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921. Biotechnology and the Future of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Author:
Jean Pascal Zanders, Frida Kuhlau, and John Hart
Publication Date:
11-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The spectre of the deliberate use of disease in war has long haunted humankind. The biological warfare threat became more realistic after the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. Not only did the terrorists demonstrate that they were prepared to murder large numbers of people indiscriminately, they also exposed the vulnerability of many societies. The sense of vulnerability was increased by attacks in the United States with letters containing anthrax bacteria, which killed several people and infected many more. Against this background the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) convened in Geneva on 19 November 2001. One of its main tasks was to evaluate the functioning of the treaty in the light of scientific and technological developments. Biotechnology has expanded rapidly in the past three decades—offering the prospect of a better quality of life—but it can be applied to design new types of biological weapons (BW). This raises concern as to whether the BTWC is sufficiently comprehensive to cover these developments.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, New York, and Washington

922. The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material

Author:
Matthew Bunn
Publication Date:
03-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Nothing could be more central to U.S. and world security than ensuring that nuclear warheads and their essential ingredients—plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)—do not fall into the hands of terrorists or proliferating states. If plutonium and HEU become regularly available on a nuclear black market, nothing else we do to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons will succeed. Similarly, unless stockpiles of nuclear warheads and fissile materials can be secured, monitored, and verifiably reduced, it will be impossible to achieve deep, transparent, and irreversible reductions in nuclear arms. Measures to control warheads and fissile materials, therefore, are central to the entire global effort to reduce nuclear arms and stem their spread. The tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of plutonium and HEU that remain in the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles represent a deadly legacy of the Cold War, and managing them securely must be a top U.S. security policy priority.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

923. Constitutional Problems with Enforcing the Biological Weapons Convention

Author:
Ronald D. Rotunda
Publication Date:
09-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The 1972 Biological Toxins and Weapons Convention—often called the Biological Weapons Convention, or BWC—requires the signatories to renounce the development, employment, transfer, acquisition, production, and possession of all biological weapons listed in the convention.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Government
Political Geography:
United States

924. Arms Control and Missile Defense: Not Mutually Exclusive

Author:
Charles V. Peña
Publication Date:
07-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Traditionally, strategic offensive arms control and ballistic missile defense have been viewed as mutually exclusive. During the Cold War, the general belief was that anti–ballistic missile (ABM) systems would call into question the ability of the superpowers to successfully survive a first nuclear strike and inflict sufficient damage with a second strike. That is, missile defense could allow one superpower to launch a first strike and then use its defenses to intercept a second strike with the other superpower's surviving warheads—thereby undermining deterrence and stability. Furthermore, the thinking was that this situation would result in a dangerous offensive arms race as each side sought to counter the effects of the other's defenses.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

925. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Next Steps

Author:
Thomas Jr. Graham and Christopher Chyba
Publication Date:
07-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:
Dr. Sid Drell: With the end of the Cold War there's been a major change in the U.S. nuclear weapons program, because the continuous cycle of developing and testing and deploying new warheads has ended. President George Bush announced in 1992 that we have no need for new nuclear weapons designs for deployment. It was this decision that, of course, opened the possibility of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which is why we now have a Stockpile Stewardship Program with the three requirements: we must maintain an enduring stockpile that's reliable, effective and safe for the indefinite future without nuclear explosive testing; we must maintain competence in nuclear weapons; and we must retain a technical capability and a manufacturing infrastructure in order to respond if required to any change in strategic circumstances. This will be one of the factors in our net assessment of whether to enter a CTBT.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, International Law, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States

926. The U.S. Enlargement Strategy and Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Michael M. May
Publication Date:
03-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:
The United States is often accused of lacking a global security strategy. The United States, so the accusation goes, makes foreign policy and security decisions on an ad-hoc basis, prompted by the demands of politics and pressure groups, and in alternating bursts of idealism and realpolitik. Since none of these factors can safely be dismissed, there has to be something to the accusation. In an unpredictable world, a certain respect for the ad hoc may even be a good thing: a global strategy, carried out without regard to circumstances, would confine the United States to a conceptual straitjacket, depriving it of needed flexibility.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States

927. A Verification Regime for Warhead Control

Author:
Liu Suping
Publication Date:
01-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:
After a brief period of progress, the U.S.-Russian nuclear reduction process has reached a stalemate. This situation causes us to rethink the following issues: What is the motivation for the two nuclear superpowers to conduct nuclear reductions? How can the focus of the nuclear arms reduction process be changed from verification of reduction of delivery vehicles to verification of reduction of warheads and nuclear materials? What is the objective for future nuclear reductions? What kind of verification regime will be required for future nuclear reductions?
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

928. An Alternative Framework for the Control of Nuclear Materials

Author:
Robert L Rinne
Publication Date:
07-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:
The decade of the 1990s has seen renewed concerns over nuclear proliferation, both horizontal and vertical. While many in the arms control community focus on numbers, it is control that is the most important factor—the detonation of just one nuclear weapon would be an international catastrophe. Rather than concentrating on numbers, the regime defined herein centers on enhancing the safety and security being provided nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile materials. The proposal in the paper is called the Nuclear Weapons Control Treaty (NWCT) and referred to as New Court. The emphasis is on control rather than disarmament, protection from unintended or unauthorized use rather than elimination. New Court, once in place, would provide an environment in which the necessary audits and accountability for undertaking dramatic reductions in the numbers of weapons and the quantities of weapons-usable materials could be made with much greater confidence than exists today. However, it will be decades (if ever) before the number of nuclear weapons goes to zero. In the meantime, it is paramount that comprehensive safety and security be established and maintained.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons

929. China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment

Author:
Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts
Publication Date:
04-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Historically, U.S. nuclear strategists and arms control experts have paid little attention to the People's Republic of China (PRC). China has not been a major factor in the U.S. nuclear calculus, which has remained centered on U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals as the principal framework for arms control and arms reductions. Yet today China is the only one of the five de jure nuclear weapons states qualitatively and quantitatively expanding its nuclear arsenal.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

930. The Election Matrix

Author:
Joseph Cirincione
Publication Date:
11-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The selection of the next president will be important for U.S. policy on nuclear weapons, but not as decisive as some might think. If the Senate stays Republican, as expected, a great deal depends on which party controls the House of Representatives.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Government
Political Geography:
United States