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11. Lines blurred: Chinese community organisations in Australia

Author:
Jennifer Hsu, Richard McGregor, and Natasha Kassam
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Australia’s foreign interference debate and the souring of bilateral relations between China and Australia has left many Chinese-Australians and their community organisations caught in a contest for their loyalty. The Chinese Party-state actively reaches out to overseas Chinese communities, in Australia and elsewhere, to promote China’s political interests and economic development, with mixed results. Australia’s efforts to combat this outreach have also had mixed results. A survey of Chinese-Australians found that many believed the new anti-foreign interference laws helped to protect community members from Beijing’s overtures. However, a greater number said attacks on the community in Australia — political, verbal, and sometimes physical — had alienated Chinese-Australians and in some cases made them more receptive to messages critical of Australia. Many Chinese-Australians said they had little or no engagement with Chinese community organisations. The newer organisations in particular, which often have closer economic ties to China, were not considered to be representative of broader community sentiment. The area in which community associations were reported to have the greatest traction was in promoting business opportunities in China.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Foreign Interference, and Community Organizing
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

12. The National FDI Observatories, a Bulwark Against the Imbalance Effects of Chinese FDI In Africa?

Author:
Joel Moudio and Steve Tametong
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Sino-African relations are structured around three axes: trade, Chinese financing in Africa and foreign direct investment (FDI). The latter is the key element in the multinationalisation of companies. Between 2003 and 2018, Chinese FDI in Africa dropped from USD 75 million to USD 2.7 billion1 ; this is in contrast to the period 2004-2008 when Africa attracted about 10% of Chinese direct investment (Sanfilippo, 2010), with a peak in 2008 of about USD 5.5 billion “due to the purchase of 20% of the shares of the Standard Bank of South Africa by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)”.2. These include: cross-border mergers and acquisitions, intra-group loans and borrowing, and the creation of subsidiaries abroad. While Chinese FDI in Africa is growing exponentially and is a development boon for African countries (1), it is also partly a “danger” for African economies. The case of Cameroon will illustrate this (2). In this context, the establishment of a National FDI Observatory (NFOID) under the joint action of civil society becomes a necessity in order to compensate for the State’s inadequacies in terms of monitoring and surveillance of the perverse effects of FDI (3).
Topic:
Civil Society, Economics, Hegemony, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon

13. What Is So Foreign About Foreign Influence Operations?

Author:
Hedvig Ördén and James Pamment
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Influence operations are increasingly seen as a threat to democratic societies because they can corrupt the integrity of political deliberation. As individuals engage in debate on social media, political deliberation becomes vulnerable to potentially destructive forms of interference. Many debates on what to do about influence operations emphasize that these operations constitute what is deemed to be a foreign threat. But does the notion of foreignness, viewed in isolation, constitute a helpful lens for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate influence operations? Ultimately, the lens of foreignness is only helpful when applied to a narrow set of cases. One sensible way of reviewing when the concept of foreignness can be useful in distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate influence operations is to consider three separate conceptions of how to determine what counts as foreign: foreign states, foreign citizens, and foreign interests. In the first case, influence operations are seen as threatening acts directed at a targeted state by foreign states, using behaviors seen as analogous to acts of war. In the second instance, influence operations are considered threatening acts conducted by foreign citizens that undermine domestic democratic systems in a targeted state. In cases of the third sort, influence operations are viewed as acts aimed at advancing foreign interests through the illegitimate employment of soft power. Given these various models, the notion of foreignness constitutes a useful lens for discussions of influence operations in cases when there is overwhelming evidence of state-based, hybrid, and irregular warfare. An argument can also be made for employing the distinction in relation to the protection of democratic institutions, such as elections. However, when influence operations are regarded as a more generalized threat to political deliberation, foreignness is not a helpful category for determining the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such campaigns. In such cases, rather than focusing on the (domestic or foreign) identity of the malicious actors themselves, it is more fruitful to conceive of illegitimacy in terms of specific manipulative communication techniques. Suitable countermeasures could include, for instance, creating greater transparency surrounding, or even restricting, the use of artificial techniques to inflate the level of perceived engagement a piece of online content generates.
Topic:
Democracy, Soft Power, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Global Focus

14. American Invasion And Withdrawals Post 9/11

Author:
Ibrahim Karatas
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
When the United States was hit by al-Qaida's terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 (hereafter 9/11 attacks), not only Americans but the whole world was shocked: The world’s only superpower was attacked at home and had lost more than three thousand people. To take revenge for the attack as well as to prevent new ones, the Bush administration decided to invade both Afghanistan and Iraq, which they claimed were sheltering and supporting al-Qaida. Afghanistan was invaded on 7 October 2001 because the US wanted (1) to eliminate Osama bin Laden (the mastermind of 9/11) and al-Qaida; (2) to remove the Taliban group from power and bring stability to Afghanistan by creating a democratic and peaceful state.[1] The US Army subsequently invaded Iraq in 2003, claiming that Saddam Hussain was supporting terrorism and producing chemical weapons. There were also allegations that the Hussain regime was behind the 9/11 attacks, but it was never proven. The US eventually removed both Taliban and Saddam Hussain from power and captured Hussain, who was later judged and executed by the new Iraqi government on 30 December 2006. US special forces killed Laden on 2 May 2011. As of today, the US has killed its two archenemies and changed regimes allegedly supporting terrorism in both Afghanistan and Iraq, yet could not bring stability. What is more, the remaining US troops are preparing to leave the two countries. Neither Afghanistan nor Iraq is in better condition than the pre-invasion era as both states have failed, lack a strong authority, and cannot !ght terrorism. In Afghanistan, the Taliban was the enemy to be removed, however the US’s recent agreement with the organization has paved the way for re-control of the country by the group. On the other hand, Iraq has become a land of widespread terrorism, and the country is more divided than before, not mentioning Iranian in"uence on Baghdad. Based on the current situation, my arguments are that (1) the US is about to make the same mistake it did in Vietnam, and (2) Afghanistan and Iraq might again become the hub of terrorist organizations as well as regional rivalries. Although I do not approve of the US invasions, as Afghanistan and Iraq saw the worse with its invasion, these countries will face the worst with the US’s withdrawal.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, War on Terror, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

15. Protocooperation as a Model for the Russia-UAE Partnership

Author:
Andrzej Jacuch
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015 marked the Russian Federation (RF) return as a key player in the Middle East and North Africa. In this context, the relations between Russia and the UAE are of utmost importance for both entities, for the region, and globally. This article seeks to fill a gap in scholarly knowledge by answering questions about the nature of the emerging cooperation between Russia and the UAE. How Russia seeks to use the UAE to expand its sphere of influence in the MENA region and how the UAE uses this cooperation to achieve its foreign policy goals. The article applies protocooperation (an analogy to the ecological relationship) as a model for the Russia-UAE partnership. The RF is strengthening its position in the MENA regarding the UAE as a key partner for regaining its political, economic, and military influence in the MENA region. Russia-UAE’s partnership aims at achieving conjunctural geopolitical interests benefiting from diminished Western, mainly the US, presence in the region.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Gulf Nations, and UAE

16. Spies and Money: Legal Defenses Against Foreign Interference in Political Campaigns

Author:
Jessica Brandt and Josh Rudolph
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In recent years, U.S. government officials have normalized a damaging notion: that soliciting or participating in foreign interference in a U.S. election will not be prosecuted. Foreign governments from Beijing to Moscow and elsewhere are watching closely, and unless Congress and the new administration act quickly to close loopholes in the current U.S. legal framework governing political campaigns, every major U.S. election could be undermined by foreign interference that is not prohibited by U.S. law. A new legal framework around political campaigns is sorely needed—one that provides a proactive and holistic approach to foreign interference rooted in the need to protect U.S. national security.
Topic:
National Security, Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
United States of America

