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112. No Agreement is Better than Another Bad Agreement with Iran
- Author:
- Yaakov Amidror
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Israel-US dialogue is necessary about Iran’s nuclear program, since a good agreement with Iran is a clear Israeli interest. But Israel must be prepared with a military option against Iran, as a last resort.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America
113. Iran Raises the Stakes for Biden
- Author:
- Alexander Grinberg
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Giving Iran unearned incentives in advance of negotiations only will bring about more Iranian provocation.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, and Negotiation
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
114. Stronger International Safeguards as a Condition of Supply to Nuclear Energy Programs: Coming to Consensus in the Nuclear Suppliers Group
- Author:
- Matt Bowen
- Publication Date:
- 08-2021
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- Nations that are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons but are not allowed nuclear weapons under the treaty (“non-nuclear-weapon states”) must have international safeguards applied to civil nuclear energy facilities if they pursue such programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies these safeguards and conducts inspections on nuclear energy programs, and determined in the 1990s that it needed additional capabilities to verify states were not engaging in secret (i.e., undeclared) nuclear activities. Subsequently, the IAEA developed a set of stronger safeguards measures, known as the Model Additional Protocol (“Additional Protocol”), which was approved in 1997. Today, most nations have an Additional Protocol in force, but a few dozen do not. The nations that do not may pose a concern if they pursue nuclear energy as a means of addressing energy and environmental challenges, such as decarbonization to meet climate goals. The greater reporting requirements and inspection measures in the Additional Protocol give the international community assurance that a nation’s declarations about its civil nuclear program are both correct and complete. The enhanced inspections in turn provide greater deterrence against states pursuing illicit nuclear activities. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—which comprises 48 governments, including those representing the major reactor vendor countries—maintains guidelines governing the export of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology. The NSG has been considering modifying those guidelines for many years to support more universal adoption of the Additional Protocol. But adoption has been hard to come by, in part because of potential disruptions to existing supply relationships given that not all countries participating in the NSG have Additional Protocols in force and some client states of countries participating in the NSG also do not have these upgraded inspections in place. There may be room for consensus building among NSG states, however, since most support requiring an Additional Protocol as a condition of supply to further the nonproliferation regime. The remaining governments may agree if measures are proffered to address challenges that have blocked acceptance to date. This commentary discusses a history of related policy developments in the NSG, examines some of the group’s roadblocks to consensus, and suggests options for making progress on adding stronger international safeguards as a condition of supply to nuclear energy programs.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Energy
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
115. Grim Prospect: Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East
- Author:
- Eva M. Lisowski
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was formed in 1957 to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to inspect civilian nuclear materials and activities to deter military diversions. To decide the frequency of inspections and inspection criteria, the IAEA set its safeguard standards with the objective of assuring “timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons.” The two nuclear weapon designs developed and detonated during World War II were the “gun-type” and “implosion” designs. Because implosion device technology requires much less fissile material than guntype technology, the IAEA significant quantity6 (SQ) values were determined based on the fissile material requirements of nuclear implosion devices like the plutonium-based “Fat Man” detonated over Nagasaki in 1945. Utilizing implosion designs perfected in the late 1940s, however, the explosive yields achieved in 1945 can be produced with much less fissile material. Table 1 lists the fissile material requirements of contemporary nuclear weapon technology. “Low Technical Capability” in Table 1 refers to the Mark III implosion device set off at Nagasaki. “Medium Technical Capability” refers to implosion designs perfected in the late 1940s and “High Technical Capability” in Table 1 refers to the implosion technologies the United States perfected in the 1950s.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, Nuclear Energy, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- Political Geography:
- Middle East
116. Space and Missile Wars: What Awaits
- Author:
- Henry D. Sokolski
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Book
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- Sometimes, slow, steady changes produce revolutionary results. A case in point is missile and space technologies, which Space and Missile Wars: What Awaits will examine. Long-range missiles, satellites, and space launch vehicles used to be high technology exclusive to the superpowers. Now, scores of states have both. As for ballistic missiles and drones, even non-state actors have them, and these systems are far more accurate than anything the superpowers had even at the height of the Cold War. Then, long-range missiles could only be certain of destroying their targets if they were nuclear-armed and wiped out areas as large as cities. Now, drones are so accurate they can pinpoint and kill single individuals. As for space satellite launchers, they originally were derived from nuclear delivery missiles. None were privately owned. Similarly, almost all space satellites were government property and, until 1965, the owners were only American and Soviet. Now, the French, Chinese, Japanese, British, Indians, Israelis, Ukrainians, Iranians, and North Koreans have all launched satellites of their own. In addition, more than 60 nations own and operate their own satellites and increasingly, satellites are launched, owned, and operated entirely by private entities. These developments are nontrivial. They will define the military competitions with China, Russia, and other hostile states for the next two to three decades. Will the spread of accurate missiles embolden weak actors – small states and terrorist organizations – to threaten stronger states with missile attacks against key civilian targets (dams, reactors, petrochemical plants)? Will weak actors be tempted to use accurate drones to assassinate their adversaries’ key leaders? Will such attacks catalyze war, producing modern Sarajevos that draw in nuclear-armed states (e.g. Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea, or the superpowers)? With so many new space actors, will anyone be able to attribute hostile actions in space? Will states attack satellites mostly in low Earth orbit or geosynchronous orbit? Will the most important attacks come from antisatellite systems based on Earth, in low Earth orbit, or on or near the moon? This volume is designed to answer these questions.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Non State Actors, Military Affairs, Drones, Nonproliferation, Space, Missile Defense, Satellite, and Nuclear Energy
