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2. Baltic and Nordic States Assess the Russian Military Threat
- Author:
- Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The newest intelligence reports by the Baltic and Nordic states jointly warn about the aggressive intentions and reconstitution of Russia’s armed forces. All of the documents assume the successful implementation of plans for larger Russian land and airborne forces till the end of 2026. However, these reports differ in the estimates of when the political moment and Russia’s conventional capabilities may permit it to initiate open conflict with NATO. Despite their informational and analytical contents, these reports may affect the Baltic region states’ capabilities development plans and their decisions about whether to increase defence spending.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States
3. When sleepwalkers awake: German plea for a new European security architecture - a German point of view
- Author:
- Stéphane Beemelmans
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- For three years, a war has been raging on Europe's borders between two geographically connected states – a conflict that originated in Russia's occupation of Crimea and Donbass almost 11 years ago. Since then, every political and military decision-maker in our part of Europe should have realized that there is a (great) power on our continent that is ready at any time to put ‘war as a continuation of politics by other means’ (Clausewitz) into practice. The deterrent mechanism between the former blocs, which had been effective for almost 50 years and thus prevented war, has evidently given way to a ‘laissez-faire’ on the part of the European states, which has allowed Russia to attack and partially occupy Ukraine with complete impunity, using a crude mix of historical and political justifications that violate international law. What should not have happened could not be seen and therefore could not be addressed appropriately. Our and NATO's ‘laissez-faire’ was based on the for malistic argument that no NATO member country had been attacked and on the lack of strategic foresight disguised as ‘hope’, the expression of which under international law was the ‘Minsk Peace Agreement’ of 2015. The hope, namely, that this attack could be localized and thus geographically restricted or ‘frozen’.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Germany
4. Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency: Gauging the Prospects for Coalition-Building Under Fire
- Author:
- Jacob Stokes, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, and Thomas Corel
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Acontingency across the Taiwan Strait has the potential to reshape the Indo-Pacific and even global security environment. This report explores how states beyond the United States and Taiwan would respond to a major Taiwan contingency. It defines a major Taiwan contingency as a conflict that might start in the so-called gray zone between peace and war but clearly escalates into a larger campaign that has unification as the near-term objective of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, the report examines how geopolitical interests, values, and material power might determine the approaches of countries across the region and the world. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The report details four key structural factors that would shape states’ responses: the specific nature of the Taiwan contingency, the global trade and technology landscape when the contingency occurs, Taiwanese and U.S. capabilities and responses, and the spectrum of intervention options. Beyond those structural factors, the response from four groups of states would play a major role in determining the outcome of a major Taiwan contingency. The first group is Japan and the Philippines. Both U.S. allies would be on the front lines of a Taiwan conflict and host U.S. forces but are also the most exposed to military retaliation from China. The second group is close U.S. allies and partners South Korea, Australia, and India. Their locations are farther from the main battlespace, but each would have to consider how its response would affect its own security concerns and relations with the United States in the future. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The third group includes the other states in Southeast Asia. Thailand and Singapore would have to consider their defense ties to Washington, while Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar might get requests from Beijing. Other Southeast Asian states would adopt a studiously neutral stance. The fourth group is Europe and the rest of the world. European states now pay more attention to Taiwan, and many see parallels with Ukraine’s plight. But uneven ties with China and a lack of power projection capabilities would mostly limit direct European intervention. Meanwhile, the developing world would likely side with Beijing. And it lacks the political will—much less the proximity or military power—to come to Taipei’s aid. Several findings flow from the analysis: First, it is unlikely that any other states will come to Taiwan’s aid if Taiwan does not fight fiercely and the United States does not intervene on a large scale. Second, geographic proximity increases a country’s stake in the defense of Taiwan, but that same closeness also makes countries more vulnerable to PRC retaliation. Third, any Taiwan contingency would cause massive economic harm, so states would try to balance protecting their economic interests—especially access to high-end semiconductors—with ending the conflict just to stem the disruption caused by the fighting. Fourth, states’ choices will reflect their national interests and values, but those responses will depend to a significant degree on what others do. U.S. policymakers should take the following actions to best position Washington to mount an effective coalition defense of Taiwan during a contingency, should those policymakers choose to do so: Prioritize preventing a Taiwan contingency. Reinforce with Taipei how much would hinge on Taiwan’s contingency response, both in terms of demonstrating will and capabilities. Expect limited contributions but be creative in exploring what in the spectrum of intervention might be possible. Deepen intra-Asian and Euro-Asian security ties that include the United States. Support and, where possible, facilitate the growth of intra-Asian security ties that do not rely on the United States as the hub. Plan for humanitarian evacuation operations as a means to encourage Southeast Asian countries to think through a Taiwan contingency.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Coalition, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
