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301. Rising in the East: The Evolution of the Islamic State in the Philippines

Author:
Amira Jadoon, Nakissa Jahanbani, and Charmaine Willis
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In 2017, the five-month “Battle of Marawi” waged by Islamic State-affiliated groups in the southern Philippines highlighted the gravity of the Islamic State threat within the country. Moreover, it highlighted the likelihood that the Philippines would remain the epicenter of the Islamic State threat in the region. Since the recovery of Marawi, it has become even more critical to understand the evolving nature of Islamic State-linked activity in the country, and its regional implications. As the second of a four-part series on the Islamic State in Southeast Asia, this report provides an overview of the characteristics of Islamic State-linked operations in the Philippines between 2014 and 2019, highlighting the instrumental value of the Islamic State brand for local groups. Drawing on open-source materials, the report examines the factors that contributed to the rise of the Islamic State’s influence and activity, specifically within the context of the Philippines, and analyzes its impact on local militancy during and after the Battle of Marawi. The losses experienced by Islamic State affiliates during the Battle of Marawi deeply changed the structure of Islamic State-linked militancy in the Philippines, moving from the united front of the Maute Group and ASG-Basilan led coalition during the battle to an increasingly decentralized structure. The findings of this report underline the Islamic State’s evolving nature and the appeal of allegiance for local groups in an environment that is marked by numerous other challenges such as poverty, clan rivalries, criminal violence, as well as a long-running communist insurgency. The change in the nature of the Islamic State’s presence in the country indicates fewer Marawi-style sieges and more targeted attacks, and an increase in the use of suicide attacks. This report is the second in a series of four reports that map the Islamic State’s presence in Southeast Asia between 2015 and 2019.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Counter-terrorism, Radicalization, Islamic State, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
East Asia, Philippines, and Southeast Asia

302. Changing Roles of the EU and ASEAN on Peace in the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Sangmin Bae and Martyn de Bruyn
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Continuing tension and competition among Northeast Asian countries complicate the degree to which North and South Korea can actively garner support from regional powers. The involvement of regional powers has not been effective means to overcome the status quo. Bilateral negotiations between North Korea and the United States, while critical for tension reduction in the region, have not been able to produce an agreement. Instead, international institutions from outside the region may be able to help negotiate a peace agreement that brings acceptable levels of security to all parties involved. This article examines the past and future roles of international institutions located outside of the region -- notably the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Exploring the relations of the EU and ASEAN with the two Koreas, the article assesses their potential as mediators in the process of creating a lasting peace between the Koreas.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Peace, Strategic Competition, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

