Search

Begin New Search Topic Conflict Publication Year within 10 Years

491. The Authoritarian Resurgence: Forward to the Past in Russia

Author:
Lilia Shevtsova
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Democracy
Institution:
National Endowment for Democracy
Abstract:
The Russian system of personalized power has demonstrated the ability to reproduce itself by both imitating and containing the West. In its quest for survival, the system has used foreign policy to a) compensate for the Kremlin’s diminishing resources, and b) contain the West’s impact inside and outside of Russia. The Kremlin’s continued experiments with new “technology” to prolong the system’s life include not only repression but also information warfare, as is seen in the development of a pro-Kremlin lobbyist network in the West to support the left-right “International.”
Topic:
Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Conflict, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and North America

492. A Look Back at NATO’s 1999 Kosovo Campaign: A Questionably "Legal" but Justifiable Exception?

Author:
Ralph R. Steinke
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
It was the last European war in a bloody century of European wars. Less than ten years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the 1999 Kosovo War—Operation Allied Force, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) referred to it—was unique in many respects. From the perspectives of both international law and the law of armed conflict, it significantly challenged the limits of jus ad bellum, the international laws of war governing the circumstances under which nations are permitted to use force, as well as jus in bello, the laws of war relating to proper conduct in war.[1] After decades of a NATO-Warsaw Pact standoff in Europe and proxy wars elsewhere it was not self-defense, but rather humanitarian considerations, that drew the NATO Alliance, with the United States in the forefront, into this conflict. While the seventy-eight-day NATO bombing campaign captured the world’s attention, not long after its conclusion this military operation began to fade from the public memory. Beyond the Balkans, a little more than two years after the Kosovo War’s conclusion, the traumatic events of September 11, 2001, would virtually remove global examination and recollections of the Kosovo conflict from the agenda. The United States and much of the world embarked on an entirely new, 21st century ideological and combative struggle: fighting the scourge of terrorism. Nevertheless, the Kosovo War has alternatively been referred to as a reference point by Americans who have sought a response to the Syrian conflict as well as by Vladimir Putin as justification for his claims to Crimea and the “protection” of Russian nationals. Some sixteen years after the Kosovo conflict and Operation Allied Force, it is worth asking: are there any insights to be recalled and gained from this conflict? What has been the war’s effect on the law of international armed conflict to date? Is Mr. Putin right to refer to the Kosovo campaign as his justification for the use of force, either implied or explicit, in Crimea or greater Ukraine? It will be argued here that in spite of significant concern and warnings then that the Kosovo campaign would provide a dangerous precedent for international law and even global stability,[2] it has had a nominal if not negligible effect on the body of international law as informed by jus ad bellum. In spite of Mr. Putin’s attempts to try to identify it as a precedent, the Kosovo campaign was indeed an exception. While it was characterized as a messy and “ugly” affair,[3] it did accomplish what it intended to do: stop the killing of potentially tens of thousands of Kosovar Albanians and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands more from Kosovo, ultimately providing them with a better and more secure life than was possible in the pre-Kosovo campaign period.
Topic:
NATO, War, Conflict, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Kosovo, and Syria

