Search

Begin New Search Topic COVID-19 Publication Year within 10 Years

41. Toynbee Coronavirus Series: Erez Manela on the WHO, smallpox eradication, and the need for renewed internationalism

Author:
Erez Manela
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
Living through historically unprecedented times has strengthened the Toynbee Prize Foundation's commitment to thinking globally about history and to representing that perspective in the public sphere. In this multimedia series on the covid-19 pandemic, we will be bringing global history to bear in thinking through the raging coronavirus and the range of social, intellectual, economic, political, and scientific crises triggered and aggravated by it. Erez Manela researches international society and the modern international order. Recently he has written about smallpox and the globalization of development, illuminating the power structures and international infrastructure that underwrote the World Health Organization’s (WHO) smallpox eradication program from 1965 to 1980. Professor of History at Harvard University, Prof. Manela teaches the history of the United States in the world and modern international history, and is the Director of Graduate Programs at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard and co-chair of the Harvard International and Global History seminar. He co-edits the Cambridge University book series ‘Global and International History.’
Topic:
Health, World Health Organization, Geopolitics, Public Health, Coronavirus, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

42. Toynbee Coronavirus Series: Dipesh Chakrabarty on zoonotic pathogens, human life, and pandemic in the age of the Anthropocene

Author:
Dipesh Chakrabarty
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
Living through historically unprecedented times has strengthened the Toynbee Prize Foundation's commitment to thinking globally about history and to representing that perspective in the public sphere. In this multimedia series on the covid-19 pandemic, we will be bringing global history to bear in thinking through the raging coronavirus and the range of social, intellectual, economic, political, and scientific crises triggered and aggravated by it. Toynbee Prize Awardee Dipesh Chakrabarty is the Lawrence A. Kimpton Distinguished Service Professor of History, South Asian Languages and Civilizations, and the College at University of Chicago. He is a founding member of the editorial collective of Subaltern Studies, a consulting editor of Critical Inquiry, a founding editor of Postcolonial Studies, and has served on the editorial boards of the American Historical Review and Public Culture, among others. His distinctions, publications, and awards are too numerous to mention; the landmark work for which he is perhaps best known, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, 2000; second edition, 2008), has been translated into Italian, French, Polish, Spanish Turkish, and Korean and is being brought out in Chinese. Included among his vast range of research interests are the implications of climate change science for historical and political thought and, most relevant for our discussion today, the Anthropocene.
Topic:
Climate Change, Coronavirus, Pandemic, COVID-19, Ecology, and Anthropocene
Political Geography:
Global Focus

43. Toynbee Coronavirus Series—Global History Forum: Jeremy Adelman, Or Rosenboim, Jamie Martin, Cindy Ewing, and Akita Shigeru

Author:
Jeremy Adelman, Or Rosenboim, Jamie Martin, Cindy Ewing, and Akita Shigeru
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
Living through historically unprecedented times has strengthened the Toynbee Prize Foundation's commitment to thinking globally about history and to representing that perspective in the public sphere. In this multimedia series on the COVID-19 pandemic, we will be bringing global history to bear in thinking through the raging coronavirus and the range of social, intellectual, economic, political, and scientific crises triggered and aggravated by it.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Coronavirus, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

44. Toynbee Coronavirus Series—Global Historians Analyze the Pandemic: Glenda Sluga, Jie-Hyun Lim, Lauren Benton, and Hsiung Ping-chen

Author:
Glenda Sluga, Jie-Hyun Lim, Lauren Benton, and Hsiung Ping-chen
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
Living through historically unprecedented times has strengthened the Toynbee Prize Foundation's commitment to thinking globally about history and to representing that perspective in the public sphere. In this multimedia series on the COVID-19 pandemic, we will be bringing global history to bear in thinking through the raging coronavirus and the range of social, intellectual, economic, political, and scientific crises triggered and aggravated by it.
Topic:
History, Geopolitics, Coronavirus, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

