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131. Planning Ahead: A Blueprint to a Middle East WMD Free Zone

Author:
Chen Kane
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Freeing the Middle East from all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and establishing a weapon-of-mass-destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) is a concept that originated many decades ago. Although this idea has existed for more than forty years, surprisingly little thought has been given to how it can be realistically implemented. Currently, there remain significant gaps regarding core concepts of the WMDFZ (the “Zone”) negotiations and implementation within the Middle East and internationally. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies offers a new report in an effort to address these gaps with regard to the planned WMDFZ Middle East Conference, negotiation process, and the subsequent establishment of such a Zone by identifying the legal, technical, and organizational elements required to support the Zone negotiations and implementation. Creating a WMDFZ is a very tall order; not only has one never been created before, but also all existing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) formalized an already existing situation—the absence of nuclear weapons in their region. The WMDFZ, by contrast, is aimed at reversing the status quo by dismantling existing WMD capabilities and programs in a region that is suspected of hosting all three categories of WMD. Moreover, the region suffers from deep-rooted conflicts and mistrust, and many areas are undergoing considerable social and political change. The increasing influence of non-state actors on states’ affairs in the region is another complicating factor. Additionally, while there are regional and international regimes and organizations charged with verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear energy programs and chemical industries (all of which could inform the WMDFZ negotiators), there are no comparable mechanisms to cover nuclear and biological weapons dismantlement, verify sensitive activities for biological programs, nor sufficiently regulate WMD delivery systems—all of which are mandated under the Middle East WMDFZ.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Middle East

132. The Case for Highly Enriched Uranium Free Zones

Author:
Andrew Bieniawski, Miles A. Pomper, and Elena Sokova
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Highly enriched uranium (HEU)—one of the key ingredients for nuclear weapons—is one of the most dangerous materials on the planet. Significant progress has been made over the past several years to eliminate all HEU from 26 countries and Taiwan. The creation of regional HEU-Free Zones would help cement a global norm against civilian HEU use in much the same way that Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones have strengthened global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. In many cases, only one or two countries in each proposed regional HEU-Free Zone have small amounts of remaining HEU, presenting an opportunity for countries to take action prior to the Nuclear Security Summit in 2016. This concept paper was developed by a working group on “The Elimination of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications,” a project of the Fissile Materials Working Group, a coalition of eighty civil society organizations committed to improving fissile materials security. Initial work on the concept was also funded by the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Global Focus

133. Replacing High-Risk Radiological Materials

Author:
Miles A. Pomper and George M. Moore
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Permanent Risk Reduction of Radioactive Sources Illustration by Evelyn Helminen, MIIS There has been a marked increase in international and domestic attention to the need to replace high-risk radioactive sources with less risky and non-isotopic alternatives in order to forestall an act of radiological terrorism. In response to this need, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey, with the support of the US and UK governments, hosted three, closed-door workshops with governmental and nongovernmental experts in Washington, London, and Vienna to propose appropriate policies. Through these workshops and additional research, CNS has developed the new occasional paper, “Permanent Risk Reduction: A Roadmap for Replacing High-Risk Radioactive Sources and Materials,” which offers a series of actions that governments could take to help expedite and encourage the substitution of high-risk sources with non-isotopic alternatives as an important contribution to the nuclear security framework.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Radiological Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

134. The Future Impact of North Korea’s Emerging Nuclear Deterrent

Author:
Leonard Spector
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The emergence of North Korea’s nuclear deterrent has been a grievous blow to international nonproliferation efforts and poses serious national security challenges for the United States and its Northeast Asian allies. It is by no means clear, however, that the precedent North Korea has set will significantly erode the nonproliferation regime or stimulate proliferation elsewhere. In a new paper (published by the US-Korea Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, on its website, 38north) CNS’s Leonard S. Spector examines the arenas in which North Korea’s new nuclear weapon status has significant negative consequences and assesses the damage that will likely be done. He concludes that the ripple effects of North Korea’s crossing the nuclear threshold may be more limited than they first appear.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

135. Keeping the Bombs in the Basement: U.S. Nonproliferation Policy toward Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan

Author:
Or Rabinowitz and Nicholas L. Miller
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Many accounts suggest that the United States did little to prevent Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa from developing nuclear weapons. These accounts are flawed, however. The United States did attempt to stop all three countries from acquiring the bomb and, when those efforts failed, to halt additional proliferation measures such as further testing and weaponization.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, Israel, and South Africa

136. Understanding the North Korean Nuclear Threat

Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference continues in New York, the international community's failure to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to North Korea looms large. Unlike the four of the world's nine nuclear-weapon states that have shown some progress in reducing their nuclear arsenals, North Korea is working hard to expand its arsenal and make it more credible. Unlike six of the nine, which have either ratified the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or maintained a testing moratorium since the treaty was concluded, North Korea has conducted three underground nuclear tests, the only state to do so during the last 17 years. Unlike the three nuclear-weapon states that never became parties to the NPT, North Korea signed the treaty, declared it was withdrawing, later pledged to denuclearize, and then reneged on its commitment. The North's nuclear program today is out of control and accelerating, damaging both the NPT and international stability. Addressing this grim reality begins with an objective assessment of North Korea's actual nuclear capabilities and an acknowledgment that the Obama administration's "strategic patience" approach is not working. Washington and Beijing must step up their efforts to revive the six-party process with the near-term goal of freezing Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs, taking care to manage potential spoilers, Russia and the U.S. Congress.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Security, Political stability, Nonproliferation, Denuclearization, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and North Korea