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1191. Introducing Information Communication Technologies into Humanitarian Programming

Author:
Laura Eldon and Anna Kondakhchyan
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Digital technologies are radically transforming the ways in which aid agencies can interact with the communities with whom they work. Oxfam believes that information communication technologies (ICTs) offer a huge opportunity to amplify and improve effectiveness across the organization’s work. From monitoring water points to delivering electronic vouchers through mobile phones and digitalizing protection surveys, Oxfam has been harnessing the use of ICTs to enhance the quality, accessibility and efficiency of its programming. Yet, the path from experimentation to widespread adoption and organizational support for new tools and technologies can be a challenging one, often opening up a range of concerns and opportunities. This article looks at the example of beneficiary information management and the introduction of World Vision’s Last Mile Mobile Solutions (LMMS) digital registration and distribution management platform. It explores the application of Oxfam’s ‘innovation pyramid’ to take the introduction of new tools from ‘systems of innovation’ to ‘systems of differentiation’ and subsequently to 'systems of record’. Digital technologies are radically transforming the ways in which aid agencies can interact with the communities with whom they work. Oxfam believes that information communication technologies (ICTs) offer a huge opportunity to amplify and improve effectiveness across the organization’s work. From monitoring water points to delivering electronic vouchers through mobile phones and digitalizing protection surveys, Oxfam has been harnessing the use of ICTs to enhance the quality, accessibility and efficiency of its programming. Yet, the path from experimentation to widespread adoption and organizational support for new tools and technologies can be a challenging one, often opening up a range of concerns and opportunities. This article looks at the example of beneficiary information management and the introduction of World Vision’s Last Mile Mobile Solutions (LMMS) digital registration and distribution management platform. It explores the application of Oxfam’s ‘innovation pyramid’ to take the introduction of new tools from ‘systems of innovation’ to ‘systems of differentiation’ and subsequently to 'systems of record’.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Communications, Digital Economy, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1192. Desarrollo económico local, competitividad e innovación: Una mirada desde Colombia

Author:
Sergio Montero, Javier García Estévez, Elisa Arond, and Andrés Medina-Garzón
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios sobre Desarrollo (CIDER), Universidad de los Andes
Abstract:
En los últimos años, agencias locales, departamentales y el gobierno nacional de Colombia han demostrado su interés por apostarle a la innovación como motor del desarrollo y la competitividad territorial. En este contexto, numerosos alcaldes y gobernadores han optado por incluir en sus planes de desarrollo las palabras ciencia, tecnología o innovación (CTeI) junto a la ya omnipresente “sostenibilidad.” En Colombia, varias entidades nacionales como Colciencias, iNNpulsa o el Ministerio de las Tecnologías y Comunicaciones han venido liderando estas apuestas de CTeI como instrumentos para promover el desarrollo del país. Varios alcaldes han declarado su interés por ser el nuevo Silicon Valley de Colombia. La obsesión actual de muchas ciudades y regiones de convertirse en los próximos Silicon Valley es parte de una tendencia global en las teorías y políticas de desarrollo territorial que cada vez ponen más énfasis en la innovación y tecnología como motores del desarrollo local y regional. Sin embargo, la tecnología, la innovación y el desarrollo económico territorial son conceptos complejos a la hora de ponerlos en práctica y adoptar modelos provenientes de regiones urbanas del Norte global, como Silicon Valley, que poco tienen que ver con la realidad y las necesidades colombianas - ni de muchos contextos del Norte-, no es siempre la salida más acertada.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economic Growth, Innovation, Economic Development, Strategic Competition, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
Colombia

1193. The Challenge of Emerging Technologies to Non-proliferation Efforts: Controlling Additive Manufacturing and Intangible Transfers of Technology

Author:
Kolja Brockmann and Robert E. Kelley
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
Additive manufacturing (AM) machines are multipurpose manufacturing instruments that rely on the transfer of build-information in a digital form. AM is a rapidly developing technology with a growing range of applications, especially in the aerospace and defence industry. It is also generating concerns about its potential to create ways of weakening or circumventing dual-use and arms export controls. This SIPRI Paper examines (a) the state of the art in AM; (b) its ability to produce military equipment and dual-use items; (c) the application of export controls to AM and their implementation at the national level; and (d) the challenges that implementation and compliance present for governments, companies and research institutes. The conclusions summarize potential options and considerations when expanding controls on AM. This is one of two research papers that address the closely related issues of controlling transfers of software and technology and applying exports controls to AM. Taken together, the papers examine some of the most challenging issues that governments, companies and research institutes in the European Union (EU) and the wider world are facing when they seek to effectively implement dual-use and arms export controls. The papers also address a range of topics that are under active discussion within the multilateral export control regimes and in connection with the recast of the EU Dual-use Regulation. For the second paper, 'The Challenge of Software and Technology Transfers to Non-proliferation Efforts: Implementing and Complying with Export Controls', see here. Funding for the concept paper was provided by the US Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Disarmament, and Exports
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

1194. Technology, politics, and development: domestic criticism of the 1975 Brazilian-West German nuclear agreement

Author:
James Cameron
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
The article analyzes the domestic debate regarding the Brazil-West Germany nuclear agreement of 1975. A number of scientists and opposition politicians sought to use the apparent failings of the agreement to critique the military’s claims regarding the deal’s contribution to Brazilian economic development and nuclear status. While limited in its immediate impact, the opposition outlined major themes that would come to the fore later in the decade as Brazilian society began to question the wisdom of the agreement. Concerned with asserting Brazil’s nuclear autonomy, the opposition’s efforts also add a new dimension to global narratives of nuclear protest.
Topic:
Development, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Treaties and Agreements, and History
Political Geography:
Europe, Brazil, South America, and West Germany

1195. Towards Elections with Integrity

Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Open Society Foundations
Abstract:
Since the 1990s, election observation has become a vital tool of the international community to support democracy and assess the legitimacy of governments. Observers receive better pre-deployment training and briefings, funding is more readily available, and methodologies have grown more sophisticated. Yet, as the election observation industry has become more professional, democracy is in decline. The European Union needs to be more strategic as both a donor and a provider of election observation. This policy brief, authored by the external policy team of the Open Society European Policy Institute, proposes six areas of reform, which include monitoring of the political processes leading up to polling day; improving collaboration with observers at a local level; strengthening and supporting the role played by civil society; setting stronger guidelines for the digital arena; developing guidelines for technology used; and finally, striking a new balance between the observation missions’ technical and political mandates.
Topic:
Civil Society, Science and Technology, Elections, Democracy, Election watch, Digital Policy, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
Europe

1196. Technological Competition and China

Author:
James A. Lewis
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Napoleon’s famous quotation about a sleeping giant moving the world when it awoke seems prescient, but a closer examination presents a more complex story. China’s rise is often accompanied by corresponding predictions of inevitable conflict and U.S. decline. These predictions are simplistic and rest on assumptions of China’s economic and political trajectory that may not be valid. In the near term, competition is unavoidable, and the more important challenge comes from China’s efforts to “return to the center of the world stage” and the means China uses to attain this at a time when the United States is reassessing its global role. The United States and China are in a growing competition, perhaps verging on conflict, but it is not a nineteenth century competition between empires for control of territory and resources. Unlike great power competition in previous centuries, the focal point is not military strength or territorial expansion. This conflict is over control of the modern levers of power—global rules and institutions, standards, trade, and technology. The ability to create new technologies, particularly digital technologies (given their importance for politics, security, and economic growth) have become key factors in the U.S.-China relationship, which is marked by close commercial cooperation and deep governmental distrust. This disparity creates unavoidable tensions. The link between technology, innovation, national security, and international power is now widely recognized. When Vladimir Putin says that the country that leads in artificial intelligence (AI) “will be the ruler of the world,” it is hyperbole, but hyperbole that confirms that political leaders recognize that the ability to innovate is a potent source of national power. In the digital age, national security and national power have different requirements shaped by technological change and cyberspace. Innovation has become a central element of its international influence.1 This is not new—the U.S.-Soviet space race was a contest of the ability of different systems to produce new technologies, but those were unique government programs. Technological competition today is as much between companies as states. A country’s ability to innovate and produce advanced technologies provides economic strength, military power, and an intangible benefit of perceived leadership. Both China and the United States have advantages and disadvantages in this contest, and while it is usual to focus on quantitative aspects—such as the number of engineers or patents and spending on research and development (R&D)—these are not the key determinants of technological competition between states. This competition is a contest of ideas on governance for investment, innovation, and the internet. The internet and global connectivity not only reshape the environment for competition but also create political and market forces that both nations find difficult to control.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Hegemony, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1197. How 5G Will Shape Innovation and Security