5. What’s next for Ukraine and Europe? A conversation with Dmytro Kuleba
- Author:
- Dmytro Kuleba, Carol Saivetz, and Elizabeth Wood
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Video
- Institution:
- MIT Center for International Studies
- Abstract:
- What’s next for Ukraine and Europe? A conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, former foreign minister of Ukraine: Tuesday, April 8th, 2025. Speaker: Dmytro Kuleba is a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and served as the foreign minister of Ukraine from March 2020-September 2024. Prior to that, he was deputy prime minister on matters of European relations from August 2019 to March 2020. He is internationally recognized as one of the most influential diplomats of his generation and a global champion for democracy, freedom, and resilience. Discussants: Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program at the Center for International Studies (CIS). She is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues. Elizabeth Wood is Ford International Professor of History at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine as well as articles on Vladimir Putin, the political cult of WWII, right-wing populism in Russia and Turkey, and US-Russian Partnerships in Science. She is director of the MIT-Ukraine Program at CIS.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
6. Siloed No More: The U.S.-ROK Alliance and a Taiwan Conflict
- Author:
- Clint Work
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- This project was motivated by and builds upon earlier research tracing the evolution and apparent alignment of U.S. and South Korean signaling on Taiwan, wherein the South Korean government adopted a more outspoken position regarding “the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” and framed it in increasingly expansive terms—as a regional and global issue yet also directly linked to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. The previous research indicated the U.S.-ROK alliance faced a gap between its topline diplomatic rhetoric on Taiwan and its preparedness to navigate an actual conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan and the attendant risk of a simultaneous conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This project aimed to go beyond diplomatic rhetoric. Forty-two interviews were conducted from June 2024 to February 2025 in both Washington and Seoul. Most were in-person interviews with some conducted virtually or by written response via email. Through these interviews with U.S. and ROK current and former government officials, think tank experts, and academics—as well as open-source research—this project offers insight on the evolution and state of U.S.-ROK alliance discussions on a Taiwan conflict, key challenges obstructing such discussions, and critical variables or dynamics the alliance would have to navigate in the event of a conflict.
- Topic:
- Security, Alliance, Conflict, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America
7. CTC Sentinel: April 2025 Issue
- Author:
- Michael Knights, Paul Cruickshank, Ayush Verma, Imtiaz Baloch, and Riccardo Valle
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- CTC Sentinel
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- In this month’s feature article, Michael Knights illuminates the nexus between Iraq’s oil sector and the Iran threat network. He writes: “The Iran threat network suffered grievous blows in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and Iran itself in 2024, and this has arguably made oil-rich Iraq even more important to the network. Facing renewed maximum pressure from the United States, Iran needs not only Iraq’s terrorist fundraising potential but also its value as a ‘laundromat’ through which Iranian energy products can be fraudulently relabeled as Iraqi exports. Using their control of the al-Sudani government, Iran-backed terrorist groups and militias are developing significant new strands of threat financing using Iraq’s oil sector, which combine to provide billions of dollars of illicit value each year. Iraq is thus emerging as Iran’s best bet for neutering the Trump administration’s renewed maximum pressure campaign.” He notes that “U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations are no longer content to steal oil, only to have smuggling businessmen realize most of the profits. Instead, terrorist organizations have muscled into this value-addition segment of the oil market in recent years, with AAH [Asaib Ahl al-Haq] and KH [Kataib Hezbollah] leading the pack.” Our interview is with Charlie Winter, the co-founder and chief research officer of ExTrac AI, an AI-assisted intelligence platform that identifies, maps, and forecasts geopolitical risk, including in the counterterrorism space. He states: “Our USP pivots around accessing, ingesting, and processing high-relevance publicly available information and data from hard-to-reach parts of the internet that reflects the online and offline activities and psychological operations of various non-state and state threat actors. And through our platform, which is both a web and mobile app, we provide both access to that data and the ability to generate insight from it rapidly—and we do that using a range of different kinds of automation, machine learning, [and] artificial intelligence.” He adds: “We essentially have built our system to let machines do what they do best and let human analysts do what they do best, and enable the analysts to spend a lot more time performing the highest-value tasks in the intelligence cycle.” Ayush Verma, Imtiaz Baloch, and Riccardo Valle examine the Baloch insurgency in Pakistan. They write: “The Baloch insurgency in Pakistan has intensified sharply since the beginning of 2025, marked by sophisticated attacks such as the Jaffar Express hijacking by Baloch Liberation Army-Jeeyand faction (BLA-J) on March 11, 2025, which resulted in the kidnapping of more than 400 passengers and death of at least 26 hostages. Groups like BLA-J, Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), and Baloch Liberation Army-Azad faction (BLA-A) continue to deploy suicide bombers, including women, and temporarily seize territories, targeting Chinese nationals and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects. The insurgency’s regional spillover, especially into Iran, and competition for resources and prominence among factions of the insurgency further complicate Pakistan’s internal security.” They add: “Without a political resolution addressing long-standing grievances, the insurgency threatens to escalate, destabilizing both national and regional security.”
