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1. In Syria, America Should Be Ruthlessly Focused on the Islamic State

Author:
Joseph Votel and Elizabeth Dent
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
With the U.S. military presence on a potentially short timetable, officials should prioritize policies that ensure the continued security of Islamic State detention facilities, such as brokering local ceasefire agreements and alleviating Turkish concerns. Five years ago, we warned that a snap decision to depart Syria would be a devastating setback and damage American credibility. A few weeks later, amongst a U.S. withdrawal and subsequent Turkish invasion into areas held by the Syrian Democratic Forces, we argued the United States would need to maintain the ability to fight remnants of the Islamic State and ensure the fighters in detention remain there. Washington ceded much of its negotiating power in the country to Moscow and Ankara, only to reverse course a few months later and keep a small allotment of troops in northeast Syria to prevent a power vacuum and a run on Syrian oil and gas infrastructure. Today, the United States and its Kurdish-led partners face a nearly identical set of challenges, but in a massively changed balance of power in Syria. And despite political nominees’ reassurances that the United States is unlikely to abandon its partners there, Trump himself has been more ambivalent...
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Islamic State, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

2. CTC Sentinel: January 2025 Issue

Author:
Paul Cruickshank, Julika Enslin, Nicolas Stockhammer, and Colin Clarke
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
France24’s Wassim Nasr is the only international journalist to spend time with Syria’s de facto leader Ahmed al-Sharaa both before and after the fall of Assad. In the spring of 2023, Nasr traveled to Idlib where he met with al-Sharaa (who at the time was widely known by his jihadi kunya Abu Muhammad al-Julani). Nasr’s insights detailed in “Journey to Idlib” in the May 2023 issue of CTC Sentinel on al-Sharaa’s ideological journey away from the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida toward what might be termed pragmatic Islamism were invaluable to international security analysts. Late last year, shortly after the fall of the Assad regime, Nasr traveled back to Syria where he met with al-Sharaa for a second time and interviewed him. Speaking to CTC Sentinel about the trip in his follow-up feature interview “Journey to Damascus,” Nasr says: “Comparing the man I saw in 2023 with the man I saw in late 2024, he was the same. He spoke very slowly, very quietly. It was the same impression I had a year and a half ago, which was very surprising to many people. I was very cautious a year and a half ago, asking myself, ‘Okay, should I take what he is saying for granted?’ But I was reassured. Because I saw that when they took Aleppo, [when] they took Damascus, actually he applied what he said to me a year and a half ago. It can’t be dismissed as just talk.” In the feature article, Nicolas Stockhammer and Colin Clarke examine the Islamic State-inspired plot to attack a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna that was thwarted in August 2024. They write that the plot “underlined that Islamic State Khorasan (ISK), which appears to have inspired the lead plotter, remains an enduring threat, evolving its tactics and strategy while focusing on radicalizing followers and supporters through relentless online propaganda. The suspects in the Vienna plot epitomized the interplay of online and offline radicalization, with extremist content on social media platforms like TikTok playing a pivotal role.” In the second interview, Wassim Nasr provides insights from his interview last fall with Mohamed (Amadou) Koufa, the number two in JNIM, al-Qa`ida’s affiliate in the Sahel. For Nasr, the questions Koufa chose not to answer were even more significant than his answers. “In my assessment, Koufa’s refusal to speak about al-Qa`ida was significant. I think it’s very possible that JNIM is at least seriously discussing and maybe preparing to break from al-Qa`ida. Since the last third of December, JNIM has stopped referring to AQIM and stopped directing followers to the AQIM media outlet Al-Izza. … It looks like they might be preparing the landscape for a split with al-Qa`ida in the same way that Jabhat al-Nusra—the predecessor group of Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), the group now in power in Syria—split with al-Qa`ida.” Nasr says that it is possible that having seen HTS come to power in Syria after it split with al-Qa`ida and having seen al-Sharaa in recent weeks win broad international acceptance, JNIM may be preparing to start on a similar path away from the global jihadi group.
Topic:
Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Bashar al-Assad, and Ahmad al-Sharaa
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Syria, and Austria

