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Begin New Search Topic Campaign Finance Publication Year within 10 Years

1. Ads and Editorials: How Pretreatment Reduces the Persuasiveness of Interest Group Advertisements

Author:
Matthew Lesenyie
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
California Journal of Politics and Policy
Institution:
Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley
Abstract:
Advertising studies commonly examine the effects of one-sided treatments. However, political communication campaigns are competitive environments where voters are likely to hear more than one perspective. Because of this dynamic, the persuasive effects of single-sided ads may be less likely to hold in a competitive environment. When respondents are exposed to arguments from both sides of a ballot proposition issue, can the disclosure of a credible group help an advertisement overcome prior opinions? I address this question using a randomized experiment that includes ballot proposition campaign ads. In the experiments, I manipulate the pretreatment environment by exposing some respondents to a newspaper editorial in order to provide them with prior opinions that might cause them to resist subsequent advertisements. I also vary the presence or absence of campaign finance disclosure within the advertisements. In all cases, the presence of a credible editorial is associated with a change in support for the initiative. However, the use of a credible campaign finance disclosure has a far less consistent effect. While campaign finance disclosures from credible groups can help counteract prior beliefs that citizens may hold, I find that the magnitude of these changes is somewhat small.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, Campaign Finance, Advertising, and Interest Groups
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Judicial selection and production efficiency: The role of campaign finance

Author:
Mayur Choudhary
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:
This paper studies the effect of campaign finance on judicial selection and production efficiency. Using the Supreme Court’s surprise verdict in the Citizens United v. FEC case in 2010, which generates exogenous variation in campaign finance laws, I document that the removal of such bans led to a 33% ($ 200,000) increase in the average electoral expenditure of judicial candidates and increased competition in State Supreme Court judge elections. The judicial bench also becomes populated with more business-friendly judges. State courts decide the majority of labor, contract, and administrative law disputes, and the State Supreme Court has the power to set legal precedents. Therefore, shifts in the judicial bench of the State Supreme Court affect the legal environment and the contracting choices of firms and labor. I document that labor productivity measured as value added per worker increased by 8% in treated states with judicial elections. For sectors more reliant on contract enforcement, labor productivity is higher in states with judicial elections. Overall, removing constraints on electoral finance improves competition in judicial elections, the judicial bench becomes more business-friendly, and improves production efficiency due to the alleviation of contract-enforcement frictions.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Elections, Supreme Court, Judiciary, and Campaign Finance
Political Geography:
United States of America and North America

3. The Integrity of Elections in Asia: Policy Lessons Applied

Author:
Kyle Lemargie and Silja Paasilinna
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
Abstract:
In response to a recent study by Max Grömping entitled The Integrity of Elections in Asia: Policy Lessons from Expert Evaluations, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) produced a briefing paper with some examples of policy lessons applied in practice across Asia. IFES has worked in Asia for the past three decades supporting election management bodies, civil society and other electoral stakeholders in their efforts to promote electoral integrity.
Topic:
Law, Elections, Transparency, and Campaign Finance
Political Geography:
Asia

4. The Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014

Author:
Yasmine Bekkouche and Julia Cagé
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
What is the price of a vote? This paper investigates this consequential controversy by analyzing a new comprehensive dataset of all French municipal and legislative elections over the 1993-2014 period. We begin by documenting the evolution of campaign finance in France, and show that both the amount and sources of campaign contributions vary widely from one candidate to another, in particular depending on their political party. We then turn to the empirical analysis and tackle a number of empirical challenges. First, we rely on recent methodological innovations to handle the special characteristics of multiparty data. Second, to overcome the endogenous nature of campaign spending, we propose a new instrument based on a change in legislation. We find that an increase in spending per voter consistently increases a candidate’s vote share both for municipal and legislative elections, and that the effect is heterogeneous depending on the parties and on the sources of campaign funding. According to our estimations, the price of a vote is about 6 euros for the legislative elections, and 32 euros for the municipal ones. Simulations show that small changes in spending patterns and caps can have a large impact on electoral outcomes and seats. Our results suggest that political finance needs to be tightly regulated.
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Elections, Political Parties, Data, and Campaign Finance
Political Geography:
Europe and France

5. The Political Cost of Corruption: Scandals, Campaign Finance, and Reelection in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies

Author:
Ivan Juca, Marcus Andre Melo, and Lucio Renno
Publication Date:
08-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
While corruption is widely disapproved of, some corrupt poli- ticians continue to win elections. We tackle this paradox by examining the effects of malfeasance scandals in politicians’ behavior. In particular, we focus on their campaign finance strategies and career choices. We explore these issues empirically with an original dataset that includes all lower-house members of Congress (MCs) in Brazil from 1995 to 2010. Although tainted incumbents tend to be penalized electorally, we show that campaign spending attenuates this effect. These results are robust, controlling for a host of potential confounders and biases. Hence, we offer a first exploration of incumbents’ strategies to avoid the electoral cost of their publicized wrongdoings. Above a certain threshold of fund- ing, Brazilian members of Congress become impervious to negative exposure, regardless of the severity of their ethical and/or criminal viola- tions. These results carry important normative consequences in terms of regulating campaign financing as a means of improving accountability.
Topic:
Corruption, Legislation, Campaign Finance, and Scandals
Political Geography:
Brazil, South America, and Latin America