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501. "Japanese Strategic Weapons Programs and Strategies: Future Scenarios and Alternative Approaches

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
The balance of power in Northeast Asia is shifting in ways that are dangerous to the security of Japan. That is certainly how the picture has appeared to the eyes of many observers in recent years.The reasons are many, and they are compelling. First, China’s emergence as a regional military power has taken place in a far more disruptive fashion than was expected. Attempts to shape China into a “responsible stakeholder” have failed. Beijing now threatens Tokyo with a growing number of coercive air and maritime operations around the Japanadministered Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. Chinese fighters, bombers, ships, and submarines have greatly expanded the scope of their training operations. They now frequently pass through Japan’s Ryukyu Island Chain on their way out into the Philippine Sea where they conduct exercises that undermine confidence in the ability of the U.S. Navy to intervene in a regional conflict.
Topic:
International Affairs and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Japan

502. Below the Threshold: The Law Governing the Use of Force Against Non-State Actors in the Absence of a Non-International Armed Conflict

Author:
Daniel Hessel, Julia Shu, and Sarah Weiner
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
Boko Haram attacks civilians in Nigeria. The Islamic State launches attacks in Paris. Terrorists take hostages at a hotel in Mali. Mexican drug gangs threaten government officials and civilians. Houthi rebels seek to take control of the government in Yemen—and succeed. States increasingly face security threats from non-state actors, which have led states and observers to ask what states can do in response. What legal framework should apply? What constraints do states face? When can states resort to the use of military force to address threats posed to them by non-state actors, either on their own territory or on the territory of another state? The answer to these questions turns on whether the conflict in question rises to the level of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC). Based on the drafting history of international humanitarian law (IHL) governing NIACs, international jurisprudence, recent state practice, and academic commentary, this paper concludes that a NIAC does not exist unless the conflict passes an intensity threshold. In other words, the intensity of the conflict distinguishes generalized violence involving a non-state actor from a NIAC. Once the existence of a NIAC is established, states participating in it will be governed by relevant IHL. But if states are only governed by the IHL applicable to NIACs once an intensity threshold has been crossed, what law applies below that threshold? The answer varies with the circumstances, depending on whether the state is responding to a threat within its own territory or from outside; and if the threat is from outside the state, whether the host state consents to the use of force against the non-state actor. Thus, to answer the question of what law applies before a NIAC is established, this white paper analyzes three different scenarios in which a state contemplates forceful engagement with a non-state actor. Each scenario presumes that t he non- state actor is organized and has engaged in some violence, but that the intensity of the clash has not crossed the intensity threshold and thus has not risen yet to the level of a NIAC. 1. In Scenario One, a state seeks to engage a non-state actor that operates exclusively within the state’s territorial borders. 2. In Scenario Two, an intervening state seeks to engage a non-state actor located in another state, with the consent of the host state. 3. In Scenario Three, an intervening state seeks to engage a non-state actor located in another state, without the consent of the host state. The analysis of each scenario first identifies the authority that governs whether and when the state may initiate forceful engagement with the non-state actor (the “may the state use force” evaluation), then discusses which legal regime governs the scope and nature of the resulting use of force (the “how may the state use force” evaluation). Different legal regimes govern the acting state’s options in each of the scenarios. Although the authority for action differs, the inquiries for Scenarios One and Two are quite similar. In Scenario One, the acting state may engage the non-state actor with force by virtue of its territorial sovereignty. It must act, however, through a domestic law enforcement framework and in compliance with human rights law. In Scenario Two, the acting state derives the authority to use force against the non-state actor from the host state’s consent. However, it may only rely on that consent insofar as it comports with the host state’s human rights obligations under international law. In raising the possibility of one state violating another state’s territorial integrity, Scenario Three raises a different set of questions. The intervening state’s threat or use of force within another state’s territory is only lawful when authorized by the U.N. Security Council or justified under the Charter’s Article 51 self-defense provision. The intervening state’s use of force is accordingly regulated by the traditional IHL of international armed conflict. Where scenarios overlap (when, for example, the intervening state has both consent and Article 51 authority to act), the acting state may rely on more than one source of authority. It must, however, continue to ensure that it has authority to use force and that its use of force comports with the legal framework appropriate for the nature and intensity of the conflict. It is worth noting at the outset that these scenarios highlight developing areas of international law. Some raise questions that have clear answers in existing legal authority, while others contend with more inchoate legal regimes. Where state practice has not yet solidified into definitive international norms, legal ambiguity remains. In such instances, this white paper notes the existence of ambiguity and examines the history, purposes, and principles of relevant legal regimes to proffer answers.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Non State Actors, Law, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Global Focus

503. The Future Impact of North Korea’s Emerging Nuclear Deterrent

Author:
Leonard Spector
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The emergence of North Korea’s nuclear deterrent has been a grievous blow to international nonproliferation efforts and poses serious national security challenges for the United States and its Northeast Asian allies. It is by no means clear, however, that the precedent North Korea has set will significantly erode the nonproliferation regime or stimulate proliferation elsewhere. In a new paper (published by the US-Korea Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, on its website, 38north) CNS’s Leonard S. Spector examines the arenas in which North Korea’s new nuclear weapon status has significant negative consequences and assesses the damage that will likely be done. He concludes that the ripple effects of North Korea’s crossing the nuclear threshold may be more limited than they first appear.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

504. Ensuring Deterrence against Russia: The View from NATO States

Author:
Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s military actions in 2014 and 2015, particularly in Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria, have upended expectations among NATO members about their security and the future course of NATO-Russian relations. In response, many of the NATO states bordering Russia have argued for reinvigorating NATO’s deterrent capabilities after two decades of drawing down conventional and nuclear forces in the immediate post-Cold War era. At its 2014 summit in Wales, NATO agreed to a number of short-term measures to bolster the alliance’s conventional deterrent, dubbed the Readiness Action Plan. But as the standoff with Russia has continued, some analysts—particularly in the United States—have argued for additional deterrence measures, including in the nuclear realm. In response, researchers from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey travelled to the NATO front-line states of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Turkey to assess the perceptions of governmental and nongovernmental experts regarding how NATO should respond to Russian actions, with an emphasis on how nuclear issues should be addressed. Our research also included meetings with experts in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as a thorough review of existing literature in the field on issues such as Russia’s new military approach and US nuclear weapon policies—past, present, and future. It was conducted with the aim of providing analysis and recommendations to NATO states in advance of the July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw. The following report highlights the key findings of this research, provides analysis on a country-by-country basis, and concludes with recommendations for consideration in Warsaw.
Topic:
NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, Europe, North Atlantic, Germany, North America, and United States of America