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171. Rise and Fall of Jacob Zuma

Author:
Vladimir Shubin
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
In May 2014 I suddenly received a telephone call from the South African Embassy in Moscow, then an official invitation signed by Jacob Zuma followed: he wanted me to be present at his second inauguration. Unfortunately I failed to do it, I was still recovering from a surgical operation, but the very fact was significant, not because I had been involved, but because it symbolized friendly relations that existed between the South African president and those in Russia who took part in supporting the long struggle against the apartheid regime.
Topic:
Apartheid, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Race
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and South Africa

172. A Comparative Study of Lula's Diplomacy in the Middle East and Ahmadinejad in Latin America

Author:
Mendelski de Souza Bruno
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The article compares Lula’s foreign policy to the Middle East with Ahmadinejad’s to Latin America. Methodologically, the historical concepts of each diplomacy is combined with empirical data on trade flows and diplomatic actions. It is argued that the implementation of foreign policies involved similar (presidential diplomacy) and distinct means (universalism and multilateralism by Brazil, and personalism, bilateralism and low institutionalization by Iran). The results of diplomacies also resembled: although the economic implications were modest, Brasilia politically increased its global projection capacity, while Tehran relatively reduced its international isolation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Middle East, Brazil, South America, and Latin America

173. The Strategic Importance of Antartica for China and India Under Mearsheimer's Offensive Realism

Author:
Monica Heinzaelmann and Leonardo Faria de Mattos
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The Antarctic Treaty was signed during the Cold War and intended to preserve the continent and transform it into a conflict free territory, prioritizing scientific cooperation. Despite having quadrupled the number of its signatories, the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) faces nowadays the uncertainties of the new international order. Starting out from John Mearsheimer’s realistic perspective, this paper aims to analyze, the strategic importance of Antarctica and the interests that China and India have on the continent, as well as speculate on how their rise on the international scenario can impact the future of the Antarctic Treaty System.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, and Antartica

174. French Guiana and the Falklands: The Military Presence of France and the United Kingdom in the South Atlantic and the South American Continent

Author:
Marcos Valle Machado De Silva
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The issue of the Falklands catalyzes the attention of researchers in studies of the military presence of extraregional actors in South America. However, France, a state equally exogenous to the South American nations, is present in the region, keeping a colonial territory, where contingents and military installations are located, almost always ignored in regional security studies. In this context, this paper aims to highlight the military presence of France and the United Kingdom in America and South Atlantic, and to analyze the tensions arising from this presence in relation to the regional Brazilian view of defense.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Imperialism, International Cooperation, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, France, Brazil, Argentina, South America, Falkland Islands, and South Atlantic

175. The Berlin Pulse 2018 (full issue)

Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Körber-Stiftung
Abstract:
Dear Readers, Welcome to the second edition of THE BERLIN PULSE! At times of turmoil, when the rules-based international order is put into question and traditional alliances become weaker, the majority of Germans still do not favour a more active stance in foreign policy: 55 percent of Germans prefer restraint rather than Germany engaging more strongly in international crises. Apparently, the demands by leading politicians and think tanks for Germany to take on greater international responsibility have not persuaded Germans to change their mind. THE BERLIN PULSE guides policy-makers and experts along the fine line between domestic constraints and international expectations. Political leaders such as the Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas and the President of Estonia Kersti Kaljulaid express their hopes and expectations for German foreign policy in 2019. Their perspectives meet the attitudes of the German public – sometimes they overlap, sometimes they clash. This year’s issue brings together data, analysis and different perspectives on the most pressing challenges for German foreign policy today and in the years to come – including some trends and outliers that may surprise you. With its new focus topic “The Value of Europe”, Körber Foundation is contributing to the debate on the past, present, and future of the European project and is paying special attention to the question of how a new split along the former “Iron Curtain” can be avoided. We are witnessing a growing internal division in the European Union: 77 percent of Germans believe the cohesion between EU member states has recently weakened. A striking 46 percent of Germans believe the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004 was not the right decision. At a time when the transatlantic relationship is going through turbulent times, three out of four Germans describe US-German relations as “somewhat bad” or “very bad” and favour a more independent foreign policy from the US. However, this alienation is not mirrored in the US: even if they consider Germany not a very important partner, 70 percent of Americans believe the relationship between the US and Germany is somewhat good or very good. We thank our transatlantic partners from the Pew Research Center for fielding joint questions on the transatlantic relationship in the US together with us. The results of the representative survey commissioned by Körber Foundation in September 2018 should enrich the conversation about German foreign policy during and beyond the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum, which we are proud to host together with the German Federal Foreign Office. “Talk to each other rather than about each other” – the motto of our founder Kurt A. Körber continues to guide Körber Foundation’s activities today. I hope you enjoy reading. Thomas Paulsen
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Affairs, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

