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11. Digital Platforms in Southeast Asia: Governance and Innovation

Author:
Faizal Bin Yahya
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as part of Southeast Asia has its digital economy and digital society objectives detailed in the ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025 (ADM 2025) and has over the years built a regulatory framework. For example, in 2016, at the Asian Telecommunications and Information Technology Ministers Meeting, the Framework on Personal Data Protection was adopted to “strengthen the protection of personal data in ASEAN.” ASEAN has also changed how it deals with Internet governance, choosing to address it as a digital and digitization issue rather than just a matter involving info-communication technologies. To enable this, ASEAN expanded the scope of its ASEAN Telecommunications and Information Technology Ministers Meeting (TELMIN) to become the ASEAN Digital Ministers Meeting (ADGMIN) in October 2019. In 2021, as the digital economy continued to expand in the region, the ADGMIN adopted the ASEAN Data Management Framework to establish common frameworks and appropriate data protection measures. Going forward it has also considered developing regional guidelines beyond the scope of Internet governance, such as those for artificial intelligence (AI) governance and ethics. This briefing examines how ASEAN member states, despite their diversity and different levels of digital transformation, are working towards implementing policy measures to regulate digital platforms on a national and regional basis for social and economic stability. However, while improving governance for cybersecurity cooperation and content regulation, these policies should also enable progress on innovation and freedom of expression.
Topic:
Governance, Social Media, Freedom of Expression, Innovation, ASEAN, Disinformation, and Digital Platforms
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia

12. The Current Status of Japan’s Countering Digital Influence Operations

Author:
Kazuki Ichida
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Digital influence operations have the capacity to shape and undermine public perceptions and opinions in targeted countries. The United States National Intelligence Council found that China, Russia, and Iran prioritize digital influence operations over cyber attacks, underscoring their perceived efficacy (National Intelligence Council 2023). Digital influence operations are variously referred to as cognitive warfare and information warfare. For the purposes of this briefing, the term “digital influence operations” will be used. This briefing describes the current status of countermeasures employed by major actors in Japan. In Japan, entities such as the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the National Police Agency, and the National Center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC), have been developing their budgets and organizations. However, efforts by the private sector, including fact-checking organizations, think tanks, and academics, still face limitations in terms of human resources and scale and are far from sufficient. In recent years, there have been signs of expansion due to increased support from the Japanese government. Three challenges impede Japan’s efforts to counter digital influence operations. First, there is a severe shortage of knowledge and human resources. Second, the measures are primarily focused on countering disinformation, improving literacy, and enhancing strategic communication. Lastly, the attacks leveraging domestic polarization in the target country have not been addressed. This issue is not unique to Japan but also prevalent in Europe and the United States.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Cybersecurity, Disinformation, and Preventive Measures
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

13. Happy Election Year!

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Billions of voters in 77 countries will go to the polls in 2024. Some of these elections will transform key nations’ foreign policies and might durably shape international relations. In many countries, though, elections are just a folding screen for authoritarian regimes. Even in advanced democracies, citizens’ disillusionment seems to give illiberalism a lifeline. The risk is also high that polls across the globe this year will be a ‘prime target’ for disinformation, ‘fake news’, conspiracy theory and cyber attacks.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Elections, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

14. How Multimodal AI Could Retool Global Crisis Response

Author:
Ben Ellencweig, Jessica Lamb, Jon Spaner, and Mihir Mysore
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Imagine this future scenario: as a hurricane develops, both its intensity and the timing of landfall are recalculated every hour on desktop-grade computers. The nature of the impact, including noncorrelated crises that may occur and second-order effects of the hurricane, are modeled through multiple scenarios on city-scale digital twins that have property-level granularity. The output of these simulations results in a clear set of trigger-based action plans that are tailored, verified through human-in-the-loop mechanisms, and sent to emergency responders, community leaders, government agencies, and potentially even residents in affected areas. Community leaders have access to tools that allow them to understand what to expect, what resources to leverage, and what actions may make the most difference. Homeowners receive targeted suggestions of how to protect their assets, avoid falling victim to fraud, and navigate post-disaster support. Disinformation campaigns get countered by fact-based automated outreach.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Crisis Management, Artificial Intelligence, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

15. The Chain of Harm: Designing Evidence-based, Locally Led Information Integrity Programming

Author:
Lisa Reppell and Brittany Hamzy
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
Abstract:
The Chain of Harm is a framework that breaks down the challenges of disinformation, misinformation, and dangerous speech (DMDS) into five interrelated stages (actor, message, mode of dissemination, interpreter, and risk). Each stage describes a discrete intervention point to disrupt the ultimate manifestation of harm. This five-stage approach supports the design of multi-layered programming that more effectively promotes healthy information environments around moments of critical social and civic importance, with particular emphasis on designing programming that is responsive to the different experiences of diverse populations.
Topic:
Elections, Cybersecurity, Disinformation, and Misinformation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16. Overview of the Russia-Ukraine War: Strategies and Expectations of the Conflict Parties

Author:
Mamuka Zhvania
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Non-objective and confusing viewpoints on the ongoing war in Ukraine often reverberate within the information sphere, and consequently in society, contributing to the dissemination of disinformation. Common suggestions include the notion that the West is weary of supporting Ukraine, Russia’s defeat is not advantageous for them, and that the West is endeavouring to compel Ukraine towards negotiations. The given article aims to elucidate the ongoing developments in the war and present a persuasive response to pertinent questions regarding the dynamics of hostilities and the strategies employed by the parties involved. The following is an analysis of the current stage of the Russia-Ukraine war, including its potential duration, the resources available to each party for conducting warfare, reasons for the delayed assistance from the West, and projections for the future.
Topic:
Disinformation, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

17. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Russia’s Attempts to Undermine Mobilisation

Author:
Maryna Vorotyntseva
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia conducts information and psychological operations to undermine and discredit Ukraine’s mobilisation, damage the morale of Ukrainian citizens, and weaken their willingness to defend their state. In support of these efforts, the Russian military and special services distribute both real and fake photographs and video content on social networks. In addition, the Russian special services use current and former male citizens of Ukraine who have voluntarily switched sides to produce malign content. The recent discussions about and promulgation of new laws related to Ukraine’s mobilisation have offered Russia further opportunities to spread disinformation.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Disinformation, Mobilization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

18. Aligned in the sand: How Europeans can help stabilise the Sahel

Author:
Will Brown
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
A decade of military, humanitarian, and developmental European interventions in the Sahelian states of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have failed comprehensively. Coups have swept the region. Burkina Faso is close to complete collapse. Europe thus faces three openly antagonistic military juntas on its southern flank, which are cutting deals with rival outside powers like Russia. The combination of past failure, disinformation campaigns, and the wars in Gaza and Ukraine have scattered European states’ approaches in all directions. Some have walked away from the Sahel completely. Others have stayed but resisted cooperation with the Sahelian juntas. A few have sought to remain engaged. European governments should stay involved in the Sahel wherever possible. The region is part of Europe’s neighbourhood; rival outside powers have no qualms about mass human-rights abuses; and further disengagement will only open up new inroads for malign actors. For European governments, this means frankly acknowledging past failures in the Sahel, gathering behind a new strategy for engagement, and supporting Gulf of Guinea states. A particular focus should be funding anti-disinformation policies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political stability, Military Intervention, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Europe, North Africa, and Sahel

19. Czech-Russian Relations. Russian Disinformation Campaign

Author:
Andrzej Jacuch
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
After the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, the Czech Republic became fully aware of the threats posed by the Kremlin despite President Zeman has denied the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine and has criticised the EU sanctions against Russia. Czechia belongs to the group of countries through which Russia influences the EU, to gradually and deliberately erode its structures. Russia exerts a strong influence on the Czech Republic by non-military means, including disinformation and propaganda, the activities of secret services, and penetration of its economy and specifically its energy sector. The article aims to answer the question about the role of Russian disinformation and propaganda in the context of Russian influence in the Czech Republic. The role of Russian disinformation and propaganda and how Russia influences Czechia is extensively analysed. The main hypothesis is that Russia treats the Czech Republic as a key state for espionage and disinformation activities and as a zone of influence, undermining the sovereignty of the Czech Republic and the role of NATO and the EU.
Topic:
International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Resilience, Disinformation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Czech Republic

20. Disinformation in the City: Response Playbook

Author:
Jessica (Ika) Trijsburg and Paul Costello
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As actors responsible for decisions and policies that shape people’s daily lives, and as those most aware of community fault lines that are fertile ground for disinformation, city officials are well positioned to respond. Yet, research, analysis, and policymaking related to disinformation have remained at the national and international levels. GMF, the Melbourne Centre for Cities, and other partners have developed a response playbook to help inform and guide city policies and practices to counter disinformation and ultimately to strengthen democracy. In cities, disinformation sometimes manifests itself in physical events, including protests and disruptions. It also has individual impacts for political, institutional, and community leaders and staff. Disinformation affects the functioning of city administrations and elected bodies, impacting governance and policymaking. It also impacts communities, reducing mutual trust and increasing division and polarization. Disinformation commonly exploits existing social fault lines and polarization. In cities, the fault lines targeted by disinformation center around First Nations, migrants, cultural diversity, gender and sexual diversity, health and wellbeing, sustainability and climate issues, and urban planning. Understanding how disinformation spreads, and how to respond effectively, is critical for city governments. Current knowledge, however, is focused mainly on the national and international realms and not readily accessible and translatable for urban governance needs. This is why GMF Cities, in response to needs expressed by many city governments, developed this playbook in collaboration with a core interdisciplinary research team from the Australian National University, Monash University, Deakin University, and Victoria University, led by the Melbourne Centre for Cities at the University of Melbourne. The playbook was developed with representatives from cities, media, the tech sector, civil society, and academia. The process began with an in-depth survey to understand the current experiences of participating cities and responses to disinformation they employed. The findings informed a series of workshops with 40 participants who together created the content of and recommendations in the playbook. The full draft was reviewed by the participants before it was submitted to other cities, city networks, disinformation experts, and other levels of government for pressure testing.
Topic:
Democracy, Cities, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Global Focus