationships that facilitate the exchange of goods and compensation (taking many forms) beyond the reach of central law enforcement or political authority. Nationally, illicit networks comprise regional and countrywide patronage, criminal, and insurgent networks that organize and profiteer from the hyper-local relationships on a macro level. Internationally, actors with reach outside of the country move illicitly gained goods such as poppy, talc, methamphetamine, minerals, and others, as well as people via human trafficking, into trading hubs in Iran, Pakistan, and the Gulf for export into international markets. They then use poorly regulated financial institutions throughout the world (notably, Western and Gulf banking systems) to store funds, some of which make their way back to Afghanistan (though this phenomenon is particularly difficult to track). This report outlines several specific policy recommendations that will be necessary to combat the illicit networks in a manner that supports the durability of the ongoing peace process in Afghanistan and the continued consolidation of its fragile democratic institutions. These recommendations include the following: For Afghanistan: Provide a path for illicit actors into the formal economy; Generate political will and support; Establish high-level Afghan support for countering illicit trafficking; and upholding the rule of law; Implement enhanced border management; Expand the negotiating table to include more localized narratives; Strengthen and internationalize counter-threat finance strategies For the United States: Support a comprehensive economic settlement; Ensure future interoperability between Afghan and US security forces For regional stakeholders: Provide access to global markets to enhance regional trade integration; Cut off regional and international components of networks to reduce viability and profitability via neighborhood watchdogs, in conjunction with the United States
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Arms Trade, Trafficking, Financial Institutions, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

24. Turkey's Giant Leap: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Author:
Hay Eytan and Cohen Yanarocak
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In the new issue of Turkeyscope, Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak discusses the evolution of the Turkish unmanned air vehicles industry and the role of the "made in Turkey UAVs" in Ankara's military campaigns.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Weapons, and Arms Trade
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Mediterranean

25. Staring Into the Abyss of US-China Decoupling

Author:
James M Dorsey
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
Israel resides at the cusp of the widening US-Chinese divide, as US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s recent visit to Israel attests. Pompeo’s visit was for the express purpose of reminding Jerusalem that its dealings with Beijing jeopardize its relationship with Washington.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Arms Trade, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

26. A Fragile Anti-US Alliance: Russia Accuses China of Technology Theft

Author:
James M Dorsey
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
The relationship between Russia and China is based on shared short-term strategic interests, but their differences lie just beneath the surface. Occasionally they erupt into the public eye, as occurred when Russia recently accused China of technology theft. The dynamic of the Russian-Chinese alliance is similar to that of Moscow’s alliances with Turkey and Iran, which also function by focusing on immediate interests and putting off serious differences as long as possible.
Topic:
Crime, Science and Technology, and Arms Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

27. Trade Update 2020: An Eye on Ammunition Transfers to Africa

Author:
Nicolas Florquin, Elodie Hainard, and Benjamin Jongleux
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Even though states may not intentionally supply materiel to armed groups, a lack of stringent risk assessments on weapons and ammunition exports destined for areas prone to diversion can hamper efforts to curtail the broader illicit arms trade. The 2020 edition of the Small Arms Survey’s annual Trade Update, Trade Update 2020: An Eye on Ammunition Transfers to Africa, delves into cases of authorized small arms ammunition transfers to Africa through exploring the potential of beyond-the-norm data sources. Relying on peacekeeping operations, national customs, and civil society research, the case studies highlight ammunition imports from opaque exporters to countries affected by armed conflict, states subject to arms embargoes, and other areas on the continent equally prone to seeing arms and ammunition diverted from the licit to illicit markets. Ammunition accounted for 42 per cent of all authorized African small arms imports in 2017. Since countries with low transparency records do export ammunition to government forces in conflict-affected regions and such regions are prone to diversion, there is a gap in risk identification. Therefore, findings from the case studies emphasize the importance of exporters improving their reporting practices and carrying out stringent risk assessments. In addition, the leveraging of multiple data sources can enhance the monitoring of the authorized ammunition trade and help curb unauthorized activities.
Topic:
Civil Society, Crime, Markets, Peacekeeping, Arms Trade, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Africa

28. Emerging Suppliers in the Global Arms Trade

Author:
Diego Lopes da Silva, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Lucie béraud-Sudreau
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Even though the volumes of arms exported by emerging suppliers are lower than those of the established exporters, they can nonetheless have a direct impact on international and regional security. The diversification in global arms transfers caused by the emergence of new suppliers therefore deserves scrutiny. Brazil, South Korea, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates are examples of emerging suppliers. Despite a continuous reliance on foreign technologies, they have managed to establish themselves in several niche categories of armaments or, in the case of South Korea, to widen the types of arms that they export. Exports of these emerging suppliers tend to go primarily to Africa, Asia and the Middle East, where most active armed conflicts are located, and also to Latin America. However, the drivers of the four countries’ arms exports differ: some have supplied with the intent to gain political influence, while others have primarily focused on the economic benefits.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Economics, Politics, Arms Trade, Disarmament, and Supply
Political Geography:
Global Focus

29. Post-shipment Control Measures: European Approaches to On-site Inspections of Exported Military Materiel

Author:
Kolja Brockmann, Lucile Robin, and Andrea Edoardo Varisco
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Post-shipment on-site inspections of exported military materiel enable an exporting country to verify that the materiel is still present in the country of destination and in the possession of the authorized end user. An increasing number of European countries are conducting on-site inspections, or are considering or planning to adopt such measures. A wide range of multilateral organizations already include the implementation of on-site inspections as part of their guidance documents. This SIPRI Background Paper provides an overview of the current state of implementation as regards on-site inspections of exported military materiel by different European countries. It highlights common sensitive issues related to the implementation of on-site inspections, maps the on-site inspection policies and practices of a selection of European countries, and provides recommendations for how the European Union could play a role in promoting such practices.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Arms Trade, Disarmament, and Exports
Political Geography:
Europe

30. US Must Protect Israel’s QME After F-35 Sale to UAE

Author:
Yaakov Amidror
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
As the largest arms supplier to the Middle East, America plays a critical role in ensuring that its sales uphold and do not adversely affect Israel’s security
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Arms Trade
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, North America, United States of America, and UAE