176. Islamists and Rights Activists in Egypt: The Potential for Convergence

Author:
Heba Raoul Ezzat
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Animosity has been the keyword in the relationship between Islamists and rights advocates for most of the past few years in Egypt. Islamists turned a blind eye to many crimes committed by the regime and its security agencies between 25 January 2011 and mid-2013. On the other hand, some rights advocates took part in mobilizing and supporting the opposition movement that led to the June 2013 demonstrations and the military seizing power. However, the killings, executions, and other egregious rights violations, then the direct confrontation between the regime and rights groups culminating in a more restrictive NGO law, led rights defenders to take a firmer position, by condemning the regime, and monitoring and documenting its violations. More Islamists are expected to see an opportunity in resorting to human rights advocacy. As such, this would mean accepting more cooperation, especially in terms of monitoring and documentation through various initiatives and institutions established after 2013. Led by a new generation of actors, will this cooperation be free from ideological conflicts? The paper seeks to review, in broad brushstrokes, the contours and important turning points of the relationship between the two groups of actors and outline a possible future trajectory.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Cooperation, Islam, NGOs, and Repression
Political Geography:
Africa, United Nations, North Africa, Egypt, and Mediterranean

177. Are Iran’s ballistic missiles designed to be nuclear capable?

Author:
Michael Elleman and Mark T. Fitzpatrick
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Iran has the largest and most diverse ballistic-missile arsenal in the Middle East – could these systems one day be used to launch nuclear weapons? In a new report, IISS analysts Michael Elleman and Mark Fitzpatrick offer a detailed assessment of the design intentions behind each missile within Iran’s inventory. The result is a clear picture as to which platforms the United States and its allies should seek to remove, and which ones can be discounted. The common claim that Iran’s missile development must be stopped altogether because these systems could deliver nuclear weapons in the future rests on broad generalisations. While there is reason for concern, priority attention should be given to those missiles that might realistically be used for such a purpose, if Iran were to go down a perilous nuclear path. The international standard – but not treaty – for determining the inherent nuclear capability of missiles is the threshold developed in 1987 by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which seeks to forestall exports of missile systems able to deliver a 500kg payload a distance of 300km or more. Eight of Iran’s 13 current ballistic missile systems – the largest and most diverse arsenal in the Middle East – exceed this threshold and are thus deemed to be nuclear capable. The other five, all within the Fateh-110 family of missiles, are certainly lethal, especially when shipped to Hizbullah for use against Israel, but they are clearly not intended for nuclear use. Because capability does not equal intent, the MTCR guidelines should be just the first step in an assessment of Iran’s intentions for its missiles. When the United Nations Security Council drafted a new resolution in July 2015 to accompany the Iran nuclear agreement finalised that month, an element of intent was added to previous sanctions resolution language that prohibited launches of Iranian missiles that were ‘capable of delivering nuclear weapons’. The 2015 resolution calls upon Iran not to engage in activity concerning missiles ‘designed to be’ capable of delivering nuclear weapons. What it means ‘to be designed’ is undefined. Judging intent is partly subjective, but technical clues and intelligence information can guide analysis. The soundest approach is to disaggregate Iran’s various missile systems, and to assess design intentions on the basis of the technical capabilities and lineage of the different missiles.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and North America