45. United G20 must pave the way for robust post-COVID-19 recovery

Author:
Phil Thornton
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The world is facing unprecedented health and economic crises that require a global solution. Governments have locked down their economies to contain the mounting death toll from the COVID-19 pandemic. With this response well underway, now is the time to move into a recovery effort. This will require a coordinated response to the health emergency and a global growth plan that is based on synchronized monetary, fiscal, and debt relief policies. Failure to act will risk a substantial shock to the postwar order established by the United States and its allies more than seventy years ago. The most effective global forum for coordinating this recovery effort is the Group of 20 (G20), which led the way out of the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2009, the closest parallel we have to the current catastrophe. Eleven years ago, world leaders used the G20 meeting in London as the forum to deliver a unified response and a massive fiscal stimulus that helped stem economic free fall and prevented the recession from becoming a second Great Depression. A decade on, it is clear that the G20 is the only body with the clout to save the global economy. This does not mean that the G20 should be the only forum for actions for its member states. The United States, for example, should also work closely with like-minded states that support a rules-based world order, and there are many other fora where it can and must be active with partners and allies. But no others share the G20’s depth and breadth in the key focus areas for recovery. The other multilateral organizations that could take up the challenge lack either the substance or membership. The United Nations may count all countries as members but is too unwieldly to coordinate a response. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has the resources but requires direction from its 189 members. The Group of Seven (G7), which once oversaw financial and economic management, does not include the fast-growing emerging economies. The G20 represents both the world’s richest and fastest-growing countries, making it the forum for international collaboration. It combines that representation with agility.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, G20, Global Markets, Geopolitics, Economy, Business, Trade, Coronavirus, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Canada, Asia, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

46. Taking stock: Where are geopolitics headed in the COVID-19 era?

Author:
Jeffrey Cimmino, Matthew Kroenig, and Barry Pavel
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic is a strategic shock, and its almost immediate, damaging effects on the global economy constitute a secondary disruption to global order. Additional secondary strategic shocks (e.g., in the developing world) are looming. Together, these developments pose arguably the greatest threat to the global order since World War II. In the aftermath of that conflict, the United States and its allies established a rules-based international system that has guaranteed freedom, peace, and prosperity for decades. If the United States and its allies do not act effectively, the pandemic could upend this order. This issue brief considers the current state of the pandemic and how it has strained the global rules-based order over the past few months. First, it considers the origins of the novel coronavirus and how it spread around the world. Next, it examines how COVID-19 has exacerbated or created pressure points in the global order, highlights uncertainties ahead, and provides recommendations to the United States and its partners for shaping the post-COVID-19 world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, European Union, Economy, Business, Coronavirus, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, China, South Asia, Eurasia, India, Taiwan, Asia, North America, Korea, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

47. The future of US-Iraq relations

Author:
C. Anthony Pfaff
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
With US-Iraq ties strained and a Strategic Dialogue between the two countries set to begin in June 2020, this Atlantic Council Iraq Initiative report by Nonresident Senior Fellow and former White House National Security Council Iraq Director Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff analyzes the current challenges in the relationship and presents policy recommendations. Dr. Pfaff argues in the report that the United States should: Avoid dragging Iraq into its broader campaign against Iran; Play to its comparative advantage: The United States can be a better security partner for Iraq than other countries and can also assist with integrating it into the international community and developing the economic and financial capabilities necessary to participate in the global economy; Continue to insist on the integration of Iran-backed militias into Iraq’s security forces; Highlight US aid to Iraq and while acknowledging US mistakes, push back against politicized narratives that explain Iraq’s lack of recovery; Emphasize military interoperability, so that in the event of an ISIS resurgence – or the emergence of a like-minded group – US forces can quickly fill in the Iraqi armed forces’ capability gaps; Promote reconciliation and provide an alternative to Iranian mediation while at the same time avoiding advocacy for a particular outcome; Provide economic assistance to set conditions for foreign investment by US companies and like-minded partners; Focus additional COVID-19 related assistance on economic recovery;.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Economic Development, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and United States of America