Author:
James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The fifth generation of mobile network technologies, known as “5G,” promises greater speed, security, and capacity. 5G will underpin the internet economy and provide the backbone for the next generation of digital technologies. So, it is unsurprising that there is intense competition among companies and countries for 5G leadership. 5G will determine the direction the internet will take and where nations will face new risks and vulnerabilities. Who makes 5G technologies will affect security and innovation in an increasingly competitive technological environment. Decisions made today about 5G will affect national security and economic performance for decades to come. This is a competition among companies and groups of companies but also a competition between market-based and state-directed decisionmaking. The United States has relied on the former, China on the latter, and Europe falls somewhere in between. American technology remains essential for 5G mobile telecommunications. American companies have been strong performers in developing 5G technologies, but the United States and its allies face a fundamental challenge from China. The focus of competition is over 5G’s intellectual property, standards, and patents. Huawei, for example, has research programs to develop alternatives to American suppliers, and U.S. trade restrictions have accelerated China’s efforts to develop its own 5G industry. While American companies lead in making essential 5G technologies, there are no longer any U.S. manufacturers of core telecommunications network equipment. Four companies dominate the market for the core network technologies needed for 5G networks. None of these companies are American. 1The choices are between European security partners (Ericsson and Nokia) and China (Huawei and ZTE). Telecom is a strategic industry and having two companies with close ties to a hostile power creates risk for the United States and its allies. A secure supply chain for 5G closes off dangerous areas of risk for national security in terms of espionage and the potential disruption to critical infrastructures. China’s aggressive global campaign of cyber espionage makes it certain that it will exploit the opportunities it gains as a 5G supplier. One way to envision this is to imagine that the person who built your house decides to burgle it. They know the layout, the power system, the access points, may have kept a key, and perhaps even built in a way to gain surreptitious entry. Major telecom “backbone” equipment connects to the manufacturer over a dedicated channel, reporting back on equipment status and receiving updates and software patches as needed, usually without the operator’s knowledge. Equipment could be sold and installed in perfectly secure condition, and a month later, the manufacture could send a software update to create vulnerabilities or disrupt service. The operator and its customers would have no knowledge of this change. The United States can manage 5G risk using two sets of policies. The first is to ensure that American companies can continue to innovate and produce advanced technologies and face fair competition overseas. American and “like-minded” companies routinely outspend their Chinese competitors in 5G R&D and hold 10 times as many 5G patents. Chinese companies still depend on the western companies for the most advanced 5G components. The second is to work with like-minded nations to develop a common approach to 5G security. The United States cannot meet the 5G challenge on its own. When the United States successfully challenged Chinese industrial policy in the past, it has been done in concert with allies. Another task will be to find ways to encourage undecided countries to spend on 5G security. Huawei’s telecom networks cost between 20 to 30 percent less than competing products. Huawei also offers foreign customers generous terms for leasing or loans. It can do this because of its access to government funds. Beijing supports Huawei for both strategic and commercial reasons. Many countries will be tempted by the steep discount. Not buying Huawei means paying a “premium” for security to which economic ministries are likely to object. The United States will need to encourage others to pay this security premium while at the same time preparing for a world where the United States unavoidably connects to Huawei-supplied networks and determine how to securely connect and communicate over telecom networks in countries using Chinese network equipment. The United States does not need to copy China’s government-centric model for 5G, but it does need to invest in research and adopt a comprehensive approach to combatting non-tariff barriers to trade. 5G leadership requires a broader technology competition policy in the United States that builds the engineering and tech workforce and supports both private and public R&D. The United States also needs to ensure that U.S. companies do not face obstacles from antitrust or patent infringement investigations undertaken by other countries to obtain competitive advantage. In the twentieth century, steel, coal, automobiles, aircraft, ships, and the ability to produce things in mass quantity were the sources of national power. The foundations of security and power are different today. The ability to create and use new technologies is the source of economic strength and military security. Technology, and the capacity to create new technologies, are the basis of information age power. 5G as the cornerstone of a new digital environment is the focal point for the new competition, where the United States is well-positioned to lead but neither success nor security are guaranteed without action.
Topic:
Science and Technology, 5G, Emerging Technology, and Telecommunications
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1198. Comparative Industrial Policy and Cybersecurity: A Framework for Analysis

