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Begin New Search Topic Contracts Publication Year within 10 Years

11. Why do Sovereign Borrowers Post Collateral? Evidence from the 19th Century

Author:
Marc Flandreau, Stefano Pietrosanti, and Carlotta E. Schuster
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
This paper explores the reasons why sovereign borrowers post collateral. Such behavior is paradoxical because conventional interpretations of collateral stress repossession of the assets pledged as the key to securing lenders against information asymmetries and moral hazard. However, repossession is generally difficult in the case of sovereign debt and in some cases impossible. Nevertheless, such sovereign “hypothecations” have a long history and are again becoming very popular today in developing countries. To explain sovereign collateralization, we emphasize an informational channel. Posting collateral produces information on opaque borrowers by displaying borrowers’ behavior and resources. We support this interpretation by examining the hypothecation “mania” of 1849-1875, when sovereigns borrowing in the London Stock Exchange pledged all kinds of intangible revenues. Yet, at that time, sovereign immunity fully protected both sovereigns and their assets and possessions. Still, we show that hypothecations significantly decreased the cost of sovereign debt. To explain how, we stress the pledges’ role in documenting sovereigns’ wealth and the management of revenue streams. Based on an exhaustive library of bond prospectuses collected from primary sources, matched with a panel of sovereign bond yields and an innovative measure of sovereign fiscal transparency, we show that collateral minutely described in debt covenants served to document and monitor sovereign resources and development prospects. Encasing this information in contracts written by lawyers served to certify the quality of the resulting data disclosure process, explaining investors’ readiness to pay a premium.
Topic:
Economics, Finance, History, Innovation, Contracts, Sovereign Debt, and Collateral
Political Geography:
Global Focus

12. From Industrial Citizenship to Private Ordering? Contract, Status, and the Question of Consent

Author:
Ruth Dukes and Wolfgang Streeck
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
This paper revisits the notions of contract and status found in classical sociology, legal theory, and labour law. Adopting an historical perspective, it explores the fragmentation of the status of industrial citizenship during the neoliberal period and discusses the enduring usefulness of the status/contract distinction in analyzing current trends in the regulation of working relations, including the spread of “gig” or platform-mediated work. Elements of status, it is argued, must always be present if work is to be performed and paid for as the parties require it. Claims to the contrary – for example, that the gig economy creates a labour market without search frictions and only minimal transaction costs: contracts without status – assume an undersocialized model of (monadic) social action that has no basis in the reality of social life (Durkheim, Weber). Still, status may come in a variety of forms that are more or less desirable from the perspective of workers, businesses, and society at large. The paper traces what it conceives as the privatization of status via contracts between employers and workers under the pressure of marketization and dominated by corporate hierarchies. Towards the end of the twentieth century, sociologists observed the division of workers into two groups or classes – core (with relatively well-paid and secure employment) and peripheral (low-paid and insecure). Thirty years later, gross inequalities of wealth and conceptions of the neoliberal self as ever-improving, everperfectible, are combining to create novel forms of status not fully anticipated by the literature.
Topic:
Democracy, Entrepreneurship, Citizenship, Economy, Industry, Contracts, Precarity, and Corporatism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

13. The Principles on Commercial Transparency in Public Contracts

Author:
The Working Group on Commercial Transparency in Public Contracts
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
Transparency by design: Transparency should be the norm for all government contracts, particularly regarding information on what is being exchanged and for what price. Contracting systems should be designed to support proactive publication of contracts as open data. Public contracting should be designed for transparency and efficiency. Full contract publication should be the norm. Information needed to judge value for money should be disclosed. Exceptions in the public interest: Redactions on the basis of commercial sensitivity should only be justified where the public interest in withholding information is greater than the public interest in having that information published. The assessment should take into account both any commercial harm to the contractor and the broader benefits of transparency to markets and public trust. Where exceptions to publication are considered: Information should only be redacted for reasons of commercial sensitivity when the public interest in withholding information is greater than the public interest in disclosure. The public interest test should take into account the wider economic benefits of the sharing of commercial information, as well as the case for accountability and the public’s right to know. All redactions should be clearly marked with the reason for redaction. A clear and robust process: Governments should issue detailed guidance on commercial sensitivity principles and exemptions, put in place systems to support publication, ensure that redaction is time-limited, and use other oversight mechanisms to compensate for information withheld from publication. Governments should issue clear guidance to public entities, agencies, and firms on contract publication and when information may be exempted from publication for commercial sensitivity reasons. Where redaction is potentially allowed, there should be a clear process for determining what is redacted, why, for how long, and with what appeals process. There should be a system for ensuring that contracts and contract information are in fact disclosed in practice. Where exemption to disclosure of information is granted for commercial sensitivity reasons, this should be grounds for increased scrutiny through other oversight mechanisms.
Topic:
Government, Transparency, Public Service, and Contracts
Political Geography:
Global Focus