- Topic:
- Oil, Terrorism, Insurgency, Artificial Intelligence, Regional Security, Threat Assessment, and Transnational Threats
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Iraq, South Asia, and Middle East
8. Jordan’s Escalating Border Threats Amid Regional Upheaval
- Author:
- Abdullah Hayek and Ahmad Sharawi
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- On January 8, the Royal Jordanian Air Force conducted strikes against suspected drug dealers and warehouses in Syria, their fourth such operation in recent months. The strikes occurred amid military reports of increased smuggling attempts—primarily involving drugs, but also weapons—across the kingdom’s northern border. Between January and August 2023 alone, a total of 194 smuggling and infiltration attempts were recorded, 88 of them involving drones. Some cross-border incidents have resulted in clashes with Jordanian security personnel, including three recent episodes: a December 12 clash in which one soldier was killed; a December 18 battle that lasted more than ten hours and marked the first seizure of antitank weaponry on the border; and a January 6 clash in which five smugglers were killed and fifteen arrested. Jordanian military officials attribute each of these attempts to pro-Iran proxy groups in Syria. Moreover, the increasingly advanced arms that smugglers are using—including rocket-propelled grenades, mines, and drones—have led Jordanian officials to conclude that these criminal endeavors pose a wider threat to national security. Greater U.S. assistance would reinforce the kingdom’s efforts to address this threat at a time of wider regional crisis.
- Topic:
- National Security, Border Control, Syrian War, Borders, Drug Trafficking, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Syria, and Jordan
9. A New Security Order for Europe
- Author:
- Pierre Vimont
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- Europe's security order has collapsed in the wake of the Ukrainian conflict. The very idea of rethinking this particular European framework raises doubts when faced with a Russian regime unable to admit the futility of its imperial dream. However, Europeans cannot afford not to think about the future of stability in Europe in response to the Russian question, which has been troubling our continent for too long[1]. Vladimir Putin's decision to invade Ukraine has put an end to the European security order as it was established in 1975 in Helsinki. By launching his "special military operation", the Russian President has gutted the whole edifice that had lasted as well as it could since its foundation.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, European Union, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe
10. Revitalizing the 3+3 Platform: A Formula for a New Regional Security Order?
- Author:
- Vasif Huseynov
- Publication Date:
- 01-2024
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Baku Dialogues
- Institution:
- ADA University
- Abstract:
- On 23 October 2023, the second meeting of the 3+3 Consultative Regional Platform took place in Tehran, Iran. This platform is built upon the idea of bringing together Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia ‘plus’ Iran, Russia, and Türkiye for regional cooperation had been introduced by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Türkiye after the Second Karabakh War. Georgia, owing to its ongoing territorial conflict with Russia, refused to participate in the platform, though its leaders signaled that they might reconsider this position in the future. The initiative, even in the 2+3 format (i.e., without Georgia), has faced several challenges, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and Iran’s mercurial policies in the region. The first meeting within this initiative (without Georgia’s participation) was held in Moscow on 10 December 2021 at the level of deputy foreign ministers. At that inaugural meeting, each side expressed optimism regarding the future of this framework. However, this optimism did not materialize for a long time. While Moscow and Tehran remained supportive of the 3+3 initiative, it mostly lost its relevance and importance for the other actors, including Azerbaijan. Despite repeated announcements by Russian and Iranian officials regarding preparations for the second meeting in this format, it took nearly two years for the meeting to actually occur. According to Russia’s leadership, the West was undermining this initiative
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and South Caucasus