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91. Karachi: Organized Crime in a Key Megacity

Author:
Nazia Hussain and Louise Shelley
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
Crime and terror groups are key non-state actors in Karachi and employ crime and violence to achieve political and economic gains. They have a different relationship with the state than crime groups in Italy where the state has more resources to share with the crime groups. Instead, much more complex relationships exist between the state and the non-state actors in this difficult environment where crime and terror groups have become a part of diffuse governance of the city, including provision of housing and water. Our analysis differs from others who suggest that crime and terror groups have stepped into a power void. We suggest that the political parties rather than the crime and terror groups are at the forefront of violent and criminalized politics. Therefore, violent non-state actors are not the ultimate arbiters of the political order. Crime and terror groups remain vulnerable as they may lose the state’s support and without this they face difficulty surviving in this highly competitive environment.
Topic:
Crime, Terrorism, Non State Actors, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Middle East, and Karachi

92. Medium-Intensity Threats: The Case for Beefed-Up IDF Ground Forces

Author:
Eado Hecht and Eitan Shamir
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA)
Abstract:
Some pundits contend that in the absence of a direct threat from state armies, and in a situation where terror, guerrilla and rocket threats predominate, Israel no longer needs heavy maneuvering formations. This 50-page study by Dr. Eado Hecht and Dr. Eitan Shamir of the BESA Center argues the contrary. The rise in capabilities of non-state actors represents a new intermediate-level threat to Israel; creating several plausible threat scenarios that require large, highly-capable ground formations. The IDF’s recent force-buildup plan, which gives priority to the air force and to precision-fire assets over ground units, is mistaken.
Topic:
International Security and Non State Actors
Political Geography:
Israel

93. Warlords, Intervention, and State Consolidation: A Typology of Political Orders in Weak and Failed States

Author:
Romain Malejacq
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security Studies
Institution:
Security Studies
Abstract:
Despite efforts to bolster failed states over the past two decades, many states in the international system still exhibit endemic weakness. External intervention often leads to political instability and in most cases fails to foster state consolidation, instead empowering and creating ties with the ones it aims to weaken. Using the case of Afghanistan, I develop a typology of political orders that explains variation in degrees of state consolidation and provides the basis for more systematic comparative analysis. I demonstrate the resilience of a political logic according to which non-state armed actors (warlords) “shape-shift” and constantly reinvent themselves to adapt to changing political environments. This article, based on extensive field research in Afghanistan, shows why failed states are unlikely to consolidate and exhibit Western-style state building, as a result of intervention or otherwise.
Topic:
Fragile/Failed State, Non State Actors, State Building, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Middle East

94. China-Myanmar Relations Since Naypyidaw’s Political Transition: How Beijing can Balance Short-term Interests and Long-term Values

Author:
Chenyang Li and James Char
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS)
Abstract:
In discussions on Myanmar's political reforms since the installation of a civilianised military regime in 2011, most analysts have focused on the bedevilment of bilateral ties between Beijing and Naypyidaw. To be sure, China has since become more attuned to the concerns of non-state actors with the opening up of Myanmar's political space as well as recalibrated its strategies in the face of renewed diplomatic competition from other countries in vying for the affections of the Burmese leadership. In acknowledging the corrections China‘s Myanmar policy has undergone, this article argues that Beijing‘s factoring in of Burmese national interests and development needs can help enhance its prospects. While a return to the previous robust bilateral relationship may appear inconceivable in the near future, this article concludes that there is still hope for Beijing in overcoming the challenges posed by Naypyidaw's political transition should it be able to keep up with the latter's evolution over the longer term.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Diplomacy, and Non State Actors
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Myanmar

95. The Metamorphosis of Religion: North Africa in the Modern Era

Author:
Mohammad Haddad
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Since the nineteenth century, North Africa’s religious life has witnessed a slow and uncertain metamorphosis. It is still unable to settle into a constant and sustainable model. The traditional order could not resist the emergence of the nation-state, modern education and new forms of social organisation. However, religion has remained on the margins of these developments. Although used in the anticolonial struggle, religion was then abandoned during the formation of the postcolonial state. Yet the difficulties faced by governments since the 1970s have entrusted religion with a predominantly opposition function, which is negative and sometimes violent. This paper argues that only neo-reformism can give a positive spin to religion’s role in politics and can serve as the basis for a new religious order.
Topic:
Islam, Post Colonialism, Non State Actors, and Reform
Political Geography:
North Africa
Publication Identifier:
978-88-98650-60-6
Publication Identifier Type:
DOI

96. Non-State Militias and Borderlands in Eastern Ukraine

Author:
Kimberly Marten
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Abstract:
Kimberly Marten considers the role that freewheeling private militias have played, both in the war in eastern Ukraine and in Ukraine’s politics more generally. While militias supplemented the Ukrainian army’s firepower, especially in the early phase of the war, we know from the experience of other countries that autonomous armed groups can also challenge the authority of the state and undermine its efficacy. How might militias shape Ukraine political trajectory and shape its security?
Topic:
International Relations, International Security, Non State Actors, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Ukraine and Eastern Europe

