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12. Dealing Preventively with NPT Withdrawal
- Author:
- Pierre Goldschmidt
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- Since it came into force in 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has worked remarkably well to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The one major exception is North Korea, which withdrew from the NPT in 2003. Despite this track record of success, the stability of the current non-proliferation regime could be significantly undermined by further withdrawals by countries such as Iran. The right of states to withdraw from the NPT is clearly stated in the Treaty. Article X.1 provides that: “Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.” Since it is impossible to deny the right of states parties to withdraw from the NPT, it is all the more important to put in place appropriate preventive measures to dissuade withdrawal from the Treaty. The urgency of dealing preventively with NPT withdrawal increases as more nonnuclear-weapon states are poised to become “nuclear threshold states.”1 As the IAEA reported in 2008: “Much of the sensitive information coming from the [Abdul Qadeer Khan] network existed in electronic form, enabling easier use and dissemination. This includes information that relates to uranium centrifuge enrichment and, more disturbing, information that relates to nuclear weapon design.”2 and: “a substantial amount of sensitive information related to the fabrication of a nuclear weapon was available to members of the network."3 The widespread dissemination of this type of scientific and technical information raises the prospect that more states will acquire the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, thus increasing the
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
13. The NPT turns 50: Will it get to 60?
- Author:
- Henry Sokolski
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- In the next decade, it is all too likely that the past success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons among the world’s nations will be reversed. Three trends make more proliferation likely. First is the decay of nuclear taboos. Second, and arguably worse, is renewed vertical proliferation—the increase in size and sophistication of nuclear arsenals by states that already have them. Third, the technical information to fuel nuclear breakouts and ramp-ups is more available now than in the past. These trends toward increased proliferation are not yet facts. The author describes three steps the international community could take to save the NPT: making further withdrawals from the NPT unattractive; clamping down on the uneconomical stockpiling and civilian use of nuclear weapons materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium); and giving real meaning to efforts to limit the threats that existing nuclear weapons pose.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, North Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America
14. The Future of U.S.-Russia Strategic Arms Control
- Author:
- Artur Kacprzyk
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The Trump administration is sceptical about extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START, NST), which is to expire in 2021. It wants to sign a new deal with Russia and China covering all kinds of nuclear weapons. It will not be possible, however, to negotiate such a complex agreement before NST expires. In effect, there is a growing risk of a collapse of U.S.-Russia strategic arms control, which would negatively affect NATO as well: it would deepen both the divisions over the future of deterrence policy within the Alliance and the differences in the U.S. Congress on the modernisation of America’s nuclear forces.
- Topic:
- NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, United States of America, and North America
15. Libya Agreement’s Impact on Italy’s Migration Policy
- Author:
- Katarzyna Michalska and Małgorzata Pawłowska
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The migration agreement concluded in 2017 between Italy and Libya helped stem the refugee and mass-migration crisis. The agreement, with minor amendments, was extended on 4 November 2019 until the end of 2021. However, its implementation has resulted in human rights violations, which is contrary to EU values and law. Italy will not quit the deal because it views it as an effective instrument for reducing irregular migration.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, International Law, Migration, Treaties and Agreements, and Refugees
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Libya, North Africa, and Italy
16. Migration Trends in Morocco: Implication for the European Union
- Author:
- Katarzyna Michalska
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The increase in irregular migration from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel has resulted in the transformation of Morocco from an emigration-only country into a transit and immigration one. EU support for Morocco focuses on the protection of the country’s borders, controlling the migration flow to Europe, and the implementation of readmission agreements. The EU also provides financial and technological support and helps to reform immigration policy. Due to the unstable humanitarian situation and growing number of refugees in Morocco, this cooperation should also include the Sahel region.
- Topic:
- Migration, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Refugees, Borders, and Humanitarian Crisis
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, North Africa, Morocco, and Sahel
17. The Impact of the EAEU-Iran Preferential Trade Agreement
- Author:
- Amat Adarov and Mahdi Ghodsi
- Publication Date:
- 05-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
- Abstract:
- The preferential trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Iran on mutual trade entered into force in October 2019. In this report we estimate its expected impact at aggregate and sectoral levels using the gravity model of trade based on the global sample of bilateral trade flows at the HS 6-digit level. The analysis suggests that the implementation of the agreement will boost mutual trade for both trading partners, with relatively greater gains expected for the EAEU’s exports to Iran. On aggregate, the total gains in mutual trade are estimated to reach almost USD 46 million, with exports from the EAEU to Iran expected to increase by 9.7%, compared with a rise in exports from Iran to the EAEU of up to 4%. The difference in the impact will also be significant across the five EAEU countries as well as across sectors, with the major export gains expected to accrue in the chemicals and agri-food sectors, especially trade in miscellaneous fruits and vegetables, as well as in the textile, polymer production and metals sectors.
