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932. Making the Grade 2000: Second Annual Review of Fissile Material Control Efforts
- Author:
- Kevin O'Neill
- Publication Date:
- 04-2000
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for Science and International Security
- Abstract:
- A little over a year ago, ISIS initiated an annual review of fissile material controls covering a broad spectrum of initiatives. To do so, 19 separate initiatives were identified and assessed. Based on this assessment, grades were awarded on a scale of A, B, C, D, and F, where an “A” is excellent and an “F” is failing. Numerically, an “A” corresponds to a numerical grade of four, and an “F” to zero. The results of the first review were disappointing. Only 12 of the 19 initiatives received a passing grade of “C” or higher. The average grade of the initiatives was a “C”-showing an unfortunate level of mediocrity across the fissile material control agenda. In ISIS’s 2000 review, we found that the outlook is worse today than it was a year ago. Rather than make progress during the past 12 months, the overall fissile material control agenda fared poorly. The average grade of the identified initiatives fell from a “C” to a “C-minus.” This overall finding is borne out if one looks at the individual grades assigned to each of the 19 identified initiatives. ISIS judged that five initiatives remained essentially static, nine received lower grades, and five initiatives received higher grades.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and Fissile Material
- Political Geography:
- Russia and United States of America
933. Progress on the Korean Peninsula?
- Author:
- John Feffer
- Publication Date:
- 12-2000
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy In Focus
- Abstract:
- It was a striking juxtaposition, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il sitting side by side at a display of mass gymnastics in Pyongyang this last October. “Spectacular and amazing,” Albright called the coordinated movements of the 100,000 performers. When a picture of the August 1998 Taepodong rocket launch was displayed, Kim Jong Il confided that it would be his country's first and last such launch. The North Korean leader was a man with whom she could do business, Albright concluded at the end of her visit. The U.S. and North Korea, technically at war for over fifty years, had never before been on quite such cordial speaking terms.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Peace Studies
- Political Geography:
- United States, Israel, North Korea, Korean Peninsula, and Pyongyang
934. Defending Against New Dangers: Arms Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction in A Globalized World
- Author:
- Major John A. Nagl
- Publication Date:
- 03-2000
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Studies Association
- Abstract:
- Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, in their classic book Strategy and Arms Control, first published in 1961, use the term "arms control" to include "all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it." This paper updates their definition of arms control and refocuses it for the post-Cold War world, arguing that arms control in the twenty-first century can remain an important component of U.S. national security policy if defined broadly and applied innovatively. Traditionally an element of nation-to-nation relations and usually conducted bilaterally, in the next century arms control will be an increasingly multilateral affair. Threats to U.S. national security in the next century will increasingly shift from other states to individuals and small groups–sub-and trans-national threats. Defending against these threats in the conventional sense will be difficult, and the focus of arms control will shift to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to these groups. It is conceivable that both the parties to arms control agreements and provisions for their enforcement will similarly shift to non-state actors, including multinational corporations.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Globalization, and International Cooperation
935. Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China
- Publication Date:
- 03-2000
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
- Abstract:
- China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is embarked on an ambitious, long-term military modernization effort to develop capabilities to fight and win short-duration, high- intensity conflicts along its periphery. China's defense modernization is broad reaching, encompassing the transformation of virtually all aspects of the military establishment, to include weapon systems, operational doctrine, institution building, and personnel reforms. China values military power to defend economic interests, secure territorial claims, and build political influence commensurate with its status as a regional power with global aspirations. In recent years, the PLA has accelerated reform and modernization in response to the central leadership's concerns that developments across the Taiwan Strait could put at risk Beijing's objectives for Taiwan unification.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy and Arms Control and Proliferation
- Political Geography:
- United States, China, Taiwan, and Beijing
936. China Rising: New Challenges to the U.S. Security Posture
- Author:
- Todd M. Koca and Jason D. Ellis
- Publication Date:
- 10-2000
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Abstract:
- The nature, scope, and viability of the strategic relationship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States have emerged as leading security policy issues. Among the many reasons for this are: China's evidently growing defense budget and its military modernization campaign; its often threatening rhetoric over Taiwan; its reputed espionage activities; and disputes over collateral security issues, such as China's continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, Beijing's lack of transparency concerning its strategic capabilities and modernization programs, and the intentions that undergird each, make it difficult to confidently forecast China's future direction; yet significant strategic decisions undertaken today will have far-reaching and long-term implications. There is a growing sense among defense analysts and specialists that the future disposition of Chinese strategic forces may only modestly resemble that of the past. Looking ahead, U.S. policy- makers must address three central questions: (1) the likely extent of China's strategic modernization; (2) the degree of complementarity of U.S. and PRC regional and strategic interests over time; and (3) the implications of each for U.S. foreign and defense policy.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation
- Political Geography:
- United States, China, and Taiwan
937. Middle East Missile Proliferation, Israeli Missile Defense, and the ABM Treaty Debate
- Author:
- Dore Gold
- Publication Date:
- 05-2000
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- Abstract:
- For most of the Cold War period, the spread of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction to the Middle East was severely constrained by the existence of a global regime of arms control agreements and export controls that was chiefly supported by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But in the last decade this regime has crumbled: In the Middle East, Iran and Iraq are seeking to build their own indigenous military-industrial infrastructure for the manufacture of intermediate-range (500-5,000 kilometers) missiles, and thus reduce their dependence on imports of whole missile systems, as was the case in the 1970s and 1980s. Intercontinental strategic-range systems are also planned. These efforts are being backed not just by other rogue states, like North Korea, but by no less than Russia itself, which has abandoned the cautiousness toward proliferation that was demonstrated by the former Soviet Union. Despite Washington's efforts to stop these trends through the United Nations monitoring of Iraq and limited sanctions against Iran, the build-up of Middle Eastern missile capabilities has only worsened, especially since 1998 which saw Iran's testing of the 1,300-kilometer-range Shahab-3 and the total collapse of the UN monitoring effort. Iraq has preserved considerable elements of its missile manufacturing infrastructure, continuing to produce short-range missiles, and with large amounts of missile components still unaccounted for. Nor did the administration stop the flow of Russian missile technology to Iran. "The proliferation of medium-range ballistic missiles," CIA Director George Tenet testified on March 21, 2000, "is significantly altering strategic balances in the Middle East and Asia." Clearly, the Middle East is far more dangerous for Israel than it was in 1991 at the end of the Gulf War. While diplomatic energies over the last decade have been focused on the Arab-Israeli peace process, a major policy failure has taken place that has left Israel and the Middle East far less secure. Not only will Israel's vulnerability increase, but on the basis of these planned missile programs, the vulnerability of Europe and the Eastern United States is likely to be far greater in the next five to ten years, as well. Thus, an entirely new strategic situation is emerging in the Middle East requiring far more intense efforts in ballistic missile defense on the part of the states of the Atlantic Alliance in order to assure their own security and enhance Middle Eastern regional stability. With Russia playing such a prominent role in the disintegration of key elements of the proliferation regime, Moscow's objections to robust missile defenses on the basis of the ABM Treaty should not serve as a constraint on the development and deployment of future missile defense systems. The Russian argument that the ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of global arms control rings hollow. The arms control regime for the Middle East has completely broken down and cannot reliably serve as the primary basis for protecting national security in the new strategic environment of this region. The most promising way of assuring the defense of Israel, the U.S., and the Western alliance is through a concerted effort to neutralize the growing missile threat with robust missile defenses, combined with the deterrence capabilities that they already possess.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Cold War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, and Soviet Union
938. The End of the Post-Gulf War Era
- Author:
- Dore Gold
- Publication Date:
- 03-2000
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- Abstract:
- Three basic conditions prevailed when the Arab-Israeli peace process began in 1991 in Madrid and accelerated in 1993 at Oslo. First, the Soviet Union crumbled and eventually collapsed, removing what had since 1955 been the strategic backbone of the Arab military option against the State of Israel. Second, Iraq was militarily crushed and under both UN sanctions and monitoring, and was therefore removed from the political and military calculus of relations between Israel and the Arab world. Third, Iran was still recovering from its eight-year war with Iraq and was far from ready to have an impact in the Middle East. Together, these three conditions created a unique moment of Pax Americana, maintained not just by virtue of American power, but by the consent of its potential rivals.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, War, and Sanctions
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Soviet Union
939. Overthrowing Saddam Hussein: The Policy Debate
- Author:
- Max Singer
- Publication Date:
- 03-2000
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- Abstract:
- Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator, has biological weapons capable of killing hundreds of thousands of Israelis with infectious diseases such as anthrax. These weapons could be delivered either by missiles, by small pilotless planes, or by infecting the passengers of a plane landing at Ben-Gurion Airport with less than an ounce of agent spread through the plane's air conditioning system. Saddam also has at least several nuclear weapons that are missing only highly enriched uranium which he is likely to be able either to make himself or to buy this year.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- United States and Middle East
940. Preventing a Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia
- Author:
- David Cortright and Samina Ahmed
- Publication Date:
- 01-2000
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame
- Abstract:
- The United States must unequivocally demand that India and Pakistan join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states. The United States should retain punitive sanctions which target Indian and Pakistani institutions and policymakers responsible for their nuclear weapons programs. Targeted incentives should be provided that seek to diminish internal support for nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. The United States should fulfill its obligation under Article VI of the NPT to achieve global nuclear disarmament.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
- Political Geography:
- United States and South Asia