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131. Towards Greater Nuclear Restraint: Raising the Threshold for Nuclear Weapon Use

Author:
Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This report focuses on the risks that a lack of nuclear restraint pose for international security. On the one hand, the problem has to do with uncertainty regarding the first use of nuclear weapons, which has increased in recent years as a result of technological developments, political tensions, and the deadlock in nuclear arms control. On the other hand, there is a longer-term trend of a lowering nuclear threshold in response to WMD proliferation threats by non-nuclear weapon states. After identifying some of the most problematic aspects of the current nuclear policies of the five nuclear weapon states (NWS), the report makes the case for greater restraint, including recommendations for reducing doctrinal ambiguity and more credible assurances that the threshold for nuclear weapon use remains high. The report also seeks to provide conceptual tools for a broad international dialogue on nuclear doctrines, based on a recent agreement by the NWS to pursue such dialogue in the 1968 Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) context.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Global Focus

132. Mapping Non-proliferation and Disarmament Education in Europe

Author:
Elizabeth I-Mi Suh
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This paper maps activities undertaken to educate the next generation of Europeans on non-proliferation and disarmament-related topics with a view to training future scholars and professionals, excluding capacity-building efforts. Most members of the European network of independent non-proliferation and disarmament think tanks conduct informal and formal educational activities, ranging from courses for students to workshops for young professionals, internships, networking events and mentoring programmes. However, the geographic distribution and dominant political science focus of these efforts illustrate the lack of accessibility and multidisciplinarity of non-proliferation and disarmament education currently available in Europe. Treating education as empowerment rather than a one-way process of recruitment can facilitate the introduction of new approaches and tools. Education can tap into existing potential among the next generation, such as intercultural competencies, multilingualism or technical know-how. Forms of participatory learning and autonomous project work place more responsibility on the learner to develop the skills required to deal with tasks.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Education, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Europe

133. The Case for Gender Balance in Arms Control, Non-proliferation and Disarmament Negotiations

Author:
Federica Dall'Arche
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Global efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and regulate small arms and light weapons (SALW) have gradually increased over the past four decades but the number of women involved in these efforts remains alarmingly small. Women face enormous obstacles when it comes to their participation in diplomatic negotiations and decision-making processes, and arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament diplomacy is no exception. Women continue to be excluded or marginalized from these procedures and when they do participate it is often in low-level positions from which exerting influence is difficult. Studies have shown that women represent only 32 per cent of all participants in official arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament forums and that heads of delegations, as well as speakers in related events and conferences, are almost exclusively men. This paper investigates the possible causes of this imbalance and shows why a continuing gender disparity among experts and practitioners in the field is problematic. It demonstrates that the inclusion of women has positive effects on the outcome of negotiations and examines why this is the case. Finally, it discusses the ways in which the European Union (EU) in particular, and the international community in general, can increase the number of women involved in the field.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Gender Issues, European Union, and Women
Political Geography:
Europe

134. The Implications of an Iran Sanctions Snapback

Author:
Richard Nephew
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
For several months, it has seemed likely that the Trump administration would elect to pursue the reimposition, or snapback, of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against Iran. For those less steeped in the terminology, the concept of sanctions “snapback” is one developed as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It refers to the ability of the United States and other partners to quickly reimpose the sanctions that were suspended as part of the quid pro quo that saw Iran accept significant restrictions and transparency requirements for its nuclear program. Conceptually, this was necessary because Iran had the ability to restart its nuclear program if the United States or others were seen as cheating on the deal. The United States and its partners needed some assurance that, if Iran were found to be cheating, they could react just as swiftly. On August 20, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo finally submitted the notification that, according to the US government, would trigger a 30-day timeline for the reimposition of these sanctions. In the US view there is now no stopping the return of the UNSC’s original Iran sanctions regime, though there may be some procedural wrangling over how and when the measures will be reimposed. It is not clear, however, whether this will be the case. A fair amount of analysis has gone into the fundamental question of whether the United States has the standing to trigger snapback, which is an issue I explored in 2019.[1] European, Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and other observers argue that the United States has no such standing, because, under the terms of the UN Security Council resolution that created the snapback mechanism (UNSCR 2231), it is no longer a “participant” of the JCPOA following its withdrawal in 2018. Even former National Security Advisor John Bolton—who was in large part responsible for the US withdrawal from the JCPOA—tends to agree with this reading.[2] The Trump administration obviously disagrees. It is an important question, and one that speaks to the underlying credibility and integrity of the US snapback decision as well as its results. But, ultimately, there is no way of finding a conclusive answer. International law being what it is, there are no authoritative arbiters available to determine whether the United States or its many critics are right. Snapback is happening and will have consequences, we now need to shift to considering what comes next. I see four main outcomes that are directly relevant to this decision and the future of US sanctions policy and negotiations.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

