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11. Combatting Corruption Among Civil Servants: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on What Works

Author:
Jordan Gans-Morse, Monica Prasad, Mariana Borges, Alexey Makarin, Theresa Mannah-Blankson, Andre Nickow, Vanessa Watters, and Dong Zhang
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of International Education
Abstract:
In 2016, USAID’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance launched its Learning Agenda—a set of research questions designed to address the issues that confront staff in USAID field offices working on the intersection of development and democracy, human rights, and governance. This literature review—produced by a team of economists, political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists—synthesizes scholarship from diverse research traditions on the following Learning Agenda question: In the context of hiring civil servants and providing positive and negative incentives for their behavior, what kinds of interventions are most effective at reducing the propensity (potential and actual) of civil servants to engage in corruption? Overall, as summarized in the chart below, there was not a great deal of rigorous academic evidence either for or against the majority of commonly prescribed anti-corruption strategies, with the partial exception of anti-corruption audits and e-governance. These findings are discussed at length in the publication, and contextualized within a broader analysis why the first wave of corruption reforms has generated so few success stories.
Topic:
Corruption, Bureaucracy, and USAID
Political Geography:
Global Focus and North America

12. Controlling Agency Choke Points: Presidents and Turnover in the Senior Executive Service

Author:
Kathleen Doherty, David Lewis, and Scott Limbocker
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
If presidents wish to see their policy priorities implemented, they need control over career executives occupying key decision-making positions. This paper examines the extent to which new presidential administrations marginalize high level career executives and whether political conflict with a new administration drives executives from their positions. Once in office, presidents are more likely to target individuals with whom they conflict and those in important policymaking positions. Turnover is also affected by the choices of career executives. Some anticipate conflict and strategically exit before a new president takes office. To assess our theory, we use unique new data that combines individual survey responses with personnel records to analyze the probability that an agency executive departs her position from March 2015 to July 2017. Given our findings that turnover is driven both by presidential marginalization and strategic exit by bureaucrats, we conclude with implications for presidential efforts to control the bureaucracy.
Topic:
Leadership, Federalism, Bureaucracy, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:
United States and North America

13. Electoral Proximity and the Political Involvement of Bureaucrats: A Natural Experiment in Argentina, 1904

Author:
Valentin Figueroa
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
In this paper, I use a slightly modified version of the Becker– Stigler model of corrupt behavior to explain bureaucratic political in- volvement. Since bureaucrats prefer higher rewards and not to support losing candidates, we expect them to become politically involved near elections – when rewards are expected to be higher, and information more abundant. Taking advantage of a natural experiment, I employ differences-in-means and differences-in-differences techniques to esti- mate the effect of electoral proximity on the political involvement of justices of the peace in the city of Buenos Aires in 1904. I find a large, positive, and highly local effect of electoral proximity on their political involvement, with no appreciable impact in the months before or after elections.
Topic:
Corruption, Elections, Justice, and Bureaucracy
Political Geography:
Argentina, South America, and Latin America

14. Producing Undesirables at the Border. Border Control Practices at a European Airport | La fabrique des indésirables Pratiques de contrôle aux frontières dans un aéroport européen

Author:
Andrew Crosby and Andrea Rea
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Cultures & Conflits
Institution:
Cultures & Conflits
Abstract:
Based on empirical research in a European airport, this article analyses how border guards control third-country nationals by advancing an anthropology of the power of border control as exhibited by the use of symbolic violence and discretionary state power. Leaning on the theories of street-level bureaucracies and organizations, we analyze the work practices, professional routines and organization of the work of border guards in order to show how border guards activate and constitute the border and the control of mobility. We argue that control at the airport is based both on the influence of the network-border and on a dramaturgical performance of bureaucratic governance, which is meant to create legitimate travelers and undesirable passengers, while circumventing potential protests of the latter and simulating accountability toward the broader public of citizens. As such, border control is more of a symbolic act than an efficient tool of immigration policy.
Topic:
Immigration, Border Control, Borders, and Bureaucracy
Political Geography:
Europe