Germany’s collaboration with Central European countries, and especially the Visegrad Group (V4) is often perceived through the prism of political differences that have arisen from divergent visions of the future EU migration policy and debates on the rule of law. Simultaneously, new opportunities to deepen the already existing cooperation may appear due to the turmoil in Germany’s domestic politics as well as the international environment..
The Visegrad Group (V4) has responded to the migration crisis by an unexpectedly unified and consistent position , which was symptomatic of its identity shift. The long-term confrontation with the European Migration and Asylum Policy, the political changes in Poland and Hungary, the illiberal rhetoric of Visegrad politicians as well as the conflict with the European Commission have significantly influenced the position of V4 and the Czech Republic in Europe.
Martin Michelot and Martin Macq wrote an introductory chapter for the new IFAT's (The Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade) publication on the security challenges for the V4 countries. The chapter wrote by our researchers focuses on the military security and military cooperation of Visegrad Four countries. The main topic for discussion is especially the dual membership of both countries in NATO and in the EU - which is trying to build-up its own military structures notably in the recent years.
Issues of labour mobility and labour markets have been among the most contentious discussions on the crowded EU agenda of the past couple years. Proposals calling for reform of the regulations on posted workers and for the enhancement of social rights, advocated primarily by Western countries - including most notably France - and the EU Commission, have been accompanied by both domestic and EU-wide squabbling. Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) have often found themselves on the defensive, seeking at once to both fend off accusations of “social dumping” and foil the undesired reforms. They fear that some of the proposals on labour reform fail to coincide with their economic interests and the principle of the free market, or perceive them as an encroachment of the EU Commission on national competencies
At first glance, reaching an agreement on the next MFF could seem easier than for its previous iterations. The MFF 2014-2020 was negotiated against the backdrop of a financial crisis which put significant strains on the member states, particularly those in the the Eurozone. Currently, economic growth has returned to the European Union and the economic sentiments have reached their highest levels since 2000s . Nevertheless, some key political developments will affect and complicate the process of finding a consensus on the next MFF. Firstly, the negotiations on the post 2020- MFF will coincide with two major processes underpinning the future of European integration: the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union and the debate on the reform of the Eurozone. Secondly, some stakeholders see Brexit as an opportunity to substantially reform the MFF and the EU budget, which in turn widened the debate to the future of main EU policies, and could breach the fragile balance between the various interests of the member states that functioned in this sphere until now.
On December 4–5, 2017, the City of Chicago hosted the North American Climate Summit in partnership with C40 and the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy. This was the first time a US climate summit convened following President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement. Featuring remarks from former President Barack Obama, the summit brought together mayors from around the world to define collective, city-level actions and commitments to combat climate change. At the time of this publication, upward of 70 cities have signed the Chicago Climate Charter, affirming their commitment to address climate change within their cities
For over a decade now, the Americas have had the highest rates of lethal violence in the world, making violent crime part of the daily life of millions of citizens across the region. In 2017, 47 of the 50 most violent cities in the world were located in the Western Hemisphere. Reducing crime and violence in urban centers has become a top priority for citizens and governments of the United States and Latin American countries alike. Rather than attempting to tackle these challenges on their own, cities across the Americas should learn from one another, exchange experiences and best practices that work, and understand the contexts in which certain strategies are effective.
Over the first two years of the Trump administration, the United States has simultaneously aggrieved Japan, a pivotal US ally in Asia, while also taking a more confrontational stance against China. This has raised broad concerns about the future of US involvement in Asia and the basis of support for the US-Japan alliance. While the American public is hesitant to get involved in a conflict between China and Japan, public support for US bases in Japan is at an all-time high, and Americans across party lines want to build strong relations with US allies in Asia
In the past year, the Trump administration has moved the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, ended aid to the United Nation agency supporting Palestinian refugees, and announced the closure of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) office in Washington, DC. These actions, heavily criticized by the international community, are a dramatic shift from past US policy. The 2018 Chicago Council Survey, conducted after the US embassy move to Jerusalem but before the other actions, finds that the American public has generally not formed an opinion about the embassy relocation and would prefer that the US not take a side in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. A just completed Chicago Council-University of Texas survey of foreign policy opinion leaders shows that leaders have stronger views. Republican opinion leaders approve of the embassy relocation, while solid majorities of Democratic and Independent leaders disapprove
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is teetering. The Trump Administration has attacked it repeatedly, blocked moves to restock its judicial panels, and looked skeptically on its multilateral decision-making process. For an organization that embodied the results of decades of trade liberalization and emerged triumphantly in the mid-1990s, this has been a remarkable fall from grace. In this brief, we ask why the WTO is worth saving, consider the complaints lodged against it, and suggest what would be required for a serious rescue attempt. There are several reasons to hope, but more reasons for concern