48. The Cost of Defence 2020-2021. Part 1: ASPI 2020 Strategic Update Brief

Author:
Marcus Hellyer
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
The Defence Strategic Update (DSU) represents a remarkable commitment by the Australian Government to sustained growth in the defence budget. Released on 1 July after months of bad economic news caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and growing budget deficits caused by the government’s measures to mitigate the economic pain, the DSU nevertheless confirms the robust funding line presented in the 2016 Defence White Paper (2016 DWP) and extends it for a further four years. This means the defence budget will continue to grow past 2% of GDP, and indeed at a faster rate than before the Covid-19 pandemic hit. Measured from a starting point in 2019–20, the budget is planned to grow by a remarkable 87.4% over the coming decade. Why did the government make that commitment? It’s clear from the DSU that it’s very concerned about Australia’s strategic circumstances, which it assesses as having deteriorated significantly in the four years since the 2016 DWP. It states that the region is in the middle of the most consequential strategic realignment since World War II. That brings significant uncertainty and risk. The government regards robust military capabilities as essential to managing it. The DSU marks a clear break from previous high-level strategic statements in the frank way it describes those risks and the new capabilities needed to address them. It also makes several key adjustments to strategic policy settings: It redefines our immediate region to an arc from the northeastern Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland Southeast Asia, to Papua New Guinea and the Southwest Pacific. It’s still a huge area. It prioritises the immediate region for defence planning. It introduces the concepts of ‘shape’, ‘deter’ and ‘respond’ to focus defence planning. The emphasis on shaping reinforces the importance of regional engagement and partnerships in creating a region conducive to our interests. It states that a largely defensive force won’t deter attack. Instead, ‘new capabilities are needed to hold adversaries’ forces and infrastructure at risk from a greater distance. They include longer range strike weapons, cyber measures and area-denial systems.’ It acknowledges that Australia can no longer rely on warning time, even for a conventional military attack on Australia, and so won’t have time to ‘gradually adjust’ military capabilities. While the redefinition of the immediate region might not in itself result in changes to the defence investment program—now known as the Force Structure Plan (FSP)—the other factors listed certainly will. To acquire new capabilities, the growth in the DSU’s funding model continues the pattern of the 2016 DWP. That means the capital component of the budget grows to 40% of the total budget and stays there. That’s a far higher percentage than has historically been the case. By the end of the decade, if that planned increase is achieved, the acquisition component of the budget will have grown by 148% in nominal terms from its 2019–20 start point. Despite the broader economic and budget uncertainty, this means that Defence is in the fortunate position of being able to add some significant new capabilities to its shopping list. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the FSP is that the ADF has entered the ‘age of missiles’ with a vengeance. There’s potentially $100 billion in investment over the next two decades in missiles and guided weapons. That includes the offensive systems needed to deter and defeat an adversary from a greater distance, such as hypersonic weapons. Even the Army is acquiring long-range missiles. But it also includes greatly enhanced defensive systems, such as ballistic missile defence, which is something Defence has considered for a long time but never previously committed to. That’s a clear sign that the region is getting much more dangerous. While the FSP is short on detail, the big picture it paints is pretty clear. It’s one in which the ADF continues its trajectory of steadily fielding improved capability and developing greater strategic weight. But there are risks, both in the design of the plan itself and in delivering it, that need to be managed. It must be said that Defence’s planning processes are improving along with its costing methodologies, so it’s likely that these are risks that it has considered in the development of the DSU and FSP. The first set of risks relates to the question of whether this is the right force for our deteriorating circumstances. Despite the recognition that Australia can’t rely on warning time, much of the planned force is still a long way off in the future. The first future frigate won’t be operational for 10 years and the first future submarine for 14, and subsequent vessels are to be delivered only on a two-year drumbeat. The Air Force isn’t getting additional air combat aircraft beyond its 72 F-35As until late in the decade. Most of the major new additions to the force structure are also some way off in the future. There’s a funding line that potentially provides a way forward to get Boeing’s Loyal Wingman unmanned aerial vehicle into service, but most of the big buckets of funding for unmanned and autonomous systems are still late in the 2020s or even in the 2030s. Until then, it looks like Defence is relying on improved weapons delivered from existing platforms to provide the main capability enhancement. Also, the force envisaged in the DSU and FSP is growing increasingly broad. There are many new capabilities in the plan, but virtually none are being retired or cancelled. Similarly, the range of tasks that the force is being asked to do isn’t being reduced. In fact, the DSU requires greater regional engagement as well as greater capacity for domestic disaster response—but will the force be able to do all the tasks expected of it? Related to this, our changing strategic environment seems to be pulling the force in two directions. The DSU states that we can’t match major-power adversaries and need to develop capabilities to deter them through strike, cyber and area-denial systems. This suggests a growing recognition of the need for asymmetric operational concepts and capabilities, yet the force is still largely being built