178. The conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
James Hackett
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
As US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un meet in Singapore on 12 June, it is useful to keep in mind what is at stake. The long-standing tinderbox of the Korean Peninsula, if ignited through another provocation or miscalculation, could spark a full-scale war that could well go nuclear. The prize of diplomacy – sustainable peace on the peninsula – is all the more valuable when one considers the range of military capabilities potentially in play. This information is of use in assessing both the goals of diplomacy and the risks should the current efforts fail. Weapons based on the Korean Peninsula have become faster, more precise and more powerful. North Korea has tested a thermonuclear weapon, an intercontinental ballistic missile and more accurate shorter-range missiles, all designed to offset the relative qualitative weakness of its broader conventional forces. It has also pursued advanced cyber capabilities. South Korea, meanwhile, has focused on developing military systems allowing for more rapid and precise strikes. US forces on the peninsula have introduced yet more advanced capabilities. For these reasons the IISS provides this independent, measured and detailed analysis of military dynamics on the peninsula. The report focuses on the defence policies and military capabilities of the two Koreas, and the US military forces stationed in South Korea which can be brought to bear in a crisis. While it does not ignore unconventional systems, it principally focuses on conventional capabilities. Due to its poverty and isolation, North Korea’s conventional forces have become relatively weaker, compared with those of South Korea and its US ally. Aware of this qualitative inferiority, Pyongyang has invested in asymmetric capabilities, particularly the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver them. Nonetheless, Pyongyang’s armed forces remain equipped with a wide range of conventional military systems, including large numbers of artillery pieces and multiple-launch rocket systems. Its armed forces, at around 1.2 million, are the fourth-largest in the world. Its conventional military power remains significant, not least because of these numbers (for instance, 4,000 main battle tanks and 8,500 self-propelled- and towed-artillery systems) and the weight of fire they could rapidly bring to bear if employed. Seoul, for instance, is within range of many of North Korea’s artillery systems. North Korea has also developed increasingly advanced cyber capabilities as another aspect of its asymmetric power. The North will continue to improve these, if only to slow the decline in military parity between it and the South. US and South Korean defence authorities assume that the North will, in the event of major conflict, use cyber attacks against South Korean critical infrastructure and command-and-control networks. However, recent events like the Wannacry ransomware attacks have shown that North Korea is now using its cyber power for another purpose: raising revenue to support the regime. Meanwhile, South Korea’s defence policy and military posture is dominated by the security challenge from the North. This has led Seoul to pursue military capabilities, and strategies, designed to defeat North Korean provocations. These range from developments in air-defence, intended to tackle North Korea’s air force and missile capabilities, to strategies designed to pre-empt a potential North Korean provocation. To enable these strategies, South Korea has developed and procured increasingly advanced military systems, ranging from its own Hyeonmu ballistic- and cruise-missiles, to advanced air-to-ground air-launched weapons and, in the next few years, squadrons of F-35A combat aircraft. Working closely with the South Korean armed forces, the US maintains a military presence some 28,500-strong in South Korea, augmented by advanced military systems on the peninsula like the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic-missile-defence system, and the military power deployed by the US in the broader Indo-Pacific. This publication builds on the contributions of expert analysts of military power on the Korean Peninsula, and the extensive information holdings available in the IISS Military Balance+ database. It was prepared with the support of the Korea Foundation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

179. Reducing the Risk of Iran Developing an ICBM

Author:
Michael Elleman
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
With the Iran nuclear accord currently on life support, it is not too late to pursue diplomatic measures that address the growing challenge posed by Iran’s ballistic missiles, argues Michael Elleman in a new report. The lack of curbs on Iran’s missile programme was cited by President Donald Trump in May 2018 as one of the principal reasons for withdrawing from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). With the nuclear accord consequently on life support, it is not too late to pursue diplomatic measures that address the growing challenge posed by Iran’s ballistic missiles. The most promising would be to lock in, through negotiations, the 2,000 kilometre-range limit that Iran has previously stated is its maximum requirement. While this would not reduce the threat perceived by Iran’s regional neighbours, it would forestall development of systems that could target Western Europe or North America. Tehran is not likely to commit to verification measures for such negotiated range limits, however, without receiving something in return. One bargain that could be considered would be to allow Iran to continue its satellite-launch programme, under certain conditions, while capping the maximum range of its ballistic missiles. Such a trade-off may also be relevant to the North Korean case.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

180. Ministers For Foreign Affairs 1972-83

Author:
Melissa Conley Tyler and John Robbins
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) is pleased to present the latest book in the Australian Ministers for Foreign Affairs series. In May 2016 the AIIA held a one-day forum to examine the achievements of Australia’s foreign ministers between 1972-83. This forum and publication is the third book in the AIIA’s Australian Ministers for Foreign Affairs series following on from Ministers for Foreign Affairs 1960-72 and R.G. Casey: Minister for External Affairs 1951-60.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, Diplomacy, Human Rights, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Indonesia, Asia, and Australia