303. Competitive Strategies for Democracy in the Age of AI

Author:
Andrew Imbrie
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In a 1972 paper for the United States Air Force Project at RAND, the late Andrew Marshall defined what he called a more “efficient, effective U.S. competitive role.”1 His theory of the case was straightforward: The United States needed to sustain a long-term, strategic competition with the Soviet Union; the nature of that competition was poorly specified, but could be shaped in ways favorable to enduring U.S. advantages; and the United States should therefore assess the balance of strategic forces, clarify its goals, and develop competitive strategies to match its strengths against Soviet weaknesses. The competition between the United States and China today is different from and far more complex than the U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War, notably in the levels of economic interdependence and the role of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. China, Russia, and other authoritarian powers seek to achieve strategic advantage through AI-enabled capabilities and systems.2 By one estimate, more than 100 countries purchase surveillance and censorship gear from China and Russia, receive training on these technologies, or simply imitate methods of surveillance and censorship that are designed to control public opinion.3 As the digital and physical environments become intertwined, authoritarian practices in one domain will increasingly encroach upon the other. At stake are the core values of liberty, equality, and justice that underpin free and open societies. The novel coronavirus pandemic will accelerate these trends. Increased U.S.-China tensions, cascading economic crises, and renewed debates over the resilience of supply chains and the future of digital surveillance are all characteristics of a world that demands global cooperation but sorely lacks it. The fault lines between liberal democracies and illiberal, authoritarian regimes are widening at a time of growing turbulence in the international system. Even before the virus, U.S.-China relations faced a heightened risk of conflict. The years ahead are likely to bring greater turmoil, with AI and other emerging technologies at the center of an extended, continuing strategic competition among the major powers. In the long-term contest between the forces of democracy and autocracy, the United States should apply Marshall’s counsel and develop more competitive strategies that play to its strengths. The right U.S. approach starts with its broad network of allies and partners. America has formed security guarantees with 52 countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, compared with Russia’s five (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) and China’s one (North Korea).4 The United States benefits from allies that share its values and produce strategic resources in AI, including computer and data science experts; private sectors that are innovative, dominant, and trend-setting; large and diverse pools data on which to train algorithms; governmental research and development (R&D) investments; diplomatic support for initiatives in AI safety and governance; and the clout needed to export norms and best practices internationally. In a world of globalized markets for AI talent and integrated supply chains, an alliance-centric strategy provides a competitive advantage over any single country that attempts to develop a robust AI ecosystem on its own. A competitive strategy in AI will require the United States and its allies to assess their comparative advantages; identify anomalies and patterns in the strategic choices of authoritarian competitors that are deeply rooted; and match relative strengths against specific areas of weakness.5 This paper focuses on the dynamics between the United States and China in AI. Based on an initial assessment of recent advances and long-term potential, it recommends that democratic nations sharpen their edge in five key areas: Hardware edge: exploit hardware chokepoints, leveraging the advantages that democratic nations have in the production of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and advanced AI chips. Data edge: develop common standards to share, pool, and store non-sensitive data sets around discrete projects, such as health intelligence and biosecurity, predictive maintenance, and maritime domain awareness; invest in privacy-preserving machine learning; and support research into new techniques for making personal data less relevant to AI systems, such as one-shot learning and advanced simulations. Talent edge: develop inter-allied human capital in AI, share best practices, and cultivate democratic networks of AI researchers through exchange programs, joint scholarships, and conference support, while ensuring research security among allies and partners. Innovation edge: harness the estimated two-thirds of global R&D that is conducted by democratic nations to foster collaboration in specific areas of promise, such as human-machine teaming methods and verification techniques for complex controls systems and AI-enabled, safety-critical infrastructure. Rule-setting edge: shape global norms and standards for AI, reflecting and supporting human rights and liberal values; create the conditions for a common AI market among democratic nations; and extend the benefits of AI to fragile democracies by establishing a multilateral digital infrastructure network.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

304. Axis of Convenience? Israel and China in a multipolar world

Author:
Vuk Vuksanovic
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Despite being one of the most important allies of the United States in the Middle East, Israel has been building a new partnership with China since 2013. The repositioning is motivated by changes in the country’s strategic environment, its crisis in the relationship with the United States during the Obama years, and its economic and infrastructural needs. However, Israel is still deeply anchored in its alliance with the United States, which will impose limitations on how far its partnership with China can grow. For now, nevertheless, this relationship attests to the new geopolitical reality of the 21st century in which even the most ardent US allies, such as Israel, must hedge their bets and diversify their partnerships by engaging China.
Topic:
Partnerships, Alliance, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, and United States of America

305. Battleground Southeast Asia: China's Rise and America's Options

Author:
Charles Dunst
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Southeast Asia, while still a reservoir of goodwill for the US, has in recent years come increasingly under China's umbrella. In this Strategic Update, Charles Dunst analyzes China's expansion there, discusses Southeast Asians' American predeliction, and offers steps the US can take to "win back" the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, International Affairs, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