493. Kosovo 1999 and Crimea 2014: Similarities and Differences

Author:
Pál Dunay
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
Since the so-called Kosovo conflict of 1999 the views of states, including those of major players, have been divided as to whether it was a humanitarian intervention or the collective aggression of NATO member states. In 2014 the Russian Federation annexed Crimea and Sevastopol (formally separate entities) to its territory. Since then the argument has shifted and the current disagreement centers around how we should assess these two changes of territorial status quo (Kosovo and Crimea) in Europe. The situation is further complicated as states wish to present their actions as moral and legal (the general expectation is that they do so). This results in a situation where the dominant discourse is supposed to support the aspirations of states both in the east and in the west. The main effort of each party goes in countering the other’s position. It is difficult to get hold of a reliable set of facts, as these are presented selectively by the different parties. A further challenge arises in that different fields are not kept distinct from one another, and hence the legal and political analyses are often used interchangeably and with insufficient differentiation. This is aggravated by the fact that the so-called normative approach to international (and domestic) politics prevails in the analysis. Every state feels compelled to prove that it acts in full accordance with international norms, including legal rules and moral predicaments. However, any attempt to correctly analyze the change of the territorial status quo in the two cases mentioned above requires the contrary: keeping the different aspects strictly separate and only synthesizing the results in the conclusions. In this article I endeavor to keep the legal analysis separate from the political and moral assessment and wish to state in advance that they do not necessarily manifest in the same direction. Moreover, when the topic of analysis is as politically heavy-loaded as the change of territorial status quo in Europe, the international legal assessment must be disaggregated further. Namely, there is the positive international law as it exists, de lege lata, as adopted by the states or as it appears as jus cogens. There is also international law that does not exist, yet about which we speak as de lege ferenda with a view to its future evolution. Such differentiation will be particularly relevant in this case due to the swift evolution of norms in the area of humanitarian intervention relevant as point of reference in the case of Kosovo and the ambiguous content of the right to self-determination in the case of Crimea. International law has a further characteristic feature. Namely, its development cannot flexibly follow historical changes. This is particularly noticeable when major historical changes occur at a rapid pace. This was the case before and during World War II and more recently as the Cold War came to an end. The international system changed and international law in some areas did not follow. The gap between the international system and international law, where the latter forms part and parcel of the former, has widened. Furthermore, universal international law most often requires the consent of states in various regions of the world. This presents a challenge as states often profess different values and their value judgment serves different interests. It is the purpose of this article to present the legal situation that underlies the two cases, the position of the main actors, and attempt to draw separate conclusions as regards the assessment de lege lata and de lege ferenda.
Topic:
NATO, Imperialism, Conflict, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Kosovo, and Crimea

494. Peace in Sri Lanka

Author:
Abdul Majid, Umbreen Javaid, and Faruq Saadat Zahid
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
The two races living on the same land come face to face to fight against each other for their own interests and rights. The history of Sri Lanka from its inception is red with bloodshed between the Tamils and the sinhala. Whereas, the indigenous Tamils remained calm and cool, the migrant Tamils made a group to get their own home land in Sri Lanka by conquering and snatching the piece of land known as Eelam. They struggled, killed general public and the people in security, there was a time when security forces were tired off and LTTE fighters were aggressive. There was a movement in the history very well known as the event of 9/11 that defined these fighters clearly as terrorists. It further strengthened and encouraged the Sri Lankan government to get the international moral, financial and military support. That ultimately resulted in a national success and LTTE lost the war in 2009. The Sri Lanka government faces the challenge of accommodating the Tamils and brings them into the governing, security and educational force of the nation. Also resolve their all political, economic, social and psychological grievances.
Topic:
Ethnic Conflict, Government, and Conflict
Political Geography:
South Asia and Sri Lanka

495. Election Audits: International Principles that Protect Election Integrity

Author:
International Foundation for Electoral Systems
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Foundation for Electoral Systems
Abstract:
The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and Democracy International (DI) have released a new joint white paper that identifies best practices for election audits in developing democracies. Election audits, which are increasingly used as a means of settling disputes about electoral results, are often conducted as ad hoc processes without clearly defined standards and procedures. In this collaborative effort, IFES and DI put forth recommendations to guide electoral management bodies in preparing for election audits. As the international community continues to support electoral processes in developing democracies around the world, it is critical to come to consensus on standards that should be applied both to assess the need for an election audit and to conduct such an audit. This white paper is the first effort at building that consensus. Elections in developing and post-conflict environments can offer countries a path to democracy and their citizens the prospect of a better life. The peaceful and credible resolution of electoral disputes is of special importance in these contexts, where legal frameworks for elections are sometimes ambiguous, the rule of law may be weak, and allegations of fraud are commonplace and frequently legitimate. Drawing on their extensive involvement in several recent election audits in developing democracies, IFES and DI seek to define the most important considerations for audits, based on the premise that they should be used only in limited circumstances and according to clearly defined and predetermined frameworks. Ad hoc audit processes, conducted absent a clear regulatory framework, can weaken the credibility of election outcomes and undermine the ability of new democracies to provide effective governance and to hold elected officials accountable to their citizens.
Topic:
Elections, Election watch, Conflict, and Rigged Elections
Political Geography:
Global Focus

496. Peace Operations in the Central African Republic: Some Challenges and Ways Forward

Author:
Jude Cocodia
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Social Science Research Council
Abstract:
Despite their burgeoning reputation in peacekeeping, the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) are apparently finding the conflict in the Central African Repub- lic (CAR) difficult to resolve. The explanation involves, in part, the complex situation within the country, apathy on the part of national political elites, and a lack of local participation in peacemaking. Other factors are linked to poor field leadership, the composition of the peacekeeping contingent, and the nature of the mandate. The situation demands more analysis of peace operations and the political conditions under which such operations occur, with a view toward lessening human suffering, making peacekeepers accountable, and brightening the prospects for peace.
Topic:
Diplomacy, United Nations, Conflict, Peace, and African Union
Political Geography:
Africa and Central African Republic

497. Arab League Summit Report

Author:
Omar Sheira and Muhammed Ammash
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center
Abstract:
The 26th Arab League Summit, held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, came amidst a series of divisive crises in the Middle East and North African region: in Yemen, a Saudi Arabian-led coalition initiated a campaign of airstrikes to counter the advance of the Houthi rebellion; in Libya, a multiparty civil war continues between rival governments and Islamist-oriented groups; in Syria, the civil war enters its fifth year, prolonging the conflict and adding more parties; and in Iraq, the government leads an offensive against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), to regain territory which was seized by the group in the Summer of 2014. Meanwhile, Iran also has an alleged role in the crises in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, which was referenced during the Summit. In addition to these issues, the agenda of the Arab League Summit also aimed to monitor the implementation of past recommendations, express support for Palestine and Somalia, and discuss ways to combat extremist groups.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Palestine, and Arab Countries

498. Externalizing the Crisis: Buffer Zones Around the EU

Author:
Emma Burström
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center
Abstract:
With the Syrian civil war soon entering its fifth year of armed conflict, the European Union is facing the largest influx of people in its history. Over 710,000 refugees and irregular migrants, of which a majority were Syrians, entered EU territory in the first 3 quarters of 2015 only (FRONTEX, 2015). Despite several informal top-level meetings between the EU member states and a pledge to relocate 160,000 refugees from the two main reception countries Greece and Italy, concrete action has yet to be taken and, as of yet, less than two hundred have been resettled within the EU (European Commission (d), 2015). Attempts to manage the influx of refugees and irregular migrants on a supranational level have been met with resistance from the governments of the member states. As the situation deteriorates and the number of people arriving shows no sign of abating, the member states are desperately looking outside the EU for solutions. Hoping to persuade transit countries to participate in refugee protection, and to contribute to stronger borders, the EU is engaging in various projects and negotiations focusing on its near abroad, with the aim of creating a buffer against the migrants. This policy update will briefly explore the history and implementation of these buffer zones, from the visa restrictions during the Yugoslav wars in the 90’s to the increasing use of ‘safe third countries’ today. Further, the positive and negative aspects of these buffer zones will be examined with the objective of: 1) detecting the possible risks of human rights violations, poverty, and insecurity, that closed border could cause; and 2), highlighting the potential benefits to the refugees and irregular migrants, the host countries, and the refugee sending countries, that could be the result of well-constructed policies.
Topic:
European Union, Refugees, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and Syria

499. Hacia un nuevo y diferente «Flanco Sur» en el Gran Magreb-Sahel

Author:
Raquel Barrás and Pablo Rey García
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
La unión de espacios subgobernados, la corrupción, el crimen organizado y terrorismo es la amenaza a la que se enfrenta la UE y sus estados miembros en el Gran Magreb, el cual está recreando un nuevo y diferente Flanco Sur al que existía durante la Guerra Fría. El aumento de la actividad extremista en la región del Sahel-Sáhara a partir de 2005 ha ido en paralelo con el crecimiento de las redes de crimen organizado transnacional a través del área. Aunque hay un intenso debate sobre su relación, intensidad e impacto, es una dinámica innegable en el área. La UE no tiene realmente una política unificada Magreb-Sahel y en términos de crimen organizado y terrorismo, el Sahel no se puede separar del Magreb. Hay una comprensión limitada y parcial del problema tanto en términos de amenazas como en soluciones viables, ampliado irremediablemente por la acción de Boko Haram y desbordando la visión, proyección y estrategia de la UE. A pesar del "Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020", las medidas tomadas son reducidas, muy recientes y probablemente insuficientes y tardías desde el punto de vista de la dinámica y sinergia entre terrorismo-crimen organizado en un contexto de corrupción. La UE sigue manteniendo un enfoque seguridad-desarrollo, básicamente en una concepción de seguridad humana, a pesar de que este enfoque es altamente discutible para enfrentarse a este tipo de amenazas.
Topic:
Terrorism, European Union, Conflict, Hybrid Warfare, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
Europe, North Africa, Morocco, and Sahel