135. War and COVID-19 in Yemen

Author:
Afrah Nasser
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
After Yemen’s 2011 uprising broke out, the country went through a series of political upheavals and cycles of violence that tore the country apart, including the start of a full-scale civil war in 2014 and the Saudi- and UAE-led intervention in 2015. In a context where civilians have been deliberately attacked by all sides, COVID-19 has added a new layer to the unspeakable suffering for millions of civilians in Yemen, whilst Europe has reacted with development aid but has thus far failed to support need for accountability in the conflict.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Health, War, Coronavirus, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia

136. Nuclear Risk Reduction: Looking Back, Moving Forward, and the Role of NATO

Author:
Wilfred Wan
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In a difficult geopolitical environment marked by increased tensions among nuclear-armed and nuclear-allied states, there has emerged an urgent and widespread call for the implementation of practical measures to reduce the risk of nuclear-weapon use – whether intentional or inadvertent. A concerted effort to take risk reduction forward must address the spectrum of use scenarios by drawing on past activities, building on existing agreements and considering innovative approaches. NATO will have a key role to play, given the nuclear nature of the Alliance and the involvement of its members in strategic and regional competition. Alliance activities past and present can provide insight relevant to the development of multilateral risk-reduction measures. At the same time, in highlighting the dynamism and multi-faceted nature of risk, they underline the scale of the challenge ahead.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Risk, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

137. NATO’s Current and Future Support for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation

Author:
Rose Gottemoeller and Steven Hill
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Times may be tough in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (ADN). But ADN is by no means dead. This is a moment of opportunity, a chance to look to the future and consider what we should be doing differently to improve the international architecture for ADN in the future. NATO is in the process of considering how it can adapt to continue to be relevant in the changing global security environment. The time is therefore ripe for the Alliance to take on an enhanced role in preserving and strengthening more effective ADN. There are a number of areas in which it can support these efforts. These include specific steps to preserve and implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty, modernise the Vienna Document, adapt nuclear arms control regimes and deal with emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs). NATO should position itself as a focal point for innovation in the ADN area, including promoting advances in verification, improving the multinational sharing and use of data, and advancing dialogue related to outer space.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nonproliferation, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

138. Reviving Nuclear Arms Control Under Biden

Author:
Steven Pifer
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
The Biden presidency that begins in January will adopt some very different directions from its predecessor in foreign policy. One such area is arms control, particularly nuclear arms control with Russia—the one country capable of physically destroying America. President-elect Biden understands that arms control can contribute to U.S. security, something that President Donald Trump never seemed to fully appreciate. Biden will agree to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the sole remaining agreement limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. His administration should aim to go beyond that and negotiate further nuclear arms cuts. That will not prove to be easy. Doing so, however, could produce arrangements that would enhance U.S. security and reduce nuclear risks.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

139. Prudence or Folly: A Case for Extending the New START Treaty

Author:
Thomas Graham
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
During the depths of the 45-year-long Cold War in the early years, neither side believed it had an understanding of what the other side was doing. Both sides feared a sudden bolt from the blue in which nuclear weapons would lay waste to their societies. The threat was indeed beyond rational description. One U.S. B-52 bomber in those days carried more explosive power than all the bombs dropped by all the sides in World War II. The Soviet Union deployed an intercontinental ballistic missile with a 25-kiloton warhead that could strike the United States with only a few minutes of advanced warning, perhaps 20 minutes. One way of thinking about the explosive capability of just one megaton is to contemplate a freight train loaded with dynamite stretching from New York to California. Just one Soviet missile had 25 times this capability, and the Soviet Union had hundreds of such weapons. The bombs on the U.S. strategic bombers were of the same destructive force. And the U.S. ultimately built a missile force that had a destructive capability that was at least three or four times greater than the Soviet force. The two nations were like two strong men fighting each other to the death in a pitch-black room with long knives. The principal difference was that one of the men would eventually win and emerge victorious from the darkroom; yet in nuclear war, there would be no winners, only losers—and both contestants would be effectively destroyed.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, United States, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

140. Transparency and Reporting on Arms Exports within and from the EU

Author:
Ian Stewart
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The EU’s annual report on arms export control presently lags behind the national reports of many countries. The introduction of a searchable online database will be a substantial step in increasing the user-friendliness of the report. This paper makes recommendations with regard to readability, comprehensiveness and comparability. Perhaps the principal recommendation is that steps be taken to harmonise the data provided under the categories ‘licensed value’ and ‘actual exports’, which are presently not consistently interpreted across the EU. The main argument of this paper is that the EU should move towards using data visualisation to complement the lengthy statistical tables in the annual report and thus make it more readable. The EU and its Member States should also explore opportunities to enhance the data contained in the report to include additional identified data fields, narrative sections to complement the statistical data, and disaggregated data on licence denials. In identifying additional data fields that could be included, the paper also examines the challenges associated with the provision of the data in each case.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Exports, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Europe