Search

Begin New Search Topic Cyberspace Publication Year within 10 Years

61. Surviving and Thriving in the Digital Economy

Author:
Goran Samuel Pesic
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Cyber-crime is growing exponentially and Canadian governments at all levels have not kept pace quickly enough to protect both themselves and private enterprise. Evolving technology allows for ever-more sophisticated cyber-threats to intellectual property, but some businesses and governments have neither changed their pre-internet thinking nor established adequate safeguards. Protection should start with educational campaigns about the scope and varieties of risk that permeate the private sector, e-commerce and smart cities using the internet of things. Thirty years ago, just 32 per cent of the market value of Standard & Poor’s 500 companies was based on intangible assets, mainly intellectual property. Today, that figure stands at 80 per cent and protecting those assets from cyber-crime is of vital importance. While cyber-criminals look to make money off of phishing scams, their interests have also extended to infiltrating proprietary industrial designs, resource management and information affecting acquisitions. The fact that some countries see this type of crime as a normal way to gain access to foreign business information is often poorly understood by Canadian businesses accustomed to functioning under much higher ethical standards. The e-commerce realm faces its own cyber-threats including those affecting privacy, data sovereignty, location of data centres, data security and legislation. E-commerce merchants must protect themselves by ensuring the security of their clients’ computers, communication channels, web servers and data encryption. It sounds daunting, but it shouldn’t be. Merchants can take steps such as doing risk assessments, developing security policies, establishing a single point of security oversight, instituting authentication processes using biometrics, auditing security and maintaining an emergency reporting system. Government can assist with cyber-security in Canada’s private sector through awareness campaigns, rewarding businesses for best practices, providing tax credits to offset the cost of security measures, and offering preferential lending and insurance deals from government institutions. The federal government’s 2015 Digital Privacy Act was a good first step, but there is much territory left to be covered. The act offers little assistance in making the leap from a pre-internet governmental model of doing business with the private sector. Nor does it acknowledge the full costs organizations must face when contemplating improving their cyber-security. The growth of smart cities, connected to the internet of things, creates new susceptibilities to cyber-crime. By 2021, there will be approximately 28 billion internet-connected devices globally and 16 billion of those will be related to the internet of things. However, smart cities appear to be low on the list of cyber-security priorities at all levels of government. There is a lack of local guidance and commitment, an absence of funding programs and tax incentives for risk-sharing arrangements, and nothing in the way of a federally initiated smart-cities strategy. The key to keeping ahead of the cyber-criminals is to recalibrate our understanding of the threats accompanying the technology. New ideas, new economic policies, new safeguards, new regulations and new ways of doing business will all help to keep Canada safe in the burgeoning knowledge economy.
Topic:
Crime, Digital Economy, Economy, Internet of Things, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Canada and Global Focus

62. From NORAD to NOR[A]D: The Future Evolution of North American Defence Co-operation

Author:
Andrea Charron and James Fergusson
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The North American defence environment is in the process of a major transformation, occasioned by dramatic changes in the geostrategic/political landscape and the development of new generations of weapon systems. As a result, the requirements to deter, detect and defend North America from a variety of new threats are transforming. In this context, Canada and the United States, through the Permanent Joint Board of Defense (PJBD) established the Evolution of North American Defense (EvoNAD) study, and tasked its execution to the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) command. EvoNAD considers a long time horizon and has been broken into subcomponents reflecting six domain priorities: air, maritime, cyber, aerospace, space and land. The overarching factor which binds the six components together is the recognition that the single-domain threat environment is evolving into a multi-domain one. In the past, the threat to North America resided largely on a single axis (north-south), within a dominant domain (air, combined with ballistic missiles), met by a bi-national structure. While this threat seemed to collapse with the end of the Cold War, NORAD continued and evolved to adapt to new threats as well as to continue to monitor the Cold War-styled air and aerospace threats. Subsequently, 9/11 created a new threat environment and forced NORAD to consider threats emanating from within North America as well as outside of it. In addition to a number of changes, including direct feeds from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and NAVCANADA, NORAD expanded into the maritime domain via a maritime warning mission. Roughly at the same time, NORAD’s attention also turned to the cyber-domain and its common threat to North America. The air threat has now returned with the resumption of long-range Russian flights across the Arctic, and down the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. This threat, however, is of a different character because of the development of a new generation of Russian long-range air-launched cruise missiles, as well as sea-launched cruise missiles, which have direct implications for NORAD’s capacity to deter, detect and defend, as well as for its current area of operations and mission suites (air/aerospace warning and control and maritime warning). Not only will these new long-range capabilities diffuse to other potential adversaries, generating a global threat environment, but also the first generation of hypersonic weapons has set the conditions for the merger of air and missile defence, and the air and outer space domains. Finally, the consequences of an attack against North America, alongside potential catastrophic natural disasters relative to the role of military forces in support of civil authorities, raises issues for both Canada and the U.S., and thus NORAD, regarding the most efficient and effective means to respond. The multi-domain/multi-dimensional North American threat environment should drive both Canada and the U.S. towards deeper defence co-operation, and the functional demands of this new threat environment could lead to NORAD’s ultimate transformation into an integrated, multi-domain and dimensional North American Defense Command solution. Of course, this outcome is not inevitable, and numerous barriers exist. Nonetheless, the same logic which led to NORAD’s creation in 1957 (with the agreement signed in 1958), remains valid. Driven by the common recognition that the defence of North America is indivisible, a North American Defense Command would be a natural evolution in Canada – American defence relations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Maritime, Land, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and United States of America