500. Below the Threshold: The Law Governing the Use of Force Against Non-State Actors in the Absence of a Non-International Armed Conflict

Author:
Daniel Hessel, Julia Shu, and Sarah Weiner
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
Boko Haram attacks civilians in Nigeria. The Islamic State launches attacks in Paris. Terrorists take hostages at a hotel in Mali. Mexican drug gangs threaten government officials and civilians. Houthi rebels seek to take control of the government in Yemen—and succeed. States increasingly face security threats from non-state actors, which have led states and observers to ask what states can do in response. What legal framework should apply? What constraints do states face? When can states resort to the use of military force to address threats posed to them by non-state actors, either on their own territory or on the territory of another state? The answer to these questions turns on whether the conflict in question rises to the level of a non-international armed conflict (NIAC). Based on the drafting history of international humanitarian law (IHL) governing NIACs, international jurisprudence, recent state practice, and academic commentary, this paper concludes that a NIAC does not exist unless the conflict passes an intensity threshold. In other words, the intensity of the conflict distinguishes generalized violence involving a non-state actor from a NIAC. Once the existence of a NIAC is established, states participating in it will be governed by relevant IHL. But if states are only governed by the IHL applicable to NIACs once an intensity threshold has been crossed, what law applies below that threshold? The answer varies with the circumstances, depending on whether the state is responding to a threat within its own territory or from outside; and if the threat is from outside the state, whether the host state consents to the use of force against the non-state actor. Thus, to answer the question of what law applies before a NIAC is established, this white paper analyzes three different scenarios in which a state contemplates forceful engagement with a non-state actor. Each scenario presumes that t he non- state actor is organized and has engaged in some violence, but that the intensity of the clash has not crossed the intensity threshold and thus has not risen yet to the level of a NIAC. 1. In Scenario One, a state seeks to engage a non-state actor that operates exclusively within the state’s territorial borders. 2. In Scenario Two, an intervening state seeks to engage a non-state actor located in another state, with the consent of the host state. 3. In Scenario Three, an intervening state seeks to engage a non-state actor located in another state, without the consent of the host state. The analysis of each scenario first identifies the authority that governs whether and when the state may initiate forceful engagement with the non-state actor (the “may the state use force” evaluation), then discusses which legal regime governs the scope and nature of the resulting use of force (the “how may the state use force” evaluation). Different legal regimes govern the acting state’s options in each of the scenarios. Although the authority for action differs, the inquiries for Scenarios One and Two are quite similar. In Scenario One, the acting state may engage the non-state actor with force by virtue of its territorial sovereignty. It must act, however, through a domestic law enforcement framework and in compliance with human rights law. In Scenario Two, the acting state derives the authority to use force against the non-state actor from the host state’s consent. However, it may only rely on that consent insofar as it comports with the host state’s human rights obligations under international law. In raising the possibility of one state violating another state’s territorial integrity, Scenario Three raises a different set of questions. The intervening state’s threat or use of force within another state’s territory is only lawful when authorized by the U.N. Security Council or justified under the Charter’s Article 51 self-defense provision. The intervening state’s use of force is accordingly regulated by the traditional IHL of international armed conflict. Where scenarios overlap (when, for example, the intervening state has both consent and Article 51 authority to act), the acting state may rely on more than one source of authority. It must, however, continue to ensure that it has authority to use force and that its use of force comports with the legal framework appropriate for the nature and intensity of the conflict. It is worth noting at the outset that these scenarios highlight developing areas of international law. Some raise questions that have clear answers in existing legal authority, while others contend with more inchoate legal regimes. Where state practice has not yet solidified into definitive international norms, legal ambiguity remains. In such instances, this white paper notes the existence of ambiguity and examines the history, purposes, and principles of relevant legal regimes to proffer answers.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Non State Actors, Law, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Global Focus