97. Maritime Non-state Actors: A Challenge for the Royal Canadian Navy?

Author:
David Rudd
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Global security and prosperity depends in part on good order at sea, with its attendant flow of licit maritime commerce. While challenges to that order have existed since the earliest sea-farers, new players have emerged in recent decades that inhibit the ability of nation-states to regulate domestic and international maritime activity. This paper is intended to provide a brief exploration of the nature of maritime non-state actors (MNSAs) and the challenge they pose to national and international maritime security. It will examine the types and motivations of MNSAs and identify some of the ways in which a navy may interact with them. In doing so it will help to shape decision-making on how allied navies in general and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in particular might theoretically align their capability-development efforts with these trends. As the paper is intended to be an overview of a complex and evolving phenomenon, it proceeds from the premise that the strategic/policy, doctrinal, and tactical questions raised herein will require more study.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Non State Actors, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

98. Armed Non-State Actors: Current Trends Future Challenges

Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
Most of today's armed conflicts take place within states and are waged by at least one NSA fighting state forces and/or other NSAs. In these conflicts, frequent violations of humanitarian norms are committed by both state and non-state parties. NSAs also frequently control or heavily influence areas where civilians live. Consequently, efforts to protect civilian populations should address not only the behaviour of states, but also that of NSA.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Armed Struggle, and Non State Actors
Political Geography:
Geneva

99. Private Military Security Companies: Future Challenges in Security Governance

Author:
Anne-Marie Buzatu and Benjamin S. Buckland
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
Private military and security forces, in various forms, have been around for as long as there has been war and insecurity. In the fi rst and second centuries BC, Carthaginians used Numidian mercenaries, in the fifth century the Romans used Germanic mercenaries on their northern borders, the Byzantines hired the Spanish in the fourteenth century, the English used Prussian “Hessians” in the American War of Independence, and the Swiss Guard have been providing protective services to the Vatican since 1506. These forces were used by strong regional and local powers to safeguard or expand territory or other spheres of influence under their control.
Topic:
Security, Privatization, and Non State Actors
Political Geography:
Geneva

100. Below the Threshold: The Law Governing the Use of Force Against Non-State Actors in the Absence of a Non-International Armed Conflict

Author:
Daniel Hessel, Julia Shu, and Sarah Weiner
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
Boko Haram attacks civilians in Nigeria. The Islamic State launches attacks in Paris. Terrorists take hostages at a hotel in Mali. Mexican drug gangs threaten government officials and civilians. Houthi rebels seek to take control of the government in Yemen—and succeed. States increasingly face security threats from non-state actors, which have led states and observers to ask what states can do in response. What legal framework should apply? What constraints do states face? When can states resort to the use of military force to address threats posed to them by non-state actors, either on their own territory or on the territory of another state? The answer to these questions turns on whether the conflict in question rises to the level of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC). Based on the drafting history of international humanitarian law (IHL) governing NIACs, international jurisprudence, recent state practice, and academic commentary, this paper concludes that a NIAC does not exist unless the conflict passes an intensity threshold. In other words, the intensity of the conflict distinguishes generalized violence involving a non-state actor from a NIAC. Once the existence of a NIAC is established, states participating in it will be governed by relevant IHL. But if states are only governed by the IHL applicable to NIACs once an intensity threshold has been crossed, what law applies below that threshold? The answer varies with the circumstances, depending on whether the state is responding to a threat within its own territory or from outside; and if the threat is from outside the state, whether the host state consents to the use of force against the non-state actor. Thus, to answer the question of what law applies before a NIAC is established, this white paper analyzes three different scenarios in which a state contemplates forceful engagement with a non-state actor. Each scenario presumes that t he non- state actor is organized and has engaged in some violence, but that the intensity of the clash has not crossed the intensity threshold and thus has not risen yet to the level of a NIAC. 1. In Scenario One, a state seeks to engage a non-state actor that operates exclusively within the state’s territorial borders. 2. In Scenario Two, an intervening state seeks to engage a non-state actor located in another state, with the consent of the host state. 3. In Scenario Three, an intervening state seeks to engage a non-state actor located in another state, without the consent of the host state. The analysis of each scenario first identifies the authority that governs whether and when the state may initiate forceful engagement with the non-state actor (the “may the state use force” evaluation), then discusses which legal regime governs the scope and nature of the resulting use of force (the “how may the state use force” evaluation). Different legal regimes govern the acting state’s options in each of the scenarios. Although the authority for action differs, the inquiries for Scenarios One and Two are quite similar. In Scenario One, the acting state may engage the non-state actor with force by virtue of its territorial sovereignty. It must act, however, through a domestic law enforcement framework and in compliance with human rights law. In Scenario Two, the acting state derives the authority to use force against the non-state actor from the host state’s consent. However, it may only rely on that consent insofar as it comports with the host state’s human rights obligations under international law. In raising the possibility of one state violating another state’s territorial integrity, Scenario Three raises a different set of questions. The intervening state’s threat or use of force within another state’s territory is only lawful when authorized by the U.N. Security Council or justified under the Charter’s Article 51 self-defense provision. The intervening state’s use of force is accordingly regulated by the traditional IHL of international armed conflict. Where scenarios overlap (when, for example, the intervening state has both consent and Article 51 authority to act), the acting state may rely on more than one source of authority. It must, however, continue to ensure that it has authority to use force and that its use of force comports with the legal framework appropriate for the nature and intensity of the conflict. It is worth noting at the outset that these scenarios highlight developing areas of international law. Some raise questions that have clear answers in existing legal authority, while others contend with more inchoate legal regimes. Where state practice has not yet solidified into definitive international norms, legal ambiguity remains. In such instances, this white paper notes the existence of ambiguity and examines the history, purposes, and principles of relevant legal regimes to proffer answers.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Non State Actors, Law, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Global Focus