63. Blockchain for Humanitarian Aid: Problem or Panacea?

Author:
Christopher Chen
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
A notable development in the Fourth Industrial Revolution is blockchain technology. Originally created as an alternative means of financial transfer, the technology can be applied to any type of information and asset. Organisations and countries are starting to explore ways of using it in the context of humanitarian aid. Is this a panacea or a problem?
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Science and Technology, Blockchain, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

64. Online Information Laundering: The Role of Social Media

Author:
Kirill Meleshevich and Bret Schafer
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Russia’s ability to successfully conduct hybrid warfare is predicated on the creation of a fog of ambiguity between the Kremlin’s actions and the Kremlin itself. By conducting operations through an ad hoc network of proxies, carve-outs, and cutouts — whose connection to the Kremlin is difficult to definitively establish — the Russian government is able to maintain plausible deniability and thus lower the diplomatic and military costs of its actions. It is a strategy with deep roots: maskirovka — a Soviet-era military doctrine that translates as “mask” or “masquerade” — established operational deceit as a core tenet of both conventional and irregular warfare. While modern maskirovka is most commonly associated with the use of “little green men” to occupy Crimea, it is a tactic that is also deeply ingrained in the Kremlin’s ongoing disinformation campaign against the United States and Europe. This presents an obvious challenge: How can the West respond to an adversary who denies even being present on the battlefield? One answer may lie in understanding the operational resemblance between the spread of disinformation and the laundering of illicit funds. Just as ill-gotten money needs to be moved from an illegitimate source into an established financial institution, disinformation is most powerful when a façade of legitimacy is created through “information laundering.” Anti-money laundering practitioners describe the need for financial criminals to place, layer, and integrate illicit funds, meaning that money obtained through criminal means needs to find an entry point into the financial system, then move between banks or financial products to hide the identity of the owner, and finally be woven into an asset from which seemingly legitimate funds can be drawn. Russian disinformation follows a similar pattern; only here, the currency is information and the reward is influence. This piece will examine these similarities and explore the policy measures that could be taken in light of these findings.
Topic:
Internet, Social Media, Disinformation, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and United States of America

65. Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025: Challenging NATO in the Electromagnetic Spectrum

Author:
Roger N. McDermott
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This study examines how and why Russia’s military has turned its attention since the reform initiated in late 2008 to more fully exploiting and developing significant use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) by employing electronic warfare (EW) assets. This is consistent with the interest in various “force enablers” and in adopting network-centric approaches to military operations as the Russian military becomes further “informationised”. The report finds that Moscow is stepping up its efforts to renew and modernise the EW inventory, and this effort is complemented by changes to organisation, doctrine, command structure, training and tactics, as well as techniques and procedures. The effect of those changes is evident in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, where EW forms an organic part of Russia’s kinetic and non-kinetic operations—both in support of proxy forces and conducted independently. Further EW capability development will pose a serious challenge to the proper planning and execution of NATO’s defence of the Baltic states, and NATO’s entire Eastern Flank, in the event of a Russian assault. This capability is an integral part of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) approach and is clearly tailored to target NATO’s C4ISR. NATO’s planners must also understand that the Russian EW capability extends well beyond air defence or even A2/AD, as it is fielding a wider array of systems to assist, for example, psychological operations (PSYOPS) and cyber operations. Russia’s ability to contest the EMS, combined with its holistic military thinking, means that EW capability will be exploited and effects created well beyond the traditional realms in which NATO’s thinking about EW is rooted. We might witness an ever-growing convergence of Russia’s EW, cyber- and information warfare approaches, which will further challenge NATO’s concepts and practices. As a result, NATO needs to plan, revise its scenarios, and train to conduct defensive and offensive operations in a fiercely contested EMS battlespace. In their current form, NATO plans to defend its Eastern Flank including the Baltic states might be inadequate as they do not take account of the full spectrum of Russia’s current and future EW capabilities and their uses—as part of A2/AD approach and beyond. NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence and further development of its posture in the Baltic area, which might possibly include assets for integrated air and missile defence in the future, will fail to deliver the desired outcome if the Alliance falls behind in the contest for EMS dominance.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Hybrid Warfare, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, and Syria

66. Manufacturing Consent in Cyberspace: China’s “Fifty-Cent Army”

Author:
Jonathan Hassid and Sun Wanning
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
Studies on public expression in China tend to focus on how the state and internet users (netizens) struggle over the limits of online expression. Few have systematically traced discourse competi- tion within state-imposed boundaries, particularly how the authoritar- ian state has adapted to manage, rather than censor, online expres- sion. This paper explores and evaluates the state’s attempts to ma- nipulate online expression without resorting to censorship and coer- cion by examining the role of internet commentators, known as the “fifty-cent army”, in Chinese cyberspace. To cope with the challenge of online expression, the authoritarian state has mobilized its agents to engage anonymously in online discussions and produce apparently spontaneous pro-regime commentary. However, due to a lack of proper motivation and the persistence of old propaganda logic, this seemingly smart adaptation has proven ineffective or even counter- productive: It not only decreases netizens’ trust in the state but also, ironically, suppresses the voices of regime supporters.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Internet, State Media, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
China and Asia