306. Strengthening Delhi’s Strategic Partnerships in the Indian Ocean

Author:
Darshana M. Baruah
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The Indian Ocean region (IOR) is a critical juncture of the wider Indo-Pacific. It is one of the most crucial trade corridors that links the Middle East, Europe, Africa, South Asia, and Southeast and Northeast Asia. As outlined by the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Indian Ocean is "[h]ome to nearly 2.7 billion people … carrying half of the world’s container ships, one third of the world’s bulk cargo traffic, and two thirds of the world’s oil shipments." After the Cold War, the Indian Ocean remained relatively peaceful, with minimal geopolitical competition. India and the United States have been the primary actors in the theater and largely accepted each other’s presence and operations. After the Cold War, Washington welcomed a greater Indian role, with then–U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates encouraging India to be a "net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond." However, as China continues to expand its presence and deepen its engagements across the Indo-Pacific, there is a new geopolitical competition emerging in the Indian Ocean. While India perceives a growing Chinese presence as competition to its strategic and security role in the IOR, Beijing is determined to stake its claim and emerge as a key player in the IOR. This ambition feeds into China’s larger objective of becoming a global maritime power. India has a vital interest in the Indian Ocean, and as one of the IOR’s most prominent resident naval powers, its role in the IOR has been critical to maintaining peace and security. As China continues to expand its engagements and presence across the IOR, Delhi is beginning to review its maritime engagements and policies. Much of Delhi’s advantage is rooted in geography and operational experience, whereas it suffers from serious capacity constraints. Should China manage to find the means and ways to sustain itself in the region and gain experience operating there, it will be able to quickly overcome India’s advantages. Given that neither India nor China is looking to engage in a military conflict to establish dominance, strategic signaling, positioning, power projection, and enhanced operational capabilities will be key to enabling India to maintain a favorable position in the IOR in the next decade or so. As India continues to modernize its military, engaging with key partners will strengthen its ability to address emerging threats and China’s expanding presence in the IOR. This paper first explores India’s current approach to IOR chokepoints and how Delhi can leverage strategic partnerships to shore up its advantages in the IOR. It then identifies presence, maritime domain awareness, strategic collaborations, innovation, and nontraditional threats as the key areas where India can maximize its maritime partnerships to prepare for, deter, and respond to a more assertive China in the IOR.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Partnerships, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, and Indian Ocean

307. Imbalance of Power: India’s Military Choices in an Era of Strategic Competition with China

Author:
Daniel Kliman, Iskander Rehman, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States has made a strategic bet: that India will decisively shape the military balance in Asia.1 In an era of avowed great power competition with China,2 at a time when the U.S. military’s edge over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to erode,3 this wager will have an outsized impact on the future trajectory of the region. If India can maintain an advantage over China along its Himalayan frontier and sustain its dominance in the Indian Ocean, U.S. efforts to deny Beijing a regional sphere of influence are far more likely to succeed—as is the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific shared by Washington and Delhi. If India fails to realize its military potential, the United States, caught in between its many global commitments, will struggle to uphold a favorable balance of power. Today, America’s wager has yet to fully pay off. The trend lines in the India-China military equation are broadly negative. Despite very real improvements in Delhi’s defense capabilities and a significant advantage conveyed by India’s maritime geography, its longstanding superiority over China in the Indian Ocean is at risk of slipping away. Beijing has enhanced the capability and capacity of the naval forces it can project into the Indian Ocean and pursued overseas military facilities to support a more regular People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) presence there. Moreover, China’s long-range precision strike complex, though constructed primarily with the United States as the intended adversary, extends into the Indian Ocean—presenting a threat to Delhi’s maritime operations. The state of play along India’s Himalayan frontier is more mixed. Delhi possesses a clear advantage in localized military strength, but China has made significant infrastructure improvements in Tibet to enhance PLA mobility to surge troops forward, while folding the entire border with India under a single unified theater command—a major organizational restructuring that could yield an operational edge. India has not stood still amid growing military competition with China. Delhi has sought to provide its forces with greater mobility and operational awareness along the Himalayan frontier, while giving increased focus to maritime domain awareness, logistics, and subsurface monitoring across the vast expanses of the Indian Ocean. To weather a potential PLA attack, India has placed greater emphasis on infrastructure hardening; base resiliency; redundant command, control, and communications systems; and improved air defense. At the same time, India has shifted to a more punitive deterrence posture: Having invested in long-range strike capabilities suitable to both land and maritime warfare, it conducted a recent trial of a new anti-satellite weapon. It has also refined an operational concept for the Himalayan theater that aims to take the battle into China’s territory. Lastly, Delhi has begun taking steps to promote greater military jointness through new forms of defense organization.
Topic:
Power Politics, Military Affairs, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Asia, and United States of America

