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272. Trade Update 2017: Out of the Shadows
- Author:
- Paul Holtom and Irene Pavesi
- Publication Date:
- 09-2017
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Small Arms Survey
- Abstract:
- The Small Arms Survey’s Trade Update 2017: Out of the Shadows provides an overview of the international trade in small arms and light weapons in 2014, identifies the world’s top and major exporters of small arms and light weapons, and assesses changes in trade patterns from 2013 to 2014. The Update also presents the 2017 edition of the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer, which scores key exporters from the most to the least transparent. The main findings include the following: In 2014, the top exporters of small arms (those with annual exports of at least USD 100 million), in descending order, were: the United States, Italy, Brazil, Germany, South Korea, Austria, Turkey, the Russian Federation, the Czech Republic, Belgium, Croatia, Israel, Spain, Switzerland, and Japan. Brazil exported more than USD 500 million worth of small arms for the first time during 2001–14. In 2014, the top importers of small arms (those with annual imports of at least USD 100 million), in descending order, were: the United States, Canada, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Australia, Iraq, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The United States remains the world’s largest importer, but the value of its imports declined for the first time since 2001, from USD 2.5 billion in 2013 to USD 2.2 billion in 2014. The international small arms trade was worth at least USD 6 billion in 2014. Ammunition accounted for 38 per cent of global transfers. The value of ‘military firearm’ shipments increased by 49 per cent between 2013 and 2014, from USD 475 million to USD 708 million. In contrast, the value of the trade in pistols and revolvers declined by 16 per cent, from USD 1 billion to USD 845 million. The 2017 edition of the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer identifies Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Serbia as the most transparent top and major small arms exporters. Iran, Israel, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are the least transparent major exporters. The average score in the 2017 Barometer is 11.33 out of 25 points. The areas that have seen the most improvement over the past year are: comprehensiveness (+17 per cent), access and consistency (+12 per cent), licences denied (+11 per cent), and clarity (+4 per cent). In their first ATT annual reports, Austria, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Liberia—none of which had reported small arms transfers to the UN Register—provided information on small arms transfers, thus increasing overall transparency on international small arms transfers. Although Iran, North Korea, and the UAE rarely, if ever, recorded small arms exports worth USD 10 million or more in Comtrade, Survey research indicates that they are major small arms exporters. It is more difficult to determine the status of Saudi Arabia, which appears to be a significant re-exporter of small arms.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Arms Trade, Transparency, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
273. Making a Tough Job More Difficult: Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations
- Author:
- Eric G. Berman, Mihaela Racovita, and Matt Schroeder
- Publication Date:
- 10-2017
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Small Arms Survey
- Abstract:
- This Report highlights results of research into the loss of arms and ammunition in a range of peace operations. Losses include assault rifles and pistols, armoured vehicles and numerous types of light weapons that in aggregate represent thousands of weapons and millions of rounds of ammunition. Making a Tough Job more Difficult: The Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations focuses on United Nations- and regional organization-led peace operations. The materiel is lost in a variety of ways and settings—described in the report. Some loss of arms and ammunition in peace operations is inevitable given the challenges peacekeepers face in conflict and post-conflict settings. The report shows, however, that considerable quantities of arms and ammunition are lost or redistributed due to less-than-best practice and poor oversight. It also finds that the UN’s system for managing and controlling the movement of contingent-owned equipment provides the framework for weapons and ammunition management but that greater access to the policies, procedures, and guidelines of both UN and non-UN peace operations would improve understanding of existing control measures and the gaps in these controls.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, and Peacekeeping
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
274. The Case Against New Nuclear Weapons
- Author:
- Adam Mount
- Publication Date:
- 05-2017
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for American Progress - CAP
- Abstract:
- Since the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal peaked in the 1980s, American presidents—Democrat and Republican alike—have limited the development of new nuclear weapons. Whether the restriction was written into law, was included in U.S. nuclear policy, or was the result of specific decisions not to pursue new procurement projects, the United States has not built a new nuclear warhead since the late 1980s. This policy decision has generated significant cost savings, restrained strategic competition, and helped to support other stabilizing policies. With Republicans now in control of Congress and the White House, this policy is at risk. As Russia and China expand their territorial claims as well as their own nuclear arsenals, a growing chorus of U.S. politicians and strategists argue that it is not sufficient to simply replace nuclear systems as they wear out. Instead, they insist that the United States must procure new systems with qualitatively new capabilities. In some cases, appeals for new nuclear weapons are motivated by a sophisticated but mistaken argument about their necessity for deterring potential adversaries from employing nuclear weapons in limited conflicts. Other advocates endorse these programs as a way of winning future arms races or achieving supremacy over other nuclear powers.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
275. A Responsible Approach to North Korea
- Author:
- Kelly Magsamen, Melanie Hart, Michael Fuchs, and Vikram Singh
- Publication Date:
- 11-2017
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for American Progress - CAP
- Abstract:
- Kim Jong Un’s reckless and illegal nuclear and missile programs pose a serious and growing threat to U.S. national security and the security of U.S. allies. His refusal to abide by U.N. Security Council resolutions has rallied the world against him. Unfortunately, President Donald Trump is bucking this international consensus with his reckless and contradictory statements. This dynamic is both dangerous and counterproductive; it increases the risk of miscalculation on the Korean Peninsula and squanders an opportunity to press North Korea back into a diplomatic process. There are no perfect solutions to the challenge North Korea poses. The country has made rapid progress on nuclear weapons that it deems critical to its survival. Yet the United States has deterred and contained North Korea for decades, preventing another devastating war on the peninsula. To prevent war and get back to diplomacy aimed at addressing North Korea’s threats, the United States needs a more responsible approach: aggressive diplomacy with a strong team; active U.S. efforts to reassure allies of America’s commitment to their security and to smart deterrence of North Korea; and concrete steps to isolate North Korea from the global economy. This policy approach could reduce the chances of unintended conflict, protect U.S. national security interests, and open a pathway to curb North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America
276. Unrest and Tests
- Author:
- Stephen Noerper
- Publication Date:
- 01-2017
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Comparative Connections
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- North Korea opened the final months of 2016 with a bang by conducting its fifth nuclear test on Sept. 9. It followed up with a series of rocket and missile tests, culminating the year with Kim Jong Un’s claim of an imminent long-range ballistic missile capability. Yet, political transition in South Korea and the United States proved the hallmarks of late 2016, suggesting potential shifts in the approaches on the Peninsula, while underscoring the firm commitment of the US and ROK to their alliance. The Park-Choi scandal led to massive protests the final two months of the year and an impeachment vote on Dec. 9 by the National Assembly, confusing political observers about the implications for South Korean political stability. Donald Trump’s surprise victory in the US raised questions among Koreans about US reliability as an alliance partner.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Denuclearization
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America
277. Back to Diplomacy in 2017?
- Author:
- Aidan Foster-Career
- Publication Date:
- 01-2017
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Comparative Connections
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- South Korea’s hardline response to North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests earlier in the year, which led to a complete severing of all inter-Korean contact, meant there was effectively no relationship between the two Koreas in final months of 2016. With the stalemate in relations coupled with the political turmoil in both Washington and Seoul, Aidan Foster-Carter provides his analysis to help understand how we got here by looking back and, even more importantly, looking forward. While North Korea watches and waits, there is a worrying power vacuum in Seoul in the wake of “ChoiSunsil-gate.” The next move largely depends on how South Korea responds to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
278. Nuclear Test, Political Fallout, and Domestic Turmoil
- Author:
- Scott Snyder and See-Won Byun
- Publication Date:
- 01-2017
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Comparative Connections
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- North Korea’s fifth nuclear test on Sept. 9 and the intensified test-firing of a range of missile types throughout 2016 underscored existing weaknesses in using dialogue and sanctions as a response. The timing of Pyongyang’s latest provocations coincided with the G20 Summit in Hangzhou and ASEAN-related meetings in Vientiane. President Park Geun-hye used the venues for sideline talks with President Xi Jinping and President Obama. The nuclear test directly challenged a nonproliferation statement adopted by East Asia Summit (EAS) members on Oct. 8, which urged North Korea to abandon its weapons programs. Following extended negotiations with the US, China finally joined the international community in adopting UN Security Council Resolution 2321 on Nov. 30. In addition to strains in the China-DPRK relationship, regional coordination on North Korea remains challenged by disputes between China and the ROK over THAAD and illegal Chinese fishing.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Peace, and Denuclearization
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America
279. Emerging Satellites for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Verification
- Author:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Publication Date:
- 06-2016
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- he project’s final report is now available for free release. The final report discusses these particular development trends in the commercial EO domain. This is followed by an examination of how such capabilities might apply to observing nuclear fuel cycle or weapon development facilities, using facilities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a case study. Treaty verification requirements are primarily examined in the contexts of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). New EO capabilities are also examined in the context of the United Nations Security Council nuclear-related sanctions implementation, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts. The report identifies opportunities, obstacles and future considerations for the application of emerging types of commercial EO satellite data in various treaty verification domains.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, Nonproliferation, and Chemical Weapons
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
280. A Non-Ideological Reframing of the US-Russian Arms-Control Agenda
- Author:
- Nikolai Sokov
- Publication Date:
- 12-2016
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Abstract:
- US-Russian nuclear arms control has remained deadlocked since the conclusion of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in 2010. The absence of progress hasn’t, however, been a major concern in either country. Although the United States could benefit from additional reductions as it considers the wholesale replacement of its strategic delivery vehicles, that interest appears rather marginal. Russia, already in the midst of its own delivery-vehicle replacement program, seems even less interested.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America