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51. Addressing Cohesion Policy’s identity crisis in a changing European Union

Author:
Alison Hunter
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Since the late 1980s Cohesion Policy has been one of the cornerstone policies of the European Union. However, nowadays, a different, bolder Cohesion Policy debate is needed, reflecting a radically changed global environment. This Discussion Paper focuses on the upcoming review of the post-2027 Multi Annual Financial Framework and the debate concerning the future EU Cohesion Policy. It argues that Cohesion Policy’s purpose requires reinvention, not an incremental upgrade. Four overarching themes are analysed, reframing Cohesion Policy with a strategic, long-term investment perspective: EU resilience, security, strategic autonomy, and reforms. The author then proposes five recommendations which weave together these themes with the policy’s long-standing core features: Acknowledge the need to review the Cohesion Policy’s purpose. The EU should breathe new life into the Cohesion Policy debate. Revitalise Cohesion Policy’s long-term value by defending its pillars. The EU should re-confirm Cohesion Policy’s role as a structural policy. Position Cohesion Policy as the ‘guardian’ of EU place-based policymaking. Cohesion Policy should champion the “future-proofing” of regional resilience. Articulate Cohesion Policy’s role in the evolving EU governance and reform agenda. The EU should reach beyond the Recovery and Resilience Facility to reclaim Cohesion Policy’s role in structural reform. Improve Cohesion Policy’s convening power to catalyse deeper EU innovation cooperation. The future Cohesion Policy must deliver a more coordinated approach to the EU’s innovation agenda. The Paper concludes that the future Cohesion Policy should evolve in lockstep with citizens’ needs. This will not be easy. As discussions on the EU’s future have been sidelined in this crisis-prone area, the challenges ahead require strong leadership and coordination. The post-2027 EU Cohesion Policy will have much to contribute to rebuilding the EU’s future vision.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Reform, European Union, Regional Integration, Social Cohesion, Resilience, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe

52. Understanding the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement: A Means to Support ASEAN Integration

Author:
Mima Sefrina
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has accelerated the importance of digital technologies in the economy, particularly in e-commerce and digital financial services. Recognising the importance of digital technologies for economic recovery, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders signed the Bandar Seri Begawan Roadmap in 2021, which laid the foundation for the integration of the ASEAN digital economy in three phases – recovery, implementation, and transformation – and affirmed their interest in the establishment of a Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA). The DEFA aims to deepen existing digital economy cooperation and ensure the interoperability of digital economy systems. The formulation and signing of the DEFA will require the provision of flexible timelines and technical assistance, as the ASEAN Digital Integration Index shows that ASEAN is still in the early stages of digital economy development and that ASEAN Member States are at different levels of readiness for digital economy integration.
Topic:
Governance, Regulation, Digital Economy, Regional Integration, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia

53. After Gaza, Recalibrated Prospects for a Geopolitical Europe

Author:
Selin Uysal
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On October 26, the European Council adopted a new set of conclusions relating to the war in Gaza. Notably, these reiterated condemnation of Hamas, Israel’s right to defend itself in line with international law, calls to release all hostages, concern for all civilian lives, the need to ensure humanitarian access to Gaza, and a commitment to achieving a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Earlier European dissonance regarding the Gaza conflict thus appeared to be replaced by clearer communication. But European unity could soon be tested again, including on humanitarian messaging, which is less easily consented upon than meets the eye. More broadly, whereas the war in Ukraine had given rise to optimism about the emergence of a “geopolitical Europe”—a European Union capable of defining common strategic international objectives and deploying concrete operational means to achieve them—events following the Hamas attacks have exposed divisions within European institutions and highlighted the absence of a clear strategic approach in the southern neighborhood, potentially undermining the ability to achieve such objectives.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Regional Integration, Regional Politics, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Palestine, and Gaza

54. How to Reduce the Impact of Internal Contestation, Regional Fragmentation and Multipolar Competition on EU Foreign and Security Policy