Author:
Vinod K Aggarwal and Andrew Reddie
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Berkeley APEC Study Center
Abstract:
This comparative project evaluates the role of firms, governments, and other key stakeholders in the rise of industrial policy in important states in the cybersecurity industry. In particular, we focus on the U.S., China, Taiwan, Japan, the EU and other key European states. Our goals are as follows: 1) to examine the motivation for government promotion of the cybersecurity industry; 2) to inventory existing measures employed by these countries; 3) to understand the driving forces of cybersecurity industrial policy in these countries; and 4) to examine the likely conflicts that will arise from the competitive pursuit of such industrial policies and how they might possibly be resolved through international cooperation. To this end, we suggest an analytical framework to serve as the comparative structure for this project, drawing on a variety of approaches to understand industrial policy.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Industry
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Taiwan, and United States of America

1199. Comparative Industrial Policy and Cybersecurity: The U.S. Case

Author:
Vinod K Aggarwal and Andrew Reddie
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Berkeley APEC Study Center
Abstract:
This paper evaluates the role of firms, governments, and other key stakeholders in the rise of industrial policy in the United States toward the cybersecurity sector. Our goals are as follows: 1) to examine the motivation for government promotion of the cybersecurity industry in the United States; 2) to inventory existing measures employed by the U.S. government; 3) to understand the driving forces of cybersecurity industrial policy in the United States; and 4) to examine the likely conflicts that will arise from the competitive pursuit of these industrial policies and to consider how they might possibly be resolved through international cooperation. To this end, we use a “market failure”-based analytical framework to serve as the structure for this project, drawing on a variety of approaches to understand industrial policy in the United States as well as the variety of intervention strategies and instruments used by the U.S. government.
Topic:
Government, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Industry
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1200. The Rise of China as a Cybersecurity Industrial Power: Principles, Drivers, Policies, and International Implications

Author:
Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Berkeley APEC Study Center
Abstract:
This paper examines China’s cybersecurity industrial development over the past two decades since the arrival of the internet in that country. This analysis takes place from a primarily security and technology perspective because the national security apparatus occupies a powerful presence in China’s cyber affairs. Moreover, the development of the cybersecurity industry is significantly driven by the development of technological capabilities. Key issues explored include: 1) Chinese decision-making and thinking on cybersecurity development within the context of the Chinese leadership’s general approach to development, national security, and technology advancement; 2) the nature and characteristics of recent Chinese cybersecurityrelated development strategies and plans; 3) the drivers behind the development of China’s cybersecurity industry, looking especially at market failures, national security rationales, and government intervention; 4) the proliferation of principal actors and coalitions in the Chinese cybersecurity industry and how this influences its development; and 5) the nature of the relationship between the state and cybersecurity firms, in particular examining four types of interactions: the state as a customer; state hiring of talent; the state’s direct regulatory power, and the state as an investor. The paper concludes by considering the international implications of China’s rise as an increasingly capable and confident cybersecurity power.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Industry
Political Geography:
China and Asia