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531. Submarine Nuclear Reactors: A Worsening Proliferation Challenge

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
A long submerged flaw in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) surfaced conspicuously in June when Iran announced it intended to build a nuclear-powered submarine. The treaty does not ban a non-nuclear weapons state's production of weapons-grade uranium if it is to be used to power a naval reactor. What many now consider a proliferation loophole in the NPT was first seen as theoretical because only nuclear weapons states had nuclear-powered submarines when the treaty was negotiated. Now, as more and more countries initiate or announce intentions to initiate nuclear-powered submarine programs, this excuse for enriching uranium to levels beyond the needs of civilian power reactors intensifies the challenge of achieving U.S. nonproliferation goals. The United States should adjust its policy by: 1) choosing a reactor for the Ohio-class SSBN follow-on that does not require weapons-grade fuel and 2) pushing for multilateral action to close or at least narrow the NPT loophole that allows for non-nuclear weapons states to produce highly enriched uranium for naval reactors.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Submarines, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

532. CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects

Author:
Arms Control Association
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has already helped to bring an end to nuclear testing, reduced nuclear arms competition, and improved global capabilities to detect and deter nuclear testing in the future. But until the CTBT enters into force, the door to renewed testing is still open. Entry into force requires ratification by a handful of key states. On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO), ACA organized a high-level conference on the CTBT in Vienna, Austria involving senior government representatives and leading technical experts. The participants reviewed the progress of the CTBTO and the International Monitoring System, examined the role of the CTBT in advancing disarmament and curbing proliferation, and evaluated the obstacles and pathways to the Treaty’s entry into force. This conference report includes formal conference presentations and summarizes the discussions.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Political Geography:
Global Focus

533. North Korea’s Estimated Stocks of Plutonium and Weapon-Grade Uranium

Author:
David Albright and Christina Walrond
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
For years, great controversy has surrounded North Korea’s uranium enrichment program (UEP). How large is it? Has it made weapon-grade uranium (WGU)? How much could it make in the future? But there are also broader questions. What is the role of the UEP in the larger North Korean nuclear program? Is the UEP program strictly oriented to make 3.5 percent low enriched uranium for a civilian light water reactor (LWR) under construction at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, as North Korea says? Is it to make WGU? Or could North Korea intend to further enrich uranium for use in the light water reactor to make plutonium for nuclear weapons? Although LWRs are not typically used to make weapon-grade plutonium, they can do so efficiently if the reactor core is specially designed. Finally, how should the United States respond to the UEP and the associated uncertainties in this program? This ISIS report attempts to answer these questions utilizing plausible scenarios about past and possible future operation of the centrifuge program that could result in the production of WGU and future operation of the LWR that could make weapon-grade plutonium. In doing so, the report seeks to organize the incomplete data and derive answers to the above questions that have policy relevance. The report’s results are necessarily preliminary because significant uncertainties exist about the number of North Korean gas centrifuge plants, their operation, and the amount and enrichment level of the enriched uranium produced in them. In addition, although North Korea has said that its Yongbyon LWR is for civilian purposes, this statement is unverified and doubts about its potential use are justified. This report is designed to be updated if and when additional information is obtained. This report presents and evaluates a wide range of information about North Korea’s plutonium and uranium enrichment programs. It identifies gaps in knowledge of these programs. For this report, ISIS developed a variety of estimates of North Korea’s current and future stocks of WGU and weapon-grade plutonium. Although the numerical possibilities are broad, most of the discussion focuses on the central estimates. These results are presented in terms of kilograms of these materials. This report, and in particular this summary, uses the convention of converting these numbers into nuclear weapon equivalents. Often the term “equivalents” is dropped. Such a conversion is necessary when both plutonium and WGU estimates are discussed, since it allows for a more meaningful discussion of the aggregate amount of both fissile materials.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

534. Setting a Standard for stakeholdership. Industry Contribution to a strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Author:
Jean Pascal Zanders (Ed.)
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, more commonly known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), was opened for signature on 10 April 1972. Upon entering into force on 26 March 1975, it was the first treaty ever to ban completely a whole category of weapons. Together with the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the BTWC forms one of the pillars through which the international community deals with weapons of mass destruction.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, Peace Studies, Treaties and Agreements, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Europe

535. Europe deploys towards a civil-military strategy for CSDP

Author:
Sven Biscop (Ed) and Jo Coelmont (Ed)
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Why does Europe develop the military and civilian capabilities that it does? Why does it undertake the military and civilian operations that it does? And why in other cases does it refrain from action?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Europe

536. Worse, not Better ? Reinvigorating Early Warning for Conflict Prevention in the Post Lisbon European Union

Author:
John Brante, Chiara De Franco, Christoph Meyer, and Florian Otto
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The number and lethality of conflicts has been declining significantly since the end of the Cold War, but five new armed conflicts still break out each year. While costly peace-making, stabilisation and reconstruction efforts have helped to end conflicts, no comparative efforts have gone into preventing them from occurring in the first place. The international community appears stuck in the never-ending travails of managing crises, finding it difficult to act early to prevent new conflicts from escalating. Encouraging signs that this is changing include the United Nations (UN) promotion of the preventive arm of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the United States' efforts to improve its capacity to prevent conflicts and mass atrocities emerging from the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. Similarly, since the launch of the Gothenburg programme in 2001, the European Union (EU) has embraced the case for conflict prevention in policy documents as well as in the Lisbon Treaty itself, making it a hallmark of its approach to international security and conflict in contrast to conventional foreign policy. Yet, it has fallen significantly short in translating these aspirations into institutional practice and success on the ground. It suffers from the 'missing middle' syndrome between long-term structural prevention through instruments such as conditionality for EU accession and development policy, and short-term responses to erupting crisis through military and civilian missions.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Peace Studies, War, Armed Struggle, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Europe and United Nations

537. A new Geography of European power?

Author:
James Rogers
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The naval historian and geostrategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, understood the utility of military power perhaps better than anyone before or since. In an article called The Place of Force in International Relations – penned two years before his death in 1914 – he claimed: 'Force is never more operative then when it is known to exist but is not brandished' (1912). If Mahan's point was valid then, it is perhaps even more pertinent now. The rise of new powers around the world has contributed to the emergence of an increasingly unpredictable and multipolar international system. Making the use of force progressively more dangerous and politically challenging, this phenomenon is merging with a new phase in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, many European governments are increasingly reluctant – perhaps even unable – to intervene militarily in foreign lands. The operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that when armed force is used actively in support of foreign policy, it can go awry; far from re-affirming strength and determination on the part of its beholder, it can actually reveal weakness and a lack of resolve. Half-hearted military operations – of the kind frequently undertaken by democratic European states – tend not to go particularly well, especially when there is little by way of a political strategy or the financial resources needed to support them. A political community's accumulation of a military reputation, which can take decades, if not centuries, can then be rapidly squandered through a series of unsuccessful combat operations, which dent its confidence and give encouragement to its opponents or enemies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political Violence, Arms Control and Proliferation, War, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Europe

538. Bleak Outlook for 2011 Conference on Disarmament

Author:
Brian Rose
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The 2011 Conference on Disarmament (CD) began contentiously when Ambassador Zamir Akram, Pakistan\'s permanent representative to the United Nations, criticized United States\' support of India\'s membership in export organizations that would allow it to engage in nuclear trade. Pakistan believes such membership would further favor India and accentuate the asymmetry in fissile materials stockpiles of the two states. Strategic and security concerns drive Pakistan\'s commitment to block negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty. Progress during the CD seems unlikely if the United States and Pakistan remain entrenched in their respective positions.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, India, and Asia

539. "Getting Beyond Taiwan? Chinese Foreign Policy and PLA Modernization"

Author:
Michael A. Glosny
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
Since the mid-1990s, China's military modernization has focused on deterring Taiwan independence and preparing for a military response if deterrence fails. Given China's assumption of U.S. intervention in a Taiwan conflict, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been developing military capabilities to deter, delay, and disrupt U.S. military support operations. The 2008 election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou, however, has contributed to improved cross-strait economic and political cooperation and dramatically reduced the threat of Taiwan independence and war across the Taiwan Strait. Cooperation has included full restoration of direct shipping, flights, and mail across the strait, Taiwan's participation in the World Health Assembly, regularized cross-strait negotiation mechanisms that have already reached several agreements, and the recent signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Climate Change, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Israel, Taiwan, and Asia

540. Getting Beyond Taiwan? Chinese Foreign Policy PLA Modernization

Author:
Michael A. Glosny
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Since the mid-1990s, China's military modernization has focused on deterring Taiwan independence and preparing for a military response if deterrence fails. Given China's assumption of U.S. intervention in a Taiwan conflict, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been developing military capabilities to deter, delay, and disrupt U.S. military support operations. The 2008 election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou, however, has contributed to improved cross-strait economic and political cooperation and dramatically reduced the threat of Taiwan independence and war across the Taiwan Strait. Cooperation has included full restoration of direct shipping, flights, and mail across the strait, Taiwan's participation in the World Health Assembly, regularized cross-strait negotiation mechanisms that have already reached several agreements, and the recent signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Arms Control and Proliferation, Communism, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States and China