around traditional, conventional capabilities such as expensive, multi-role, manned platforms of the kind Australia has relied upon to overmatch potential adversaries. Defence is also investing in an increasingly heavy conventional land force. That’s likely to be useful against some potential non-peer adversaries—but does it play a deterrent role against a major-power adversary? There’s also the question of balance between acquisition, sustainment and personnel funding. Acquisition’s share of the budget is growing rapidly. Personnel’s share is also growing but more slowly, and will decline as a percentage of the overall budget. The DSU states that the government will consider increases to Defence’s workforce next year, but those numbers are already accounted for in the DSU’s personnel funding stream, suggesting that any additional people won’t change the overall trajectory of personnel’s share of the budget. Certainly, increased capital spending is necessary, but is a 40% acquisition / 26% personnel balance feasible in the long term? There’s no point acquiring equipment you can’t crew. Then there are a set of risks that relate to the feasibility of delivery. The first, as ever, is money. The economic future of both Australia and the world is still very uncertain. If the economic impact of Covid-19 results in prolonged economic stagnation, it’s going to take sustained resolve by this and future governments to keep increasing defence funding over the decade. Should that resolve waver and a government revert to something like 2% of GDP, that would be a huge hit to the defence budget of potentially $5–10 billion per year, with a resultant cut to either existing core capabilities or the planned new ones. The government has already stated that it’s committed to Defence’s ‘megaprojects’ and that they aren’t part of any prioritisation or trade-off process, so other things will bear the brunt of any funding hit—potentially, the new asymmetric capabilities being introduced to deter a major-power adversary. Then there’s the very difficult question of the affordability of the force. The defence budget is growing substantially, but so is the list of capabilities Defence is acquiring and sustaining. The acquisition cost of military capabilities grows much faster than inflation. Since 2016, several key capabilities have grown significantly in cost (including submarines, frigates, armoured vehicles and air defence). Moreover, sustainment costs are also growing. The sustainment cost of key future capabilities is likely to be several times greater in real terms than the systems they’re replacing. One of the biggest implementation risks relates to Australian industry’s ability to scale up to deliver the force. The local share of Defence’s capital equipment spend has consistently hovered around one-third of the total. Last year, that was around $2.6 billion. As the capital budget rapidly grows over the decade, local acquisition spending will have to grow to over $7 billion per year just to maintain that one-third share. But it’s clear the government wants that share to grow. It has to, if we’re going to address the supply-chain risks currently inherent in defence capability. Getting to between 40% and 50% means the local acquisition spend will need to reach around $10 billion per year. That’s a lot of money for Australian industry to absorb and a lot of capability for it to deliver, but, if it doesn’t get there, the government won’t achieve the level of sovereign capability that it’s seeking and we’ll continue to rely on imported systems, with the attendant supply-chain risks. While the basic settings of the government’s 2016 defence industry policy statement are the right ones, it’s likely that it’s going to have to do more to develop the kind of local industrial ecosystem necessary to deliver the level of sovereign capability described in the DSU and FSP. Relying on the local assembly of foreign designs using mainly foreign high-value subsystems isn’t going to get us there. More needs to be done to generate technological innovation and advanced manufacturing here. There are only minor increases to innovation funding in the DSU, for example. The new line in the FSP to develop sovereign weapons manufacturing could be a model for a more deliberate approach to generating sovereign industrial capability. The other risk associated with industry policy is the old one of falling into the trap of preferring industrial outcomes to military capability. That risk has already been realised. Some of the hidden costs of continuous-build programs are becoming more apparent: the FSP states that the cost increase for the Future Frigate Program was caused by the government allocating ‘additional funding to enable construction of ships at a deliberate drumbeat over a longer period of time than originally planned to achieve a continuous shipbuilding program’. That is, we’re deliberately paying more to get capability later. The DSU acknowledges that we can no longer rely on warning time to be able to gradually adjust military capability, so surely now’s the time to be spending to accelerate delivery and the rate at which we ‘adjust capability’, not slow it down. If we’re willing to pay a premium to build here, let’s pay it to get more capability sooner, not later. Why are we prioritising jobs for future generations of shipbuilders over capability for current servicemen and women who may be called upon in the near future to use it? The new strategy has been written, and the government most certainly understands the urgency driving its defence policy changes. The key question is whether Defence can sufficiently internalise that urgency to implement the changes needed in how the organisation does business. The Minister for Defence, Linda Reynolds, stated on 7 August that ‘the Defence Department … has systematically for over 100 years failed to deliver on the government’s expectations of the enterprise.’ We now have a plan that calls for speed, lateral thinking, innovation and partnerships—to be implemented by an organisation that’s slow, subject to groupthink, risk averse and reluctant to reach out. Adapting Defence to the demands of our new reality is going to be challenging, to say the least.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Budget, Economy, Economic growth, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