3. CTC Sentinel: February 2025 Issue

Author:
Moustafa Ayad, Paul Cruickshank, and Munira Mutaffa
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In this month’s feature article, Moustafa Ayad examines 93 unofficial Islamic State groups and outlets operating across social media platforms and messaging applications to understand how the Islamic State’s digital ecosystem is fostering teenage terrorism. He writes that an “ecosystem of unofficial Islamic State groups and their supporters are continuing to flaunt their ability to use social media platforms for recruitment and propaganda” with youngsters “interacting with and producing Islamic State content in new shapes and forms.” He adds that the unofficial Islamic State propagandists are “finding innovative, low budget hacks to the hurdles placed in their way by social media companies and messaging applications. The Islamic State’s digital ecosystem is thriving, and the outlets within it are not just flaunting an ability to game platforms, but are similarly expanding their presence onto new emerging applications, allowing them to fight off coordinated efforts and automated approaches intended to stop their spread.” Our interview is with Deputy Chief David Kowalski, the commanding officer of the Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations Bureau at the Los Angeles Police Department. His department is increasingly focused on keeping the upcoming Olympics in the city safe. He says: “We’ve been preparing for the 2028 Olympics for the past seven years. Each year, our preparation and development becomes more advanced. We work closely with all the agencies throughout the city, which includes our mayor’s office, the fire department, our federal agencies, the emergency management department of the city, and it’s a whole regional approach to making sure these games are successful.” He adds: “We’ve worked very closely with our partners in Paris this past summer. … From a counterterrorism point of view, we’ve had the opportunity to look at what worked in Paris and in lessons learned, and that’s been very beneficial to us as we move into 2028.” He further notes that “the threats to Los Angeles and the rest of the country continue to become more sophisticated. Over the past six years working in the field, the threat environment has never been so diverse and changing, and we must remain ahead of how these threats can impact our cities.” Munira Mustaffa provides a case study of the May 2024 Ulu Tiram attack in Malaysia. She writes that the attack “illuminates how an isolated familial environment, driven by a fanatical father’s extreme religious ideology, systematically groomed the attacker through a distorted theological narrative that reframed violence as a spiritual purification ritual and pathway to salvation.” She adds that the case study demonstrates “how self-imposed ideological exiles can create significant challenges for monitoring and intervention, thus underscoring the urgent need for sophisticated approaches that move beyond simplistic categorizations of terrorist sympathizers.”
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Ideology, Recruitment, and Digital Space
Political Geography:
Malaysia, North America, Southeast Asia, Los Angeles, and United States of America

4. CTC Sentinel: March 2025 Issue

Author:
Don Rassler, Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Julika Enslin, Aaron Y. Zelin, and Jake Dulligan
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The March issue focuses in particular on the drone threat. In the feature article, Don Rassler and Yannick Veilleux-Lepage examine the evolution of terrorist drone usage and forecast its future trajectory in light of the tactical and technological innovations emerging from the Russo-Ukrainian War. They write that “the conflict has become a critical ‘innovation hub’ for drone warfare, accelerating advancements in the scale, speed, and range of drone operations. These developments are not only transforming the modern battlefield but also creating new opportunities for violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to enhance their operational capabilities.” They assess that “in particular, the war has normalized large-scale drone deployment, demonstrating the feasibility of launching coordinated drone swarms and phased attacks capable of overwhelming existing defenses” and note that the potential future pairing of high-speed First-Person View (FPV) drones with emerging technologies such as AI-assisted targeting “could significantly increase the precision and impact of future attacks.” In a similar vein, Jake Dulligan, Laura Freeman, Austin Phoenix, and Bradley Davis, in assessing the threat posed by commercial drones, write that the biggest concern “is that drone swarms could dramatically increase the impact of bad actor drone operations, be it kinetic strikes, ISR, or psychological warfare.” This month’s interview is with Dr. Christian Klos, the Director General of Public Security at Germany’s Federal Ministry of Interior and Community. He says that “when it comes to the external threat, I would agree with the assessment that ISIS-K is in Germany as well. What we observe from the intelligence side is that there are clear indications that the group intends to conduct attacks in Europe, and this can also include Germany and therefore we are very much aware of this threat, and we have seen also travel activities. So, it’s not just some minor indications.” Aaron Zelin assesses the new Syrian government’s efforts to counter the Islamic State, Hezbollah, and the captagon trade. He writes: “Unlike the Assad regime—which did little to fight the Islamic State, was closely aligned with Hezbollah, and produced captagon on an industrial scale—HTS in its guise as the new government of Syria is taking on these challenges assertively, and has a significant track record in doing so previously. Not only are these efforts a benefit to Syrian society and the security and stability of the country, but they also align with the interests of the United States and U.S. regional allies.” Alexandre Rodde and Justin Olmstead examine the evolution of vehicular ramming attacks and prevention efforts. They write that “when it comes to indicators and warnings of future attacks, the demonstration effect created by high-casualty vehicle-ramming attacks has in the past seemingly produced a surge in copycat attacks, which means the security agencies should be particularly vigilant given the recent uptick in high-profile attacks, including the New Orleans attack.”
Topic:
Intelligence, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Weapons, Drones, Islamic State, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Public Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

5. Hamas, ISIL, and Israel: An Exercise in Comparison

Author:
Ayman Zaineldine
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cairo Review of Global Affairs
Institution:
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
Abstract:
One of Israel’s main responses to the October 7 attacks was to declare that “Hamas is ISIL,” and that the world should thus unite in support for Israel to eliminate it. But others are not sure, and ask whether Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories, and its practices as an occupying power, is even more worthy of global sanction
Topic:
Islamic State, Hamas, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

6. Crisis and adaptation of the Islamic State in Khorasan

Author:
Antonio Giustozzi
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
The paper discusses the conditions of the Islamic State in Khorasan and how its strategy and structures evolved after the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in August 2021. The author also assesses the potential for the Islamic State in Khorasan to recover strength and expand its activities again in the future, in the context of Taliban counter-terrorism.
Topic:
Taliban, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Khorasan Group
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

