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81. Taking Stock of the Arms Trade Treaty: Application of the Risk-assessment Criteria

Author:
Paul Beijer
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
A central element of the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is the risk-assessment criteria in articles 6 and 7. The flexibility in the wording of the two articles has required efforts to reach common interpretations of the criteria in order to lessen the scope for different assessment outcomes. These efforts, as well as improved and aligned national practices, will enhance the treaty’s long-term impact. While there are limits to how far some states parties will want to go, there is a genuine preparedness to look at ways to increase the effectiveness of the ATT that should be encouraged and supported. This is one of a series of five papers that are being produced as part of a wider project aimed at taking stock of specific aspects of the ATT—its scope, the application of the risk-assessment criteria, its processes and forums, universalization efforts, and international assistance to support ATT implementation.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, Arms Trade, and Risk
Political Geography:
Global Focus

82. Mitigating Humanitarian Impact in a Complex Sanctions Environment: The European Union and the Sanctions Regimes against Iran

Author:
Keith A. Preble and Kolja Brockmann
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Iran is one of the most heavily sanctioned countries in the world. The combination of sanctions on Iran imposed by the United States, the United Nations and the European Union (EU) in response to, among others, nuclear and ballistic missile activities and human rights violations provides for a sanctions environment that is highly complex and difficult to navigate for exporters, financial institutions and humanitarian actors. Particularly in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, there is renewed attention to the humanitarian impact of sanctions, especially in the case of Iran which became one of the flashpoints of the pandemic. The focus of this paper is on the array of overlapping sanctions and the mitigation of humanitarian impact, with a particular focus on EU sanctions policy and instruments. The paper outlines key milestones and phases in the imposition of sanctions on Iran by the three main sanctioning actors, the USA, the UN and the EU, thus demonstrating the complexity and the at times coordinated or contradictory nature of the different sanctions. It then explores the humanitarian impact of sanctions on Iran by discussing several illustrative indicators and the impact of sanctions on the provision of international humanitarian aid. The paper reviews existing mechanisms to mitigate the humanitarian impact of sanctions and how they could be improved. In the context of the sanctions of Iran, but also beyond, the paper finds that there is a clear need to further strengthen compliance, enforcement and coordination of EU sanctions, including in the context of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It concludes by providing specific recommendations for the EU and its member states on improving the effective use of sanctions and reducing their humanitarian impact, including through strengthening key instruments and assessment processes, better coordination with the USA and more engagement with humanitarian actors.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Sanctions, European Union, Arms Trade, Disarmament, and Exports
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

83. Additive Manufacturing for Missiles and Other Uncrewed Delivery Systems: Challenges for the Missile Technology Control Regime

Author:
Kolja Brockmann
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Additive manufacturing (AM) has become an attractive production technology for the aerospace sector, particularly in the area of missiles, space launch vehicles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). Modern AM techniques—often referred to as 3D printing—create objects from feedstock materials such as metallic powders by building them up from the first to the last layer in an iterative process of depositing and fusing layers of material. AM is being used to produce a growing range of components for missiles and UAVs. AM has been recognized to pose a growing proliferation threat and a challenge to existing export controls. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has been discussing AM since at least 2013 and seeks to update and harmonize the export controls of the participating states to mitigate the risks posed by AM and ensure the effectiveness of export controls. The export controls prescribed by the MTCR and some of the other regimes already create controls on AM. However, many of these controls are based on overlaps rather than control list items that cover AM by design and may not ensure adequate coverage. This report provides a short introduction to modern AM techniques and describes a range of specific applications of AM in missiles and other delivery systems. It discusses the proliferation risks posed by AM and the engineering and organizational considerations that have to be weighed against the technical capabilities of AM. It analyses the application of export controls to AM, primarily under the MTCR, by discussing controls on AM production equipment; feedstock materials; transfers of technology and technical assistance; and catch-all controls. The report concludes by outlining key measures through which the MTCR could strengthen its efforts to address AM and the proliferation risks and challenges to export controls it poses.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Global Focus