17. Defending 2020: What Worked, What Didn’t, and What’s Next

Author:
Jessica Brandt and Bradley Hanlon
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The 2016 presidential election served as a wakeup call to the threat of authoritarian interference, and in the years since, many segments of American society—from the federal government to private companies and civil society groups—have taken valuable steps to prepare for and counter it. Congress and the Executive Branch stood up a new government agency and multiple coordinating bodies to protect election infrastructure, while social media platforms have instituted policies to restrict the manipulation of advertisements, label misleading and false content, and slow the spread of disinformation. Working together, civil society instituted new cross-sector coordination mechanisms for election security. Yet longstanding vulnerabilities—including crippling political polarization and underfunded election jurisdictions—persist. A series of high-profile failures to prosecute the solicitation of foreign interference in U.S. elections further threaten to solidify a dangerous new norm. Meanwhile, the threat landscape is growing more dynamic. New actors, including China and Iran, have taken an interest in adopting elements of Russia’s information manipulation playbook. And that playbook is itself evolving. In 2020, Russia and Iran took active steps to influence U.S. voters, engaging in information operations—at times augmented by cyberattacks—to denigrate candidates, sow chaos and division, and reduce trust in democratic institutions.1 New players, including Cuba, Venezuela, and other, non-state actors also took steps to influence voters and attack election infrastructure.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Elections, Disinformation, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America

18. Adversarial Avenues: Ten Bipartisan Ways to Make a Bill Like S. 1 Close Loopholes Autocrats Exploit to Meddle in U.S. Politics

Author:
Josh Rudolph
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In his push for bipartisan efforts on voting rights legislation, Senator Joe Manchin (D-WV) warned that “the lack of transparency in many campaign finance rules provides multiple avenues for foreign and national adversaries to meddle in the American political system.” These loopholes might be called the “adversarial avenues” of malign finance. Manchin went on to explain that this is why he supports two campaign finance provisions included within the For the People Act (S. 1): The DISCLOSE Act and the Honest Ads Act. Manchin is absolutely right. The most comprehensive research on covert foreign money classified by legal avenue more than 100 cases—adding up to more than $300 million over the past decade—of authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China funneling money into democratic processes as a geopolitical weapon. Strikingly, 83 percent of this activity was enabled by seven legal loopholes that were identified in this research and are now being actively tackled by the European Parliament. Two of those seven vulnerabilities would be addressed by DISCLOSE and Honest Ads, which would impose financial transparency on “dark money” non-profits and online political ads, respectively. But foreign powers do not stop there. As President George Washington warned in his farewell address, they bring “insidious wiles” to their tradecraft of foreign influence. Autocrats invent and exploit cunning ways to secure political power, devising creative tricks to interfere in elections at home and abroad, often through some degree of legal participation by people within the target country. Indeed, a recent U.S. intelligence assessment found that in the 2020 election the Kremlin’s main innovation since 2016 was more collaboration with U.S.-based conduits. That is why, in addition to Thomas Morley’s and my year-long research project on malign finance, Jessica Brandt and I worked with a bipartisan team of legal experts to develop legislative proposals that would outlaw U.S. participation in foreign interference. Drawing from this extensive body of research developed over the past two years, 10 policy proposals would further address the “multiple avenues for foreign and national adversaries to meddle in the American political system.” The first five proposals offer ways to more thoroughly approach interference issues already under consideration in S. 1, while the second five proposals introduce new resilience measures for consideration.
Topic:
Politics, Finance, Legislation, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

19. Defending Our Sovereignty: US Military Bases in Africa and the Future of African Unity

Author:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:
The enduring presence of foreign military bases in Africa continues to fragment and weaken African state institutions, prevent African unity and sovereignty, and subordinate the aspirations of the continent for pan-African consolidation. Examining gendarme functions and geopolitics, dossier no. 42 explores how the presence of foreign militaries in Africa continues to impede African people in their pursuit of the two most important principles of pan-Africanism: political unity and territorial sovereignty.
Topic:
Imperialism, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Military Affairs, Foreign Interference, and Pan-Africanism
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

20. Russia in Africa: Soviet Legacies, Current Objectives, Local Responses

Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
The Harriman Institute
Abstract:
In recent years, Russia has stepped up its engagement in Africa, forging military and security agreements as well as business relationships with leaders in several states. What lies behind Russia’s “return” to Africa? During the Cold War, Africa constituted a major site of Soviet geopolitical competition with the U.S. Does this history, as well as the legacy of Soviet antiracism, inform Russia’s current goals and actions on the continent? Panelists will explore this issue, as well as the impact of Russia’s presence on security and humanitarian crises within Africa. What has been the reaction of various local actors to Russia’s presence? Panelists will also discuss the policy response: how should the international community and the West respond to Russian engagement in Africa?
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Foreign Interference, Strategic Interests, and Influence
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and Europe