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
117. China's Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords?
- Author:
- Henry D. Sokolski
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- Although much has been said about the fusion of China’s civilian and military sectors, no detailed, unclassified analysis has been done of how Beijing’s “peaceful” nuclear efforts might be exploited to make more nuclear warheads. Even the U.S. Department of Energy’s own explanations of the export restrictions it imposed on “advanced” nuclear exports to China failed to discuss this. This volume is dedicated to clarifying just what the connection could be. Much of it focuses on China’s advanced fast breeder reactor program and its related plutonium recycling efforts. As explained in this volume’s first chapter, “How Many Nuclear Warheads China Might Acquire by 2030,” the least burdensome way for China to achieve nuclear weapons parity with the United States is simply to use the weaponsgrade plutonium that its planned “peaceful” fast breeder reactor and reprocessing programs will produce to make primaries for the two-stage thermonuclear weapons designs they already have perfected. By exploiting this weapons plutonium and the highly enriched uranium and tritium that China can easily access or make, Beijing by 2030 could conservatively assemble an arsenal of 1,270 warheads (nearly as many as the US currently has deployed on its intercontinental missiles).
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, Denuclearization, and Nuclear Energy
- Political Geography:
- United States and China
118. A Gender Framework for Arms Control and Disarmament
- Author:
- Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Jana Wattenberg
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Women In International Security (WIIS)
- Abstract:
- I n recent years, gender has come up in arms control and disarmament deliberations. Ireland, for example, submitted working papers on gender to preparatory committee meetings of the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT) Review Conferences. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) emphasizes that nuclear weapons use affects men and women differently and calls for equal representation in disarmament negotiations. However, such references to gender are so far the exception rather than the rule in arms control and disarmament talks. We argue that a systematic inclusion of gender perspectives advances arms control and disarmament deliberations and negotiations in four main ways. First, a gender lens calls attention to the human and gendered consequences of the development and use of weapons. Second, it exposes arms control and disarmament agreements that lack gender provisions. Third, a gender lens highlights the absence of diversity in arms control and disarmament communities.3 Fourth, gender perspectives help reveal hierarchical power structures and encourage critical reflections on the legitimacy of established processes and agreements. In sum, the inclusion of a gender perspective produces more humane, effective, legitimate and sustainable agreements.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Gender Issues, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Women, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
119. Reinforcing the Global Norm Against Chemical Weapons Use
- Author:
- Julia Masterson
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Arms Control Association
- Abstract:
- In recent years, the global norm against chemical weapons use has eroded, and it is critical that responsible states take action to reinforce it. Systematic violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the malign use of chemical agents have continued for nearly a decade without adequate accountability. These incidents risk growing in severity and becoming more widespread for as long as the issue remains unaddressed. Reinforcing the norm against chemical weapons use necessitates a unified global effort to utilize all CWC provisions and to strengthen the consequences that violators face under the treaty and in accordance with international law.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, International Law, Weapons, Norms, and Chemical Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
120. Nuclear Challenges for the New U.S. Presidential Administration: The First 100 Days and Beyond
- Author:
- Kelsey Davenport, Daryl G. Kimball, and Kingston Reif
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Arms Control Association
- Abstract:
- Upon taking office, the new presidential administration of Joseph Biden will confront a dizzying array of major challenges, not the least of which are related to the risks posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons. Tensions between the world’s nuclear-armed states are rising; the risk of nuclear use is growing; billions of dollars are being spent to replace and upgrade nuclear weapons; and key agreements that have kept nuclear competition in check are gone or are in serious jeopardy. The situation has been complicated by the neglect and poor policy choices of President Donald Trump and his administration. Over the past four years the Trump administration made nearly every nuclear policy challenge facing the United States worse. Fortunately, Biden has a long and distinguished track record when it comes to dealing with nuclear weapons-related security issues. Unlike his predecessor, Biden possesses a strong personal commitment to effective nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament that dates back to his early days in the Senate and continued through his last days as vice-president under President Barack Obama. In this analysis we have outlined what we believe to be the five most important sets of nuclear weapons policy challenges and decisions that the new Biden administration will need to address in its first 100 days and beyond, along with recommendations for effectively dealing with each of these policy challenges: Reviving and Advancing the Nuclear Arms Control Enterprise Reducing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Excess Stabilizing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Jump-starting Denuclearization and Peace Diplomacy with North Korea Restoring U.S. Leadership on Multilateral Nonproliferation and Disarmament If pursued, these actions and decisions would make the United States and the world safer from the threats posed by nuclear weapons. These initial steps would also put the administration in a better position to pursue more lasting and far-reaching nuclear risk reduction and elimination initiatives over the next four years.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Peace, Denuclearization, and Joe Biden
- Political Geography:
- United States and Global Focus