Author:
Sarah van Bentum, Caterina Bedin, Gregor Walter-Drop, Steven Blockmans, Agnès Levallois, and Tiffany Guendouz
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
In a Union of 27 Member States, differences in (geo)political interests, socio-economic realities, historical trajectories and national identity construction constantly threaten internal unity and thus also the external coherence of the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUFSP). The following three factors and their mutually reinforcing interplay appear to have a significant impact on the creation and shaping of EUFSP, especially when it comes to managing international crises and conflicts: internal contestation, regional fragmentation and multipolar competition. The analysis in this paper draws on the main findings from nine case studies carried out under the Horizon 2020 JOINT project. The paper first assesses the (generally negative) impact of the three factors on EUFSP in these contexts of international crises, identifies common patterns and divergent approaches. The second part of the paper identifies strategies to mitigate and/or reduce the (negative) impact of these challenges on EUFSP and points towards windows of opportunity to take action moving forward. The ultimate aim of this research is to provide experts and officials with concrete ideas about how EU policy decision-making processes can enable greater coherence among EU institutions and Member States in their response to international crises and conflicts.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Regional Integration, Multipolarity, and Fragmentation
Political Geography:
Europe

55. The Potential Impact of Ukrainian Accession on the EU’s Budget

Author:
Michael Emerson
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
If hypothetically Ukraine was already today a full EU Member State, it could be benefitting from around EUR 18-19 billion of receipts from the EU budget, net of contributions – i.e. roughly within the range of Poland and Romania scaled to fit Ukraine. At current rates, this would mean an increase in GNI-based contributions by all Member States of around 10 %, with only Spain changing from a (small) net beneficiary to a (small) net payer. However, this is only a simple ‘static’ reference number for a more complex and realistic assessment with many ‘dynamic’ factors that could reduce this amount by the time Ukraine might actually accede over the course of the next decade. These can include catching up to the relative prosperity of Poland and Romania, possibly making budgetary room for poorer new Member States, and control valves with capping mechanisms for budget spending on cohesion and agriculture. Both capping mechanisms would need reform, but there is room for negotiation of mutually acceptable outcomes. It is sometimes rumoured that the Ukraine bill would turn all of today’s net beneficiaries into net payers to the EU budget. Our calculations show that this speculation, or maybe disinformation, is absolutely unfounded. The EU’s proposed new EUR 50 billion Ukraine Facility for 2024 to 2027, averaging EUR 12.5 billion per year in grants and loans, is already not so far behind the static estimate for full membership. There are further huge uncertainties affecting the outcome – how the war may end, how far donors and investors other than the EU will contribute to reconstruction, and the idea of ‘Making Russia pay,’ given most of its frozen EUR 300 billion assets are held in the EU. Overall, the budgetary aspect of Ukraine’s possible accession looks relatively manageable, compared to other more intractable political, economic, demographic, and security issues. Three recommendations are presented, including on the need for the European Commission to inform public debate along the lines of the present paper to avoid speculation over exaggerated concerns.
Topic:
Budget, European Union, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

56. The EU accession prospects of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia

Author:
Michael Emerson, Tinatin Akhvlediani, Denis Cenusa, Veronika Movchan, and Artem Remizov
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
In the week following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 all three East European states associated with the EU – Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia – submitted applications to accede to the EU. In response, the European Commission published ‘Opinions’ in June, setting out in each case conditions that should be met for these applications to advance on the path towards membership. This paper reports on the first half-year of the work undertaken by the three states to meet these conditions. All three states have set in motion actions largely concerning the fundamental political and rule of law criteria for membership. In all cases there is much work in progress underway, with some conditions already met, and others at an earlier stage. For both Ukraine and Moldova, it is possible that the majority of conditions will be met in the course of 2023. For Georgia there are still some more basic political obstacles to be overcome. The Commission is due to publish in October 2023 comprehensive evaluations of the preparedness of each of the three states, and in the case that the conditions are largely met, the EU should as a next step open up the formal accession negotiation process. It is also recommended that the EU reform by that time the accession process itself, notably by switching to qualified majority voting on the details of the procedures, and better still adopting a staged accession process that would assure structured incentives for overcoming the blockages in the present system as seen in the Western Balkans.
Topic:
Politics, European Union, Rule of Law, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Europe, Moldova, and Georgia

57. Kosovo citizens’ perceptions on EU integration, Kosovo-Serbia bilateral relations, and Regional Cooperation

Author:
Dea Fetiu and Gramos Sejdiu
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
This report of Western Balkans Security Barometer analyzes the Kosovo citizens’ perceptions on EU integration, Kosovo-Serbia bilateral relations, and Regional Cooperation. Over the course of our measurement period, the public perception of EU integration has consistently maintained a high level of support. In 2020, 92.5 percent of citizens expressed support, followed by 92.3 percent in 2021, and 94.2 percent in 2022. These findings indicate a stable and high level of support for the integration process, with no significant changes observed over the last three years. Turning to the citizens’ perceptions of the Kosovo-Serbia bilateral relations and the dialogue process, the second part of the report highlights an increase in support for the dialogue among Kosovo citizens. In 2021, 74.3 percent expressed their support to the dialogue, which rose to 83 percent in 2022. Furthermore, the chapter touches upon the shift of citizens’ perspectives on the impact of the dialogue on Kosovo – Serbia relations, with 40 percent of the respondents believing it had improved in 2022 compared to 14.6 percent in 2021. A majority of respondents (68.8 percent) expressed support for regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, indicating a positive inclination among Kosovo’s population. Additionally, respondents consistently expressed support for free movement, information exchange, and the establishment of a common market for goods and workforce in the Western Balkans. When specifically asked about the Open Balkan Initiative, responses were very divided and varied over the years, with fluctuating levels of support and opposition. Overall, the findings highlight the strong aspiration for EU integration and the continuation of the Kosovo – Serbia dialogue, with citizens understanding the complexity and challenges of both processes and the challenges ahead.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, European Union, Regional Integration, Survey, and Perception
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

58. Citizens’ Perceptions on Foreign Actors Influence in Kosovo and Regional Cooperation

Author:
Dorjeta Rukiqi
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The general perception of respondents towards Western countries such as the USA (91 percent), Germany (90 percent), Austria (84 percent), and the United Kingdom (83 percent) is positive. Conversely, negative perceptions are held towards states that do not recognize Kosovo, such as Russia (86 percent), Greece (69 percent), China (65 percent), Spain (61 percent), and Iran (49 percent). The positive impact of Western actors in Kosovo is evident in their aid, assistance, and support throughout the state-building process of Kosovo. Their foreign agendas, aimed at promoting democracy and providing economic and financial support, have greatly facilitated Kosovo’s advancement as a young state. Conversely, perceptions of malign influences align with the hindrances posed by countries like Russia, China, and Spain. These nations have impeded Kosovo’s progress by obstructing its participation in crucial processes, blocking its membership in international organizations, refusing to acknowledge its independence, and disregarding its institutions. These actions have contributed to the negative perceptions of these countries among respondents, reflecting their adverse impact on Kosovo’s development. Regarding regional countries, 90 percent of the respondents view Albania as having the most positive impact, while Serbia is perceived as the regional country with the most negative impact. In terms of regional cooperation, 69 percent of respondents support it, while 24 percent oppose it. Similarly, 70 percent of respondents support the free movement of labor and goods within the region, while 24 percent hold an opposing view. However, only 31 percent of respondents support the so-called Open Balkan Initiative, while 52 percent are against it. The Open Balkan Initiative, a regional effort to promote cooperation in the Western Balkans, has elicited a mixed response among the public in Kosovo. The lack of a clear written statute and undefined objectives have led to confusion, with many perceiving the initiative as a means for Serbia to consolidate its dominance in the region. These factors contribute to the complex dynamics and uncertainties surrounding the Open Balkan Initiative in Kosovo. Respondents who support the Open Balkan Initiative argue that it improves regional cooperation, establishes freedom of movement in the region, generates employment, and fosters economic development. On the other hand, those who oppose it argue that it empowers Serbia, discriminates against Kosovo’s position in the region, and weakens Kosovo’s economy.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Public Opinion, Citizenship, Regional Integration, and Survey
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Kosovo

