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111. Corruption at the level of local and central government in view of the country’s resilience system

Author:
Maciej Pietrusiński
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
Corruption regardless of its form and the stage at which it occurs has a pathological character. It has a destructive impact on the functioning mechanisms of public at state level, at local level and private institutions, as well as causing dysfunctions in economic systems. In addition, corruption causes security threats on a national, regional and global scale. There is no country in the world that has managed to fully solve the problem of corruption. The mechanisms and guidelines being put in place for offices and organisations countering this issue only limit the scale and narrow the area of impact. Even institutions concerned with ensuring security inside the state and protecting its interests beyond its borders are not free from this practice. This article will describe the impact of bribery on the functioning of key areas affecting the entire state and international security system.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Corruption, Resilience, Military, Local Government, and Public Administration
Political Geography:
Poland and Global Focus

112. Maverick or Front-runner? Army Modernization in Hungary in the Light of the Other Visegrad Countries

Author:
Sandor Gallai and Daniel Gyuriss
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
This article compares Hungary's defence modernisation policy with that of the other Visegrad countries and finds that Poland has invested the most in developing its military capabilities and, together with the Czech Republic, has benefited considerably from rising international demand stimulated by the war. Both combined the purchase of modern equipment with the award of government contracts to local suppliers. Slovakia followed the same pattern, but without significant export capacity. Hungary, on the other hand, was unable to prevent the collapse of its former defence industry. As a result, its current development programme uniquely integrates the goals of army modernisation with the plan for rebuilding the sector, which relies heavily on the participation of large European companies, whose role is less important in the other countries. Two other distinctive features of the Hungarian modernisation policy are its embeddedness in broader economic and regional policies, and the creation of six distinct territorial clusters where the reorganisation of the sector is taking place.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Modernization, Visegrad Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Hungary, and Czech Republic

113. NATO and the European Union: Bridging the gap

Author:
Andrew Duff
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
In this Discussion Paper, Andrew Duff examines how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed structural flaws in how the West organises its European defence and how the European Union and NATO have struggled to coordinate, risking duplication and competition. Despite largely overlapping membership, neither organisation has been able to realise conventional solid defence forces. Europe’s armaments industries remain largely fragmented. Ukraine’s application to join the EU and NATO upturns the status quo. The author analyses how the Union's political and financial heft can best be combined with the Atlantic Alliance's military strength and recommends forging a permanent organic link between the two at the executive level. However, a joint command will enhance the EU’s development in security and defence, revitalise NATO, and ensure that the US and UK remain engaged in Europe.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Europe

114. Lessons from battlefield Ukraine: With Ukraine’s former defense minister Oleksii Reznikov

Author:
Oleksii Reznikov, Mariana Budjeryn, Carol Saivetz, and Elizabeth Wood
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Lessons from battlefield Ukraine: A conversation with Ukraine’s former defense minister Oleksii Reznikov: Thursday, October 17th, 2024. Speaker: Oleksii Reznikov, Ukraine’s former defense minister, led Ukraine’s defense establishment in the lead up to Russia’s full-scale invasion and during the first year and a half of the war. Mr. Reznikov will discuss the successes and challenges of Ukraine’s defense effort, the role of technology and uncrewed systems, and the evolution of the battlefield in the Russo-Ukrainian war. Discussant: Mariana Budjeryn, PhD, is a senior research associate with the Project on Managing the Atom (MTA) at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. She is the author of "Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine." Co-Chairs: Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program. She is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues. Elizabeth Wood is the Ford International Professor of History at MIT. She is the author most recently of "Roots of Russia's War in Ukraine," as well as articles on Vladimir Putin, right-wing populism in Russia and Turkey, and more.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

115. Cooperation on Semiconductor Supply Chains and Technology

Author:
Soyoung Kwon
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The security alliance between the United States and South Korea, once focused primarily on military defense, is evolving to include economic security and technological cooperation. The evolving partnership between the two countries, particularly in the areas of semiconductor supply chains and advanced technologies, features the deepening and broadening of the alliance in the form of a Global Comprehensive Strategic Alliance. This change is driven by intensifying competition between the United States and China, which has led to the securitization of key technologies like semiconductors. This paper examines the opportunities and challenges in deepening and broadening US-South Korea cooperation on semiconductor supply chains. While such developments support the shared objectives of advancing technological innovation, bolstering supply chain resilience, and addressing potential threats from China, challenges remain in diverging threat perceptions and concerns about collective deterrence. The study concludes that aligning strategic objectives in economic security and technological cooperation is essential to ensure the sustainability of the alliance and its ability to navigate the complex global techno-geopolitical landscape.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