7. The Islamic State on the March in Africa

Author:
Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Local branches now control territory in Mali, Somalia, and Mozambique, setting the stage for new foreign fighter mobilizations, resource extraction opportunities, and perhaps even external operations against the West. Nearly five years after losing territorial control in its core areas of Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State is once again racking up territorial gains around Africa. In Mali, IS forces seized portions of the rural eastern Menaka region and the Ansongo district in southern Gao last year, while foreign fighters reportedly became more interested in traveling to Wilayat Sahel, the group’s self-styled “Sahel Province.” Elsewhere, IS “provinces” in Somalia and Mozambique have taken over various towns in the Puntland and Cabo Delgado regions over the past two months, further destabilizing the area and in some cases jeopardizing important natural gas projects.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, Foreign Fighters, and Natural Gas
Political Geography:
Africa

8. U.S. Returnees from Syria Reveal Much About the Repatriation Challenge

Author:
Devorah Margolin
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The latest U.S. repatriation is an important model for the international community to follow, but much work still needs to be done on resolving the precarious detainee dilemma before the situation in northeast Syria deteriorates further. On May 7, the United States repatriated eleven Americans and one noncitizen from northeast Syria, its largest repatriation of individuals affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) to date. The group included Brandy Salman and her nine U.S.-born children (five of whom are now adults), as well as two minor children of Abdelhamid al-Madioum, who was repatriated in 2020 and pleaded guilty to supporting terrorism a year later. Notably, one of the two Madioum children is a U.S. citizen and the other is not. The move brings the total number of Americans repatriated to fifty-one. Between 2013 and 2019, an estimated 300 Americans joined or attempted to join IS and other jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq—part of a wave of more than 53,000 men, women, and minors from roughly eighty countries who did the same. Since the fall of the IS territorial “caliphate” in March 2019, successive U.S. administrations have led the charge in encouraging these countries to repatriate their citizens. Although the number of people involved in this week’s repatriation is small, their cases set a potent precedent and illustrate the urgency of accelerating the pace—while also showing why the process has been such a challenge.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Islamic State, Detention, Repatriation, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

9. An Iron Curtain in the Sahel

Author:
Kyle Robertson
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Russia is taking advantage of recent coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to embed itself in the Sahel. However, its indiscriminate counterterrorism tactics come with a cost for their forces and the regimes it protects. Weak, corrupt governments with limited resources and active insurgencies set the conditions for military Juntas to seize power in Burkina Faso, Mali, and, most recently, Niger. The region’s militaries blamed persistent violence on civilian leaders and foreign forces–particularly France–that they viewed as inept. Additionally, the perceived interference of the United States and the failure of its counterterrorism policy to address local grievances drove recruitment for insurgent groups such as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Sahel. Russian disinformation–which, according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, accounts for roughly half of disinformation campaigns in West Africa–compounded these failures by targeting the United States and using themes of anti-imperialism and neocolonialism to inflame anti-western sentiment. Once the coups occurred, the United States was required by law to cut off security assistance, ending more than a decade of investment in the Sahel’s security infrastructure and giving Russia an opening in the region.
Topic:
Corruption, Insurgency, Islamic State, and Coup
Political Geography:
Africa, Mali, Sahel, Niger, and Burkina Faso

10. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq's Strategic Role in ISIS Operations—A Crossroads of Conflict

Author:
Frzand Sherko
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Effective counter-narratives are required to weaken the group's ideological appeal, especially the propaganda targeting Kurdish populations. Since the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019, ISIS has undergone significant changes in its strategy and operations, especially in critical Iraqi provinces like Kirkuk, Salahuddin, Diyala, and Nineveh, which have historically been hotspots for insurgent activities and are now playing a pivotal role in the reorganization and operations of ISIS in Iraq. Iraq’s “disputed territories”–areas claimed by both the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)–have long been a haven for terrorist organizations. Terrorist leaders Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi operated and were eventually killed in hideouts adjacent to disputed areas, and other figures like Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Abu Ibrahim al-Quraishi, and Abu Hassan al-Quraishi took advantage of the shaky security situation to conduct operations in this locations. However, extremist groups do not thrive in these contested areas out of convenience alone; the provinces of Kirkuk, Salahuddin, Diyala, and Nineveh all hold significant strategic, economic, and geographic importance. Due to its vast oil resources, Kirkuk has been an enticing target, while Salahuddin’s proximity to Baghdad gives it immense historical and strategic significance. Diyala’s shared border with Iran makes it valuable as a launch point for cross-border attacks. Nineveh remains a significant symbolic and operational center even after the loss of territorial control by ISIS, as the province is home to Mosul, the once de facto capital of the ISIS caliphate. The diverse ethnic makeup of each of these provinces has likewise been of interest to ISIS as it has looked to exploit potential cleavages. In addition to military operations, ISIS conducts psychological warfare aimed at destabilizing state authority and creating fear among the population. The ongoing instability in these regions, compounded by political disputes and poor governance, furthers the efficacy of these efforts. However, activity in Erbil and Sulimaniyah is also increasingly visible to Kurdish security and counterterrorism forces.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Islamic State, Conflict, Ideology, and Narrative
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)