59. With war next door, Moldova is accelerating its rapprochement with the EU

Author:
Maia Sandu
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Russia's ruthless invasion of Ukraine has upended the existing order in Europe and the world, and with it the security architecture, global energy, trade, and financial systems. Since the end of the Cold War, technological progress and economic growth had led to stronger cooperation and an unprecedented level of connectivity between countries. Growing interdependence of the world's economies, cultures, and populations, brought about by cross-border trade and flows of investment, people, and information have promoted reconciliation and prosperity. Dictatorships fell, one-party rule ended, democracy prevailed. The Republic of Moldova declared independence in 1991[1] . Like us, the newly independent states had great expectations. We embraced this new beginning as a chance for peace and democratic development. We committed to being part of the free world. A world where states are sovereign and equal; where borders are respected; where states cooperate, settle disputes peacefully and fulfil obligations under international law; where respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is at the heart of governance. And like others, Moldova hoped that buffer zones, spheres of influence and land grabs were a matter of the past. Above all, we wanted to live freely and choose our own future. But our aspirations to make our own choices were met by Russia's imperialist response. Its encouragement and support for secessionist rebels on the left bank of the Nistru river gave birth to a frozen conflict. Frozen conflicts, like the one in Moldova's Transnistrian region, have become one of Russia's foreign policy tools to destabilise its neighbourhood, prevent democratic consolidation and to simply hold back our development. Fast-forward a quarter of a century and a similar toolbox is applied to keep the EU-hopeful Ukraine part of the Russian sphere of influence. First Crimea, then Donbas, and eight years later - on that grim morning of 24 February 2022 - a full scale invasion of Ukraine. This ruthless, unjust, illegal war has unleashed an unimaginable tragedy on the Ukrainian people, generating shock waves across Europe and beyond the continent. As the first bombs fell on Ukrainian soil, Moldova has vigorously condemned the war, opened its borders to hundreds of thousands of refugees and has firmly stood with Ukraine ever since. Watching the suffering from across the border with sorrow and horror, we have been wondering if Moldova will be next. I am grateful to Ukraine, its military and citizens, for their fierce resistance. As they are fighting for their land and freedom, they are fighting for ours, too. We are safe thanks to Ukraine.
Topic:
European Union, Regional Integration, Rapprochement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Moldova

60. For the generations on the move in Europe, still so many challenges to overcome. A European odyssey

Author:
Niccolò Bianchini and Stefanie Buzmaniuk
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Until the middle of the 20th century, living in another European country and encountering its traditions and customs was the preserve of the nobility, the clergy, scientists (Marie Curie, Alfred Nobel, Émilie du Châtelet), intellectuals (Goethe, Nietzsche, Pirandello), artists (Modigliani, van Gogh), musicians (Liszt, Chopin) and writers (Joyce, Stendhal, Rilke). Democratising this experience is one of the promises of the European project. Living, working, studying or retiring in another Member State has become a reality for a considerable share of European citizens. 13.7 million Europeans (i.e. 3.1% of the European population) are "internal migrants" whom we shall call "mobile Europeans", i.e. citizens who choose to live in a Member State of the European Union other than the one in which they were born or of which they are a national. If, by way of comparison, we were to reduce this figure to the population of a European State, it would correspond to a State with a population greater than Belgium - a State which has 21 Members of the European Parliament. If these citizens had a common voice, their political power would be considerable. Often, however, mobile Europeans are identified more by their national passports than by their European citizenship - and the administrative and practical obstacles they face in their experiences as "nationals of another Member State" are very real. Europeans have been guaranteed freedom of movement since the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Initially limited to workers, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, changes to the Treaties and successive enlargements have given new categories of Europeans the right to settle in a Member State other than that of their nationality. Intra-European mobility was made possible by the introduction of European citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993. Mobility is guaranteed by article 3 TEU, article 21 TFEU and article 45 the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. The latter give Europeans political rights, as well as "the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States". At present, the principle of free movement - which was strengthened thanks to the Schengen Agreement of 1995 - applies to the 27 Member States of the European Union and to the countries of the European Economic Area, which includes Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. This principle also applies to Switzerland under bilateral agreements. It is mainly nationals of Central and Eastern European or Southern European countries who decide to live in another Member State. In 2021, the Romanians, Poles, Italians and Portuguese comprised the main groups of Europeans living far from home. Flows are particularly significant from East to West and from South to the North of the continent, but there are also considerable flows between neighbouring countries, such as Germany and Austria, Sweden and Denmark or between the Baltic States. Incidentally Germany is the country which hosts the greatest number of these mobile Europeans (4.5 million), followed by Spain, Italy and France. Croatia, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia are home to fewer than 1%. The free movement or people, goods and services is considered by Europe's citizens as the most positive achievement of European integration, followed by peace. In a geopolitical context that has brought the issue of peace in Europe back to the fore, this result, which dates from the winter of 2022, may come as a surprise. At the same time, it testifies to Europeans' attachment to a "tangible" Europe and underlines the importance granted to this achievement, whose impact is indeed a reality. Moreover, 58% of Europeans believe that the free movement of people is beneficial to the labour market. Despite the expression of attachment on the part of Europeans and the legal efforts made to support free movement, reality unfortunately reveals that there is still vast scope for progress and many areas for improvement. This is why it remains imperative to analyse the obstacles that, in practice, complicate citizens' mobility and prevent the creation of a more people-centred Europe.
Topic:
Democratization, Migration, Citizenship, Regional Integration, and Mobility
Political Geography:
Europe