84. South Asia’s Nuclear Challenges: Interlocking Views from India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States

Author:
Petr Topychkanov and Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This report provides an overview of views on nuclear postures and escalation affecting South Asia, based on 119 research interviews conducted in 2020 with military, nuclear, political and regional experts from India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States. The publication also builds on the findings from a virtual workshop that SIPRI hosted on 8 and 9 December 2020 on ‘Nuclear challenges in South Asia: Views from India, Pakistan, China, Russia, Australia, New Zealand and the USA’. These discussions revealed a variety of interlocking insights on such issues as no first use, lowered nuclear thresholds, conventional and nuclear entanglement and emerging technologies that are shaping strategic stability. The publication consists of five country-focused sections that explore nuclear postures, strategic technologies and escalatory risks, as well as conclusions that offer building blocks for the next steps on engagement. This report was prepared in the framework of the SIPRI project Assessing Nuclear Deterrence Risks and Challenges in South Asia, generously supported by the German Federal Foreign Office.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Power, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, and United States of America

85. New Technologies and Nuclear Disarmament: Outlining a Way Forward

Author:
Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This report sheds light on the impact of recent military-technological advancements on nuclear deterrence and disarmament. Noting that progress towards multilateral disarmament is hardly possible without prior and significant reductions in the largest nuclear weapon arsenals, the report views the resumption of bilateral arms control between Russia and the United States as the most important step towards disarmament at the present moment. It argues that these two countries should move away from their cold war era nuclear doctrines, which seek an ability to win nuclear wars, towards a policy of ‘minimal nuclear deterrence’, that is focused on deterring a nuclear attack. In line with doctrinal changes, further cuts in Russian and US nuclear stockpiles could be achieved by removing nuclear weapons from regional conflict dynamics, meaning that they would no longer serve as a deterrent against conventional aggression. Such a change would help to reduce nuclear risks without undermining regional deterrence, as each side already has robust conventional forces comprised of precision-strike weapons and other advanced military systems. At the same time, the report notes that progress towards nuclear disarmament would be complicated by long-range precision-strike weapons and strategic missile defences, which have raised the bar for credible nuclear deterrence by creating uncertainty about US adversaries’ second-strike capabilities. Lowering that bar and eventually reducing the perceived need for nuclear deterrence will require creative arms control diplomacy, including limits on strategic missile defences; stronger norms against both nuclear and conventional aggression; as well as a clear stigma against nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

86. Supporting Small Arms and Light Weapons Controls through Development Assistance: The Case of sub-Saharan Africa

Author:
Giovanna Maletta and Lucile Robin
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) has had a negative impact on conflict, security and development. In order to help states to address the multifaceted challenges posed by the proliferation of these weapons, some states as well as regional and international organizations have established a series of funding instruments and assistance programmes that support or provide SALW control-related assistance. In view of the recognized linkages between SALW proliferation, security and development, official development assistance (ODA) has progressively become an eligible source of funding in this field. However, there remains limited clarity on which assistance activities have been supported through development spending. A comprehensive assessment of the use of ODA to support SALW control-related assistance could help donors, policymakers and interested stakeholders to understand how assistance policies have adjusted to the recognition of the link between conventional arms control and sustainable development made in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Focusing on SALW control-related assistance provided in sub-Saharan Africa as a case study and comparing information included in separate data sets compiled by SIPRI and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, this report attempts to provide information on which relevant activities have been supported through ODA in this region. It shows that only a limited number of donors have used ODA to support SALW control-related assistance and that they have different practices in the way they report on the use of these funds. It also outlines the challenges that make mapping this assistance a particularly difficult exercise.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Development, and Development Assistance
Political Geography:
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa

87. Iranian Nuclear Weapons Development Sites Requiring IAEA Inspections

Author:
David Block
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Nuclear weapons experts David Albright and Sarah Burkhard of the Institute for Science and International Security provide a meticulously researched analysis of Iran’s nuclear development activities in their new book, Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons. Based on their rare and extensive access to 300 tons of documents in Iran’s Atomic Archives, they reveal several previously unknown aspects of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, including a unique advanced indigenous design for a nuclear weapon just 55cm in diameter requiring less than 25kg of weapons grade uranium; a crash program designed to test and complete five ballistic capable nuclear weapons; as well a substantial site infrastructure for the enrichment, fabrication, manufacturing and testing of nuclear weapons cores and triggers. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Chair Rafael Grossi, in a March 23 interview with Newsweek, said Iran must come clean about past undeclared nuclear activity, including recent findings of undeclared uranium, if there is any possibility to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, or JCPOA. Grossi added that “detailed and technical discussions” are needed to address the issue of Iran’s past undeclared work — including ascertaining the location of Iran’s undeclared stockpile of enriched uranium — which the world’s nuclear watchdog explained is “totally connected” to the future of the deal. Underscoring the urgency of Grossi’s point, following the IAEA Board of Governors June 10 meeting and reports on Iran’s NPT & JCPOA non-compliance, the Group of Seven nations (G7) issued a communique reiterating a joint commitment to “ensuring that Iran will never develop a nuclear weapon…ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme…and to ensure full and timely cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.” The statement was met with unusual outrage and defiance by Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani, who warned that Iran can expand its nuclear program “on any day, at any hour” to increase uranium enrichment beyond the current level of 63 percent, which is already sufficiently enriched to fuel a nuclear weapon. Given the importance of Iran fully addressing its undeclared nuclear activity, this table identifies the locations of Amad and post-Amad facilities in various states, including razed, shut down, repurposed, or possibly still active, which is relevant to the IAEA’s efforts to determine the origin of undeclared nuclear materials, fate of undeclared facilities and activities, the completeness of Iran’s nuclear declaration, and whether nuclear weapons efforts have ended or in fact are ongoing. Such a determination requires IAEA visits to key sites in the Amad and post-Amad programs.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

88. The Iran Nuclear Deal at Five: A Revival?

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The 2015 nuclear deal enters 2021 clinging to life, having survived the Trump administration’s withdrawal and Iran’s breaches of its commitments. When the Biden administration takes office, Washington and Tehran should move quickly and in parallel to revive the agreement on its original terms.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

89. Arms Control and Strategic Stability with Russia: The View from Europe

Author:
Jon B. Wolfsthal and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States and its NATO partners have successfully managed the challenge of deterrence and reassurance for generations. The risk of conflict, even nuclear conflict, with Russia remains all too real, especially as political and military competition continues to escalate, and as new technologies and capabilities come online that could further raise the risk of direct military confrontation between the United States and Russia. Ensuring clear, consistent, and constructive communication among officials and experts within the transatlantic security community about the potential dangers posed by Russian behavior, and how to effectively pursue greater stability together, will be essential if the alliance is to remain successful in the decades to come. The following assessment is informed by conversations among such experts committed to that goal. The memo identifies European allies and partners’ views, interests, and concerns about America’s emerging dialogue with Russia on arms control and strategic stability. It is intended to inform U.S. approaches to alliance management and consultation with European allies as well as potential talks and negotiations with the Russian Federation. Although the expert discussions occurred before Russia’s military buildup on Ukraine’s border resumed in October 2021, the insights the working group produced remain relevant so long as the U.S.-Russia arms control and strategic stability dialogue persists.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Strategic Stability, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

90. Reimagining Nuclear Arms Control: A Comprehensive Approach

Author:
James M. Acton, Thomas Macdonald, and Pranay Vaddi
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The governments of China, Russia, and the United States all express support for arms control. They disagree profoundly, however, about its purposes and preconditions. To try to find common ground, this report presents nine detailed practical measures that—implemented individually or as part of a package—would help address each state’s specific security concerns and the shared dangers of arms racing and inadvertent escalation.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America