116. Adapting US strategy to account for China’s transformation into a peer nuclear power

Author:
David Shullman, John K. Culver, Kitsch Liao, and Samantha Wong
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
China’s rapidly improving nuclear capabilities and expanding nuclear arsenal underpin its recent rise as a nuclear peer power. For the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region, the uncertainty of China’s intentions behind this nuclear expansion poses a major challenge. It necessitates a revisit of the fundamental assumptions underpinning US and allied planning and preparation for a potential conflict with China. The 2022 White House National Security Strategy1 and National Defense Strategy2 identified China as the only competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological wherewithal to reshape the international order. The 2022 United States Nuclear Posture Review noted how China has embarked on an ambitious expansion, modernization, and diversification of its nuclear forces and established a nascent nuclear triad.3 The report further assessed that Beijing will likely possess at least 1,000 deliverable warheads by the end of the decade.4 China also sustains extensive and ambitious space operations. According to the Department of Defense’s 2022 China Military Power Report5, as of 2021, China’s 260 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites were the largest collection of such constellations globally other than the United States’. The transformation of China’s military capabilities no longer represents the linear, stepwise modernization of an outmoded military that characterized the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for the past two decades. Since the PLA launched its major internal command and service restructuring in 2015, previous doctrinal and teaching publications acquired and exploited by Western analysts are out of date and likely declining in relevance. By extension, much of the Western analysis of PLA plans, operations, and concepts of deterrence and escalation control are also likely to be out of date. China’s rapid expansion of strategic warfighting capabilities (i.e., nuclear forces, space/counterspace systems, and cyber/information operations) represents tremendous discontinuity in the pace, scope, and scale of the PLA’s transformation, necessitating a major US reassessment of Chinese strategy, doctrine, and warfighting operations. The commonly accepted notion that deliberate Chinese nuclear force modernization is characterized as “running faster to stay in the same place” to sustain a minimal retaliatory posture is assessed to have evolved. China now has a higher likelihood of using its newfound nuclear power to more actively deter or compel6 its opponents and safeguard its core interests. This includes perceived external threats that could negatively impact domestic political interests. As a step in this reassessment, this project reevaluated China’s strategy, doctrine, and warfighting concepts in light of its ongoing rapid transformation into a peer nuclear power, examined implications of this assessment for future US contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region, and produced several actionable findings and recommendations for US government decision-makers that can be addressed in the next five- to ten-year horizon.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

117. Securing Europe’s Future: Strengthening ICT Competitiveness for Economic and National Security

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Europe’s Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector, including ICT manufacturing such as telecom equipment and electronic components, as well as ICT services such as software, telecommunication services, and data processing, is no longer merely an economic pillar but a strategic asset essential for national security and defence capabilities. This paper identifies two concerns linking technology and national security: the exploitation of ICT as a gateway to critical infrastructure and the weaponisation of trade and technological dependencies in ICT by foreign nations. Addressing these two challenges requires tailored approaches, as they involve distinct nations and contexts. First, the EU should reduce its reliance on Chinese telecom equipment within its networks and accelerate the deployment of 5G. While phasing out Chinese telecom equipment will take years, a faster rollout of 5G can be achieved in the short term. To accomplish this, the EU should promote the scale and profitability of its telecom operators. Secondly, the EU relies heavily on US companies for a substantial share of its cloud-based online services. However, it is unlikely that the US would impose restrictions on these exports to the EU. Furthermore, replicating the infrastructure needed to deliver cloud-based online services would entail significant costs. To achieve technological leadership, the EU must prioritise emerging technologies such as 6G, XG, AI, quantum computing, and edge and hybrid computing, which will form the foundation of future commercial and military innovations. Thirdly, the EU should strengthen its leadership position in the development of technologies for advanced mobile communication, including 5G, 6G, and XG. Through significant effort and investment in R&D, European companies have secured a leading role in developing technical standards for cellular communication and telecom equipment. Large European firms such as Ericsson and Nokia, as well as EU SMEs that are champions in their fields, are among the most significant contributors to the technological standards. This hard-won position is one that EU policymakers must do their utmost to protect and develop. However, complacency is a recipe for disaster. The EU has the potential to foster companies that could lead in the technologies of tomorrow. It possesses the necessary fundamentals to drive technological innovation in the ICT sector, including high levels of human capital, firms operating at the technological frontier, and a market economy underpinned by strong institutions, the rule of law, and robust intellectual property protections. These constitute Europe’s comparative advantages, and the EU must adopt policies that recognise and reinforce them, rather than undermine them.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, European Union, Digital Economy, Trade, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

118. How to do strategic foresight

Author:
Samantha Cristoforetti and Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
F oresight” is on the rise. What was a discipline restricted to a few people decades ago has become very popular. That’s good news – a wider use of foresight can have a number of benefits, as this guide explains. However, along with that popularity, the expectations about the scope of foresight have also grown. We can even find an aura of mystery surrounding the discipline. This is less helpful, as there is a risk of creating misperceptions about the nature of foresight. That is why it is necessary to limit the scope of foresight from the outset by clearly stating what it is and is not. Foresight is not about predicting or knowing the future. Despite the fantastic cover of this work, the aim of foresight is not envisioning what the future holds for us, i.e. predicting what is going to happen. Instead, foresight aims to make us more aware of what may happen, through a broad study of phenomena that are already present, so as to inform potential decisions. It may seem paradoxical, but a thorough analysis of the present reality is the basis of good foresight. Foresight is not a body of expert knowledge. It is not the realm of “experts” who pretend to hold special insights on the future. Rather, foresight is a methodical approach to thinking about possible futures that, at the same time, allows us to reveal and refine the assumptions and understandings we have about those futures. That does not mean that expertise does not matter. To the contrary, good foresight must integrate thematic, regional, scientific, military, political, economic, environmental, and other expertise to provide valuable insights. Foresight is not an end in itself. Instead, foresight is the first step to building better strategies and policies and improve the decision-making process in general. In this regard, foresight helps us to understand how potential, plausible futures could look like. Foresight helps us challenge our understandings and assumptions about the future, preventing bias that could hinder our plans and policies. Furthermore, foresight can help us shape our idea of a preferred future and set the basis of our effort to achieve it. Strategic foresight goes beyond pure foresight practices and is about integrating foresight into the policy-making process. This is a statement closely related to the previous idea and justifies the title of this guide. Chapter 4, “Setting the Policy,” is precisely dedicated to linking foresight to the policy/strategy-making process. As highlighted there, developing strategies and plans can be enhanced and supported by considering multiple alternative futures and their implications. This guide will use both terms, strategic foresight and foresight, the latter more specifically referring to the discipline of exploring, anticipating, and shaping the future in a systemic way.1 This guide aims to provide a simple tool for policy practitioners to start navigating the foresight discipline and help foster foresight thinking in policy teams and organizations. It does not intend to present a set of last-generation methodologies. Instead, this guide offers some simple tools and techniques of proven effectiveness that can be used by non-expert personnel. Nevertheless, simplicity is not equivalent to a lack of rigour, so the guide proposes a complete foresight process, starting with driver identification and scenario-building and ending with preparing and monitoring subsequent policies.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Foresight
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

119. Financing European air defence through European Union debt

Author:
Armin Steinbach and Guntram B. Wolff
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Europe is vulnerable to air attacks by both state and non-state actors. Russia has substantially increased its production of hypersonic missiles, missiles and drones, while European air defence capacities remain patchy with little improvement in coverage in recent years. Air defence is a classic European public good. No individual nation alone can provide it comprehensively, while air defence provided individual European Union countries can offer significant benefits to Europe as a whole. Joint EU funding for the build-up of greater air defence capabilities would be thus justified and help ensure rapid and sufficient provisioning. Debt funding would be economically justified as air defence systems, such as Patriot and IRIS-T, involve large upfront costs – debt would allow the cost of the investment to be smoothed over longer periods. Issuing EU debt, similarly to what was done with the NextGenerationEU post-pandemic recovery instrument, would be justified given the level of the air-attack threat. EU debt funding of air defence system is legally possible. Debt funding for air defence would respect the EU’s limited competence in defence and such a scheme would maintain the exceptional character of debt funding, with EU countries responding to a security threat in an act of solidarity. Joint debt issuance would not imply changing the command structure of air defence as foreseen under NATO and the European Sky Shield Initiative, but it would impact procurement processes. Procurement could be organised in the framework of the EU’s existing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) system. Additional EU debt would benefit the development of European industrial capacities in air defence, even if in the short term some funds were used to buy systems from the United States. Significant funds for research and the development of the domestic industrial base should be part of the initiative.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Debt, European Union, Finance, Macroeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

120. Is There Life After NATO?

Author:
Marc Trachtenberg
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
It is often claimed that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 requires the United States to defend “every inch” of NATO territory. The historical evidence, however, shows that this is not the case at all. It is also commonly claimed that until Donald Trump came along, no American president would have dreamed of threatening not to defend the European allies. This too, it turns out, is not supported by the evidence. But it is not just a question of getting the history right. Those historical claims are important because they support the more fundamental claim that the NATO system is so obviously in America’s interest that it needs to be treated as sacrosanct. But has it been such a phenomenal success?
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America