Search

Begin New Search Topic Nuclear Weapons Publication Year within 10 Years

201. Evaluating Project Aim 2020: Preparing to Transform the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Author:
Robert Shea
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The National Academy of Public Administration
Abstract:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has experienced significant changes over the last five years. NRC developed Project Aim 2020 (Project Aim) to improve the agency’s planning and operational functions. Project Aim set out to identify key strategies and recommendations to transform the agency during the next five years to enhance the NRC’s ability to plan and execute its mission in a more effective, efficient, and agile manner. The NRC requested the National Academy of Public Administration (the Academy) to conduct an independent assessment of Project Aim. The Academy’s review of Project Aim consisted of two reports: an evaluation of Project Aim processes; and an assessment of the Project Aim final report. The Academy reports were prepared by a professional Study Team, in consultation with an experienced Focus Group of five Academy Fellows and one non-Fellow. The Study Team and Focus Group utilized their knowledge of strategic planning and organizational change management in their evaluation of the NRC’s efforts, providing the NRC with several pragmatic recommendations as the agency pursues an important organizational transformation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

202. Expanding Nuclear Weapons State Transparency to Strengthen Nonproliferation

Author:
Jonas Siegel
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
In the years since the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, NPT nuclear weapons states have engaged in consequential transparency measures about their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials. The level of transparency thus far achieved, however, has proven uneven in terms of the types and amounts of information released and in terms of the frequency of those releases—and most importantly, has not contributed significantly to fulfillment of these states NPT commitments. Nuclear weapons states should reassess the scope of their transparency efforts to date and consider expanding the types of information that they reveal to provide international assurances and achieve gains in support of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This paper identifies particular steps that these states could take to fulfill the desire for greater transparency that move beyond declarations of the number and status of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. In particular, it focuses on how transparency can be expanded about the operational practices and protocols that govern the day-to-day management of their military nuclear materials—their warheads, weapons components, and material stockpiles—and how transparency in this area would contribute to fulfilling their disarmament and nonproliferation commitments.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, and France

203. Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Negotiations

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Clay Ramsay, and Ebrahim Mohseni
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
View the survey questionnaire and trend tables.This survey is one in a series of surveys related to Iran that CISSM has conducted since 2013. View the complete list of surveys. Summary of Findings 1. Iran’s Nuclear Program Overwhelming majorities of Iranians continue to say that it is very important for Iran to have a nuclear program. The nuclear program is seen as one of Iran’s greatest achievements. A large majority continues to see the program as driven purely by peaceful goals, though one in five see it as being an effort to pursue nuclear weapons. This support for Iran’s nuclear program appears to be driven by a combination of symbolic and economic considerations. However, while a majority sees the program as being an important way for Iran to stand up to the West, serving Iran’s future energy and medical needs is seen as more important. 2. Views on Nuclear Weapons A large and growing majority of Iranians express opposition to nuclear weapons in various ways. Two thirds now say that producing nuclear weapons is contrary to Islam. Eight in ten approve of the NPT goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and establishing a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. Consistent with these views, Iranians express opposition to chemical weapons, with nine in ten approving of Iran’s decision, during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, to not use chemical weapons in response to Iraq’s use of them. 3. Iran - P5+1 Nuclear Deal Given information about the nuclear deal being negotiated between Iran and the P5+1, a substantial majority favors it and only one in six oppose it. A quarter, though, are undecided or equivocal. Nearly three in four are optimistic that Iran and the P5+1 will arrive at a deal in regard to Iran’s nuclear program. Three in four think the Majlis (Iran’s Parliament) should have a say on a nuclear deal. 4. The Potential Removal of Sanctions The support for Iran pursuing a deal with the P5+1 appears to rest to some extent on the assumption—held by a large majority—that all sanctions on Iran would be lifted as part of the deal, and there is optimism that the sanctions would in fact be lifted. Approximately half of respondents say Iran should not agree to a deal unless the U.S. lifts all of its sanctions, while nearly as many say Iran should be ready to make a deal even if the U.S. retains some sanctions, provided all UN and EU sanctions are lifted. Among those who believe that all U.S. sanctions would be lifted, support for a deal is nearly two thirds, while among those who assume that the U.S. will retain some sanctions, support is a bare majority. The removal of UN sanctions is seen as more important than the removal of U.S. sanctions. 5. Expectations About Positive Effects of a Deal Iranians express high expectations that a nuclear deal would result in significant positive effects in the near term. Majorities say they would expect to see, within a year, better access to foreign medicines and medical equipment, significantly more foreign investment, and tangible improvement in living standards. 6. The Sanctions and Iran’s Economy The sanctions on Iran are overwhelmingly perceived as having a negative impact on the country’s economy and on the lives of ordinary people. However, views of the economy are fairly sanguine and have been improving. Also, the impact of the sanctions is seen as limited and a lesser factor affecting the economy as compared to domestic mismanagement and corruption. 7. Views of Rouhani As Iran’s parliamentary elections near, Iran’s President Rouhani is clearly one of the strongest political figures in Iran. Half would prefer to see Rouhani supporters win in the February 2016 parliamentary elections, while one quarter favors his critics. However, Rouhani supporters have high expectations that a deal removing all U.S. sanctions and bringing rapid economic change is going to take place. If a deal is reached that does not meet these expectations, Rouhani could be left politically vulnerable. In a hypothetical presidential match-up, Rouhani currently does better than former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by two to one. Large majorities say Rouhani has been at least somewhat successful in improving the economic situation, improving Iran’s relations with European countries, and reducing sanctions. Three in four Iranians say that if the negotiations were to fail to produce a final agreement, they would only or mostly blame the P5+1 countries. 8. Relations with the U.S. Views of the United States, especially the U.S. government, continue to be quite negative. Only four in ten believe that U.S. leaders genuinely believe that Iran is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. Asked why the U.S. is imposing sanctions on Iran, the most common answers portray the U.S. as seeking to confront and dominate Iran; very few mention concerns about nuclear weapons. However, a slight majority has a positive view of the American people. If Iran and the P5+1 reach a deal, a large majority believes that the U.S. will still impede other countries from cooperating with Iran, and a slight majority believes that Iran making concessions on the nuclear issue will likely lead the U.S. to seek more concessions. Just one in six believe that concessions would be likely to lead to greater accommodation; however, this number is higher than a year ago. Large majorities favor various confidence-building measures between Iran and the U.S., including greater trade, which is more widely supported than a year ago. People-to-people confidence-building measures are especially popular. A majority thinks that it is possible for Islam and the West to find common ground. 9. Views of P5+1 Countries Two thirds say they do not trust the P5+1 countries—however, the minority expressing trust has increased since fall 2014. Views of specific countries vary: large majorities have negative views of the UK and the U.S.; modest majorities have unfavorable views of Russia and France, while views are divided on Germany and China. 10. Views of Regional Actors A very large majority has an unfavorable view of Saudi Arabia—even slightly more negative than views of the U.S. A slight majority now has an unfavorable view of Turkey, which was not the case a year ago. Large majorities continue to view Syria and Iraq favorably.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia

204. No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security, Thomas M. Nichols

Author:
Todd S. Sechser
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
At around 5,000 total warheads, the U.S. nuclear stockpile today is a fraction of its former self. One therefore might presume that U.S. nuclear doctrine has undergone an equally significant transformation since the end of the Cold War. Thomas M. Nichols disabuses readers of this notion, showing how the machinery of “mutual assured destruction” remains predominant even though the world that spawned this doctrine disappeared with the Soviet Union. But this doctrine is now obsolete, Nichols argues. Deterrence no longer requires—if it ever did—an expansive nuclear inventory with diverse delivery platforms, a launch-on-warning alert posture, and convoluted targeting plans. In Nichols's view, a pocket-sized nuclear deterrent would be adequate. Yet U.S. strategy remains saddled with the costly baggage of an arms competition that ended a quarter-century ago. - See more at: http://www.psqonline.org/article.cfm?IDArticle=19347#sthash.Giq99dtz.dpuf
Topic:
Security, Cold War, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States and Soviet Union

205. Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions

Author:
Gene Gerzhoy
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
When does a nuclear-armed state's provision of security guarantees to a militarily threatened ally inhibit the ally's nuclear weapons ambitions? Although the established security model of nuclear proliferation posits that clients will prefer to depend on a patron's extended nuclear deterrent, this proposition overlooks how military threats and doubts about the patron's intentions encourage clients to seek nuclear weapons of their own. To resolve this indeterminacy in the security model's explanation of nuclear restraint, it is necessary to account for the patron's use of alliance coercion, a strategy consisting of conditional threats of military abandonment to obtain compliance with the patron's demands. This strategy succeeds when the client is militarily dependent on the patron and when the patron provides assurances that threats of abandonment are conditional on the client's nuclear choices. Historical evidence from West Germany's nuclear decisionmaking provides a test of this logic. Contrary to the common belief among nonproliferation scholars, German leaders persistently doubted the credibility and durability of U.S. security guarantees and sought to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent. Rather than preferring to renounce nuclear armament, Germany was compelled to do so by U.S. threats of military abandonment, contradicting the established logic of the security model and affirming the logic of alliance coercion.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Germany, and West Germany

206. Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation

Author:
Francis Gavin
Publication Date:
08-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The United States has gone to extraordinary lengths since the beginning of the nuclear age to inhibit—that is, to slow, halt, and reverse—the spread of nuclear weapons and, when unsuccessful, to mitigate the consequences. To accomplish this end, the United States has developed and implemented a wide range of tools, applied in a variety of combinations. These “strategies of inhibition” employ different policies rarely seen as connected to one another, from treaties and norms to alliances and security guarantees, to sanctions and preventive military action. The United States has applied these measures to friend and foe alike, often regardless of political orientation, economic system, or alliance status, to secure protection from nuclear attack and maintain freedom of action. Collectively, these linked strategies of inhibition have been an independent and driving feature of U.S. national security policy for more than seven decades, to an extent rarely documented or fully understood. The strategies of inhibition make sense of puzzles that neither containment nor openness strategies can explain, while providing critical insights into post–World War II history, theory, the causes of nuclear proliferation, and debates over the past, present, and future trajectory of U.S. grand strategy.
Topic:
National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Soviet Union, and Germany

207. Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy

Author:
Mark S. Bell
Publication Date:
08-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
What happens to the foreign policies of states when they acquire nuclear weapons? Despite its importance, this question has not been answered satisfactorily. Nuclear weapons can facilitate six conceptually distinct foreign policy behaviors: aggression, expansion, independence, bolstering, steadfastness, and compromise. This typology of foreign policy behaviors enables scholars to move beyond simple claims of “nuclear emboldenment,” and allows for more nuanced examination of the ways in which nuclear weapons affect the foreign policies of current and future nuclear states. The typology also sheds light on Great Britain's response to nuclear acquisition. Britain used nuclear weapons to engage in greater levels of steadfastness in responding to challenges, bolstering junior allies, and demonstrating independence from the United States, but it did not engage in greater levels of aggression, expansion, or compromise. The typology and the British case demonstrate the value of distinguishing among different effects of nuclear weapons acquisition, have implications for scholars' and policymakers' understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in international politics, and suggest avenues for future research.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States

208. Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why?

Author:
Ron E. Hassner and Jason Wittenberg
Publication Date:
08-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Fortified boundaries are asymmetrical, physical barriers placed along borders. These boundaries are more formidable in structure than conventional boundary lines, but less robust than militarized boundaries. Their goal is to impose costs on infiltrators and in so doing deter or impede infiltration. A novel dataset of all such boundaries worldwide shows that states are constructing these barriers at an accelerating rate. More than half of barrier builders are Muslim-majority states, and so are the vast majority of targets. A multivariate analysis demonstrates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, states that construct such barriers do not tend to suffer disproportionately from terrorism, nor are they apt to be involved in a significant number of territorial disputes. Instead, differences in state wealth and migration rates are the best predictors of barrier construction. Qualitative case studies suggest that the most effective fortified boundaries are found where the initiating state controls the territory beyond a boundary that blocks the only access route into the state.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Global Security
Political Geography:
United States, Soviet Union, and Mexico

209. Pakistan’s Nuclear Development (1974-1998): External Pressures

Author:
Iram Khalid and Zakia Bano
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
Pakistan detonated its nuclear test on May 28, 1998 in the Chagai hills which is along the western border of the province, Baluchistan. Many personalities and organizations were involved in developing the nuclear device against a backdrop of political, security and economic constraints, as well as opportunities. India’s 1974 nuclear explosion had proved a fundamental flashpoint for Pakistan‘s nuclear program. Pakistan decided to accomplish its vow to “eat grass or go hungry” in its mission on its advance for the nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s nuclear program evolved under immensely intricate and challenging security dilemmas and circumstances. Historical experience, a combination of cultural nuances, idiosyncrasies of personalities, and domestic politics existed throughout the nuclearization process. Pakistan faced regional crises, geographical compulsions, technical challenges, global politics, external pressure and international propaganda to nuclear materials know-how.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, History, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, India, and Punjab

210. If Japan and South Korea Go Nuclear: Two Military-Technical Scenarios

Author:
Ian Easton and Charles Ferguson
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
America's security alliances with Japan and South Korea made headlines last month. In addition to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's address to a joint session of Congress, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter visited both Japan and South Korea. Their main focus was on how to fortify Seoul's and Tokyo's security alliance ties with the US against possible Chinese and North Korean military threats.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus