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171. The Washington Summit: NATO-Ukraine

Author:
Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. In the first brief of the series, Henrik Larsen looks at the additional steps NATO might take in Washington to help Ukraine defeat Russia’s aggression. There is seemingly no common appetite to advance Ukraine’s membership status, but the Alliance is likely to take a new role in coordinating the delivery of lethal aid. It may also agree an initiative to secure more stable longer-term financing of military assistance. Even so, it is hard to see that NATO’s support and solidarity represent a genuine commitment to Ukraine’s future security.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

172. Japan, NATO, and the Diversification of Security Partnerships

Author:
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, Takuya Matsuda, Bart Gaens, and Nele Loorents
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The US-led military alliances remain an integral part of the defence and deterrence strategies of countries in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions. Whereas the European security architecture is centred on a multilateral alliance, that is, NATO, the Asian security order is rooted in the hub-and-spokes system – the network of US-led bilateral alliances with key partners in Asia, such as Japan. Bringing in experts from Europe and Japan, this report examines the key shifts in the allies’ threat perceptions and strategic thinking on policy responses. It also explores the rise of informal security alignments designed to address both traditional and hybrid challenges and exemplified by the minilateral-type security cooperation pursued by Japan. Finally, the report zooms in on the growing interlinkages between security in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions, as evidenced by the deepened security ties between like-minded partners. The report argues that the Russian invasion of Ukraine should be seen as a critical juncture for alliance politics. Military alliances are now increasingly being operationalised to enhance military readiness and effectively generate combat power in case of a contingency. The US-Japan alliance, the report finds, should be perceived as a manifestation of some of the broad and enduring changes in the role of alliance politics in international security, which are observable both in the Western Pacific and Europe. While the US-led alliance remains a key pillar of the security and defence policies of the ‘junior’ allies, notably Japan, the report highlights the allies’ uncertainties about the sustainability of the American security commitments, both in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic region. Assessing Japan’s updated conceptualisation of security in the context of the Ukraine war and the rise of hybrid threats, the report detects a sense of urgency in Tokyo to develop a diverse set of capabilities and expand security partnerships. Australia, India, and the Republic of Korea remain a priority in terms of alignment cooperation. At the same time, the changing nature of security challenges is steadily raising the importance of cooperation with geographically distant partners, as seen in Tokyo’s evolving security partnership with the EU and NATO. Japan’s strategic partnership diplomacy exemplifies a broader trend of strategic diversification. Tokyo has been successful in utilising alignment policy to promote an interconnected network and accomplish issue-based, functional cooperation in various areas. From NATO’s perspective, addressing hybrid challenges requires collaboration with various actors, including geographically distant players. Minilateral and multilateral formats involving a small group of like-minded countries can provide NATO with the opportunity to work closely with Japan and other Indo-Pacific partners on specific issues, such as cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Resilience, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, South Korea, and United States of America

173. New Russian Immigration to the EU: The Case of the Baltic States, Finland, Germany & Poland

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The political atmosphere in Russia, as well as the September 2022 mobilisation call for military service, made thousands of Russians leave their home country. Although a vast majority of them have settled in post-Soviet countries, a noticeable portion has also taken up residence in EU countries. A recent couple of years have seen significant expert interest in new Russian immigration, so there is no shortage of publications on the phenomenon. However, many of these analyses suffer from substantial flaws. This report aims to provide a better understanding of new Russian immigration to the EU, as well as this group’s prevailing views on the most sensitive political issues. It concludes that the scale of emigration from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine is often overstated. It seems appropriate to distinguish between two waves of new Russian immigration to the EU. The spring wave was apparently more substantial in number and included a higher proportion of political and civil activists, academics, and IT professionals. In contrast, the autumn wave was less “politicised” as many of those leaving Russia were not necessarily opposed to Putin or his war but were primarily motivated by the fear of conscription and the prospect of being sent to the front line. After moving abroad, interest in Russia-related political activities among new Russian immigrants, even seasoned activists, tends to fade. Few remain engaged in political endeavours, instead focusing more on adapting to new realities. Their interactions with associations of Russian migrants from the previous “post-Crimean wave” are sporadic. When it comes to issues related to the politics of EU countries, new Russian immigrants often have a Russia-centric perspective on most of them. This is especially true regarding visa and travel sanctions against Russia. Immigrants remain almost impervious to the argument that for the governments of countries bordering Russia, the absolute priority is their national security and domestic public order, not the transformation of the Russian political regime at any cost. There were several quite sensitive topics that often provoked mixed feelings and even negative emotions among the respondents. The most challenging and almost taboo subject in Russian immigrant communities was donations to support the Ukrainian army. Along with Russian influencers and opposition politicians, most new Russian immigrants are reluctant to get involved in the Russia-Ukraine war, viewing it as not their concern. They largely attribute Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Russian government and state-owned media, seeing the Russian population merely as “victims of propaganda” and absolving “average Russians” of responsibility for the war. New Russian émigrés preserve regular contacts with relatives and friends in their homeland but tend to avoid discussing politically charged topics, particularly those related to Ukraine. It appears that they have virtually no impact on the perception of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political attitudes of those who stayed in Russia, and this divide between the two groups is likely to endure. Many admitted that by staying abroad, they are losing touch with developments in Russia. Moreover, most new Russian immigrants see no future for themselves or their children in Russia and are unlikely to return there. A few might consider a temporary return if a trusted leader came to power, but generally, they prefer to live in a free, democratic Russia without taking risks or acting as change agents. Hence, when developing a strategy regarding new Russian immigrants, it is essential to primarily consider the EU’s own security considerations rather than the imagined capabilities of these immigrants. It is crucial to avoid letting the wish for significant socio-political change in Russia cloud objective analysis. In the foreseeable future, Russia will continue to pose serious security threats to Europe, while, as of now, there is no serious indication that new Russian immigration could emerge as a politically influential force back home anytime soon.
Topic:
Security, Diaspora, Immigration, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

174. Advise, Assist, Enable: A Critical Analysis of the US Army's Security Force Assistance Mission During the War on Terror

Author:
John A. Nagl and Marshall Cooperman
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The U.S. Army struggled to build capable host-nation security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan because it did not give those security force assistance (SFA) missions the priority and support they deserved. Both the selection and training of U.S. advisors were highly flawed. The Army also struggled to ensure the selection of high-quality personnel into the host-nation forces. Much of the SFA effort was conducted in an ad hoc manner, without sufficient funding or strategic prioritization. Today, the Army has corrected many of the issues that plagued its SFA formations during the War on Terror by creating a permanent Security Force Assistance Command and six Security Force Assistance Brigades. It is essential for the Army to maintain and support these formations to ensure that the bitter lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are not forgotten.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, North America, and United States of America

175. Russia and China in Central Asia

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The two countries that have the greatest influence in Central Asia are Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing have common interests in Central Asia, foremost are security interests connected to sharing long borders with a mainly Muslim region that itself borders Afghanistan. However, both these giant neighbors view Central Asia differently. Russia and China each have their own purposes in Central Asia, some of which do not affect the other, but some that at the least make the other country uncomfortable. Since Russia launched its full-scale war in Ukraine, these Sino-Russian rifts are becoming more pronounced. Russia and China want the current status quo in Central Asia, and that is the reason both countries have been concerned by the three revolutions in Kyrgyzstan since 2005. Moscow and Beijing know the top people in the Central Asian governments and have established security and business ties in all five countries. Neither China nor Russia want their relationships with individual Central Asian states to change, and neither wants to see the arrival of strong outside competitors for influence in Central Asia as was the case when the United States and its allies suddenly increased their presence in Central Asia for the campaign in Afghanistan in the years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

176. The Image and the Perception: Gender-responsive Strategic Communications in EU Civilian CSDP Missions

Author:
Gretchen Baldwin
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) is doubling down on its efforts to strengthen the civilian dimensions of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and increase the effectiveness of its civilian crisis management missions. Two thematic areas that receive stronger attention in the newly updated Civilian CSDP Compact from May 2023 are gender equality and strategic communications. Yet in civilian CSDP missions, overlap between these areas—which come together as ‘gender-responsive strategic communications’—remains limited. There has also only been limited research on the overlap between gender expertise and communications in peace operations and crisis management missions. This SIPRI Policy Brief explores the opportunities and challenges of gender-responsive strategic communications in the context of EU civilian CSDP missions. It provides six recommendations which align with ongoing processes towards improving capability development, gender parity, counter-foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), and training. The recommendations address formal guidance, accountability mechanisms, contextual awareness in missions, men in gender work, women’s participation and gendered FIMI threats.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Women, and Strategic Communication
Political Geography:
Europe

177. Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons in Military Alliances

Author:
Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the role of nuclear weapons in military alliances, focusing on the perspectives of the so-called umbrella states—that is, allied states that do not have their own nuclear weapons but are part of the ‘extended nuclear deterrence arrangements’ of a nuclear-armed patron. After analysing allied security thinking and highlighting the underlying assumptions about nuclear deterrence, the paper subjects some of those assumptions to critical scrutiny. Taking into account regional military balances and escalation risks related to nuclear deterrence, it challenges the perceived security benefits of forward-deployed non-strategic weapons, continued support for allied nuclear doctrines based on readiness for the first use of nuclear weapons, and the assumed inevitability of nuclear second strike that underlies the practices of nuclear assurance. The goal is to open discussion on the development of a more measured approach to deterrence that would allow for minimizing the role of nuclear weapons in military alliances.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

178. The Rise of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the Challenge of Deterrence

Author:
Kenneth R. Weinstein and William Chou
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first introduced the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in July 2016. Over the past eight years, FOIP has redefined the geopolitics of Asia, becoming central to the strategic visions of Japan, the United States, Australia, India, South Korea, key European nations, and the European Union. Every nation that has adopted FOIP has developed its own version of the concept. But FOIP still repositions the strategic geography of Asia, broadening the region from the Asia-Pacific, which placed a dominant China at the center, to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This shift highlights the critical role of the four large democracies that comprise the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—Japan, India, the US, and Australia—a partnership the states revived with the ascent of FOIP. FOIP, moreover, offers a conceptual counter to the strategy of China’s One Belt, One Road (also known as the Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI) by engaging Australia and Europe on the importance of economic development assistance for, and investment in, Southeast Asia. The Trump administration’s rapid adoption of FOIP—the first time an ally’s strategic concept became central to US grand strategy—deepened America and Japan’s strategic alignment, which encouraged Tokyo to become more engaged in security and encouraged the US to become more engaged in economic development. The concept has made immense contributions to Indo-Pacific connectivity, prosperity, peace, and security. It has also been central to the Biden administration’s efforts to move away from the traditional hub-and-spoke alliance in which US partners worked directly with Washington as the hub but not with not each other, toward a lattice architecture in which like-minded allies (such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines) are linked to each other in a mutually reinforcing effort to meet the region’s security challenges. However, a Hudson Institute tabletop exercise conducted for this study showed the limitations of FOIP as a strategic doctrine. Specifically, it cannot induce either friendly or less-friendly ASEAN countries to openly aid Taiwan if the People’s Republic of China seeks either to invade or impose a blockade. FOIP, nonetheless, remains central to promoting prosperity and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan refashioned FOIP and focused on promoting agreement around minimal international norms that Russia violated. To enhance regional trust, Kishida highlighted an “Indo-Pacific way,” which would enhance regional resilience by mitigating natural disasters through cooperation under Japanese leadership and enhancing maritime security. Herein lies the security paradox behind FOIP: The concept can extend the network of partners and allies dedicated to Indo-Pacific security. This, in turn, may reduce the burden America bears by shifting it to other nations. But for the time being, FOIP rests upon the foundation of US deterrence.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

