Search

Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Publication Year within 25 Years

381. Too Close for Comfort Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy

Author:
Patricia Lewis, Benoît Pelopidas, Heather Williams, and Sasan Aghlani
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:
Nuclear weapons have not been detonated in violent conflict since 1945. The decades since then are commonly perceived – particularly in those countries that possess nuclear weapons – as an era of successful nuclear non-use and a vindication of the framework of nuclear deterrence. In this narrative, the fear of massive retaliation and a shared understanding and set of behaviours are believed to have prevented the use of nuclear weapons. Yet the decades since 1945 have been punctuated by a series of disturbing close calls. Evidence from many declassified documents, testimonies and interviews suggests that the world has, indeed, been lucky, given the number of instances in which nuclear weapons were nearly used inadvertently as a result of miscalculation or error.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Washington

382. Why Nuclear Deterrence Still Matters to NATO

Author:
Walter B. Slocombe and Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
NATO's Strategic Concept (SC), adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, includes a number of propositions that define NATO's nuclear policy. Most fundamentally, NATO's most important strategy document declares that "[d]eterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of" the Alliance's "overall strategy."
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security

383. Governing Uranium and Nuclear Supply Chains: Why Private Engagement is Needed

Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The expansion of uranium mining into states of weak governance calls for new forms of regulation from private and public actors. Companies along the nuclear supply chain can strengthen the global nuclear regulatory regime through engagement, material stewardship, and traceability approaches.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, Markets, Nuclear Weapons, Natural Resources, and Nuclear Power

384. Transforming armed non-state actors Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
It is necessary to rethink the assumptions and theory of change of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs in current situations of armed violence.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Political Violence, Arms Control and Proliferation, Development, War, and Armed Struggle

385. Prioritising European Defence Cooperation: The next step for the common security and defence policy

Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The European council's decisions on the common Security and Defence policy (CSDP) in December 2013 and the process that now follows should be used by EU member states as a means to progressively empower the CSDP within a short-term future.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe

386. Breaking Down Iran’s Breakout Capacity

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As efforts intensify to bring the Iran nuclear negotiations to a successful conclusion by November 24, the issue of breakout continues to occupy center stage. Setting limits on Iran’s nuclear program to dissuade the leaders in Tehran from breaking out of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and possibly building nuclear weapons is a central objective of the P5+1 powers (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Consideration of the effect of agreed limits on the time it would take Iran to build nuclear weapons is, therefore, a necessary step in formulating the P5+1 negotiating position, but is not sufficient for navigating the appropriate course toward a comprehensive agreement. Relying on the narrow definition of the term “breakout”—obtaining enough weapons-grade uranium gas for one bomb—does not fully capture the path that would have to be traveled. It is also necessary to consider “effective breakout”—the time needed to build a credible nuclear arsenal—in order to ensure that the proper balance between verification and limitations can be achieved.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

387. A Win-Win Formula for Defining Iran's Uranium-Enrichment Capacity

Author:
Kelsey Davenport and Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As negotiators prepare to resume talks over Iran's nuclear program, they face a formidable task: to bridge the remaining gaps and reach a comprehensive nuclear deal by November 24. Perhaps the most difficult issue Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) must resolve is how to define the size and scope of Iran's uranium enrichment program. To achieve a win-win outcome the two sides must develop a creative, technically sound formula that increases the time it would take for Iran to enrich uranium to weapons grade, while still providing Tehran with a modest program that allows domestic production of enriched uranium to contribute to fueling future civilian reactors and allows research and development to advance centrifuge technology. In collaboration with the International Crisis Group, the Arms Control Association has developed a proposal to define Iran's uranium enrichment program in a manner that meets the fundamental concerns of both Tehran and the P5+1. The proposal is the product of feedback from a number of technical and political experts. While this may not be "the solution" to the enrichment puzzle, the proposal offers constructive options for the negotiators to consider.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

388. Iran Nuclear Brief: Iranian Missiles and the Comprehensive Nuclear Deal

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The international community has been acutely concerned for many years about Iran's increasing capacity to produce material for nuclear weapons. With sufficient fissile material and a warhead design, Iran could use its existing ballistic missiles to pose a credible nuclear threat throughout the region. Consequently, after repeatedly directing Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, the UN Security Council decided in 2010 that Iran also had to halt all activities related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Now that serious negotiations are under way to curtail Iran's ability to dash for a bomb, seeking ballistic missile limits as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal would be unwise. Getting adequate and verifiable constraints on Iran's nuclear program remains the highest priority. The best way to address Iran's potential to exploit nuclear-capable missiles is to ensure that Iran's nuclear program is sufficiently limited and transparent. To also demand severe limits on conventional weapons that Iran regards as vital to its self-defense would jeopardize the negotiations' key objective.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

389. The Unaffordable Arsenal: Reducing the Costs of the Bloated U.S. Nuclear Stockpile

Author:
Tom Z. Collina
Publication Date:
10-2014
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The United States currently plans to spend some $355 billion to maintain and rebuild its Cold War-era nuclear arsenal over the next decade, even as the overall U.S. defense budget is declining and U.S. military planners and the president have determined that the United States can deter nuclear threats against the United States and its allies with far fewer nuclear weapons. This report argues that the increasingly high cost of nuclear weapons, combined with shrinking budgets and stockpiles, should compel the executive branch, Congress, and the American public to rethink current plans to rebuild U.S. nuclear forces in the years ahead. The Unaffordable Arsenal outlines common sense ways to save roughly $70 billion over the next decade across all three legs of the triad by scaling-back, delaying, and/or deferring expensive new delivery systems and by taking a more disciplined, straightforward approach to nuclear warhead life-extensions and refurbishments.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

390. Rethinking U.S.-China Security Cooperation

Author:
Nancy Gallagher
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This paper argues that traditional arms control approaches no longer work well for even traditional security problems on the U.S.-Chinese security agenda for three reasons: Firstly, even when both states reason for arms control from the superpowers’ experience during the Cold War, they do so in different ways; secondly, a growing number of experts and policy elite in both countries do not think the benefits of formal arms control outweigh the costs and risks; and thirdly, those who think formal arms control has an important role to play lack a clear and compelling logic for why arms control is durable and achievable among highly interdependent states with unequal power, mixed interests, and dissimilar values. Past attempts find a new basis for U.S.-China security cooperation—e.g., by using voluntary measures or by relying on the economic interdependence of the two states—have proved insufficient. The second half of this paper suggests the basic elements of a cooperative security logic that could be a more appropriate and effective basis for cooperation. Instead of narrowly defining the objective of arms control as increasing deterrence stability at lower cost and risk, this logic aims more broadly to prevent threats from developing, provide reassurance, and promote consensual political order among states. Rather than trying primarily to set equal technical limitations on military capabilities, dialogue and negotiations should seek to ensure that whatever capabilities states have, including asymmetrical and dual-use ones, are used for mutually acceptable purposes and according to equitable behavioral rules. Issues related to transparency, verification, and compliance management would also be handled in ways that promote cooperation rather than competition. The paper concludes by examining how U.S.-Chinese cooperation in space, on nuclear weapons issues (including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), and on missile defense all stand to benefit from reliance on this new logic.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Bilateral Relations, Deterrence, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America