- Topic:
- Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Global Political Economy, Exports, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Belarus
18. Can the possible non-extension of the New START Treaty influence the strategic stability in the use of the outer space domain?
- Author:
- Miroslav Tuma
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Institute of International Relations Prague
- Abstract:
- The New START Treaty, which limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons, will expire in February 2021. According to the assessment of most arms control experts and, for example, the former US and Russian Foreign Ministers, the non-extension of the New Start Treaty will have a number of negative effects. What are the possibilities of the subsequent development if the last US-Russian control-arms contract New START is not extended? And what would that mean for strategic use of the universe? The unfavorable security situation in the world in recent years is characterized, among other things, by deepening crisis of the bilateral arms-control system between the USA and Russia, built since the 1970s. The urgency of addressing this situation is underlined by the fact that both countries own about 90% of all nuclear weapons that they modernize, introduce new weapon systems into their equipment, and reduce the explosiveness of nuclear warheads and thus their declared applicability in regional conflicts. The culmination of this crisis may be the expiry of the US-Russian New START treaty which limits the number of deployed nuclear warheads and strategic carriers. Concerns about the consequences of non-prolongation are, among others, raised by the expected disruption of space strategic stability, which could occur as a result of eventual termination of the complex verification system. In addition to notifications, the exchange of telemetry and information, on-the-spot inspections, etc., the termination would relate in particular to the contractual non-interference in the verification work carried out by National Technical Means (NTMs).
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America
19. George Bogle’s 1774 Mission to Tibet: Establishing English Trade and Reach beyond Northern Borders of Bengal
- Author:
- Monika Chansoria
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
- Abstract:
- In the last quarter of the 18th century, Warren Hastings, the first de facto Governor General of India from 1774 to 1785 initiated and set up the English East India Company’s relations with Tibet. The backdrop to this was created when the ruler (sde-srid or srid-skyon) of Bhutan overran Sikkim some years prior. In 1771, the Bhutanese descended on the plains and invaded Cooch-Behar, taking in the Raja (King) as a prisoner. The royal family called on Warren Hastings for assistance, who, in turn, dispatched a battalion of sepoys. The Bhutanese were driven away from Cooch-Behar and chased into the Duars around winter 1772-1773.1 In the given circumstances, the Bhutanese government appealed the Tashi Lama (who was the acting Regent of Tibet during the infancy of the Dalai Lama) to intervene on their behalf.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, History, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- India, Asia, England, and Tibet
20. Institutionalizing Defense Cooperation Agreements: A Contextual Study of India & Japan’s First 2+2 Foreign & Defense Ministerial Meet
- Author:
- Monika Chansoria
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
- Abstract:
- Bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs) have become the most common form of institutionalized defense cooperation. These formal agreements establish broad defense-oriented legal frameworks between signatories, facilitating cooperation in fundamental areas such as defense policy coordination, research and development, joint military exercises, education and training, arms procurement, and exchange of classified information. Nearly a thousand DCAs are currently in force, with potentially wideranging impacts on national and international security outcomes. A theory that integrates cooperation theory with insights from social network analysis explains the significance and need for DCAs. Shifts in the global security environment since the 1980s fueled the demand for DCAs. Ever since, States are known to have used DCAs to modernize their militaries, respond to shared security threats, and establish security umbrellas with like-minded states. However, the DCA proliferation cannot be attributed to the demand factor alone. Nations are required also to overcome dilemmas of mistrust and distributional conflicts. Network influences can increase the supply of DCAs by providing governments with information about the trustworthiness of partners and the risk of asymmetric distributions of gains. Two specific network influences that can be identified here are—preferential attachment and triadic closure. They show that these influences are largely responsible for the post-Cold War diffusion of DCAs. Novel empirical strategies further indicate that these influences derive from the proposed informational mechanism. States use the DCA ties of others to glean information about prospective defense partners, thus endogenously fueling further growth of the global DCA network.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- Japan, India, and Asia