14. Examining the Impact of E-Procurement in Ukraine

Author:
Artur Kovalchuk, Charles Kenny, and Mallika Snyder
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
This paper examines the impact of Ukraine’s ambitious procurement reform on outcomes amongst a set of procurements that used competitive tendering. The ProZorro system placed all of the country’s government procurement online, introduced an auction approach as the default procurement method, and extended transparency. The reform was introduced with a dramatic increase in the proportion of government procurement that was conducted competitively. This paper examines the impact of ProZorro and reform on contracts that were procured competitively both prior to and after the introduction of the new system. It finds some evidence of impact of the new system on increasing the number of bidders, cost savings, and reduced contracting times.
Topic:
Governance, Reform, Procurement, and Contracts
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

15. Assessing How Foreign State-Owned Enterprises' U.S. Based Operations Disrupt U.S. Jobs

Author:
Oxford Economics
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
The entrance of a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) in the transit passenger railcar manufacturing sector disrupts the current private-sector competitive railcar manufacturing sector in the U.S. In this study, Oxford Economics measures the net effects, stemming from this disruption by quantifying the loss to U.S. jobs, income and GDP that result from anti-competitive SOE practices. Even when domestic protective measures, such as 'Buy America' are put in place loss due to the SOE offshoring key apsects of their supply chain quickly accumulates--especially given the size and duration of municipal transit railcar contracts. We estimate that for every $1 billion in new contracts awarded to a Chinese SOE, the U.S. loses between 3,250 and 5,100 jobs.
Topic:
Hegemony, Employment, State Actors, Manufacturing, Job Creation, Supply Chains, and Contracts
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

16. Mongolia's Missing Oil, Gas and Mining Contracts

Author:
Robert Pitman
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Many of the most important contracts for publicly owned oil, gas and minerals in Mongolia remain secret, despite government promises to make contracts public. A review of publicly available contracts in Mongolia suggests that contracts are unlikely to contain the kinds of information about a project that are commercially sensitive. Likewise, evidence suggests that there is no reason to think that confidentiality clauses prevent disclosure of contracts. Contracting regimes in Mongolia are complex and therefore in many instances, it will be necessary to publish several contracts and associated documents for each project. There are five steps that the government can take to make contracts public: 1) explain the contracting landscape, 2) define the scope of disclosure, 3) establish a contract disclosure rule, 4) make contracts accessible, and 5) support contract use.
Topic:
Civil Society, Government, Oil, Gas, Journalism, Tax Systems, Mining, Private Sector, and Contracts
Political Geography:
Mongolia and Asia

17. How and Why the Myanmar Government Should Publish Petroleum and Mining Contracts

Author:
Sebastian Sahla, Hosana Chay, and Robert Pitman
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Contract disclosure is a growing global norm. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) board agreed to require all member governments to disclose the contracts they sign with oil, gas and mining companies beginning in January 2021. Around the world governments, companies and civil society are increasingly advocating for disclosure. In Myanmar, progress has been extremely slow. Despite civil society activists and several major investors supporting reforms, the government has not disclosed any petroleum or mining contracts so far. With new licenses expected to be issued in the petroleum, minerals and gemstone sectors, the Myanmar government should act now to keep pace with a global trend.
Topic:
Corruption, Natural Resources, Regulation, Negotiation, Legislation, Transparency, and Contracts
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Mongolia, Asia, Sierra Leone, Mexico, Myanmar, and Cameroon

18. New Entrants and Small Business Graduation in the Market for Federal Contracts

Author:
Gregory Sanders and Andrew Philip Hunter
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
This report tracks businesses new to the federal contracting arena from 2001-2016, otherwise known as new entrants, using publicly available contracting data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). Firm-level information on these vendors is collected over this time period and used to evaluate entrances, exits, and status changes among federal vendors with the purpose of comparing challenges faced by small businesses with those of larger ones. The final results compare the survival rates between small and non-small new entrants contracting with the federal government and calculate the graduation rates for those small new entrants who grew in size during the observation period and survived after ten years.
Topic:
Privatization, Non State Actors, Business, and Contracts
Political Geography:
Global Focus