308. China’s Export Success: Due to Unfair Practices or Fair Competition?

Author:
Rolf Langhammer
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Compared with previous ratings, China’s trade policy today is more positively acknowledged. Yet, China can still be criticised in particular because of its non-transparent subsidy policy, the privileged role of state-owned enterprises, the heavy hand of the state in general, the sluggish enforcement of intellectual property rights, and the prevalence of non-tariff barriers. Yet, it cannot be ignored that Chinese entrepreneurship mentality is highly developed outside state interference in world markets. Especially, in the digital economy, high motivation and a large pool of human skills act as drivers of innovations, so far mainly process innovations. The trade war with the US hurts China and is responded by China with asymmetrical retaliation. The more Chinese exports to the US in total are affected, the more costs will have to be borne by US consumers as options to shift to alternative suppliers become weaker. What President Trump would see as a “good” deal for the US is unclear. It can be thus presumed that the trade war will continue into 2020 and that it is in fact a tech war. The EU is affected as EU companies produce in China for the US market and in the US for the Chinese market. While it might gain from trade diversion effects in the short run, the negative effects on investment due to uncertainty weigh more heavily. The EU is tempted to negotiate a free trade agreement with China but rightly refuses to start negotiations before China is prepared to conclude an agreement on investment. The EU should not see China and the US on equidistance. Workable relations with the US are much more important. To conclude, China’s trade policy has improved relative to Western standards but still warrants further steps towards much less state influence. Yet, its global competiveness especially in the state-of-the-art digital economy is high and is owed to a strong entrepreneurial mentality.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Asia, Exports, Trade, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

309. Public Prefers Cooperation and Engagement with China

Author:
Craig Kafura
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Since the Trump administration took office in 2017, it has pursued a more competitive relationship with China on both economic and security fronts. The Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy stated that China “seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region,” and Washington and Beijing have been engaged in an escalating trade war since the United States first imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports in March 2018. Just as the high-level US-China relationship has taken a sharp turn towards competition, so too have public perceptions of Sino-American relations: a February 2019 Chicago Council poll found that a majority of Americans describe the United States and China as rivals (63%) rather than partners (32%), a shift that has occurred across partisan lines. However, Americans have not fully closed the door to bilateral cooperation, and most Americans do not see the rise of China as a critical threat to the United States.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

310. Cooperation and Hedging: Comparing US and South Korean Views of China

Author:
Karl Friedhoff, Dina Smeltz, J. James Kim, Kang Chungku, and Scott A. Snyder
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
While Seoul and Washington currently agree on using high-level diplomacy to encourage North Korea to denuclearize, South Korean and US approaches toward China differ and could become a source of friction between the two allies. Under President Donald Trump, the United States has confronted China through tariffs on Chinese imports and identified China as a near-peer adversary. Meanwhile, South Korean President Moon Jae-in has made efforts to end a dispute with China over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and indicated openness to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Public preferences in both the United States and South Korea are not necessarily aligned with their own governments’ policies toward China. Chicago Council and Asan Institute surveys conducted in 2019 find that both South Koreans and Americans see a strengthened US-ROK alliance as an asset in dealing with China, suggesting that Washington and Seoul can afford to strengthen coordination between their policies toward China.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America