49. Covid-19 Disinformation & Social Media Manipulation

Author:
Elise Thomas, Albert Zhang, and Jake Wallis
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
ASPI ICPC has investigated a campaign of cross-platform inauthentic activity, conducted by Chinese-speaking actors and broadly in alignment with the political goal of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to denigrate the standing of the US. This appears to be targeted primarily at Western and US-based audiences by artificially boosting legitimate media and social media content in order to amplify divisive or negative narratives about the US. This has included highlighting racial tensions, amplifying criticisms of the US’s handling of the coronavirus crisis, and political and personal scandals linked to President Donald Trump. However, there’s no clear indication of a partisan lean in this campaign. President Trump appears to be criticised in his capacity as a leader of the US rather than as a presidential candidate. This activity has been conducted primarily in English, with a smaller amount of Chinese-language content. It relies on a high degree of automation and appears to have achieved low engagement across both Facebook and Twitter. The divergent tactics used in this campaign suggest that’s unconnected to the state-linked operations studied by ASPI ICPC in Tweeting through the Great Firewall and Retweeting through the Great Firewall. There’s no clear actor—state or non-state—to which attribution can be made from this investigation. It does appear that those behind the campaign commonly type in double-byte fonts used for Asian languages, including Chinese, and that a small number of accounts appear to have been used in an earlier campaign targeting the Falun Gong / Falun Dafa community in the US. This activity is valuable as a case study because it highlights the ways in which social media platforms provide a vector for small-scale actors to engage in covert political influence campaigns targeting citizens and voters in other nations in ways that can complement state-driven propaganda. The investigation offers insights into behavioural patterns that can reveal coordinated inauthentic activity designed to drive influence, even when it is disguised through selective sharing of authentic content by accounts with profiles that offer a veneer of legitimacy
Topic:
Internet, Social Media, COVID-19, and Misinformation
Political Geography:
Australia, North America, and United States of America

50. ID2020, Bill Gates and the Mark of the Beast: how Covid-19 catalyses existing online conspiracy movements

Author:
Elise Thomas and Albert Zhang
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
Against the backdrop of the global Covid-19 pandemic, billionaire philanthropist Bill Gates has become the subject of a diverse and rapidly expanding universe of conspiracy theories. This report takes a close look at a particular variant of the Gates conspiracy theories, which is referred to here as the ID2020 conspiracy (named after the non-profit ID2020 Alliance, which the conspiracy theorists claim has a role in the narrative), as a case study for examining the dynamics of online conspiracy theories on Covid-19. Like many conspiracy theories, that narrative builds on legitimate concerns, in this case about privacy and surveillance in the context of digital identity systems, and distorts them in extreme and unfounded ways. Among the many conspiracy theories now surrounding Gates, this one is particularly worthy of attention because it highlights the way emergent events catalyse existing online conspiracy substrates. In times of crisis, these digital structures—the online communities, the content, the shaping of recommendation algorithms—serve to channel anxious, uncertain individuals towards conspiratorial beliefs. This report focuses primarily on the role and use of those digital structures in proliferating the ID2020 conspiracy.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Internet, COVID-19, and Misinformation
Political Geography:
Australia and Global Focus