179. The Yemen Annual Review 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Peace talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) dominated Yemeni politics over the last year. The negotiations began as backchannel discussions in October 2022 after the Houthis resisted UN pressure to renew a truce first agreed in April 2022 by making a series of eleventh-hour demands. The talks continued despite Houthi attacks on oil terminals in southern Yemen in late 2022 that effectively put the internationally recognized government under a form of economic blockade. As the months progressed, the government’s increasingly dire economic situation pressured it to accept the Saudi policy of seeking a settlement with Houthi authorities, seemingly at almost any price. The broad terms of a Saudi-Houthi agreement first became public in January, when international media reported that Saudi Arabia had agreed in principle to pay outstanding civil servant salaries in Houthi-run areas, including those of military and security personnel, and to remove restrictions on entry points, including the ports of Hudaydah and Sana’a airport. In return, Saudi Arabia wanted guarantees that there would be no more attacks on its territory and the creation of a buffer zone along the border, an end to the Houthi blockade of southern ports and the siege of Taiz, and for direct Yemeni-Yemeni talks to follow any deal. Within a few months, these proposals had morphed into a comprehensive roadmap for peace involving a six-month ceasefire, to be followed by three months of government-Houthi discussions on managing a transitional phase of two years, during which a final resolution of the conflict would be negotiated. A prisoner swap in April arranged by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Switzerland saw around 973 people released, including high-profile figures, and seemed to augur rapid progress. But Saudi Arabia appeared to overplay its hand when Ambassador to Yemen Mohammed al-Jaber led a delegation on a much-feted trip to Sana’a in April. The Houthis again raised their demands, arguing that an agreement must be signed first with Riyadh alone as a party to the conflict, and that Saudi Arabia should agree to pay compensation for war damage and finance postwar reconstruction. Al-Jaber left Sana’a without an agreement, but the basic terms of a formal de-escalation and path toward a resolution of the conflict were nevertheless laid down. Saudi Arabia’s problem now was how to manage resistance from the government’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). Ultimately, it was kept in the dark about the details of the proposed arrangement for most of the year, even its chairman Rashad al-Alimi, who was expected to sign off at the end of the process. A Houthi delegation met Saudi officials during a hajj pilgrimage trip in June – posing for photos with Defense Minister Khaled bin Salman – sending the signal that a formal agreement normalizing Saudi-Houthi ties and initiating a Yemeni-Yemeni peace process had become a question not of if, but when. A complication that emerged early on was US reservations about a peace deal following the Saudi-Iran rapprochement brokered by China in March. This seemed to mark China’s arrival as a diplomatic player in the region, putting the Americans on notice that another global superpower was interested in challenging its role in the Middle East, including, perhaps, in Yemen. There was an irony here, in that rising criticism of Saudi Arabia’s conduct during the war in the US Congress, and threats to halt arms sales, played a role in bringing the Saudi leadership around the idea of getting out of Yemen and ending a foreign military adventure that had damaged its global standing.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Investment, Houthis, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia

180. The Yemen Review Quarterly: January-March 2024

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Yemen’s political and economic situation worsened in the first months of the year as the impacts of the Red Sea crisis, which began in November, began to manifest themselves. Peace talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) were effectively placed on hold, and the United States broadened its response to the Houthi attacks, launching strikes alongside the UK against Houthi targets inside Yemen and designating the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group (SDGT), which came into effect on February 16. The designation could impact not only Houthi military and economic activities but also risks a further stranglehold on international humanitarian work in Houthi-run territories, as banks and exchange firms stop dealing with Sana’a-based entities. In late March, Houthi authorities issued a 100-rial coin to replace dilapidated notes, escalating the economic warfare between the two rival central banks. Denouncing the move as illegal, the Aden central bank branch prohibited the coins’ circulation, but the real fear is that this is a trial balloon for a series of currency roll-outs that will end with Sana’a printing its own banknotes, possibly with foreign help, as rebel authorities did in Libya in 2019. Prime Minister Maeen Abdelmalek Saeed finally stepped down, succeeded by Foreign Minister Ahmed Awadh bin Mubarak on February 5. Yemen’s ambassador in Riyadh, Shaya al-Zindani, was belatedly appointed to the vacant foreign minister post on March 26. Neither man is popular with the PLC. Combined with the government’s strained finances, this could hamper their effectiveness. Houthi attacks on foreign shipping and US-UK attacks continued more or less unabated, causing in one case the sinking of a ship carrying fertilizer and diesel fuel. US-UK airstrikes have killed at least 37 on the Houthi side, and reportedly some Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers. After talks with Omani officials in Muscat in early April, the US Yemen envoy appeared to hold out hope of a resolution, suggesting the sanctions would be lifted if the attacks stopped – as tensions rose again between Iran and Israel, with possible implications for Yemen. Tensions also rose on frontlines inside Yemen as Houthi and government-aligned forces reinforced their military presence in several areas, including Hudaydah and Marib. The US-UK strikes also heightened the repressive atmosphere in Sana’a and elsewhere, as Houthi authorities cracked down in areas near mobile launch sites and introduced a new law against support for Israel that is already being used as another cudgel to crush dissent. Al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch announced the loss of its leader Khaled Batarfi in March, who died after several months of illness. He was replaced by Saad al-Awlaqi, a senior Yemeni figure with strong tribal ties in Shabwa who is popular among younger members of the group but whose ties with Iran-based Saif al-Adel, the de facto leader of the global organization, appear to be tense. Al-Qaeda also lost Saif al-Adel’s son, known as Ibn al-Madani, reportedly as a result of a fire in the place where he was staying in Marib, and the group’s lead drone expert Khaled al-Sana’ani also died in an apparent traffic incident – incidents that have raised speculation of possible internal skulduggery as Al-Awlaqi settles into his new role.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Politics, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia